HISTORY AND MEMORY IN ANCIENT GREECE

Gordon S. Shrimpton

With an Appendix on Herodotus' Source Citations by G. S. Shrimpton and K. M. Gillis

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For Kathryn

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Preface and Acknowledgments

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Abbreviations

Ad Pomp.	*To Pompeius,* a letter on style written by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
AHR	*American Historial Review*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
APA	American Philological Association
AR or Apoll. Rhod.	Apollonius of Rhodes
ATL	*Athenian Tribute Lists,* by B. D. Merritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor
BG	*Bellum Gallicum*; Caesar's *Gallic War*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*
Cim.	Plutarch's "life" of Cimon
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CW	*Classical World*
Dem.	an essay on Demosthenes and his style by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
DH	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
DL	Diogenes Laertius
DM	*De Memoria,* Aristotle's treatise on memory
DS	Diodorus of Sicily
EMC/CV	*Echos du monde classique/Classical Views*
Euseb.	Eusebius

F, FF	"fragment," "fragments," usually as collected by F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* (q.v.)
F. Gr. Hist.	*Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, by F. Jacoby
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
Harp.	Harpocration
HCT	*A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, by A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover
Hdt.	Herodotus
HG	*Historica Graeca*, by Xenophon; *A History of My Times* (Penguin)
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*, various editors
JHI	*Journal of the History of Ideas*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
LCL	The Loeb Classical Library
Luc.	Lucian
Marc.	Marcellinus
Mor.	*Moralia*, by Plutarch
Myst.	*On the Mysteries*, by Lucian
Nic.	Plutarch's "life" of Nicias
Paus.	Pausanias
PE	*Praeparatio Evangelica*
Plut.	Plutarch
Polyb.	Polybius
Porph.	Porphyry
PRIA	*Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*
RE	*Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
schol.	scholion (pl. scholia), an ancient or Byzantine annotation
T, TT	testimonium, testimonia (pl.); "testimonies," usually as collected by F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* (q.v.)
TAPA	*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*
Them.	Plutarch's "life" of Themistocles
Thuc.	Thucydides
Thuc.	essay on Thucydides by Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Vit.	*Vita*, a "life" or biographical compilation
X.	Xenophon
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

HISTORY AND MEMORY IN ANCIENT GREECE

Introduction

On doit des égards aux vivants; on ne doit aux morts que la verité.
(To the living we owe civility; truth is all that we owe to the dead.)
Voltaire

As Voltaire's dictum implies, to be civil we accustom ourselves to deceit. Death should relieve the living of the prevarications of civility, at least towards the deceased, but it brings new and different reasons for lying. Henry Fielding once pointed out that the surest way for an embattled husband to secure a full and complete reconciliation with his wife was to die and leave her in control of his fortune. Then, to judge from the eulogies at the wake and the glowing sentiments on the grave monument, the monster is transformed into a saint.

History is a study of power in human systems: how it is managed, seized, lost, used, and occasionally even shared. Today, historians investigate living subjects as well as dead ones, but nothing can be studied until it has become part of the past. Remorseless time claims us all, and neither history's heroes nor its villains escape; it also condemns contemporary systems eventually to become relics of a distant past. With the passage of time, some way of paying the dead the truth that is their due ought to be possible. Is there a magic moment, a window of opportunity, in which a historian would have the best chance of producing the perfect history? Arguably, this moment should be so distanced by time from its subject that the lies of civility cease to inhibit, because the subject has little or no bearing on the present. At the same time, the subject should be recent enough for ample documentation to survive and present no difficulty of interpretation—contextualization, to use a more contemporary expression. In theory, one would suppose, such a moment should exist, but I am unable to say whether anyone has ever found it.

Norman Davies recently observed that the critical moment has yet to come (if it has not already been lost forever) with reference to the

Second World War.[1] He lists and illustrates "nine categories of selectivity" that produce distortions in our understanding of the war. Of particular relevance to my own argument are those of propaganda and regional perspective, which Davies exemplifies dramatically. Some things do not change, for history was born out of rivalries of regional propaganda in ancient Greece. In other words, it came about in circumstances under which everyone claimed to possess the truth, but dispassionate honesty was a very scarce commodity. To return to Davies's dilemma, it is likely that the definitive history of the whole war will never be written. However, the fact that we can debate specific problems concerning it, in spite of his pessimism, proves the existence of a broad consensus on the general subject. As Steven Shapin points out, disputes are resolved in the margins of consensus.[2] Accordingly, in this book I shall speak of history emerging from ancient Greek regional disputation, while at the same time describing the task of the ancient generalist historian as one of capturing the consensus about the past shared by all.

Because history as it is generally practised is a study of power, it has little time for the weak and disenfranchised unless, like Marx's working class, they are the victims of power. "History is written by the victors," is the way that Norman Davies articulates an old commonplace—commonplace strangely forgotten by classicists and ancient historians, who believe that Thucydides of Athens (c.460–c.397? BC) could and would have finished his *Peloponnesian War* but for an untimely death. His project was to write about the war from the point of view of the side that eventually lost, an impossible undertaking to complete. The notion that he would have pressed on with his history despite that impossibility as long as he had breath is simply a romanticization.

Losers and winners can trade places. Davies does not consider what happens when the silenced mouths of history suddenly gain a voice. The result can be an impassioned, sometimes vitriolic, historiography. If only we had the complete works of Theopompus (c.379–c.320 BC), we would possess a clearer illustration of this phenomenon. Despite the loss of most of his writings, Theopompus' spleen radiates from the surviving fragments. His native Chios, always claimed by Persia, had been incorporated into the Athenian empire, into the Spartan empire, and then into an attempted revival of the Athenian empire. During his

1. Davis, "The Misunderstood Victory in Europe."

2. Shapin, *A Social History of Truth*, 19. For the importance and nature of consensus in all systems of knowledge, see 3–41.

mature lifetime, it gained a measure of independence. In that time Theopompus turned on the old mainland powers of Greece with a vengeance, never missing an opportunity to accuse their political leaders of venality. In the tenth book of his *Philippica*, he included an extended diatribe against the Athenian imperialist leaders, blaming them for political corruption and personal greed. As the Athenians were losing political dominance, they also lost control over their history. The heroes who had fashioned their power were in danger of being vilified by the very states that they had helped to subjugate. As things turned out, the Athenians had the last word. Athens became one of the major "university towns" of the Roman world, and the Romans had no trouble embracing imperialist heroes. They still found Theopompus useful for stylistic purposes and for examples of how to sketch—or assassinate—a character, but his material was largely dismissed as the product of an extremely malicious mind. His exposure of the venality of imperialism would scarcely have been to their taste. So the reputations of the Athenians' heroes were saved by their Roman conquerors.

The Romans chose to live with Theopompus' "malice" because they still had a use for him. More recently, Thomas Hobbes's assault on the experimental science of Robert Boyle (*Dialogus Physicus*, 1661) suffered a near-complete *damnatio memoriae* until 1985.[3] Boyle's victory over Hobbes won the intellectual and epistemological high ground for experimental science that it has occupied until this century. The experimentalists' project promised to unpack the secrets of nature one by one, to reduce all natural processes to individual sequences that could be replicated in the laboratory. Given sufficient time and after enough experimentation, the function of every cog, screw, and bearing in nature's gigantic machine would be fully understood. Experimental science is still vitally important, but its major discoveries in the twentieth century have been its own limitations. As it probes the microcosm, it encounters wave functions, probability, and the uncertainty principle. As it investigates the macrocosm, its yardsticks of time and space cease to be constants according to relativity theory: time slows down for an object as its velocity increases. And now, according to chaos theory, most of nature, while not lacking form, is so chaotic that its processes do not repeat themselves with a reliability sufficient to make standard methods of prediction and experimentation of any significance. Once again, to

3. Shapin and Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump*, 6–15. The *Dialogus Physicus* is translated on 345–91.

express doubts about the great experimentalist project is respectable. The rehabilitation of Hobbes's *Dialogus Physicus* is a landmark event.

Introductions are written to help readers prepare for the argument that is to come. Perhaps it will be useful if I mention one major theme that runs through this book and three recurring and interconnected metaphors. The theme is the interplay of similarity and difference: How similar is ancient historiography to its modern counterpart, and to what extent do apparent similarities conceal fundamental differences? The three metaphors are the place or platform from which the past is viewed, the mists that distort or conceal the object, and the object itself—a mountain, according to this metaphor, but one that takes as much imagination as clarity of vision to perceive.

Thematically, there is a sustained argument throughout the book directed at peering behind superficial similarities between ancient and modern historical writing. The ancients wrote lengthy prose descriptions of peoples, places, and past events that bear many similarities to modern history. The first practitioner, Herodotus (c.484–c.425 BC), even used the word (*historiē*) as part of his description of his great opus. He and his successors seem to have exerted themselves greatly to ensure that their works would preserve and transmit knowledge about the past with due regard to truth. This said, it is as well to remember that the way we understand "knowledge" and "truth" has changed since Herodotus.

It did not all happen at one time, but arguably the great watershed was Boyle's victory over Hobbes. Since that era, knowledge has been a matter of investigation and discovery. Boyle changed knowledge, over Hobbes's objections, in ways that would have made it unrecognizable to previous generations. His discoveries were his own, and so knowledge became a commodity eventually to be bought and sold through publication. While publication allegedly democratizes knowledge by making it openly available, there was and is an elitist aspect to experimentalism. Only the sympathetic few were admitted to observe Boyle's experiments, a fatal weakness of his project in Hobbes's eyes. For Hobbes, true knowledge should be immediately accessible to any intelligent being, but it was and still is true that scientific experiments must be demystified by extensive preparation (education, it is often called) before even the simplest ones can be "understood." Thus Boyle's project also stratified knowledge into more than one layer, with the results of experimentalism—the most direct and perfectly repeatable experience of nature possible—at the top and the newest and best of it the possession of the few

avant-garde experimenters. The ancients neither commodified nor stratified knowledge, but possibly the greatest point of difference lies in their attitude to discovery. It was vital in the ancient world, but lacked the power to convey ownership or confer importance in its own right. Discovery (Latin, *invenire*; Greek, *heuriskein*) meant finding the right way of putting ideas into words. The ideas could be new, but were often traditional. In that case, discovery for the ancients simply meant finding the right way of expressing old knowledge. This approach fits with the meaning of the commonest word used by ancient historians for truth, *alētheia*. Truth meant the absence of forgetfulness. It had nothing to do with investigation and discovery and everything to do with the meticulous presentation of tradition.

This preliminary treatment of my theme opens doors to further enquiry, which must wait for fuller treatment in the main part of the book. Now for the metaphors, the first of which is the platform. I think of history as an observation of the past. This must be a metaphor because the past does not exist to be observed. Only its traces survive, from which it must be imagined. Nevertheless, in many cases the evidence is so extensive that it seems a needless inconvenience to be constantly reminding ourselves, "Well, yes, it's not really *the past* that we study; it's just the surviving evidence." The woman described early in the first essay remembered a playful father but reconstructed an abusive one from family memorabilia. Her "method" was simple: the use of tangible materials, undeniable as to their meaning, to correct a fond impression. Professional historians go through much more elaborate preparation. They are trained in universities to practise a method of discovery of both facts and evidence in a way that approximates as far as possible to the rules of experimentalism.

In other words, they construct their methodological platforms using materials discarded by yesterday's science, and the result is inevitably a poor imitation of the type of knowledge produced in laboratories. Chaos theory provides a much better model for historical knowledge than experimentalism. Nevertheless, one of my points is that the nature and location of the platform, whether good or bad, is one of the keys to understanding the significance of the observation. The mountain looks different from different angles. A reader can only decode the reported observation by identifying the angle of relationship between the observer and the observed. For these reasons, I have tried to learn a little of the history of science and reflect that small amount of knowledge in this book. I believe that science shapes our thinking in so many impercepti-

ble ways that it is as well to look around and identify those influences from time to time. Since they pervade our thinking, they must shape in some way how we see the ancient world. But modern science is thoroughly alien to that world. So some effort is needed to identify and strip away the irrelevant fabric of modernism if we are ever going to improve our understanding of the ancients.

Thus we come to the second metaphor, the mist. To explain why galaxies do not fly apart, astrophysicists look for more sources of gravity in them. Once the mass of existing galaxies is calculated from the amount of known visible matter, and once the velocity of the stars orbiting the centre of the galaxy is calculated, it looks as if the centrifugal force of the speeding stars should allow them to fly away from the galaxy—that the galaxy should be exploding. Much more matter, and with it much more gravity, is needed to hold them from escaping. Perhaps there are more black holes than anyone has suspected, but it does appear that there are clouds of invisible matter in space as well, and this observation could help to explain the problem.

Now if these clouds do have a gravitational field, then according to relativity theory, they curve space and turn it into a lens. As a result, anything seen through space may be subject to distortion. The trick is to identify the lens effect and compensate for it. Once that is done, the validity of the observation is enhanced. For my purpose, many distorting "lenses" could be identified, but it will become clear from my first essay that I regard the birth of modernism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as easily the most significant of these.

Finally, there is the mountain. It gradually transforms itself from the problem—the thing we try to observe and understand—to a symbol of tragi-heroic sacrifice. The mountain enters early in the second essay, where it is enshrouded in mist, its features barely distinguishable from the clouds. At this point it seems to represent the past. By the end of the essay, it re-emerges as the greatest mountain of mythology: Atlas holding up the canopy of heaven. Somehow the image becomes a source of protection and comfort without losing any of its icy aloofness.

1

Rhetoric, Reason, Science, and Memory

HISTORY

"Rulers, Statesmen, Nations, are wont to be emphatically commended to the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experience and history teach us is this—that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it."[1] So said the German philosopher Hegel in the second decade of the nineteenth century. In a perverse way, the twentieth century seems to have born him out. Military historians "learned" that the correct way to attack an enemy position was by seizing the offensive in a frontal assault[2]—just in time for the First World War, the principal tactic of which was to send men running or walking by the thousands directly towards machine-gun emplacements. The justification for the ensuing slaughter was that it was to be a war to end all wars. When it was over, the League of Nations was established in the hope of preserving the peace. In the next few decades, opportunist dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler mocked and humiliated statesmen who made a show of negotiating the avoidance of war. The lesson of the Second World War seemed to be that it was a mistake to appease tyrants. The result was a veritable frenzy of standing up to dictators from Stalin to Ho Chi Minh, the prolongation of the Cold War, and the development of thermonuclear overkill.

In antiquity the Greeks assigned each of their various cultural activities to one of their nine muses. Clio was the muse of history. Her song

1. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 6.

2. Howard, *The Lessons of History*, 110–12. The experts had not really done their homework, as Howard points out.

was intended to entertain and inform. The same Greeks knew of other entertaining divinities called sirens, who were not so benign. Sailors who paused to hear their song were drawn inexorably to them and ended their lives shipwrecked on the reefs near their lair. To judge from the twentieth century and our capacity to "apply" the lessons of history with disastrous results, the song of Clio has seemingly changed from that of a muse to resemble that of a siren. So why do we continue to study history?

Is there a choice? Our first encounters with historical processes are deeply personal, visceral, beginning as they do with unremembered childhoods. We learn the rudiments of historical thinking, particularly the organization of spatial and temporal relationships, with speech. "The very verb-systems of Indo-European languages," said George Steiner, "are 'performative' of those attitudes towards act and survival which animate the classic doctrine of knowledge and survival and of art. What the poet terms 'glory' is a direct function of the felt reality of the future tense. The ordered density of remembrance hinges on the prodigal exactitudes of the Indo-European preterits."[3] Clinical evidence for Steiner's insight that historical awareness develops with language has been advanced by Oliver Sacks in his study of the treatment of the deaf. Joseph, as Sacks calls him, was born deaf and had experienced no linguistic communication until he reached age eleven, when he first learned to sign. To begin with, he was "unable to communicate how he had spent the weekend—one could not really ask him, even in Sign: he could not even grasp the *idea* of a question, much less formulate an answer. It was not only language that was missing: there was not, it was evident, a clear sense of the past, of 'a day ago' as distinct from 'a year ago.' There was a strange lack of historical sense, the feeling of a life that lacked autobiographical and historical dimension, the feeling of a life that only existed in the moment, in the present."[4] Sacks goes on to speak of the unmistakable joy that Joseph exhibited during his experience of learning to communicate. For most of us the pleasure of Joseph's discoveries belong to the forgotten past of our infancy. Perhaps this fact explains another of Steiner's intuitions: "Most history seems to carry on its back vestiges of paradise. At some point in more or less remote times things were better, almost golden."[5] Possibly, this Edenic burden of history springs from the histori-

3. G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 114.
4. O. Sacks, *Seeing Voices*, 39–40.
5. G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 2.

ans' own visceral recollections of the ecstatic discovery of space, time, and self in early childhood.

From childhood? From infancy it now appears that we learn certain relationships that might crudely be called "causal." In a recent exciting article, Thomas Lawson reports on developments in the cognitive sciences that show how concepts of "living," "dead," and especially "agency" are well understood by infants.[6] Without the aid of language to provide an organizing narrative, children can apparently grasp the notion that a bird makes a twig bounce when it lands on it or a butterfly makes flowers tremble as it removes nectar, and they can see these winged creatures as agents. "Agents not only get inanimate things to do things," Lawson points out, "but animate things as well. With such notions in place so early, it should not be surprising that people can acquire notions of special classes of agents, actions and objects" (494). Earlier in the same article (490–91), he describes recent research indicating that a certain level of knowledge and understanding is possible in ritual without any cognition of meaning. Or in Lawson's words (and emphasis), "In explaining religious ritual, meaning does not matter! For example *it is not necessary to know what a ritual act means in order to know that it cannot be performed unless another act has been performed before it*" (491). If Lawson is right, then some of the intellectual tools we need for doing history, or, indeed, conducting almost any scientific investigation, are developing in our minds before we ever speak a word. Furthermore, there may be ways in which we sense meaning in repeated action long before we are ever able to put it into words. Lawson goes on to argue that these notions of agency, absorbed so early in our lives, can be used to explain the development of religious agency and the persistence of religious traditions despite their frequent "counter-intuitive" nature (494). Perhaps they also explain the persistent search for causes, explanations, and origins that animates so much of human enquiry, including history.

Since the hope that the study of history can be a rich source of guidance for future planning has proved illusory, in recent years another explanation for our persistent interest in narrative history has become a commonplace: legitimization. Feminists point out that traditional narrative history has effectively drawn a conceptual circle—like the view from a porthole or the field of vision of a telescope—around a world of predominantly masculine interests such as war, property, and politics. So feminists including Amy Richlin describe history as an exercise of

6. Lawson, "Counterintuitive Notions and the Problem of Transmission."

power.[7] It has given the masculine world the authority of generations of tradition, shutting out, disinheriting, the female. The power of history is its capacity to ostracize.

The Nazis knew instinctively that legitimacy can be derived from history's shadows, and the longer the better. Years before they came to power, such Nazis as Alfred Rosenberg taught that the history of Aryan blood went back to prehistoric times.[8] Across the Atlantic, while Hegel was delivering his lectures on the philosophy of history at Heidelberg, Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States was using history, as he saw it, to lay an abiding foundation for modern jurisprudence in dealing with native land claims. According to his doctrine, the basis of the Europeans' claim to possess the Americas lay in the fact of discovery. They owned the land because they had discovered it. In a complex ruling, Marshall went on to argue that the principle of discovery did not deprive the counter-claims of the First Nations of all merit.[9] But this view reads like an easy concession to people who have in effect been rendered invisible from the outset. Implicitly, the native peoples did not have history, unlike the privileged Europeans, and so there was no need to enquire about where they came from or whether *they* had discovered anything.

To return to Rosenberg and his Nazi colleagues, they knew very well about another people in Europe who could trace their bloodline back to prehistoric times and with credentials that were more widely acknowledged than any he and his colleagues could produce for their Aryans. Was it then their history, with its vast weight of tradition and authority, that singled out the Jews for eradication, condemning them to the firing lines, the asphyxiation wagons, the gas chambers?[10] "A society requires antecedents." To quote Steiner once more, "Where these are not naturally at hand, where a community is new or reassembled after a long interval of dispersal or subjection, a necessary past tense to the grammar of being is created by intellectual and emotional fiat."[11] When the need for these antecedents is psychotic, the determination to establish them and remove all rivals can lead to ferocious extremes.

7. Richlin, "Hijacking the Palladion," 74.

8. Rosenberg's *Der Mythus des 20 Jahrhunderts* appeared in 1934. I have not seen a copy. For a good recent discussion of the way in which Nazis manipulated archaeological evidence, see B. Arnold, "The Past as Propaganda," 30–37.

9. Berger, *A Long and Terrible Shadow*, 79–80.

10. G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 35–41. Steiner suggests that it was their discrediting of polytheism by the introduction of an awful, omnipresent, and paradoxically absent god.

11. Ibid., 1.

John Lukacs defined history as "the remembered past."[12] But since we do not normally speak of memory operating on the present or the future, the word "past" seems redundant to his definition. In other words, he saw history and memory as one and the same. This identification, while not entirely persuasive, calls attention to the importance of memory in the matrix of historical production. Memory selects; it preserves and discards, treasures and abhors, elevates and ostracizes. Neither individuals nor nations want to have everything preserved in archives or memory. At the end of a bitterly cold January in Stalingrad in 1943, Field Marshal von Paulus surrendered to the Soviet Bolsheviks. German radio did not broadcast the full story. It aired a brief announcement hinting at tragi-heroic sacrifice, followed by three full days of uninterrupted music, some stirring and military, such as the national anthem, some contemplative, such as Bruckner's Seventh Symphony. Apparently, Hitler had no desire to tell the truth, and there were no words to express his disappointment. Paulus and the remnants of his demoralized army had been expected to fight to the death.[13] Their defeat was catastrophe enough, their unheroic surrender pure humiliation to Hitler. Of course, he could not seriously hope to obliterate the truth. It was too widely known beyond the now-shrinking frontiers of the Third Reich. The history that he would have liked to have seen written was controlled from outside his empire by peoples who had voices that he would never be able to silence.

When other peoples who come under our investigative scrutiny are mute for one reason or another, our reports become easier to write. The ancient Greeks, faced by the awesome monumentality of Egypt, developed a strategy of belittlement that aimed at preserving their self-esteem while performing the unavoidable task of describing a vast country that always figured prominently in their history. Towering stelae were dubbed obelisks, "little spits for roasting meat." The Greek word "pyramid" also describes little cakes from the oven. The ostrich was called *strouthos*, a sparrow, and "crocodile" recalls the little yellow-green lizards that scamper over rocks in Greece and Italy.[14] The Greeks probably did not expect any authoritative Egyptians to take sufficient interest in their descriptions of these details to call for corrections.

12. Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness.*

13. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich,* 930–34; Keegan, *The Second World War,* 237.

14. Vermeule, "The World Turned Upside Down," 43.

As for prehistoric humans, they will never have the opportunity to correct our impressions of them. A recent article in *Scientific American* calls attention to the difficulties involved in constructing their lost world from flimsy evidence. Authors Blumenschine and Cavallo argue that early humans did not descend from the trees to become mighty hunters of superior intelligence, but rather stayed with the trees to scavenge from carcasses, particularly those left there by leopards, in competition with the buzzard and the hyena.[15] If they are right, how do we account for the error that they seek to correct? "This question matters," say the authors, "perhaps as much as any evolutionary studies because it touches on the definition of human nature. Unfortunately, the answer given by the theory of Man the Hunter is based more on sexual and other prejudices than on the fossil record and the ecology of finding food" (90).

Prehistorians can be forgiven, perhaps, for projecting their male-oriented prejudices onto a remote past. After all, the evidence is so thin on the ground, so to speak. However, there is no shortage of evidence for American relations with southeast Asia in the 1950s and the following two decades. "In 1962," writes Noam Chomsky,

> the U.S. began extensive bombing and defoliation of South Vietnam as part of an effort to drive several million people into concentration camps where they would be surrounded by barbed wire and "protected" from the South Vietnamese guerrillas (the NLF; in U.S. terminology, "Viet Cong") whom they were willingly supporting, as the U.S. conceded ... Throughout all of this period [1962 to early 1965] no North Vietnamese regulars were detected in South Vietnam ... By April 1965, when the U.S. invaded South Vietnam outright, deaths there probably amounted to 200,000. While it was the bombing of North Vietnam that attracted international attention, the main U.S. attack, including bombing, was always directed against South Vietnam. Once again, U.S. hegemony in the international system is reflected by the fact that there is no such event in recorded history as the U.S. attack on South Vietnam (rather sanitized history records only a U.S. "defence" of South Vietnam, which was unwise, the official doves later maintained), and the attack was never recognized as such nor condemned by the United Nations.[16]

According to Blumenschine and Cavallo, the model or construct Man the Hunter was allegedly chosen in the absence of good evidence and

15. Blumenschine and Cavallo, "Scavenging and Human Evolution."
16. Chomsky, *On Power and Ideology*, 43–44.

used to interpret what evidence there was. If it had been allowed to persist, the alternative construct—humans as wily scavengers—would never have been developed. The new interpretation was developed by two prehistorians who went in search of new evidence and re-evaluated the old. In this respect, modern documentary history is distinct from memory. In most cases, memory simply decays, but history can renew itself by returning to the evidence. And when the process of renewal results in a whole new understanding of the subject, this, of course, is known as a revision. Because of revisionism, the historical record can be renewed, improved even, in a way that memory cannot be—when left to its own devices, at least. History in the hands of ancient writers does not exhibit this quality of revisionism. Instead it resembles what Halbwachs has called "the collective memory."[17] Ancient historical writing conforms to Lukacs's definition of history as "the remembered past" more closely than modern documentary history (see below); and to repeat, memory is selective.

"Today, one can travel through most of western Europe, and even the Soviet Union, and find no precise ground on which to locate the facts of the Second World War or one's own recollection of the ash hills of 1945." I am quoting from George Steiner again, writing in 1971. "It is as if a violent instinct of effacement and renewal had prevailed, a creative amnesia. It was indecent to survive, let alone prosper again, in the graphic presence of the immediate past."[18] The need for a past, for what Steiner calls "antecedents" earlier in the same work, is sometimes at war with a need to erase all memory of the recent past when its images terrify. In the words of Susan Griffin: "In Berlin and Munich I spoke to many men and women, in my generation or younger [Griffin was born shortly after the end of the Second World War], who were the children of soldiers, or party members, or SS men, or generals, or simply believers. Their parents would not speak to them of what had happened. The atmosphere in both cities was as if a pall had been placed over memory. And thus the shared mind of this nation has no roots, no continuous link with what keeps life in a pattern of meaning."[19] But the blackness of a totally forgotten past can itself be terrifying, I suppose, for some have decided to

17. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory.*

18. G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle,* 59. The love-hate relationship that many of us have with the past receives surprisingly little attention. Plumb's *The Death of the Past* is stimulating but far from complete. Much more thorough and thoughtful, but to my mind surprisingly "genteel," is Lowenthal's *The Past Is a Foreign Country.* See also Foner, " 'We Must Forget the Past.' "

19. Griffin, *A Chorus of Stones,* 166; Knowlton and Cates, *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?.*

unearth and face it whatever its burden. Griffin goes on to speak of a woman who "pieced together the truth of her father's life, a member of the Gestapo, a man she remembered as playful by contrast to her stern mother. He died in the war. Only over time could she put certain pieces together. How he had had a man working under him beaten. And then, how he had beaten her." When the back of history bears no "vestiges of paradise," the choice that individuals and nations face is bleak.

The woman in Griffin's example re-established contact with, reconstructed, her abusive father from old family records and memorabilia. To understand the step that the Greeks took to initiate the process of historical writing, we must first imagine a world in which tangible survivals from the past are as nothing compared to what can be assumed for that woman's—and our—world with newspapers (available on microfilm for as far back as the beginning of the paper's publication in some cases), diaries, letters, photographs, archives, libraries. Thus I come to the first point that I wish to make in this book about ancient historical writing:

1 At first, forgetting the past, at least in all its particular detail, must have been more usual than remembering it. The decision to set on record a narrative of past events as a form of knowledge constituted an intellectual revolution of immeasurable significance. Historiography was not without antecedents, to be sure, but they took the form of substitute representations that had the effect of heroizing the experience while avoiding the multitudinous discomforts of a detailed description, a memorialization, of a "real" past.

Think of history as a cake. The cake is covered with icing (frosting, as some call it), which is the historian's written text. We do not find what supports or shapes the text without slicing the cake. Once that is done, we see two layers distinct from each other except that the line of demarcation between them is very blurred. The bottom layer is made up of facts, the top, of general, defining concepts. These concepts determine the relevance of the facts. For, once a defining generality is admitted into the upper layer, it attracts into the lower any facts that relate to it and repels those that do not.

Consider one of Collingwood's favourite examples of a historical fact: Caesar crossed the Rubicon.[20] This is a reference to Julius Caesar's deci-

20. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 213. Cf. McCullagh, "The Truth of Historical Narratives."

sion, taken on 10 January 49 BC, to march his army against Rome in defiance of instructions from the Senate. In previous years, Caesar himself and his armies had crossed many rivers and streams, passing through northern Italy and conquering the future province of Gaul (roughly modern France). His passing over the Rubicon has been of special significance, however, because of the generalities that have interested some historians for millennia: "war," with a lesser category of "civil war," and a specific manifestation of "Roman civil war." Caesar declared, renewed, or escalated the Roman civil war by marching his legions south of a line of demarcation represented by the Rubicon, leaving no doubt that the old senatorial order would have to fight to maintain its authority. In 58 BC, early in the conquest of Gaul, he had driven his legions across the river Saône in a single day (*BG* 1.13), catching the Helvetii by surprise since they themselves had found it nearly uncrossable. A historian of the Gallic War must attend to the crossing of the Saône but is not likely to take much interest in the crossing of the Rubicon. Defining general concepts identify the relevant facts. Take an interest in military history, especially the technology of moving and supplying armies, and all river crossings may be of interest. Write a history of the Gallic War, and the Saône will be in the bottom layer of your cake, but probably not the Rubicon, while the civil war rejects the Saône but obviously includes the Rubicon.

To judge from the manuals of historical method widely used in North America today, practising historians are primarily interested in the bottom layer of the cake. One such manual, popular enough to go through two editions, was expanded in the second to include (among other things) "the role of ideas in historical investigation."[21] Historians "are interested in ideas," it says, "because (a) they influenced past events; (b) they influence the historian's interpretation of past events; and (c) difficult problems arise in connection with the effort to show the influence of ideas in human affairs" (42–43). The second item on this list, the way that ideas "influence the historian's interpretation of past events," deserves attention. Some ideas, in the form of defining concepts, or constructs, go well beyond mere influence on a historian's

21. The quotations in the text are taken from a compilation produced by members of the Department of History at Syracuse University: Shafer, ed., *A Guide to Historical Method*, 1. If re-editions are any guide, the following is more popular: Barzun and Graff, *The Modern Researcher*. Both works focus primarily on the labours of collecting and verifying documents and factual details.

interpretation. They govern the content and structure of the final report. In fact, they turn it into rhetoric.

From the examples cited above, consider the Vietnam conflict. A history of American involvement with Vietnam through the 1960s and 1970s will present itself as an account either of the defence of the South Vietnamese against invasion or insurgency or, with Chomsky, as an attack by the United States on South Vietnam. It will scarcely be able to accomplish both without serious confusion. Similarly, the beginnings of the human race may start as an account of Man the Hunter or now, with Blumenschine and Cavallo, of humans the skulking scavengers, but not both. The final narrative is largely controlled by the initial, defining choice of the overarching construct. These constructs, often too vague or controversial to be the subject of proof,[22] are what shape our historical cakes from the top down. History is a science insofar as it can be compiled from its bottom layer—the factual basis—upward. But insofar as the particular facts must be aligned to comply with some defining construct—that is, from the top down—history is rhetoric. The line between science and rhetoric is imperceptible. Yet the two are as immiscible as water and oil. This is a great, unresolvable paradox of history.

The fact that history is rhetoric, at least in part, gets little attention from practising historians.[23] J. H. Hexter is a notable exception. He published an article entitled "The Rhetoric of History" in 1967, and it was reprinted as part of his *Doing History* in 1971.[24] At first his idea seems not too revolutionary, for Hexter regards even the language of the hard sciences as a form of rhetoric, employing a vocabulary that is too exact and "denotative" to be of much use for historiography. Indeed, historians may employ language that is

22. G. R. Elton points this out: " 'Feudalism' is a categorizing concept to make discourse easier; it never existed in reality and cannot therefore have risen or declined. Controversies over the dates at which these non-events are supposed to have occurred are exceptionally futile because there can be no agreement about the concept itself, or at least about which of its alleged characteristics shall be regarded as sufficiently dominant to define the moment when the whole thing declined." Cf. Fogel and Elton, *Which Road to the Past?* 79.

23. As a perusal of other manuals on historical method makes clear. Over and above Shafer's *A Guide to Historical Method* and Barzun and Graff's *The Modern Researcher*, I offer two more of a potentially endless list of examples: Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method*, particularly "Vivid Writing," 401–404 (more significant for what it does not say than what it does); Seldon, ed., *Contemporary History*, in which, not surprisingly, only A. J. Woodman's essay, "Contemporary History in the Classical World," mentions rhetoric. Clives, *Not by Fact Alone*, dares to suggest that style as well as method is worth cultivating.

24. Hexter, *Doing History*, 15–76.

imprecise and may turn out to be ambiguous, because of its rich aura of connotation. Whether or not the historians who in practice follow this rhetorical strategy [of an evocative, if scientifically imprecise, language] are fully aware of it, the implication of this strategy is very radical. It entails the claim that historians can produce cumulative increments of knowledge without consistent resort to the rhetoric which scientists have found indispensable for formulating and communicating what they know. Positively it implies that for communicating what the historian knows, a rhetoric more like that employed in the fictive arts than that employed in the sciences is not only permissible but on occasion indispensable. (18–19)

Hexter goes on to argue that one of the effects of this line of rhetoric is a confrontation with, or vicarious participation in, the event (43). Except for the scientific analogies and the examples he uses that are taken from baseball, his argument might have come from almost any ancient rhetorical manual.

History as an unresolvable paradox is no new idea. Hayden White, considering the "burden of history" in a way that sets him apart from George Steiner, characterizes the paradox in terms of the long-standing debate over history as art or science: "when historians claim that history is a combination of science and art, they generally mean that it is a combination of *late nineteenth-century* social science and *mid-nineteenth century* art" (White's emphasis).[25] They are, in effect, practising bad science

25. White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 43. When Hexter's *Doing History* speaks of scientists using a "denotative" language, he shows the truth of White's comment. Humanists have mistaken assumptions about contemporary science. Using this denotative language in part, Einstein, "dans une lettre à M. Solovine ... reconnaît l'absence de tout rapport logique entre ce qu'il appelle l'ensemble 'S' des propositions theoriques et le niveau 'E' de la perception sensible" (Brisson and Meyerstein, *Inventer l'univers*, 9). It appears that in physics it is not a question of accounting for experience in precise, denotative language, but of creating a system, or a model, that works. Thus physics plays a similar role for us to that which myth played for the ancients. To quote Brisson and Meyerstein again, "vouloir connaître scientifiquement l'univers, c'est essayer d'en inventer un modèle qui 'fonctionne.'" On the relationship (or lack of it) between the new physics and everyday experience, see Hawking, *Black Holes and Baby Galaxies and Other Essays*, 41–47. Pay especial attention to his discussion of Schrödinger's cat, his treatment of Feynman's "sum over histories," or multiple histories and imaginary time (80–82 and passim). Furthermore, Ian Stewart, commenting on non-linear phenomena in fluid dynamics, observes the impossibility of proving a theory. One can only show that a theory resists falsification, not that it is true. Therefore, in *Does God Play Dice?* 174, he says that as the third millennium AD approaches, "scientists abandon the pursuit of Truth." If there is to be a bridge between chaos theory and the entropy of Big Bang cosmology, it will probably be built by the information theorists. Cf. Campbell, *Grammatical Man*.

and bad art simultaneously. They forget, he goes on, that their assumptions about science embrace an anachronistic nineteenth-century concept of objectivity and that the "facts" of science are "constructed by the kinds of questions which the investigator asks of the phenomena before him." A little later White develops the point:

> It now seems possible to hold that an explanation need not be assigned unilaterally to the category of the literally truthful on the one hand or the purely imaginary on the other, but can be judged solely in terms of the metaphors which govern its sequence of articulation. Thus envisaged, the governing metaphor of an historical account could be treated as a *heuristic rule which self-consciously eliminates certain kinds of data from consideration as evidence.* The historian operating under such a conception could thus be viewed as one who, like the modern artist and scientist, seeks to exploit a certain perspective on the world that does not pretend to exhaust description or analysis of all the data in the entire phenomenal field but rather offers itself as *one way among many* of disclosing certain aspects of the field. (46, White's emphasis)

Both Hexter's and White's remarks are helpful if a little Humpty Dumptian. Hexter begins by calling history a form of rhetoric and then describes any logically connected sequence of propositions purporting to describe an aspect of reality, even expressed in rigidly denotative mathematical symbols, as rhetoric. In other words, history is rhetoric, like everything else. White, for his part, attacks the old descriptions of history as a mixture of science and art and then reminds us that scientific "facts" are mental constructs produced by the investigator's questioning of the phenomena, so bringing them close, if not equating them, to historical "facts."

> "There's glory for you!"
>
> "I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
>
> Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!'"
>
> "But glory doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'" Alice objected.
>
> "When *I* use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—nothing more nor less." (*Alice through the Looking Glass*, Humpty's emphasis)

James H. Merrell recently published a history of the Catawbas and their neighbours, including, most notably, European settlers. He reports

how his friends used to ask him if his work was going to be "Indian history or colonial American history."[26] He states that his reply was "Yes." This answer became prophetic, for his work turned out to be a partial history of both subjects. History is built up as a result of an interplay between the defining concept, the theme or topic, and the amassing of the relevant data. In addition, when prospective readers approach a piece of history, they want to know what it is "of" and expect the researcher to have an answer right from the start. At its most simple level, the chosen subject can function as one of Hayden White's heuristic rules. It is a proposal that a historian can select facts and events from a chaotic array, like a child selecting from a richly furnished toy-box, and put them together to make a scene or tell a story. Each fact is, or ought to be, every bit as reliable as many so-called scientific ones. "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is neither more gospel nor piffle than "electrons are negatively charged particles." Both are statements the denial of which sets one against the received evidence as it is presently understood. "In the double-slit experiment photons will be detected in five areas with a predictable calculable probability" represents the results of the observation of a select group of particles under rigidly controlled conditions. It "explores," in White's terms, "a certain perspective on the world that does not pretend to exhaust description or analysis of all the data in the entire phenomenal field." The historian cannot conduct rigidly controlled experiments and so must rely on the attractiveness or plausibility of any proposed arrangement of facts. This is the rhetoric of history. It may be pernicious when the defining concept does not fit comfortably with the evidence (Rosenberg's "history" of Aryan blood; Man the Hunter controlling, even concealing, the evidence), vexed when the construct is the subject of emotional debate (the "defence of" vs the "attack on" South Vietnam), or relatively innocuous when there is general agreement on the topic's legitimacy (the Roman civil war).

On the subject of defining or controlling general concepts, this book argues the following for early Greek historical writing:

2 From Homer to Thucydides the representation or description of the past, when written from a general or universal perspective, took the form of a "war story." Later, in the fourth century, attention shifted to less structured histories of the Hellenic people.

26. Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, vii. Cf. Topolski, "Historical Narrative"; Passmore, "Narratives and Events"; Rüsen, "Historical Narration."

Ancient historical writing was more overtly rhetorical than most modern work for the following reasons:

a the old war stories had a somewhat formulaic structure: preliminaries; narrative leading to a crisis; fighting leading to the establishment of a clear victor;
b even after the disappearance of the war story, formulaic writing continued, particularly for battle narratives;
c characterization, whether of peoples or individual politicians and statesmen, was a justification for the writing of history (in most cases) and quite regularly a source of verification for the narrative (see below). This meant that the narrative tended to be an argument for the characterization, which in turn verified the narrative.

By contrast with modern historical manuals, which emphasize the factual layer of the cake while saying little or nothing about the upper layer—the rhetorical impact of defining generalities—or the stylistic overlay, ancient treatments (usually brief parts of treatises on rhetoric) focused on style and general concepts while saying little or nothing about the gathering and verification of facts, to judge from the few surviving examples. Only one historian, Polybius (c.200–after 118 BC), devotes space to an extended discussion of historical method. As part of a prolonged attack on one of his forerunners, Timaeus of Tauromenium (c.356–260 BC), he talks of the need for historians to learn history by reading history books through their ears (presumably by having slaves or scribes read them aloud), visiting important places, and something he calls *polypragmosynē*. This word means "being a busybody" in Plato, but probably denotes something like "taking an active interest in everything" or "gaining experience" in Polybius. The following is a translation of the passage. A few words have fallen out of the text near the middle of the quotation, and a suggested restoration is included in square brackets.

I shall now speak of the reason for Timaeus' failing. This reason is not well known to the many but will be found to be the truest of the accusations against him. He has the appearance of having cultivated a training and a capacity for dealing with each subject and especially a disposition towards *polypragmosynē*. In general, he seems to have approached the writing of history with diligence. In some respects, however, it turns out that no one of the historians of repute is more inexperienced or careless. My contention will be clear from the following considerations.

By nature we are given two instruments, so to speak, whereby we learn all things and indulge our *polypragmosyne*: hearing and vision. By far the more reliable of the two is vision. As Heraclitus put it, "Eyes are more precise witnesses than ears." Of these two paths to the fulfilment of *polypragmosynē*, Timaeus took the easier and worse, for he refrained completely from the visual and devoted himself to the auditory. Now the ears are advantageous in [two] ways, and the one, the reading of histories, [he has energetically pursued], but from the other, the examination of witnesses, he has held aloof in his laziness, as I declared above. It is easy to see why he made this choice, for one can exercise one's *polypragmosyne* with respect to things in books without danger or deprivation, provided that the historian only take the precaution of getting himself a city with an abundant supply of history books or of having a library near the house. Then it remains to enquire after the business at hand at one's leisure and to compare the blunders of previous historians without suffering the least inconvenience. However, *polypragmosynē* demands considerable hardship and expense; but it is a very profitable thing, indeed, the most important aspect of history. This is clear from the very people who address themselves to these works. (12.26–27)

The picture of Timaeus reclining at home, exposing the errors of his forerunners is a fine piece of irony. Earlier (12.25.4), Polybius had characterized him as extremely bitter in reproaching others for the faults of which he himself was guilty. Further, the apparent reference to the questioning of eyewitnesses is a single word in Greek, *anakriseis*. This word is generally used for the examination or questioning of people in legal cases. Along with the advisability of visiting battle sites, mentioned subsequently, it makes the examination of witnesses a reason for leaving the library or study and travelling about. By the time that Polybius comes to his conclusion, however, he forgets about gaining access to informants and looking at battlefields and begins to speak of activity as it if were a good in and of itself. He probably means that, since history was war and politics to the ancients, the man who was involved in those activities would be able to write about them with greater understanding than the cloistered "bookworm." Experience may sharpen one's critical faculty, especially when that experience comes from activity in historical situations, but it can also interfere with the gathering of information.[27] Polybius seems unprepared to admit that the bookworm could know more

27. For a full discussion of this passage and Polybius' ideas concerning historical "research" (my quotation marks), see K. Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History*, 203–209.

about the specific events about which he wishes to write than the man of affairs who may have limited time for books or the examination of witnesses.

We do not have all the ancient rhetorical manuals by any means. So their general attitude to historical writing is not well known. But Cicero (106–43 BC), the Roman statesman, orator, and scholar, had access to both Greek and Roman treatises on the subject. He produced his own work on rhetoric, *De Oratore*, and in it he gave consideration to producing a history:

> Don't you see how great a task history is for an orator? In terms of fluency of discourse and variety it is probably his greatest task, yet I can't find a separate treatment of the subject anywhere in the rules of rhetoric (and they're easily available for inspection).
>
> Everyone of course knows that the first law of historiography is not daring to say anything false, and the second is not refraining from saying anything true: there should be no suggestion of prejudice for, or bias against, when you write. These foundations are of course recognised by everyone, but the actual superstructure consists of content and style. It is in the nature of content, on the one hand, that you require a chronological order of events and topographical descriptions; and also that you need—since in the treatment of important and memorable achievements the reader expects (i) intention, (ii) the events themselves, and (iii) consequences—in the case of (i) to indicate whether you approve of the intentions, of (ii) to reveal not only what was said or done but also in what manner, and of (iii) to explain all the reasons, whether they be of chance or intelligence or impetuousness, and also to give not only the achievements of any famous protagonist but also his life and character. The nature of style and type of discourse, on the other hand, require amplitude and mobility, with a slow and regular fluence and without any of the roughness and prickliness associated with the law-courts. (A. J. Woodman, tr.)[28]

It is gratifying to see that Cicero regards the avoidance of falsehood as the first law of history and that the second amounts to telling the whole truth. But this "truth" gets little attention here, for he moves speedily to consider style and the whole rhetorical superstructure. Two other passages assembled and translated by Woodman amplify the importance of style and provide insights into the ancient theory of historical verification:

28. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*, 80.

Our *narratio* must be clear and convincing [*probabiliter*], but it can also be entertaining [*suauitatem*] ... It will be convincing if the events correspond to the individuals, times and places involved [*personis, temporibus, locis*], and if we set out the reason [*causa*] for each event [*facti*] and consequence [*euenti*] ... It will be entertaining if it induces surprise [*admirationes*] and suspense [*exspectationes*], and if it involves unexpected outcomes [*exitus inopinatos*], conflicting emotions [*interpositos motus animorum*], dialogues between individuals [*colloquia personarum*], grief, anger, fear [*metus*], delight [*laetitias*] and passion [*cupiditates*].

The *narratio* will be convincing [*probabilis*] if it appears to contain elements which customarily appear in real life [*in ueritate*]: if the proper qualities of the individuals are maintained, if reasons for their actions [*causae factorum*] are plain, ... and if the subject-matter fits in with the character [*naturam*] of those involved.[29]

The *narratio* of the historian "convinces" by its correspondence, not to the events, as in modern theory, but to the "people, times and places." Cicero does not explain how the historian brings this correspondence into effect. It is clear from Polybius, however, that the historian was expected to suit his narrative to places by visiting and inspecting them. As for peoples and times, we are left to draw what inferences we can. The word that Woodman translates "individuals," *personae*, means many other things, including "character" as in a play. In the context of politics, it should be understood to mean "known character," perhaps even "public image." The last sentence of Woodman's second passage confirms this interpretation. On that understanding, historical veracity depended on its faithfulness to public memory, which was of such general concepts as the characters of public figures and, probably, the nature of the times in which they lived. If that is true, then the individual historian was not expected to engage in a personal investigation of "the facts" on his own authority, but to conform to received opinion.

This was not just the historiographical theory of a single Roman scholar, for Cicero's Greek contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus thought this way too. In words that suggest a dependence on the same rhetorical manuals used by Cicero more than any mutual borrowing, Dionysius praises the veracity of Thucydides, the great Athenian historian from the fifth century. It is commendable that Thucydides has neither

29. Ibid., 85–86. Cf. Brunt, "Cicero and Historiography." Brunt is very effective against an earlier, ill-grounded view that saw major differences between Hellenistic and classical historiography. There were certainly some stylistic innovations, but substantive change is difficult to show. The theory depends on the judgments of ancient critics, who often contradict each other and sometimes gave their subjects some very slanted readings.

added to nor subtracted from the story, he argues, "and he does not usurp authority in his writing. No, he keeps his subject unsullied and pure of any charge of envy and malice, especially in his appraisals of great men. For example, in his first book he calls to mind and records without envy the established qualities of Themistocles (Thucydides 1.138.3–6). Further, when he touches on the political dealings of Pericles, he sets down in his second book an encomium worthy of Pericles' well-known reputation (2.65.8–13). Finally, on the subjects of Demosthenes the general, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Alcibiades the son of Clinias, and any others whom he is compelled to speak of, he reports only things that are suitable to each person" (*Thuc.* 8).

Even more clearly than Cicero, Dionysius articulates the view that historical veracity was to be recognized by the historian's faithfulness to well-known information, especially individual reputations. History was about reputations, and to advance views that conflicted from received opinion—on one's own authority—was to face the charge of being a malicious character assassin.

If such was the theory, is there evidence that it was the practice?

3 It will be shown that in ancient Greece the arbitration of historical truth was the right of the community and was never conceded to the individual. The individual researcher was never given legitimacy. Theopompus, one of the few who dared to oppose the authority of the Greek community by their own research into an acutely sensitive question, was branded as malicious.

This view of early Greek historiography may be disturbing for two reasons. One is that it may be read to imply that individual intellectual freedom was opposed by censorious ancient communities, which would then appear to foreshadow twentieth-century totalitarianism with its grim doctrines of Stalinism, Naziism, and McCarthyism. The second is that it may be seen to imply that ancient historiography was little more than state propaganda. A third implication, that it seems to deny "authorial intent" to ancient historians, will perhaps be given a more mixed reception.

The natural abhorrence of state- or community-controlled truth was captured by the poet W. H. Auden:

By wire and wireless, in a score of bad translations,
They give their simple message to the world of man:

"Man can have unity if man will give up Freedom.
The State is real, the Individual is wicked;
Violence shall synchronize your movements like a tune,
And Terror like a frost shall halt the flood of thinking.

Leave Truth to the police and us; we know the Good;
We build the perfect city time shall never alter;
Our Law shall guard you always like a cirque of mountains,
Your ignorance keep off evil like a dangerous sea;
You shall be consummated in the General Will,
Your children innocent and charming as the beasts."[30]

Auden decries a specific form of interference in free thinking developed by the highly centralized, bureaucratic, totalitarian states of twentieth-century Europe. The ancient Greek communities generally lacked the capacity to centralize that modern methods of communication, eavesdropping, and record keeping make possible.

Of course, any Greek city-state was naturally jealous of its reputation, and historians had to be wary if they wanted to be welcomed and rewarded for reciting their histories. At the same time, the surviving histories (and the lost ones studied in this book) avoided excesses of local influence from individual city-states by adopting a Panhellenic or universalist perspective. If individual city-states were usually too disorganized to orchestrate a rigid control of thought among their citizens, the interstate community was much less focused. Provided the historian avoided excessive praise or malicious denigration of individual states and their heroes, there could be a fair degree of latitude for free enquiry.

The question of the extent to which early Greek historical writing reflected—or actually was—state propaganda is a more difficult one. On that subject, this book argues the following:

4 As far back as our evidence goes, the Greeks recognized two perspectives on the past, one local or regional, the other Panhellenic or universal. Generally, local histories used documents and temple archives in an unabashed celebration of the greatness of the community. Panhellenic histories drew on these works, but moderated their excesses.

30. This passage is from "A Verse Commentary" to "In Time of War"; see *Collected Poetry of W. H. Auden*, 342.

Because of the interaction between local and universal history,[31] it would be wrong to argue that ancient historiography, despite an apparent lack of interest in documents, had no basis at all in documentary evidence. Indeed, the typical attitude of the universalist, which is exemplified by Polybius as quoted above, that historical accuracy was obtainable by visiting as many places as possible was not a bad assessment under the circumstances. Moments of embarrassment suppressed in one community would probably be subjects of celebration in the memory and documents of its rivals.

The question of the intent of an ancient historian brings up what Steiner has called the "astute trivalizations, the playful nihilism of deconstruction."[32] The dismissive tone of his words, part of an essay published in 1986, suggests that even then some thinkers were resisting the excesses of deconstruction. It has been more a medicine than a plague. Like a laxative, it relieved some cramps, but at least it has compelled us to deal more carefully with the concept of authorship. The ancients' rhetorical manuals suggest that the historian's task was to articulate fairly, in the most charming possible prose, what he found in the memory of his community. They seem to deny the propriety of a historian's individuality, calling instead for a high degree of conformity and self-denial.[33] On the surface, historians studied in this book did make a show of self-effacement (see below). Xenophon is the most extreme example; Theopompus perhaps went the furthest in self-revelation. But it is easy to oversimplify the relationship of the historian to the Greek community.

The reason is that so much is different today, but often the differences are subtle and easily overlooked. I suggested above, and will argue more fully below, that ancient history was predominantly memory—the

31. Throughout I shall use the terms "universal," "general," and "generalizing" to distinguish histories of more than one place from local histories that focused exclusively on one place. "Place" means city-state for Greeks and nation or ethnic group for non-Greeks. This definition is for the convenience of my argument and does not necessarily reflect ancient usage, which is, in fact, somewhat confused. Polybius gives the fullest information on universal versus "monographic" history, but he makes his meaning far from clear. Cf. K. Sacks, *Polybius*, 96–121.

32. G. Steiner, *Real Presences*, 13.

33. Wheeldon, "'True Stories.'" This essay analyses the Roman historians and draws conclusions that anticipate some that I will draw about the Greeks both here and in the next essay. I do not think that the Greeks could rely on *auctoritas* to quite the same extent as some Romans, and perhaps allowance should be made for some other differences between Greece and Rome, but this was a most enjoyable and thought-provoking essay.

recording of what might be called "the collective memory." The quoted expression is Maurice Halbwachs's phrase. His insightful study of the sociology of memory rewards attention today despite the fact that his work is now about half a century old. Perhaps excessively, Halbwachs would deny the individuality of personal memory. All memory, he argues, is fed, supported, and prompted first by close family interactions and eventually in the community at large. Obviously, this view limits drastically the notion of individuality, if it does not eliminate it altogether, since individuality or identity is preserved through personal memory.[34]

Society "can live only if there is a sufficient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it," says Halbwachs.[35] And one way to maintain this unity is through the memory of a common past. When Gillian Tindall paused to study the history of Kentish Town in London, she found that there was a strong tradition that the townsite had been open fields in living memory. "I was again and again told 'Cows were grazed at Gospel Oak when I was a girl,' or 'It used to be all fields around here, dear; I remember before such-and-such a street was built.' "[36] These memories turned old railway stables into farm buildings, wishes into "reality," for Tindall possessed documentary evidence to show that they were wrong. The "memories" expressed a "desire," as she puts it, "to disinter the fields that lie sleeping beneath." Tindall points out that the stories found their way into print, owing to what she calls the gullibility of newspaper editors. But she was not a member of the community; the newspapers were—or wanted to be.

I take Tindall's encounter with Kentish Town as a model to show what is possible for the ancient world. Smaller communities, whatever their ideological or political divisions, may develop a cohesive oral history that suits their needs. The larger and more diverse the community addressed, the more tenuous its consensus about the past is likely to be. Nevertheless, insofar as there was an interstate community in ancient Greece, the model suggests that it would have to have had some sort of communal memory, a consensus about the past. To go too far in opposing this memory would be an act of self-ostracism for an ancient writer. I shall argue that the historians were faithful to their constituencies, but they did not always choose them wisely, if universal approbation was their aim.

34. Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, 197–200.
35. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 182.
36. Tindall, *The Fields Beneath*, 128–29.

The use of a model from present-day experience has its pitfalls, as Michael Fotiadis has recently pointed out,[37] and I would be wrong to leave the impression that I think the model works perfectly. It is always possible for an independent-minded person to undermine authority while superficially complying with it. I shall suggest possible examples of this behaviour in the next essay. Of greater significance, perhaps, is my suggestion that local histories, which were often known to the generalists, did embrace public documents and that the use of such material will have imposed some limits on the scope for free invention. On the other hand, the rare occasions on which ancient generalists resorted openly to documentation and the even rarer ones in which documents were used to attack received opinion seem to suggest that the typical posture of the historian (however insincere) was one of subservience to the chosen constituency.

By comparison to the early Greeks, serious historians today aspire to a greater intellectual independence from their communities and more direct contact with the documents that shape the evidentiary base for their investigations. So history has undergone great developments in methodology since ancient times. But it is arguable that ancient historians represented the true nature of the human condition more directly than we do. The reason is that the "madness" (by Foucault's definition) of the Age of Reason stands between us and them.[38] Properly speaking, that era, alias the Enlightenment, belongs to the eighteenth century with the publication of d'Holbach's *Système de la nature* (1770), Voltaire's *Candide* (1759), or, earlier, Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40). But its roots go deep into the previous century.

While René Descartes was in his stove-heated room in Bavaria in 1619 conceiving his life's mission, Bernini was adorning Rome with such turbulent and unreservedly sensual compositions as the Ecstasy of St Teresa. One result of Descartes's introspection was a proposal for splitting reality into the spiritual and the material. What was beginning was more than just a dividing of intellectual paths, however. It was nothing short of a

37. Fotiadis, "Modernity and the Past-Still-Present."

38. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*. "In madness equilibrium beneath the cloud of illusion, beneath feigned disorder; the rigor of the architecture is concealed beneath the cunning arrangement of these disordered violences." If one understands "illusion" as a systematic refusal by science to allow for disorder (entropy) or unpredictability (chaos) and "disordered violences" as the inexplicable attachment of guilt to the poor, unemployed, and insane, then one can substitute "Age of Reason" for "madness" in the quoted sentence. See Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians."

restructuring of social values along the lines of state and church, rationality and irrationality, female and male, order and disorder, sanity and madness. Kenneth Clark brings out the growing division in his remarks about Rome in the era of the Restoration:

The stabilising, comprehensive religions of the world, the religions which penetrate to every part of a man's being—in Egypt, India or China—gave the female principle of creation at least as much importance as the male, and wouldn't have taken seriously a philosophy that failed to include them both ... The aggressive, nomadic societies ... Israel, Islam, the Protestant North, conceived their gods as male. It's a curious fact that the all-male religions have produced no religious imagery—in most cases have positively forbidden it. The great religious art of the world is deeply involved with the female principle. Of course, the ordinary Catholic who prayed to the Virgin was not conscious of any of this; nor was he or she interested in the really baffling theological problems presented by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.[39]

The "really baffling theological problems presented by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception" and other spiritual mysteries could be swept to one side by the rationalism with which Descartes addressed the material world. And so they were. In his own words, his search for a single, undeniable principle on which to base proof of his own existence began as a flight from madness.

But, although the senses sometimes deceive us, concerning things which are barely perceptible or at a great distance, there are perhaps many other things about which one cannot reasonably doubt, although we know them through the medium of the senses, for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a dressing-gown, with this paper in my hands, and other things of this nature. And how could I deny that these hands and this body belong to me, unless perhaps I were to assimilate myself to those insane persons whose minds are so troubled and clouded by the black vapours of the bile that they constantly assert that they are kings, when they are very poor; that they are wearing gold and purple, when they are quite naked; or who imagine that they are pitchers or that they have a body of glass. But these are madmen, and I would not be less extravagant if I were to follow their example.

However, I must here consider that I am a man, and consequently that I am in the habit of sleeping and of representing to myself in my dreams those same

39. Clark, *Civilisation*, 177.

things, or sometimes even less likely things, which insane people do when they are awake.[40]

This is not to say that Descartes would have dismissed the mysteries of the church as insanity, but a dualistic dawn was gleaming, a world with two suns, rationality and irrationality, and one sun would soon be regarded as unreal. Henceforth, the church would have to fight for its place as champion of the spiritual—as "real" as the rational.

Its task is not my concern, for I wish only to show how a preoccupation with a mechanistic orderliness followed on the heels of Descartes and influences thinking to this day; and to the extent that the Greeks were not mechanists, their historical writing may resist modern interpretaton. The seventeenth-century craving for rational order was taken to great extremes. It found practical, as well as literary, expression. Descartes's highly influential *Meditationes de prima philosophia* was published in 1641. Fifteen years later, in 1656, the Hôpital-Général was founded in Paris, thus signalling what Foucault would call "the Great Confinement." "Disorderly" people—mendicants, the unemployed, and, most disruptive of all, the mad—were confined in various degrees of punitive detention. Most of these people were kept out of sight, but the public paid to view the insane, much as they would later flock to see animals in zoos. Of course, the "mad" were kept safely behind bars to protect the "sane" from any possible violence.[41] Thirty-one years after the founding of the Hôpital-Général, orderliness and rationality achieved perfect union in Newton's *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (1687).

Thanks to Newton's discovery of the law of gravity, it was possible even for those of us who do not understand his mathematics to look out onto the universe and see a serene, yet gargantuan machine designed and set in motion by an awesome clockmaker. Since the *Principia*, for about two centuries, science had no place for disorder. Newton's magnificent

40. From the First Meditation in Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, 96. The dualism with which Descartes is credited is as much a convenience for a kind of historical taxonomy than anything real. The conscription of the *Principia* into the camp of atheistic rationalists would surely have annoyed Newton, who wrote the work to dispel atheism, not support it. Recent scholarship emphasizes his hermeticism and well-documented (if unorthodox) piety. Cf. Mandelbrote, "'A Duty of the Greatest Moment.'"

41. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 38–64, 67–70. I think that Derrida's critique of Foucault's reading of Descartes in *Writing and Difference* did not give sufficient attention to the fact that the passage which I have quoted is an extended reflection on madness, far more substantial than is required by the argument.

machine survived the romanticism of the nineteenth century. This fact is remarkable in itself, but particularly so for two reasons. First, the age of romanticism, while it agreed that the laws of nature required study, preferred to acquire them by sensation rather than intellection.[42] Newton's mathematical logic was not the choice of the romantics. Second, by shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century, scientists were actually in possession of a discovery (entropy) that threatened the perfection of Newton's universe (see below), but little was made of it to undermine his theory. It would seem that the nineteenth century was as fixated on order as previous periods. Despite the romantic rebellions of Marx, Beethoven, and Wordsworth, a sense of order sanctified by a "rationalism" survived vigorously into the twentieth century. When Jean-Jacques Rousseau declared, "Man is born free and is everywhere in chains," he was calling for the liberation of human males from other males. For Rousseau, politics were for men; women should rule in the home. His cry for revolution did not seek to change the underlying social order.

In 1854 Rudolf Clausius associated the second law of thermodynamics with entropy, the observation that energy flows only from an ordered to a disordered state and that this process is irreversible. Four years later, in 1858, a girl was born to the Goulden family in Manchester, England. They called her Emmeline. In 1879 Emmeline married Richard Marsden Pankhurst. Once again, it seems, while the political and social order was about to change, science approached a major revolution. Eight years after the marriage, the Michelson-Morley experiment established the speed of light as an absolute. In 1903 the soon-to-be-famous Mrs Pankhurst founded the Women's Social and Political Union. Two years later Einstein published his special theory of relativity. As a result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, time and space, two great constants for Newton, were shown to be relative. Time slows down for an object as its velocity increases. Even worse for the parts of the old machine, an implication of special relativity was that the line between matter and energy became blurred.

The indomitable Mrs Pankhurst was arrested in 1908 and was actually sentenced to three years' imprisonment in 1913, a sentence that she cut short by going on a hunger strike. Two years later Einstein's general theory of relativity explained Newton's gravity as the curvature of space. Mrs Pankhurst's suffragettes absorbed themselves in the war effort until

42. This propensity is demonstrated at some length by Clark in *Civilisation*, 285–91.

1918, but then turned to blowing up railway stations, smashing windows, and burning down Lloyd George's unfinished mansion when they saw that their demands were achieving inadequate attention. In 1927 Heisenberg's uncertainty principle appeared. Scientists had the choice of establishing the location or the velocity of a particle, but never both with precision. The next year Mrs Pankhurst died, but not before she saw the Representation of the People Act go through the British House of Lords to become law. Now British women could join their Norwegian sisters (since 1912) and their American ones (since 1920) and exercise the franchise. Moreover, in 1923 Hubble advanced his expanding universe theory. Later cosmologists such as Stephen Hawking would associate this theory with the law of entropy to suggest that the universe, Newton's magnificent machine, was not the design of a master clockmaker but the result of an explosion.

This brief rehearsal of well-known events suggests some lines along which to see both similarities and degrees of difference between ourselves and the ancients. In fact, this book proposes:

5 Recent discoveries in physics will gradually become popularly known. It seems inevitable that they will change our understanding of many things, since they are so radical. Despite the millennia that separate us from the ancients, there are ways in which our new perspectives may actually make them more intelligible, more familiar, to us.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, English speakers have used the word "rational" since the middle of the seventeenth century to exclude "insanity," "excess," or "folly." Reason has been associated with order and stability. The Greek word for order was *kosmos*. It was not associated with reason so much as beauty (cf. cosmetics). To describe something as stable, one called it *bebaion* (or *empodon*), which suggests unshakeable constancy perhaps, but not reason necessarily. For "reason" they used *logos* and its cognates (cf. logic), but *logos* was often contrasted with *ergon* (deed, fact, or reality)[43] to suggest something argumentative or vague and theoretical. For them, "reason" (*logos*) moved easily across a spectrum that included plausibility, even speciousness.[44]

43. On this subject, see the landmark study of Parry, Logos *and* Ergon *in Thucydides*.

44. On the comic stage, Aristophanes pits "the unjust reason" (*adikos logos*) against the "just reason" (*dikaios logos*) in *Clouds* (lines 889–1112). One of the most extreme advocates of the power of *logos* (through persuasion) was Gorgias of Leontini. Guthrie's *The Sophists*, 273, describes his "thesis that we are all at the mercy of opinion and truth is for

Lowell Edmunds points out that Greek thinking before Thucydides' time saw the randomness of chance (*tychē*) as the rule in human affairs.[45] Predictably, the exception to this rule comes from Thucydides, who saw in Pericles and his vision of the Athenian achievement down to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War an order informed by a rational intelligence (*gnōmē*) supported by the technical skills (*technai*) widely held by the Athenian population. But this Athens, partly real, perhaps, and surely an idealized vision in some degree, ended abruptly with the plague that devastated the population both physically and morally and took Pericles shortly after the war began (Thuc. 2.47–55). If this was the Greek Enlightenment, its life was brief and ended brutishly.

Different too was the Greek attitude to the disorderly outbursts of people who today would be called insane. In the nineteenth century, Nietzsche recognized that the Greek world-view was dualistic.[46] It combined elements that he described as Apolline, or coolly rational, and Dionysiac, inspired by turbulence and characterized by orgiastic behaviour. And E. R. Dodds, in his more systematic study, showed how they saw madness and irrationality as sometimes destructive but sometimes beneficial to society; in other words, not much different in its effects from "rationality."[47]

For a brief period, the fifth century did witness the emergence of systems of thought that were wholly secular and "rational" by any standard. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c.500–c.428) came to Athens, probably in 480, where he is supposed to have taught such luminaries as the statesman Pericles and Thucydides, the great historian. His works are lost,[48] but the unanimous judgment of the ancients was that he advanced an

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each of us whatever we can be persuaded to believe." Gorgias also proposed that *logos*, effectively controlled, should be sufficient to persuade anyone of anything. Euripides dramatized a refutation of this idea in *Hippolytus* (lines 983–1101). In that scene, Hippolytus despairs of using reason to convince his deluded and furious father of the truth. It is worth noting in connection with my argument in the next essay that Theseus' tragic mistake was in believing a written document without collecting oral testimony about the veracity of its content. The author who most regularly contrasted *logos*, "theory," with *ergon*, "fact," was Thucydides.

45. Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides*, 176–204 and passim.

46. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*.

47. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 64–101.

48. Nebelsick, *Circles of God*, 1–87. The fragments of and testimonies to Anaxagoras may be consulted in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 402–33. The authors supply Greek texts, translations, and an excellent commentary. On Thucydides' relationship to contemporary thinkers, see Hussey, "Thucydidean History and Democratean Theory"; Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*. There are stimulating studies of early Greek rationality in Huby and Neal, eds., *The Criterion of Truth*, particularly Furley, "The Truth as What Survives the Elenchos," and Tarrant, "By Calculation of Reason?"

atheistic cosmology. One ancient critic even believed that his atheism influenced Thucydides, who indeed has little time for the gods and religious institutions and festivals.[49] At the same time, Leucippus of Miletus (fl.c.489) and his pupil Democritus of Abdera (c.460–c.357) developed the theory of atomism, according to which the observed objects in the world were compositions of indivisible particles (*atoma*). These "compositions came about *without the necessity of divine intervention whatever*."[50] Thus the fifth century saw the brief emergence of a way of explaining the world that resembles the pure reason of eighteenth-century Europe. It may perhaps be understood as an elitist, intellectual repudiation of the simpler and somewhat self-contradictory polytheism of the fifth-century masses, who were gaining so much political power at the time, thanks to the spread of democracy.

These three philosophers, particularly Anaxagoras, caused a stir in late-fifth-century Athens, and it seems perfectly sensible to see Thucydides as part of their movement in some way. Their influence on his predecessor, Herodotus, if any, seems, however, to have been negligible, and they themselves fell quickly into the shadows cast by the two giants of the next century, Plato and Aristotle. Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Physics* were impressive attempts at providing a rational account of the universe. Brisson and Meyerstein (see note 25 above) have shown how closely Plato's methods in the *Timaeus* anticipate those of modern, Big Bang cosmology. Both employ the language of mathematics, both lay down a foundation of postulates or axioms, and both end up with a physics that does not really explain human experience! In the words of Brisson and Meyerstein, "entre ces deux mondes, le monde matériel du changement et du devenir et celui des formes immuables, le monde de l'être et des theories mathématiques, *il n'existe aucun rapport logique*; entre ces deux sphères gît un *hiatus irrationalis*" (8, authors' emphasis). But this is not the whole picture. Harold Nebelsick (60–71) shows how the cosmologies of Plato and Aristotle included something spiritual, mystic, or numinous. So the ancient Greek "enlightenment" was little more than a brief disturbance.

The "cosmos" of the narrative historian is human activity; it is rational-

49. The article on this subject is by Hornblower, "The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War." The ancient critic was the otherwise unknown Antyllus cited by Marcellinus in his *Life* of Thucydides, 22.

50. Nebelsick, *Circles of God*, 6–7 (author's emphasis).

ized by causal explanation. Now, if Thomas Lawson is right (see above), infantile perceptions of "causality" arise from observations of agency and are reinforced by ritual. In a world such as that of the Greeks in which competing metaphors were not developed, or at least never enjoyed the widespread currency and enduring influence of Newton's physics until historiography was well developed, it may well be that notions of causation never entirely freed themselves from this single underlying metaphor of agency. Lawson also argues that our receptiveness to agency—ingrained since before speech—explains the persistence of religion and religious traditions. (If the world is a great clock, who winds it up?) From his thesis it would seem to follow that our earliest historians would see cause as a form of agency, and they might be expected to parade both human and divine agents across the stages of their histories.

When we turn to the first Greek historian, Herodotus, we see a preparedness to accept both human and divine agency. In 1982 Mabel Lang delivered the Martin Classical Lectures at Oberlin College. Her papers, all on Herodotean narrative, were published two years later.[51] Focusing on human agency, she pointed out the way that Herodotus uses speeches or comments about the knowledge or state of mind of an actor, carefully planted in his narrative, to provide explanations of or motivation for events that follow (12–17, 80–92, and passim). The basic formula, "knowledge (or debate) leads to a decision which prompts action," is given a rich variety of treatments, but clearly follows a recognizable pattern. It is both logical and chronological.

Provocation to historical action does not always come from thinking, reasoning humans, however. In 1989 Donald Lateiner demonstrated how the major events in Herodotus are motivated or explained by reference to five general concepts or agents: divine jealousy; fate (or the cycle of fortune); divinities; act and retribution; historical analysis (*logos*). He quotes David Hume effectively to show how alien much of this approach is to the (Scottish) Enlightenment. Nevertheless, Herodotus explains major events both by the arguable (*logos*) and by reference to the inscrutable (gods, fate). He covers at least four, if not all five, of these categories in any major search for historical cause.[52]

As Lateiner points out, Hume doubted the notion of causation; as well, his empiricism would not allow for the intervention of gods and

51. Lang, *Herodotean Narrative and Discourse.*

52. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus,* 189–210, especially the table on 206.

fate in any logical statement. Since the Enlightenment, in general, human things must be explained in human terms or at least as subject to forces accessible to human intellection. To invoke the gods is to summon the inscrutable and potentially to submit history to apocalyptic visions. If Herodotus' panoply of causation includes irrational forces by Enlightenment standards, is there any sense in which he could be called illogical? Mabel Lang has shown that he was not. Indeed, he displays an instinctive grasp of the idea that a historical narrative can both include and be a logical and "rational" explanation of human action.[53] To give but one demonstration, he knows how to develop a story syllogistically. Using this method, he (like many subsequent narrators) presents a series of minor premises succeeded by conclusions that follow if the reader silently accepts the correctness of the suppressed major premise. There is a good example from Herodotus' description of the choice presented to Gyges by the wife of Candaules: either to die because he has seen her naked or to murder King Candaules, marry her, and ascend the throne. He chooses life (1.8–12). The syllogism is (1, unexpressed major premise) most people choose to live whatever the circumstance; (2, expressed minor premise) Gyges was given a choice between dying immediately for his error or committing murder and living; therefore (3, conclusion of episode) Gyges chose to live. Not all historical syllogisms are this easy, but easy or not, it is useful to detect the major premises assumed in a narrative. They are valuable clues to the attitudes that the historians expected to find in their audiences.

This syllogistic logic with unexpressed major premise is a typical historical device. I found it on nearly every page of Macauley's *History of England.*[54] One way or another, he explains everything like a true rationalist. Herodotus, on the other hand, leaves some things unexplained. At the very beginning of the story of Candaules, he abruptly announces that the king "fell in love with his wife and, smitten with love, he thought her far the most beautiful of all women" (1.8.1). Writing for an audience unused to marriages based on love and mutual attraction, he was ascribing to Candaules a behaviour that would scarcely seem to be in the normal course of things. It is noteworthy that he does not begin by accepting the beauty of the woman in order to motivate the love. On

53. Gardiner's *The Nature of Historical Explanation* is still a useful and lucid introduction to this subject, even though it is dated.

54. Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–59) wrote *The History of England from the Accession of James II* from 1847 until his death. It was published piecemeal from 1848, with the last volume appearing posthumously in 1861.

the contrary, the perception of beauty seems to be regarded as a kind of psychotic delusion motivated by the unexplained onset of passion. Well, perhaps Greek men did fall in love with their wives after marriage in numbers sufficient to make this story seem reasonable, but Herodotus is not telling a reasonable story. Candaules brags repeatedly about his wife's beauty to his personal bodyguard, Gyges, and when Gyges' protestations of belief seem insincere, he contrives a way for him to view her disrobing for bed. Some people are just not right in the head; bizarre and erratic behaviour occurs, and there is no use falsifying it by giving it a rational explanation.[55]

Occasionally, Herodotus goes even further; he sometimes speaks of events as if he accepts them partially as mysterious occurrences despite their being the actions of people reputedly more stable than Candaules. He uses divine interference and fate to help motivate Xerxes' invasion of Greece, his main subject, and the gods and divine retribution (but *not* fate—at least explicitly) to explain in part the successful Greek resistance. More specifically, consider the following passage from book 6, the preliminaries to the great battle of Marathon (6.103.1–3):

> Now when the Athenians heard this news [that the Persians were moving from Eretria towards Marathon], they went out themselves to Marathon. Ten generals commanded them, one of whom was Miltiades, whose father, Cimon son of Stesagoras, *it befell* to be exiled from Athens in flight from Pisistratus the son of Hippocrates. While Cimon was in exile, *it happened* that he won the four-horse chariot race at the Olympic games, and by winning this victory [*it happened*] that he won the same prize as his maternal half-brother, Miltiades. Afterwards, when he won in the next Olympiad, he agreed to have Pisistratus announced as the victor. So, having surrendered the victory to him, he returned home under agreement. And when he won another Olympic victory with the same horses, *it befell* him to be murdered by the sons of Pisistratus (that was after Pisistratus had died). (my emphasis)

Some things proceed logically—"the Athenians heard this news ... they went out themselves to Marathon ..."—while others seem random or fatal: "it befell" (the verb is *katalambanō*) or "it happened" (*symbaino*). *Katalambanō* means "overtake," and the unexpressed subject is probably

55. For similar (and fuller) treatment of this passage, see Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 29–38, and in general the whole chapter entitled "Logic and Accident," 23–48.

something like "disaster," as in book 7 (10.γ.1). *Symbainō* means "to come together," "converge."[56]

The description of historical events as happenings, as if at random, can be seen as a refusal to submit to the chronological logic of process, the imperative of *post hoc ergo propter hoc.* Herodotus *does* imply that news of the Persian approach prompted the Athenians to march out to Marathon. On the other hand, he does not find an explicit connection between Cimon's third Olympic victory and his murder at the bidding of Pisistratus' sons. It would be natural to infer that the Pisistratids became jealous and sought to remove so splendid a rival by assassination. Herodotus permits his readers to make the association while avoiding it himself.

Thucydides of Athens was Herodotus' younger contemporary. His historiography seems to shed the confusion of superstition and to exude the confidence of reason. He did not entertain the Olympian gods in his history and scorned oracle mongering (5.26.4–5; 2.54.3–4). His own views are often difficult to ascertain, but he can make the Pericles whom he admired speak like a disciple of Voltaire: "The rationality [*xynesis*] of a better mind makes risk taking against fair odds more reasonable [*echyroteran*, "stronger"]; it puts less confidence in hope (the strength of which is in perplexity) than in the appraisal of existing conditions from which projections are made more secure" (2.62.5). But wars have ways of defying, and then destroying, human reason, especially prolonged ones like the twenty-seven-year struggle between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides' subject. Even before its outbreak, he makes some unnamed Athenians observe to the Spartans by way of warning, "As a war drags on, most things come to depend on its chance occurrences" (1.78.2).

In spite of that ominous remark, it is clear that Thucydides began his history with a confidence in the power of human intelligence unequalled in all ancient historical writing. He believed that both of his

56. Generally speaking, the historians use *symbainō* to mean "happen" or "turn out" (Hdt. 2.120.3; Thuc. 7.57.7, 86.3, 87.5). Aristotle's use of the verb (*Physics* 188a–b; 195b–198b) is important as an ancient treatment of chance and causality, but I do not think it can explain the usages in the early historians. If anything, his usage looks forward to the random convergences of particles in Feynman diagrams, also called space-time diagrams. They were named after the Nobel-prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman. Gary Zukav describes them in *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*, 212–51, as does Fritjof Capra in *The Tao of Physics*, 177–207. Feynman's autobiographical *Surely You're Joking Mr. Feynman* is delightful and gives some insights to the working of an innovative scientific mind. I have not read the sequel.

heroes, Themistocles and Pericles, were gifted with an innate mental ability to foretell the consequences of major decisions (1.138.3; 2.65.7). He claims the same skill for himself when he declares that he foresaw the magnitude of the war even before it started (1.1.1). He believed that the study of history could be useful because human nature was a constant, and situations similar to present ones would recur as a consequence (1.22.4). So when he began writing his history, he probably would not have agreed with Hegel that people lacked a capacity to learn anything useful from history. He must surely have expected that a deeper understanding of history would help some statesmen to cultivate the analytical and forecasting skills that he attributed to heroes such as Themistocles and Pericles. It must have been easy for wealthy Athenians to think that way in the 430s, when their city was at the pinnacle of power and the finishing touches were being put on the Parthenon.

Thucydides was indeed writing at a time of unprecedented Athenian self-confidence. He himself gives graphic descriptions of the brash way that his fellow citizens had pressed the claims of their empire into all parts of the Aegean and beyond in the middle of the fifth century. He makes little mention of the Periclean building program, but his own history—certainly the early books—is its own monument to Athenian self-assurance. As regularly as the tribute flowed in from the empire to be transformed into jury pay for Athenian citizens, not to mention the elegant refinements to the Doric order embodied in the Parthenon, so in an inexorable and orderly way did a prosperous future grow out of a recent heroic past for the Athenians. Their successful expulsion of the Persian invaders, followed by their seizure of a maritime empire using the navy that had defeated the Persians, was now converting itself into cash.

No doubt, the gratifying way in which a prosperous future seemed to develop from a heroic past for the Athenians during their time of success in the fifth century made it possible for them to believe that their better lights could predict the future. Thucydides certainly thought as much about Themistocles, Pericles, and himself. Given such physical and intellectual powers at the Athenians' disposal, one can understand why their leading historian had no interest in the gods. What could the gods do that the Athenians were not already achieving for themselves? This attitude surely puts Thucydides in the company of modern intellectuals. Since the systematization of empiricism under Bacon, the experimentalism of Boyle, and the physics of Newton (to mention but three

revolutionary thinkers from the English-speaking world), no part of the universe has seemed inaccessible to human intellection, and much of the immediate environment has fallen subject to human control, not to say despoliation. Showing the apparent modernity of Thucydides—his early confidence in the power and intellectual ability of his contemporaries to understand and control key aspects of their physical environment—is relatively easy, and Edmunds has done it well. The challenge is to appreciate the extent to which Thucydides was still a child of antiquity.

Discovering the ancient, rather than the modern, Thucydides will be one of many important tasks for the second essay in this book. This essay's purpose is to sketch out the theoretical framework of the argument to come. One of its themes so far has been to show the difference between the ancient and modern approaches to historical methodology. Modern theorists emphasize the collection, verification, and analysis of documentary evidence. The ancients concentrated on style and the nature of the general ideas around which a historical narrative must be organized. This could be taken as *prima facie* evidence that they lacked the idea of historical research in any modern sense. The problem is that Dionysius, Cicero, and their sources may not have understood Thucydides. Is it possible that he was no mere genius, but a superintellect misunderstood by all the ancients who read him, an inventor of a true historical method, a modern mind in just about every respect, too far ahead of his time for his accomplishments to be understood by or have an affect on the thinkers of his age?

Most contemporary readers of Thucydides go straight to his famous remarks in the first book (22), a passage that is generally taken to be a conscious revelation of the historian's research procedures. My argument in the next essay, however, will be that this is not a statement of investigative method, but rather Thucydides' description of his literary aims and methods. Hence the need for a preliminary discussion on the theoretical level. Is it possible, on theoretical grounds, that Thucydides gave conscious consideration to the question of investigative method at the outset of his famous work?

This speculation raises an interesting question. Where does one look for a possible historical method in Thucydides if the one key piece of evidence is in dispute? Anything that exists must occupy space. Solid objects, such as statues, have a physical, Newtonian existence and so must occupy Newtonian space. Historical method is a mental thing. It exists in the imagination and so must occupy imaginary space. For a historian, method exists between the event or circumstance in question

and its description. In fact, the historical event or circumstance does not exist after its time, but its traces are left in the materials examined by the historian. But unless he or she can mentally separate the description from the thing described, it is difficult to see how she or he can devise a method for making the description the best possible representation of the event or circumstance under scrutiny. On this issue, the language of Thucydides is clear. For him, his topic, the war, was both the *ergon*, the fact or deed, *and* his description of it. In other words, he cannot have had a historical method in any modern sense because he did not create in his mind the theoretical space in which it would have needed to exist. This conclusion raises a flood of questions, to be sure, which I intend to address in the next essay.

It would be unfair of me, however, to leave things in such an extreme state of suspension. So I shall offer a brief sketch, in bare skeletal form, of modern methodological concepts and then show how Thucydidean terminology diverges. For this purpose, one needs to think of three things: the event, the historical fact, and the account produced by the historian. By "historical fact" I shall mean anything found in a historical work that is generally deemed to be factual at the time of the production of the work. In other words, an event of the past (e.g., Winston Churchill had bacon and eggs for breakfast on such-and-such a day), however well documented, is not a historical fact by this definition unless some historian selects it for inclusion in a book or article (or some such publication); it is merely a fact of the past. So an event of the past, however well documented, need not be a fact of history until a historian makes it so. One may think of past events that are not used by practising historians as wallflowers at a school dance. Sometimes historians bring them in to the celebration; sometimes they are returned to their chairs along the wall to wait and hope to catch someone else's eye.

The history of the French Revolution brims to overflowing with examples of what I mean. It is a subject that seems to attract controversy. Was the Revolution merely a political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy of France or, as George Comninel has recently argued, "a product of the fundamental class dynamics of exploitive relations in the ancien régime?"[57] Until this question is settled, the definitive account of the Revolution awaits formulation—that, at least, is Comninel's view. I cannot involve myself in this debate, but simply point out that he has placed himself, armed with certain methodological and ideological

57. Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution*, 201.

questions (his project is to regenerate a Marxist analysis of the Revolution), in the space between the events and the description. His purpose is to separate the dancers from the wallflowers, even to banish altogether certain alleged events (bourgeois political revolution, for example) from his historical party.

To reinforce my point, I cannot resist summarizing the remarks of Leo Tolstoy that he included as an addendum to *War and Peace.* Tolstoy saw the Napoleonic Wars as a great movement of peoples that began with ferment in Paris in 1789 (the French Revolution). For him the chief historical question was, "What is the force that moves nations?" Tolstoy was particularly vitriolic about biographical historians and authors who focused on individual nation states. For them, sovereigns and heroes were the prime movers in history. In answer to Tolstoy's implied question, What was the force that set the Napoleonic Wars in motion? these historians correctly go back to the French Revolution, but then they go on to answer: "Louis XIV was a very haughty and self-willed man; he had such and such mistresses, and such and such ministers, and he governed France badly. Louis' successors, too, were weak men ...," and so forth.[58] For Tolstoy, such historians address irrelevancies. In his simile they are like deaf men barking out answers to questions no one has asked them. From Tolstoy to Comninel my two examples span more than a century of historical production. While the questions have changed over that time, the underlying assumptions are remarkably similar. Like Comninel, Tolstoy argues in effect that historians confuse the dancers with the wallflowers. For this confusion to be possible, historical facts and irrelevant events must occupy contiguous space in our conceptual framework. In fact, they do because modern documentary historians find too much data in their sources to describe and report completely. Historical facts (by my definition) and irrelevant events exist side by side in the documents. Before the definitive description can be produced, however, there must be "space" for historians to occupy and time for them to work, sorting out methodological, perspectival, and ideological questions.

How did the ancient Greeks conceptualize the ideas of event (relevant or otherwise), historical fact (as defined above), and final description, and where in this constellation of ideas would they have located historical method, if indeed they had more than a most rudimentary

58. Tolstoy, *War and Peace,* 1275–93. The quotation is from page 1277.

notion of what it might be? They had a number of words for "event," each with a variety of cognates. I shall mention a few of the more significant ones, setting aside the cognate expressions. They used *genomena* (croppings up, events), *symbainonta* (occurrences, accidents), and *pragmata* (transactions, events, or things in general) for events. Thucydides also used *prachthen* (thing done), which is the neuter passive participle of *prasso* (do, manage). If they had a word for "historical fact," the word that leaps most frequently from Thucydides' pages is *ergon.* This word has a variety of meanings and Thucydides employs it in all ways, but I shall confine my attention to passages in which it comes closest to our "historical fact."

In one of them (1.17), he shows how a *prachthen* can become an *ergon* in his mind. To qualify for promotion, a *prachthen* must be *axiologon,* "worthy of *logos* (report)." Then it becomes an *ergon.* To the obvious question, Who decides that *prachthenta* (plural) are worthy of *logos* and so promotable to the status of *erga*? there is an answer, also from the pages of Thucydides. In book 3 (38.4) he makes the Athenian politician Cleon berate the Athenians for coming to their democratic assemblies and listening to *erga.* Now surely these *erga* are reports of *prachthenta* that are deemed *axiologa,* but it is unlikely that Cleon is complaining to the Athenians that they come to their assemblies to sit listening to historical facts. They are trying to make decisions of policy from reports that come to them from time to time. These reports are *erga* because they are deemed by the community to be indisputable and not because a historian has laboured over them and "blessed" them as authentic.

Thucydides does not use *erga* to mean "facts verified by a historian and found suitable for inclusion in a history" unless it is in 1.22. There he speaks of the *erga tōn prachthentōn,* which were *epiponōs heurisketo.* Most translators assume that the Greek means something like "the facts of the things done," which were "discovered with much toil." Difficulties with this translation include the following. First, the verb *heuriskō,* "discover," does not mean "find out by investigation or enquiry"—the verb for that in Greek is *pynthanomai*—but rather "hit upon, discover, more or less by accident." And second, I think it must be wrong to assume that *erga* in this programmatic statement must mean something that it does not mean anywhere else in Thucydides. The solutions to these difficulties are, first, to take *heuriskō* in a technical, rhetorical sense of "arrange one's thoughts in preparation for a major, literary composition," "discover the correct way of presenting one's synthesis," and, second, to take

erga in the more general Thucydidean sense of "factual reports" or the like. Then one would have to construe *tōn prachthentōn* as a genitive of source or origin and translate thus: "The factual reports arising from the things done ... were arranged by me with great care." So understood, 1.22 prepares the reader for the famous Thucydidean *diairesis*, the dividing up of the war rigidly and systematically into seasons, a method of narration unique to Thucydides and one for which his readers would need some advance preparation.

As to the relationship between event, historical fact, and historical description, the following observations can be made. In Thucydides 1.17 the implication seems to be that a *prachthen* that is not *axiologon* will simply be forgotten. He says no *ergon* was done *eprachthē* by the tyrants that is *axiologon*. In other words, he is not setting aside known events as irrelevant like Tolstoy or Comninel; he is saying that there is nothing to report. So the event has no way of remaining in contiguity with historical facts. Greek wallflowers leave the dance, never to return. As to the relationship between historical fact and description, if the event that is not deemed *axiologon* is forgotten, then it would appear that the only way for an *ergon* to survive is to become *logos*, a report, and it will last longer if the report is written. In this system there can be no conceptual distinction between historical facts and their description. The facts are really memories that will not last without historical literature. When Thucydides speaks of his subject, he calls it "this war" (e.g., 1.18.1). In one breath he uses war (*polemos*) as if to mean the things that happened "out there," and in the next, with no warning, the same *polemos* is the history that he has composed (e.g., 1.1; usually translated "the history of the war," but the Greek says, "Thucydides has written the war"). This identification of fact with description makes no room for a sophisticated historical method.

Thucydides began his work with great confidence in human intelligence and skill, particularly Athenian intelligence and skill. As a consequence, he makes statements that sound like modern rationalism. Rationalist he may have been, though I think his confidence must have waned as the war dragged on and eventually ruined Athens, but his rationalism does not require us to think of him as a theorist about historical method, a modern researcher into documents, a Leopold Ranke before his time. This subject will be revisited from time to time in the next essay. Perhaps these remarks will suffice for now to show why I regard Thucydides as a memorative, not an empirical scientific, historian, despite his apparent modernity of style and outlook.

Thucydides' war went through three phases. In the first (the Archidamian War, 431–421), Pericles' predictions that the Athenians would do well if they remained behind their walls while Spartan forces ravaged their land and if they counter-attacked the Peloponnese from the sea (1.141.2–143) were born out. The Spartans ratified the Peace of Nicias in 421 over the objections of some of their allies, especially the Corinthians (5.30), creating a serious rift in their old Peloponnesian alliance. So began the second phase of the war, the period of uneasy peace. When the Athenians decided to take advantage of the Peace of Nicias (a peace in name only, as Thucydides sees things: 5.26) to launch an expedition to Sicily, Nicias advised them against the idea (6.9–14). He further suspected that offers of financial support from Egesta were illusory (6.22). (His foreboding was prophetic, for the Athenians lost catastrophically in their attempt to seize Syracuse.) By 413 the war entered its third phase, and the only decision for the Athenians was whether to fight on or sue for peace.

In the event, the decision was taken from them and made by members of the Athenian empire. They too, like the Athenians at the start of the war, faced hostilities with every calculation of success. The prime instigators of revolt, the Chians, are praised by Thucydides for selecting an ideal moment and laying their plans well, but then they were cheated of immediate success by incomprehensible human events (*anthrōpeiois paralogois*, 24.4–5). Later in the same book, the intelligentsia overthrew democracy to seize power in Athens, and what Thucydides calls a "moderate government" was set up (8.64–97, especially 97). Nothing comes of it, however, but the prolongation of a hopeless war.

For Jacques Derrida, in his critique of Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*, history comes into being by the act of decision (de-cision, cutting away) of the rational from the irrational. History belongs to the rational side. The rational mind is orderly, explaining everything.[59] When it cannot, it affirms its faith in reason through the belief that the elusive explanation is but a discovery or two away. This thinking is at the heart of classical determinism in physics: "An intellect which at any moment knew all the forces that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom: for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain, and the future just like the

59. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 34–47.

past would be present before its eyes." This statement comes from *Philosophical Essays on Probabilities* (1814) by the brilliant mathematician Pierre-Simon de Laplace.[60] Written more than a century after the *Principia* of Newton, it gives a glimpse of the lasting vigour with which deterministic mechanism had taken root in European scientific thought by that time.

Rationality achieves maximum power in a tightly closed system, a fact that explains the success rate of well-designed scientific experiments. A good experiment excludes all influences on the event under scrutiny that cannot be seen or accounted for. If this ability to see and put in order all things contingent on a chosen event is a highly effective form of rationality, it is understandable that Foucault could define madness, rationality's extreme denial, as a blindness.[61] "Thucydides' *History* is a study of man's attempt to master the world by the intellect," said Adam Parry.[62] Thucydides' confidence in his own rationality and that of his two heroes was born in a world of limited variables, the closed system of Athenian-Spartan rivalry. So long as his war involved those two powers alone, it followed the intelligent predictions of Pericles (as Thucydides reports them: 1.141–44) fairly closely. That it does so is most impressive because the devastating plague that afflicted Athens early in the war and Brasidas' daringly brilliant expedition from Sparta to Amphipolis in 424 could not have been expected, and both did heavy damage to the Athenian cause. However, after the Peace of Nicias was negotiated between Athens and Sparta in 421, the Athenians, by attacking Sicily, dramatically expanded the arena of war to include the western Mediterranean. And when they failed, the Spartans did the most unexpected thing of all. They, the self-proclaimed champions of Hellenic freedom, struck a devil's bargain with Greece's old enemy, Persia, in which the freedom of the Asiatic Greeks was sold to the Persian king in exchange for an alliance against Athens and money to build warships and hire crews to row them. This decisive turn of events was not foreseen by Pericles, who only considered the possibility that the Spartans might borrow money from Peloponnesian temple treasuries and Delphi (1.143.1), something they did not do. Now the old polarized world of Athens versus Sparta was opened to include erratic influences from the east and west. Thucydides

60. Quoted in Stewart, *Does God Play Dice?* 109–12.
61. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 105–107.
62. Parry, Logos *and* Ergon *in Thucydides*, 181.

stopped writing seven years before the war's ending and very shortly after describing the agreement reached between Sparta and Persia.[63]

MEMORY

The trouble with classical determinism is that it cannot predict the weather. Laplace's superintellect could know everything about every molecule in the atmosphere and still not come up with a reliable, long-range forecast. Most of the things we experience in our lives are by nature unpredictable, like the weather. Hexter pointed out that historians look back on their subjects and can produce convincing narratives because they know by hindsight where they are going.[64] They know, as Lowenthal puts it, "the future of the past."[65] This ability helps immensely with the selection of detail for reporting, organization, and explanation, and may yield the impression that occurrences are the inevitable consequences of prior circumstances. So it appears that Derrida was right: historians practise an orderly rationalism that goes back at least to Descartes. On the other hand, this orderliness detaches the narrative

63. He had planned to continue until 404, when Athens fell (5.26). In fact, the opening words of 5.26 seem to suggest that he had written something that actually reached that year. If so, it was probably a collection of notes. As it stands, his history breaks off abruptly with the summer of 411 unfinished. The argument of Wettergreen in "On the End of Thucydides' Narrative" does not carry conviction because it does not pay sufficient attention to clues in Thucydides' text. Flory follows a much more promising line in two recent articles: "Thucydides' Hypothesis about the Peloponnesian War," especially 52–53; and "The Death of Thucydides and the Motif of 'Land on Sea.'" The extent to which Thucydides' experience of the Peloponnesian War and its outcome disillusioned him in his early faith in Pericles' intellectualism (or rationalism) is a difficult problem. It has much to do with the extent to which he saw chance (*tychē*) in control of everything in the later phases of the war. Edmunds's *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides*, 174–214, discusses the question most judiciously. For Stahl in *Thukydides*, the crisis came around 424 with the Athenian seizure of Pylos. Rhodes, *Thucydides History III*, 12, suggests that *tychē* refers to anything that cannot be predicted. Did Thucydides see the Spartan alliance with Persia as an unforeseen twist of fate of sufficient magnitude to destroy all confidence in the value of intelligence for historical prognosis? Seager and Tuplin, in "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia," show that the "Greeks of Asia" do not appear in ancient literature as a unit until c.400 BC. If this means that they went largely unnoticed as a significant group until about that time, then their use in 411–404 as a decisive piece in the endgame of the Peloponnesian War must have taken everyone by surprise. Because Thucydides' work is unfinished, however, his reaction is not preserved. *Tyche* played an increasingly important part in later Greek historical writing. Cf. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, 16–26, and *Polybius*, 58–65.

64. Hexter, *Doing History*, 38–39.

65. Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, 218.

product from experience. As events unfold, people engaged in them are uncertain of their ultimate significance, perplexed as to their outcome. These doubts and perplexities—in fact, nearly all "subjective" experiences—get lost in a typical historical account.[66] In general, the more compellingly reasonable the narrative, the more likely it is to be disengaged from the chaos of immediate experience.

Now this characteristic is peculiar because, by the standards most commonly used today, a form of experience is the ultimate test of historical accuracy. The most serious criticisms of the accuracy of the ancient historians come down to a claim (or claims) that they fail an experiential—properly speaking, an empirical—test.[67] It will be shown in the next essay and Appendix 1 that Herodotus is found by some not to have seen things (inscriptions in Boeotia, the Black Sea, and Egypt) that he expressly claims to have observed. Likewise, Thucydides is found by critics to have reported speeches directly that cannot have been given and some that were, but that he cannot have heard; even the ones he heard he does not seem to think he should have reproduced in their exact words. At least Herodotus pays lip-service to the idea that on-the-spot observation is best whether or not he practised what he preached. It appears that modern critics want events recounted "objectively," as a detached observer would have seen and heard them, but not "subjectively," as an involved participant would have felt them.

This objective empiricism originates with the thought of Francis Bacon. "Much talked of but little read" in Macauley's day, Bacon receives even less attention today, but there is no doubt that the empiricism against which critics measure the ancient historians goes back to him. His career can be appreciated by contrasting it with that of one of his contemporaries, Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit priest who lived in China from 1583 until the year of his death, 1610. Ricci's purpose was to preach Christianity, of course, but he also offered instruction in the training of the memory. His method was to construct a large building in the mind with many rooms, a memory palace. The palace could be based on known real buildings, but was really fictive, simply a creation of distinct and vivid mental spaces in which to store things that one wanted to remember. This was Ricci's

66. Ibid., 218.

67. For a recent discussion of the reliability of ancient historians see Rhodes, "In Defence of the Greek Historians." Rhodes does not attack the issue of empiricism directly. Now, for a penetrating discussion of the role of the senses of sight and hearing in Herodotus and Thucydides and the implications for their historiography, see Hedrick, "The Meaning of Material Culture."

adaptation of place memory, a method known to the ancient world and widely cultivated by scholars of the Middle Ages. For Francis Bacon, the advocate of a new empiricism, the memory games of people such as Ricci were of little value. "I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing that I do the tricks of tumblers, funamboloes, baladines: the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body, matter of strangeness without worthiness."[68]

Bacon began, like Descartes, by doubting the ability of human sensation to provide reliable information. But since the senses were untrustworthy, he reasoned that one should devise tests for the inductions one draws from observations. He was not the first to advocate testing or experimentation, but he is credited with seeing how it could be used most effectively to bolster confidence in sense data.[69] His entire project called for publication of one's results, in which one should pay careful attention to one's style. The purpose of publication was philanthropic: discoveries were for the good of humankind. New knowledge should be shared so as to become incremental and forward moving.[70] In this way, empiricism gained scientific respectability because all observations were subject to experimental tests, which could then be scrutinized by any who cared to read the results, and a moral justification because everything would be done in the spirit of philanthropy. In effect, Bacon rejected the "stove-heated room" as a suitable environment for enquiry. Science was not for the withdrawn; it was to involve a community.

The ancients did not develop such a complete system of empiricist philosophy. However, I would warn against concluding that they had no empiricists, in some sense of that word. This is not a reference to the well-known ancient commonplace that "eyes are more reliable than ears" (Hdt. 1.8.2). That remark certainly points to experience as one source of reliable knowledge, but it does not make the ancients empiricists (see below). On the other hand, Polybius' remark cited above does suggest an empirical test for battle narratives, the examination of battle sites, of which Bacon could well have approved. Did the alleged activity fit the space to which the narrative assigns it? As Rosenmeyer observed, historical events must take place somewhere, and the criterion

68. Bacon, *Selections*, 1–14. The quotation is from 11 and refers specifically to the *Novum Organum* and *De Augmentis*, the two works most central to an understanding of Bacon's scientific empiricism. On Matteo Ricci, see Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*, 1–23. The quotation from Bacon is from Spence, 13.

69. Prior, "Bacon's Man of Science."

70. Stephens, *Francis Bacon and the Style of Science.*

of specific location is one way whereby the ancients could, and sometimes did, use locality to distinguish a historical event from a more fictive one of the type to be found in poetry.[71]

However, they were not as rigorous in applying even this one test as modern empiricists would like them to be. In general, one would have to conclude that their empirical traditions were not strong. The reason is not that they doubted the senses to the same extent as Descartes, Bacon, and most other thinkers of that age. It is rather that they placed a far lower value on the thing observed, the phenomenal world, than nineteenth- and twentieth-century empirical scientists.[72] Their philosophers and historians showed a greater concern for what Eiseley calls "the unexpected universe" within,[73] the soul, its training and moral health, than the world "out there." Following one of the implications of Hedrick's argument (see note 67), I would suggest that the eyes of an ancient historian were not those of an empiricist who experiences, tests, and verifies, but those of a witness who has seen and remembers.

If that is so, and if my earlier suggestion is right that ancient historians preserved memory and did not quite "do history" as it is practised today, it would follow that they did not measure historical accuracy by empirical standards. Is there another kind of historical truth, a memorative one, for example, distinguishable from that which flows from modern scientific empiricism? There is, and to explain it, it will be necessary first to show how the unaided memory addresses a circumstance, especially a narrative of real or alleged events.

I have already cited the example of Kentish Town as Tindall reports it to show how a community can create its own past complete with vivid personal "memories." This example confirms Halbwachs's analysis that memory has a strong communal aspect, is reconstructed and controlled by and in the community that posseses it. Studies of the psychology of memory add further details to this picture. Gregg describes an experiment in which subjects were asked to recall the names of classmates up

71. Rosenmeyer, "History or Poetry?" especially 253. Cf. Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 52–53.

72. See Shrimpton, "Greek Views of Reality and the Development of Rhetorical History." Perhaps the most radical indictment of the senses comes from Parmenides' "Way of Truth." But it should not be forgotten that he also wrote another poem, "The Way of Seeming," in which sense data were probably conceded a usefulness in the phenomenal world.

73. Eiseley, *The Unexpected Universe*: The "unexpected universe ... lies deep-hidden in the human heart, and not at the peripheries of space. Both the light we seek and the shadows that we fear are projected from within" (45).

to twenty years earlier and to record their recollective strategies.[74] "First there was an attempt to mentally recapture the temporal and geographical *context* of the schooldays. Second, a *search* for children and their names was carried out by, for example, examining images of classrooms, working around the neighbourhood identifying children who had taken part in common activities ... During the third stage of the cycle the retrieved information was *verified* by one or more means including judging whether it cued other information which could, in turn, be verified" (181–82, author's emphasis). So memory works in a spatial context. It relies on the rememberer's ability to regain contact with the experience, in this case of school, from that to specific places in the physical environment, to the people in it, and then to further interconnections.

For the student of memorative history, experiments by Bartlett conducted in the first decades of this century and still cited by psychologists today are extremely informative.[75] Bartlett conducted two types of experiments, the first called repeated reproductions, the second, serial reproductions. For the first type, he asked subjects to read a story at their own pace twice and then write it as they each remembered it after ever-increasing intervals of time. In some cases he was able to test their recollection of the story after intervals of ten years and more. In the second type, Bartlett asked subjects to record the recollection once after a short interval, and the remembered version would then be shown to a second subject and the procedure re-enacted, followed by a third, a fourth, and so on, up to as many as fifteen reproductions. In other words, his experiments reflected under controlled conditions the two ways whereby oral material would have come to an ancient historian: remembered without serialization by an informant or informants who had direct contact with the event or reported by an informant at the end of a series of repetitions covering decades or even generations. In addition, the historian himself would probably have relied to some extent on his own memory. Using ancient scrolls and writing materials to take notes "in the field" would have been impractical.

Before I summarize Bartlett's results, it would be as well to introduce a few cautionary remarks. First, the ancients were probably more confident in mentally receiving and transmitting prose information than the majority of Bartlett's subjects, who tended to be students at Cambridge University. Twentieth-century students rely more heavily on note taking

74. Gregg, *Introduction to Human Memory.*
75. Bartlett, *Remembering.*

and book reading than the fifth- and fourth-century Athenians did.[76] Second, insofar as the ancients wanted their repetitions to hold an audience, something to be considered in an oral society,[77] then attention to style and entertaining embellishment may have come into play more than in Bartlett's results. Third, historical events, though not reported in the news media, of course, were frequently celebrated in public monuments—particularly at Athens, but elsewhere as well—and in some cases were dramatized in the theatre. Famous examples would be the *Capture of Miletus* and *Phoenissae* of Phrynicus and the *Persae* of Aeschylus.[78] Theoretically, inscribed monuments could act as a brake on innovation in a tradition simply by standing in the community as an unaltering textual reference, but that would depend on the care with which they were consulted. On the other hand, plays could introduce various types of "spin" and even rearrangements of the story to suit the requirements of staging and dramatization that would probably have far-reaching, and usually destructive, influence if Bartlett's results are a guide (89–93). Fourth and last, some educated ancients were trained in mnemonic techniques that could have provided them with a prodigious capacity for remembering details accurately. In the next essay I shall consider the possibility that Thucydides acquired and used this skill. It should be noted, however, that the method is designed for assimilation and recollection of lists, disconnected bits of information, rather than a long, sequential narrative.

To return to Bartlett, he began by showing his subjects the same story whether they were in the "repetition" or the "serial" group. Taken from North American folklore, it was called "The War of the Ghosts." It provided subjects with the challenge of remembering a tale plucked from an alien cultural environment and containing certain apparent inconsequences resulting from that fact and the obvious supernatural aspect of the story. In general, it was progressively altered and abbreviated by the

76. D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ.*

77. For a brief bibliography, see note 13 to the next essay, on literacy and orality in the ancient world.

78. Cornell, "The Formation of the Historical Tradition of Early Rome," discussed important concepts of method, rhetoric, and elaboration that apply in a general way to Greek traditions, in my belief. The impact of historical plays will be discussed in the next essay, but see Raubitschek, "The Phoenissai of Phrynichos," for a discussion of the possible influence of a play on the development of a historical tradition. If Raubitschek is right, I would argue that the *Phoenissae* helped to shape the public memory of the origins of the Persian War, which was then captured and reported by Herodotus.

subjects along the same lines, regardless of the experimental group, though, of course, there were differences in detail between the two groups. Some of the changes were predictable. Alien aspects of the story were either dropped or rationalized, as were the supernatural ones, which were not understood in spite of the clue provided by the title. By degrees, the process tended to be one of abbreviation and cultural assimilation.

The repetition experiment produced two notable aberrations. First, two villages were named in the original story Egulac and Kalama, but only one person, a woman, retained these names accurately over any length of time. Most people either dropped them or altered them somehow. In general, the subjects who forgot or altered the names tended to remember the story substantially, albeit after certain rationalizations and omissions. The woman who retained the names accurately forgot the story itself most rapidly. Years later she could still remember the place names exactly, but the narrative was gone completely. In the second case, the individual was a painter. At first this person retained an extremely vivid memory of the beginning and end of the story, both embellished with extraneous detail from his or her own imagination, but forgot the middle part. Eventually, after two and a half years, this person was able to recall only the basic elements of the story as he or she had first transformed it. Nonetheless, these two examples serve to illustrate a fundamental difference between memorative and empirical accuracy. It may be erroneous to infer that a remembered story is accurate because it contains vivid "circumstantiality" or exhibits detailed precision. An empiricist using documents would be expected to produce an account that preserves place names exactly, provided that they were found in the documents, but an accurate, memorative version might lose those details or distort them somehow.

Next, Bartlett tried a differently structured story from Congo folklore. In the main, the results were the same. The differences were easily attributable to the story's peculiar structure. A considerable number of experiments involved more culturally familiar material. A report of a cricket match was shown to a group who were predominantly sporting enthusiasts. A selection from a review of a book on lawn tennis was given to subjects nearly all of whom played the game and were keenly interested in it. Bartlett also tried an amusing story about Indian recruits in the British army that had actually been in public circulation on subjects many of whom had been officers. Finally, he used two arguments, one about animal speciation and its relationship to geographical isolation

and another more general and reflective one on travel and self-reliance. In all the familiar cases the decay was unexpectedly rapid, much quicker than for the culturally unfamiliar stories. Factual errors were only outstripped by omissions. Statements of fact were reversed, then re-reversed. Unlike the results with the alien stories, after the third or fourth repetition there was scarcely any discernible relationship between the reproduction and the original version. Bartlett was surprised by the rapid deterioriation of culturally familiar material.[79] However, Lowenthal points out that we are continually bombarded with familiar information, and there is a natural tendency, even a necessity, to forget it.[80] And Bartlett observed a tendency of serial repetitions to give the material a group stamp or character that accompanied the drastic abbreviations (179). Forgetting is a natural strategy whereby individuals deal with masses of familiar detail. If Halbwachs is right, selecting the few things that will be remembered is a community exercise.

Gregg reports on experiments conducted to ascertain the psychological nature of recall.[81] People were shown a film of a multiple car accident. They were then divided into three groups. One was asked to estimate the speed when the cars "smashed" together, another the same question using the word "hit," and the third no question at all. The first group gave higher estimates than the second. One week later, it was more than twice as likely to remember having seen broken glass than the other two. Apparently, the questioner exerts more control over the repeated information than he or she may realize.

Many years after the publication of Bartlett's results, Tom Harrisson took advantage of an unusual opportunity to test them in a historical situation, away from the controlled environment of the psychologist's study. Harrisson, an experienced field ornithologist,[82] had been general overseer of a project called Mass-Observation (M-O), which began in Britain in 1937 and continued through the bombings of 1941. "M-O ... sought to supply accurate observations of everyday life and *real* (not just published) public moods, an anthropology and a mass-documentation for a vast sector of normal life which did not, at that time, seem to be adequately considered by the media, the arts, the social sciences, even by

79. "It is now fairly clear that the astonishing abbreviation and transformations which overtook the cricket report were no mere matter of chance, for exactly the same type of change is again illustrated in the [tennis] series just given" (154).

80. Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, 204–206.

81. Gregg, *Introduction to Human Memory*, 155–56.

82. Harrisson, *Living through the Blitz*, 11.

the political leaders" (author's emphasis). The project was organized in response to the perceived threat of fascism and was conducted by large numbers of observers, mostly volunteers. It took two approaches: one he calls self-documentation, and the other "specialized in a more observational angle, approaching the study of Britons rather as if they were birds, emphasizing seen behaviour or overheard conversations rather than interviews." The written observations were later stored in an archive at the University of Sussex in England.

Harrisson's own experiment was conducted in the early 1970s. He asked surviving participants in the project to record their memories of specific events on which they had taken notes, without first consulting their notes. His book, *Living through the Blitz*, reveals his main interest: war memories of civilians, particularly from cities targeted by the Luftwaffe. This book sheds a flood of light on the question at hand, the relative value of empirically observed, as opposed to remembered, experience. The following is the fullest example and concerns the declaration of war, announced on the "wireless" by Neville Chamberlain, and the ominous wail of the first air-raid siren (a test and announcement; the raids themselves did not begin until later), as recorded by a student teacher in Romford, Essex. "We were gathered in our little living room and it was very crowded," she recalled thirty years afterwards, "with six of us (parents and children) all together for once. But weren't there also visitors? I have the notion that this was a special kind of gathering; something a bit formal: aunts, uncles or neighbours, perhaps, all listening to the wireless, which, those days, was on almost all the time, in anticipation of more bad news" (326). She remembered a vigorous discussion after Chamberlain's speech and being "shaken to the roots" by the siren. Finally, Mother revealed an anti-gassing strategy involving the placement of chamber pots full of urine by the doors of the house.

Against this "memory," so full of circumstantial detail, consider the written notes from the actual moment. "At eleven-fifteen, I was playing the piano in the front room, when suddenly my mother burst in, shouting: 'stop that noise!' and then flung open the windows letting in the scream of the air-raid siren, and the scuffling noise of neighbours in a hurry. Immediately, my father assumed the role of the administrative head-of-the-house, issuing commands and advice: 'All get your gas masks! Steady, no panicking! Every man for himself! Keep in the passage'" (46).

Harrisson was aware of Bartlett's work (324). To him, Bartlett had proved that "memory is self-deception." But those were Harrisson's

words, not Bartlett's. Harrisson objected to the "glossification" of the war, which frequently involved the deliberate repudiation of the observations of his M-O team (324–25). However, it is possible that he allowed his scepticism to cloud his judgment. He doubts that the woman could have been "shaken" by the siren because, he alleges, "she never heard it" (326). Yet it is clear that she *did* hear it after Mother opened the window. I point this out because I believe that Harrisson's extremely empirical perspective has blinded him to the truths preserved in the woman's memory.

What the young woman "remembered" was a sudden coming together of the family, "for once" all in a "little" space. Relatives and neighbours were also "there" in that small space. She remembers a sense of vulnerability—"being shaken to the roots"—and no doubt she heard in the shouting of her mother and the commands of her father that same vulnerability. Her observations on the spot make no mention of these feelings, but that does not mean they were not experienced. Her "memory" has turned the emotional significance of that hour into a highly conventionalized narrative—did not every Briton "remember" hearing Chamberlain and the wail of the first siren?—that gives the meaning of the moment a location in time and space. This is bad history to an empiricist, but the "objective observer" in Harrisson seems blind to the emotions that apparently take pride of place in the human memory, which, unless it is trained, Bartlett showed to be not a highly efficient recorder of empirical data. The fact that these feelings cannot be directly observed does not make them unreal, and it certainly does not make them unimportant.

Of the two descriptions of the scene in the young woman's house in Essex on Sunday morning, 3 September 1939, which one more closely resembles ancient historiography? Is it empirical description of observed events or the memorative drama that captures the significance of the moment? My suggestion would be that ancient historical writing blends these two types of description, conforming to neither pattern perfectly, but to the first on some occasions and to the second on others. This is perhaps to be expected from a time before Baconian empiricism.

It will be useful first to offer a brief sketch of the ways in which ancient historical writing conforms to the patterns of memory and then to turn to its more empirical features. Two observations are needed before I begin to do so. The first is that the dichotomy illustrated by the versions of Sunday morning, 3 September, quoted above is an extreme one. It is rare for events of such modest import to come under such close

scrutiny. Further, the banal occurrences in a family living room scarcely measure up the memorable significance of truly historical events. This fact may limit the effectivenss of the example. Nevertheless, subject to this limitation and further reservations about how "facts" are identified (summarized below), the comparison should be still instructive.

The second observation concerns the usefulness of memory. After the experiments conducted by Bartlett, Harrisson, and others reported by Gregg, one might draw a one-sidedly negative conclusion about the value of memory. Memory is a stored potential for expanding consciousness. In my discussion of it, I follow Daniel Dennett's widely acclaimed book on consciousness,[83] not because I am persuaded by his theory (I am in no position to judge it), but because he tries to develop an explanation of consciousness that takes account of most of the current theories that bear on the subject. For Dennett, memory is an extremely significant and fairly recent evolution of the human brain that is "in essence [an] *anticipation machine*" (177, author's emphasis). The expansion of the brain to include memory was stimulated at some time in the hominid past by the development of techniques of communicating with ourselves (195–99). The advantage of these techniques, which Dennett calls autostimulation, is that they make possible a consideration, an imagining of a future situation (on the assumption that the future will probably resemble the past), for which preparation will be necessary. "These techniques of representing things to ourselves," he argues, "permit us to be self-governors or executives in ways no other creature approaches. We can work out policies well in advance, thanks to our capacity for hypothetical thinking and scenario-spinning; we can stiffen our own resolve to engage in unpleasant or long-term projects by habits of self-reminding, and by rehearsing the expected benefits and costs of the policies we have adopted" (278). He continues a little later, "'Well, I mustn't do *that* again!' is the refrain of any creature that learns from experience, but we can learn to cast our *thats* back farther and more insightfully than any other creature, thanks to our habits of self-stimulation, which have, among their many effects, the enhancement of recollection" (278, author's emphasis). Elsewhere, Dennett cites various recent models of brain activity suggesting that we use different types of memory to aid in "conflict resolution," (265) by which he seems to mean any choosing or deciding that is controlled consciously from the brain.

83. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained.*

Dennett's theory points to a flaw particularly in Harrisson's extremist inference from Bartlett's results. The clinical tests did not take into consideration the idea that people are most likely to fix things in their memories when they foresee a use for the information as part of a strategy of survival, personal gratification, advancement, or the like. Culturally familiar memories are not necessarily subject to the decay that took Bartlett by surpise so long as individuals, or the community, sense a future use for them. Moreover, it would seem reasonable to expect that memories of a complex political past, suitable for early historical recording, are likely to develop in places where people can anticipate complex opportunities for a political future. Again, while these expectations for the future make possible an arresting, if not a reversal, of the natural tendency to forget culturally familiar material, they do not necessarily guard against what might be called the "pastures of Kentish Town" syndrome.

With this observation in mind, it will be useful to consider the memorative aspects of early Greek historiography. The first point may look surprising. It is the criterion of specific location treated above as the one empirical test of historical veracity that was openly recognized by the ancients. (Whether others were used covertly or indirectly will be examined below.) Following Harrisson's dichotomy, if it *is* empirical, it should not be memorative. But the truth is that it seems to fall into both camps, and this conclusion may help to explain why it is the only test of historical veracity *openly* recognized by the ancients. A single empirical test would be an anomaly. If it was developed as the result of a Baconian impulse, one would have to explain why that impulse did not lead to the open development of other experiential tests. But location has a particular affinity with memory as well. The strategies that people used for remembering classmates (see above) began with a recollection of the classroom and other spaces in which otherwise forgotten individuals could be found. Verification involved the stimulation of other such memories, which presumably proceeded along the same lines as the original ones. In that case, location is part of a verification procedure in both memorative and empirical systems.

If we follow Dennett's suggestion, memory develops out of a need to enact the future, to dramatize it in the imagination. In Harrisson's example, the woman from Essex dramatizes the past, the morning of 3 September, in her memory. The family huddles around the radio crowded by relatives and neighbours, a discussion follows, and finally Mother takes over the planning to enable the household to survive the

war. As Bartlett observed, memory has a strong tendency to conventionalize (268–80). Since the woman remembered nothing from her notes, her memory has created a scene in which the significance of the moment is conventionally enacted by all the participants who "should have" been there. Everyone hears Chamberlain; Mother plans for the family; Father's ineffectual authoritarianism is forgotten. It is unfortunate that the young woman did not "remember" details of the discussion. Since it never took place, the statements would have to be constructed along the stereotypical lines characteristic of memory, each person saying what such a person ought conventionally to say in that situation.

That ancient historians dramatize has long been recognized.[84] At times Thucydides produces melodrama.[85] His method of reporting speeches is clearly memorative (1.22.1–2): where he cannot remember them, he makes people say what the situation requires.[86] His famous Melian Dialogue (5.84–114) is perhaps the clearest example from early Greek historiography of an extended dramatization of meaning. Unnamed Athenian representatives hold a secret meeting with Melian spokesmen, also unnamed, and debate the proposed submission of Melos in highly generalized terms. The irresistibility of superior power both for those who wield it and for those who face it and the vanity of hope without power are its recurring themes. The debate seems to have been composed in retrospect, eleven years or more after the event. By that time, the victorious Spartans had had an opportunity to get revenge on the defeated Athenians for their brutal destruction of Melos, an old Spartan colony.[87]

At the time of the Melian affair, the Athenians are about to embark on the fateful Sicilian expedition, with high hopes that will soon be dashed. The Melians, deluded and ultimately destroyed by false hopes, are the alter egos of the Athenians whom they face. If the Melian debate is the clearest example of dramatized meaning, a discussion reported by

84. Cf. Grene, "Herodotus the Historian as Dramatist."

85. Grant, "Toward Knowing Thucydides," especially 85–90; Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, 110–52.

86. Discussion and recent bibliography provided in the next essay. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides*, 150–66, gives a useful survey of the question of the speeches up to 1980. I am not convinced by his proposed emendation of *lechthentōn* to *legontōn* (151). It seems to me that *lechthentōn* anticipates *prachthentōn* (1.22.2), something that Proctor does not consider.

87. Andrews in *HCT* 4: 181–88.

Herodotus (3.80–82) would have to be a close second. Seven conspirators assassinate a usurper on the Persian throne and then deliberate over the future constitution in conventionally Greek terms. Three of the seven make set speeches, Otanes for democracy, Megabyxus for oligarchy, and Darius for monarchy. The assignment of the speech on monarchy to Darius, the future king, is particularly appropriate. Each of these scenes dramatizes a moment of crisis, articulating the issues at stake. The Persians choose the stability of their accustomed system of government and embark on programs of western expansion, first under this very Darius and then under his successor, Xerxes.

Dramatization of itself proves nothing, of course; the point is simply that the stereotypical statements expressed in highly generalized terms are what one expects from a memorative history. The scenes have the appearance of having been preserved in memory *even if they have not been.* They are written for an audience that expects to hear a memorative, rather than an empirical, narration. On a different note, it was shown above that culturally familiar subjects were quickly forgotten unless the information was seen to be of special value. It is well known that Thucydides insisted on the usefulness of his history because "human nature being what it is, future events will be very similar" (1.22.4). In other words, he expects people to use his history as Dennett argues we use memory: to anticipate the future by remembering the past.[88]

Herodotus states that he visited Egypt (book 2) and frequently claims to report authentic information about Scythians (book 4) and other non-Greek peoples in various parts of his history, but his claims have been rejected by Detlev Fehling (see Appendix 1).[89] One of Fehling's criticisms is that the descriptions are too Hellenized to be authentic. This lack of authenticity, it is argued, leaves us no choice but to conclude that Herodotus had no contact with these peoples and places; so he is a liar, telling Greek stories about non-Greek people. But Bartlett has shown how mistakes occur when people from one culture encoun-

88. It has been thought that some of the lost historians of Greece were openly didactic, going beyond a simple anticipation of the future to the preaching of moral lessons. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios,* 174–75, points out that Herodotus and Thucydides did not preach moral lessons from history and argues that Theopompus probably did not, because he followed Herodotus' and Thucydides' "psychological" methods. Ephorus, on the other hand, meted out praise and blame in a way that must have been intended for instruction. Xenophon did use history to point out moral lessons; see Grayson, "Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?"

89. Fehling, *Herodotus and his "Sources,"* 3–7.

ter material from another. He found that one of the first things to be forgotten in all his tests was the title (172). This failure was particularly significant because in the case of the "War of the Ghosts," the title was an important clue to the meaning of the story. Therefore, in the first place, summary or encapsulating information from the originating culture is likely to be forgotten. In other words, general clues to the significance of information transferred from an alien culture will probably not be taken from the informer. They will have to be supplied retrospectively by the information gatherer. Therefore assimilation to the receiving culture begins at the first point of contact.

In the second place, unless the information is written down at the interview, it will have to be committed to memory, and Bartlett has shown how memory shapes received information and casts it in conventionalized terms. These terms, of course, are specific to the rememberer's culture, not the informant's. Herodotus' descriptions are not restricted to verbal information, however; many of them are visual. Fortunately, Bartlett ran a full series of tests on visual memory as well (47–62, 177–85). The results paralleled the verbal data. Finally, any questions posed by the enquirer will produce further distortions in the direction of the questioner's presuppositions, as shown by the experiment of the automobile accident reported by Gregg. This observation is significant because Fehling is very scornful of what he calls the "suggestive questions theory," which scholars have used to explain some of Herodotus' alleged distortions (4, n21). Leading questions are not a "theory," however; they are a fact. The conclusion that Herodotus was lying is not required by the evidence therefore (see also Appendix 1).

"Lies" are not necessarily invented by individuals; they may be expressions of the will of the community—the pastures of Kentish Town syndrome. One of Harrisson's most important observations was that the British recalled their endurance of the Blitz in heroic terms or they forgot it. In their memories there was no middle ground. His documents, written by observers present at the bombings, revealed some cowardice, considerable demoralization and confusion, and much apathy. The survivors of the Blitz angrily resisted any attempts to make either the negative images or the indifferent middle ground public. The result was the "glossification" of the war (324–30). In the next essay it will be argued that this public will to heroize or forget exerted enormous pressure on Greek historiography.

The conflicting versions of the scene in the home at Romford show how the process works. Of course, the woman's memory does not heroize

the scene, but it does sanitize it. Any hint of familial dysfunction (Mother's "stop that noise," Father's blustering) disappears in the "remembered" version, which features the family all together "for once." From the notes, we learn exactly what the young woman was doing—playing the piano—but nothing of what she felt. This is the empirical objectivity of the observer on the spot so prized by Harrisson. The "memory" exhibits quite different features. The woman's emotions now enter (she is "shaken to the roots"), and her sense of family bonding is dramatized, as I have suggested, but she is absent now as an individual participant. In the "memory" she is not playing the piano. We do not know what she is doing. To the conventionalization demonstrated above, now add two more possible facets of a memorative account: a subjectivity that is, second, depersonalized.

Does a memorative history require a different narrative posture from the more matter-of-fact empiricizing one?[90] Stewart Flory's recent book on Herodotus lays a good foundation for a discussion of this question. He points out that Herodotus will often give two or more versions of an event; one—usually straightforward and dull—will be identified as what really happened, and the other(s)—often told in rich detail—criticized as false.[91] An excellent example is taken from book 8 (118), in which Xerxes' flight from Greece after the battle of Salamis is described. Herodotus believes that Xerxes crossed the Strymon river and proceeded overland to the Hellespont when he returned to Asia.

The false version is much more interesting. According to it, the Persian King took a Phoenician ship from the Strymon directly to Asia, but got caught in a storm. The ship was full of Persian grandees, who leapt overboard in response to a suggestion from the captain relayed to them by Xerxes. So the captain saved the boat from sinking and with it the King's life and was rewarded with a crown, but was then beheaded for causing the death of so many noble Persians. Herodotus attacks the false story (119) by arguing that not one in ten thousand would believe that the Persians would have elected death when they had lowly Phoenician sailors to heave overboard instead. He returns to the true version and "proves" it by citing the evidence of a golden axe allegedly presented by Xerxes to the people of Abdera on his return journey by land (120).

90. Narrative voice and subjectivity are tools frequently used in feminist literary criticism. Cf. Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't.* They are valuable insights, and the general approach is adaptable to a variety of cases.

91. Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 49–69.

The axe is not quite empirical evidence since its interpretation depends on the testimony of the Abderites, but the "true" version *is* presented as verified, while the "false" one is identified as a report "in circulation" (*logos legomenos*). Now the purpose of telling "false" stories that are in circulation is explained by Flory this way: "The ideas or themes that such details introduce ... can offer insight into characters or motives" (76–77). He also points out that the meaning of the false stories is often confirmed by "true" stories found in other parts of Herodotus' work (72–76). In other words, if Flory is correct, Herodotus understood and exploited the difference between "historical" and memorative truth. The story in circulation—that is, in public memory, since this is an oral culture—captures the meaning of subservience to an Oriental potentate, which the Greeks struggled to escape. Herodotus' criticism shows that the memory has got one thing wrong: it is not the Persians, but the Phoenician subjects, who would suffer most. Thanks to the battle of Salamis and others to follow, the Greeks will not experience this treatment.

I take Herodotus' statements at face value. He claims to have investigated the actual route taken by Xerxes. This is Herodotus the empiricist before his time. But he is no Baconian and certainly not a "birdwatcher." Satisfied that he knows what really happened, he turns to "false" stories in the public memory. In particular, he gives a memorative invention that closely parallels the pastures of Kentish Town syndrome. The people of Kentish Town, like Herodotus' informants, were inventing a memory that said something about the meaning of the present: the drabness of present-day bricks and asphalt contrasted with lost green fields sleeping beneath in one case, the enjoyment of freedom contrasted with a vignette of life under an all-powerful monarch in the other. The matter-of-fact version of Xerxes' route restored to memory a fleeing monarch who could still take thought for his benefactors, giving the Abderites, for example, a golden axe. The invented memory in circulation addressed a higher truth. The Great King regarded his subjects as expendable ballast—his beneficiaries (the ship's captain, in this case) as people to be rewarded for good service, to be sure, but also to be beheaded at whim.

These stories in circulation (*legomena*) but false are given special narrative treatment by Herodotus, as Flory is well aware. "My duty is to report what is said [*ta legomena*], but I am not obliged to believe it in every case, and this can be taken to apply to my whole work," says the historian in another place (7.152.2–3). In general, disclaimers such as this

one are associated with these false, but meaningful traditions (Flory, 62–64) or, I would add, when Herodotus believes that a simple telling of the "historical" version would not be sufficient, will not be the whole truth (as in 7.152). In other words, there is a conscious change of narrator in these cases; the historian claims to step aside and let the public memory speak for itself.

Herodotus wrote about great events that occurred before his mature lifetime. On the other hand, Thucydides and Xenophon described the struggles of their own generations. It may be significant that their narrative voices always speak in the third person. When Thucydides must describe his own actions (4.104.4–105), he is not the narrative subject "I," but its object "he." Xenophon consistently does the same both in the *Hellenica* (3.2.7 refers to himself) and in his *Anabasis*, a personal memoir.[92] Taken by themselves, these characteristics of early Greek historical narrative do not prove anything, but they do conform to the nature of memorative traditions deduced from the observations of Harrisson and the psychological experiments cited above.

However, these characteristics need not be taken by themselves. In a predominantly oral society such as that of ancient Greece, it is to be expected that memory, rather than written documents, will have shaped its traditions. A deeper question concerns the extent to which the traditions were nonetheless controlled by physical evidence, particularly archives and public inscriptions. In the next essay it will be shown that the ancient writers rarely made open use of documents, and when they did, their practices hardly ever parallel the deductive procedures of modern historians. Unfortunately, we only have direct knowlege of the surviving histories. Many of the great fourth-century histories are lost to us but for a handful of quotations (called fragments) from later works. Is it possible that some of them developed more sophisticated empirical methods?

Evidently not, at least not to any significant extent. In one of his scornful dismissals of Timaeus, Polybius makes the following remark: "For this [i.e., Timaeus] is the man who made a tabulation from the beginning of the ephors and kings of Lacedaemon, of the archons in Athens, and the priestesses in Argos, setting them against the Olympic

92. For historians such as Ephorus and Theopompus whose works are lost it is not easy to be sure what narrative posture they assumed. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, 175–78 advances the attractive suggestion that this writer regularly used the style of forensic oratory—the rhetoric of the law courts—which was both vicious and tendentious in ancient Greece. Perhaps unique in this, Theopompus is probably to be thought of as a judgmental observer always ready to step in and castigate his characters for some perceived fault.

victors, and refuting the errors in the city records which amounted to more than three months. And Timaeus is also the one who discovered the stelae on the back of the building, as well as the proxeny inscriptions on the door jambs of the temple" (T. S. Brown, tr.).[93] This observation looks promising to be sure, but there is reason to believe that Timaeus' dabbling with inscriptions was exceptional.

The above quotation from Polybius comes towards the end of a lengthy attack on Timaeus for an alleged mendacious and scurrilous diatribe against Aristotle. Apparently Timaeus had taken strong exception to a characterization of the Locrians that he found in Aristotle. He "disproved" Aristotle by citing personal testimony of the Locrians and one of their inscriptions against him. Unimpressed by the inscription, Polybius suggests that it was a fabrication, probably by Timaeus rather than the Locrians (Polyb. 12.6–12). Polybius was equally unimpressed by Timaeus' researches into chronology, which seemed to have involved the discovery of some inscriptions. The theme of the digression is Timaeus' mendacity, not his trustworthiness. So when Timaeus claims uniqueness in pursuing this line of research (12.10.4), we must take him seriously. Polybius knew the lost historians who preceded Timaeus, and if they had attended to inscriptions to any extent, it is difficult to believe that Polybius would have missed the opportunity to show that Timaeus was lying on this subject as well.

So on the surface, the early histories were representations of the collective memories of their communities not directly controlled by any critical or systematic examination of documents. And when they did cite documents, they fell under suspicion for mendacity. How then did the Greek historians get anything right? After due allowance is made for chauvinistic exaggerations, factual blunders, and the like, their accounts of the histories of their own people turn out to be generally reliable, surprisingly unaffected by the pastures of Kentish Town syndrome.[94] Something is missing from the picture that I have drawn. Two clues to the identity of the missing component can be taken, one from Herodotus' "historical" account of Xerxes' retreat and the other from Polybius' attack on Timaeus. Herodotus deduced the historical route from local traditions (the Abderites' in particular), which were attached to a tangible survival (the golden axe). Similarly, Timaeus consulted local Locrian

93. Brown, *The Greek Historians*, 154.

94. The attacks on Herodotus' reliability focus on his treatment of places such as Egypt and the Black Sea or his alleged Hellenization of Persian and other non-Greek traditions. Doubts may be raised about his reporting of counter-intuitive occurrences such as Epizelus' vision of the giant during the battle of Marathon (6.117.3) or Dicaeus' reported vision of the

traditions, which included the citation of an inscription, to correct Aristotle. In the next essay the argument will be developed more fully that, while general or universal historians did not cite documents regularly, they were aware of local histories that did.

This conclusion does not mean that all the empiricists did local history. It should mean that, provided universal historians knew a great many local histories, their historiography would have been vicariously "controlled" by documents through local histories. The generalist avoided citing documents directly in order not to align himself with local propaganda. Local historians probably selected and reported documents with a view to glorifying their home towns. The most likely way for a generalist to offset the bombast of one place would be to listen to the crowing of its rivals. After that, some sort of adjudication would be necessary. In fact, Connor points out that our word "history" stems from an early Greek usage describing the role of an investigating adjudi-

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unearthly host marching towards Salamis from Eleusis before the battle of Salamis (8.65). But these are probably no more Herodotean inventions than the coffins dripping with blood at Coventry or the swastika in the sky "seen" by a woman before the Blitz and reported by Harrisson in *Living through the Blitz*, 138, are Harrisson's inventions. To be sure, Herodotus describes battles that took place decades before he was old enough to enquire about them, and one must wonder how much Harrisson's choice of heroize (glossify) or forget has distorted the sort of memories with which Herodotus must deal. His account of the battle of Marathon, fought in 490, looks heroized and is so disassociated from the topography of Marathon that a consensus on the actual course of the battle seems unattainable today. Compare, for example, Shrimpton's "Persian Cavalry at Marathon" with Evans's "Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon." On the other hand, Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea, fought in 480, contains a great deal of topographical information, which Pritchett felt was generally reliable; see Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, 1: 103–21.

This same scholar has recently produced a comprehensive and bellicose defence of the empirical accuracy and veracity of Herodotus: *The Liar School of Herodotus*. This work may be consulted for further bibliography. Waters, in *Herodotos on Tyrants and Despots*, argues for a sustained objectivity throughout Herodotus' work. By this he means that the historian's reports are not as slanted or subject to literary (including dramatic) influences as some have thought. Aly, in *Volksmärchen, Sage, und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenossen*, studied important motifs of saga and folk tale in Herodotus. While Herodotus' use of these stories may seem unhistorical, to the extent that he transmits them without alteration, confidence in his reliability as a reporter may be increased. Further, see Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 167–68. To do history in the traditional sense, a certain level of political sophistication is desirable, and perhaps Herodotus seems a little naive on this subject. However, Shimron's *Politics and Belief in Herodotus* argues the contrary view.

As for Thucydides, Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* appeared in 1907. It contends that Thucydides misrepresented the history of his war because he failed to appreciate the significance of the "Piraeus lobby." Whatever one makes of that argument, Cornford's remarks about the literary qualities of Thucydides were years ahead of their time. Still, this

cator (*histōr*) of legal disputes.[95] The purpose of the investigation was to resolve the dispute, ideally by negotiating the parties to a consensus. "The historian," he suggests, "if this is the origin of the enterprise, is not a mere antiquarian or ethnographer but a person who plays a crucial social role, the development of fair judgements and the formation of social consensus" (12). Connor goes on to argue that Herodotus expands his role in the later books, allowing himself to pass judgment where conflicting versions are not openly in evidence (13, n41). No doubt it would be a mistake to simplify the function of an ancient historian, reducing it to a single model, but I shall argue that rival local claims did not disappear from the Greek world in the period under scrutiny in this book. The historians found various ways of dealing with them. Sometimes they still tried to negotiate a consensus; sometimes they ignored them; often it is difficult to know what they did. Nevertheless, according to their theories and to the pronouncements they made in their introductory remarks, it seems that most of them believed that historical truth depended on travel and widespread consultation—contact, presumably, with these local traditions.

In archaic Greece, interstate rivalry sometimes found expression through monuments, painted pottery, and victory odes, but this competition for international recognition focused heavily on athletic victories

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indictment of Thucydides the scientific historian, if believed, only convicts him of blindness and "unhistorical" approaches to narration, but not whole-cloth fabrication. The backlash against Cornford is noted in the next essay. As if to rebut Cornford, Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (*ATL*), used Thucydides and inscriptions to construct a detailed picture of the Athenian empire. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, follows their line. For a summary statement of the trustworthiness of Thucydides that emerges after years of pursuing this method, see Lewis, "Sources, Chronology, and Method." See also Dover's very useful *Thucydides*, 4–5, for some of Thucydides' errors. Now, however, see Badian, in *From Plataea to Potidaea*, who repeatedly charges Thucydides with manipulation and distortion and occasionally the fabrication of details, but this is still a far cry from my pastures of Kentish Town syndrome.

I do not think that any one could prove that ancient historiography was free from invention. There are two questions, How much? and Who did it? How much? will be debated forever, I imagine, but Harrisson's and Tindall's observations show how entire communities, even nations, can invent a past for themselves. In other words, it is not necessarily safe to conclude that the ancient historian is solely responsible for the invention. The fourth-century historians are more difficult to assess. Xenophon is an exception, but the others are lost. Xenophon does not inspire the admiration of serious historians. Connor in "Historical Writing in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Hellenistic Period" shows why. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, 184–210, provides a good discussion of Theopompus' historical accuracy. On Ephorus, one could do much worse than Brown, *The Greek Historians*, 107–15.

95. Connor, "The *Histor* in History."

at various interstate festivals. As Finley and Pleket point out, the odes and pottery "came to an end"[96]—the time was the early fifth century. Coincidentally, from about this time the Greeks turned to the writing of history. Civic pride is natural, and community reputations are jealously protected, as Harrisson was painfully aware (327–30). Such pride can lead to distortions and fraudulence, but under the watchful eye of suspicious rivals there are times when fairness is the best policy, as Finley and Pleket observe (44–45). As in athletics, so in historiography where civic reputations were at stake. The Abderites and their axe, the Locrians and their inscription, attacked as a forgery by Polybius, are brief glimpses of the ways in which city-states advanced or fought over their reputations on a level rarely reflected in the finished historical productions of the generalist historians after Herodotus.

This model of the ancient historical enterprise—that fierce competition kept rivals honest—has its difficulties, not the least of which is that it posits the existence of an invisible force that pulls ancient historiography back from a natural tendency towards free creation. The force is invisible now because all ancient examples of local historiography are lost. Their nature must be deduced from traces, and these are pitifully scant indeed. But oral history, left to its own devices, is no more capable of policing itself for empirical accuracy than human memory.[97] Astronomers must posit the existence of vast amounts of invisible matter to ex-

96. Finley and Pleket, *The Olympic Games*, 13.

97. Oral traditions by themselves are full of omissions and errors. Vansina used a comparative approach supplemented by recent documents to reconstruct the history of the Kuba primarily from oral sources; see Vansina, *The Children of Woot*, 227–42. Reefe, *The Rainbow and the Kings*, 197–200, suggests that "oral traditions that purport to tell about specific events and actions that date from the beginning of the eighteenth century must be treated with scepticism" (199). On the method of making history from oral sources, see Vansina again in *Oral Tradition*, 76:

> A testimony is no more than a mirage of the reality it describes. The initial informant in an oral tradition gives, either consciously or unconsciously, a distorted account of what has really happened, because he sees only some aspects of it, and places his own interpretation on what he has seen. His testimony is stamped by his personality, coloured by his private interests, and set within the framework of reference provided by the cultural values of the society he belongs to. This initial testimony then undergoes alterations and distortions at the hands of all the other informants in the chain of transmission, down to and including the very last one, all of them being influenced by the same factors as the first: their private interests and the interests of the society they belong to, the cultural values of that society, and their own individual personalities.

Now see Henige, *Oral Historiography*.

plain why galaxies do not fly apart (see below); so, it seems to me, that in order to explain the general reliability of ancient historiography, something must be there that we do not see.

In my discussion of rationalism above I suggested that its influence on historical writing tends to detach it from experience. Thucydides has always drawn favourable attention from scholars whose outlook would have to be described as rationalizing. It has been observed that he is admired today by the realist school of historians and political scientists.[98] He was highly regarded by the so-called scientific historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[99] His early confidence in rationality may be seen to make him a precursor of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, but in the previous century too, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes found a kindred spirit in him.[100] Such is the enduring quality of his genius. In Herodotus' case, the ancients were at odds over whether to regard him as the father of history or the father of lies.[101] The debate continues to this day (see Appendix 1). "If Herodotus' world is an open society," said Momigliano, "Thucydides' is a closed shop." He does not allow intruders to get in as Herodotus does at the slightest provocation.[102] Unlike Thucydides, Herodotus was not limited by a preoccupation with the intense struggle for power between Athens and Sparta. The "shape of Herodotus' world" (see note 103) is expansive, open to spontaneous occurrences. In this way, it mirrors human experience directly. Further, his passion was to probe and push the bounds of Greek knowledge outward in every direction and on every subject. When every subject opens out like this, one must rationalize selectively, for effective rationalization requires an enclosure of the subject in a system isolated from the extraneous impulses of chance.[103] Hence the "physics" of Herodotus, with its coexistent randomness and rational order, bears comparison to that of late-twentieth-century cosmology, which recognizes order in galaxies and solar systems, but emphasizes their participation in a universe of increasing entropy. But

98. Lebow and Strauss, *Hegemonic Rivalry*, 1–3.

99. See, for example, Momigliano, "Friedrich Creuzer and Greek Historiography."

100. Hobbes produced his famous translation of Thucydides in 1629. He was a friend of Descartes and a believer in one-man rule as the best guarantee of political order.

101. "In Herodotus, the father of history, ... there are many fables" (Cicero *Laws* 1.5) captures the ancient ambivalence. Also cf. Evans, "Father of History or Father of Lies."

102. Momigliano, "Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography," 116.

103. Romm, "The Shape of Herodotus' World." For more bibliography, see Shimron, "Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν."

Momigliano was not just speaking of spontaneous occurrences. The "intruders" lead Herodotus away on digressions of varying length and relevance. If modern histories must be of something, it is by no means clear that the early Greek historians fully accepted that requirement or that they felt it necessary to define their subjects and adhere to them narrowly. Thucydides is an exception, but Herodotus himself declares that his "narrative style [*logos*] sought out digressions [*prosthekai*] from the start" (4.30).

After Thucydides, Xenophon continued his account of the Peloponnesian War with no declared purpose. His younger contemporary, Ephorus, seems to have produced an episodic history that moved from place to place—now the Greek mainland, now Sicily, now wherever there was significant activity. Theopompus, by ancient reports a contemporary of Ephorus though younger again, wrote a major treatise, the *Philippica*, ostensibly about Philip of Macedon, in fifty-eight books. By one account (T31) only sixteen of those books dealt with the declared subject directly. How could ancient readers gain satisfaction from a superficially purposeless, disjointed historiography? Did they simply expect historians to show them the world as it was? As for Thucydides, despite his unusual grasp of and adherence to the "closed shop" of his Peloponnesian War, his unique narrative style clings to the war's episodic development. No other historian in antiquity narrated a major event organized by summers and winters as systematically as he does. By breaking the war down into its seasonal components, he permits his readers to re-experience it more or less as it happened. Campaigns that took more than one season are fragmented into episodes and placed side by side in the enumeration of the other events and episodic fragments that belong to each season (see the next essay and Appendix 2). The meaning of these events is pointed out mostly in speeches put into the mouths of principal agents from time to time. Thucydides did not always use his knowledge of the "future of the past" to avoid narrative culs-de-sac. Scholars have noticed at least two fully developed scenes that lead to nothing in particular with reference to the war's development.[104] Of course, the ancients felt the need for some rational narrative order, but not quite to the extent required by Derrida's thesis. They were apparently responding to a perceived need to produce a narrative that gained in realism by corresponding somehow to the chaos of day-to-day experience with its randomness and promising starts that lead

104. Dover, *Thucydides*, 25–26.

either nowhere at all or to unexpected outcomes. To some extent, such an approach could only be achieved at the cost of orderliness and with it the appearance of rationality. In addition, they tended to address events either through the memory directly or "reconstructed" as if they were memories. Thus their accounts tried to capture the pathos, the emotional drama. of the event. It would be tempting to say that this pathos could be captured only at the sacrifice of a dry empiricism, but empiricism as we know it today did not quite exist to be sacrificed in the ancient world.

My aim in this book is to map out the ways by which ancient Greek historians understood things to be "true" and by which they presented their reports as worthy of belief by their audiences. Perhaps my argument will seem unduly complicated. Can we not simply expect the ancient historians to find out what happened and write it down? When they succeeded we could praise them, and condemn them when they failed. I am thinking of G. R. Elton's rebuttle of E. H. Carr, which, though dated, still represents the view of many historians of my acquaintance.[105] For Elton, the subject matter of history can be treated more objectively than that of the natural sciences if only because scientists are frequently obliged to interfere with their material, often drastically, in order to study it (72). On the other hand, the historian remains ever distant from the thing observed, like a birdwatcher.

Elton argues that historians need assurance that their work deals with reality, particularly because, unlike scientists, what they study is neither "in the presence of the observer" nor can it "be brought back for study" (71). He was well aware that the superiority of all scientific knowledge over its poor cousin from the history department was no longer quite so absolute since Heisenberg. Both science and history now deal with uncertainties. But still there were those enviable astronomers who could go to their telescopes and look at stars and galaxies again and again. Even better, since the light from distant galaxies takes thousands of millions of years to reach us, the more distant the object the younger its appearance to us. Through telescopes, scientists can actually see the past of the universe!

Well, not quite. One does not see all that is there. More information about the history of the universe is acquired by ultra-violet, infra-red, and radio telescopy than by visual observation. Moreover, all the invisible matter that must now be postulated to hold our galaxies from flying

105. Elton, *The Practice of History.*

apart must curve space according to relativity theory, and since the light from distant objects must pass through its gravitational field, it must be distorted as if it passes through a gigantic lens. What they "see" is not exactly what is there.[106] Sometimes, it seems, additional knowledge increases uncertainty about what we think we know. Such seems particularly the case since the emergence of chaos theory, which, among a number of remarkable things, determines that many of nature's systems are unpredictable. Predictability had always been a cornerstone of scientific certainty. Perhaps historians should be shedding their inferiority complexes.

And what about historical knowledge? Can the past really be studied objectively, like birdwatching, as Elton argued, even though "the bird" is not there, as he admits? "No matter how many observers may concern themselves with such questions as the day on which Britain declared war on Germany in 1914," says Elton, "who the eldest child of Henry VIII was, or where Napoleon confronted the allied armies in 1813, they will all come up with the same answer" (80). This observation sounds a little bit like Herodotus' "not one in ten thousand" from his rebuttal of the false story of Xerxes' retreat (8.119). The trouble is, as Flory points out, few modern scholars would line up with Herodotus' putative plurality.[107] They point to the folly of tossing an experienced crew overboard while the ship is in the clutches of a violent storm. Was Herodotus wrong, then, about his own society, or have modern scholars missed something?[108]

There is evidence that what we "see" is influenced, even shaped, by social and neurological preconditioning.[109] Most historians have had years of university training to prepare them to recognize and deal with

106. Lemonick and Nash, "Unraveling the Universe."

107. Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 172.

108. Actually, I think that I would put my faith in Herodotus. Mediterranean squalls come up so quickly, are so ferocious, and die down so quickly that experienced sailors would only be needed at first to stow the ship's gear properly. While the storm raged, the ship would just have to run before it; and when it abated, the Persians could probably be taught by the captain to row it to shore if it had not already run aground.

109. Cf. O. Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat.* Sacks does not openly state that what we see is shaped by neurological preconditioning. But what other conclusion is there from, say, the first case study (8–22)? The implied question seems to be, What constitutes normality and why? The people in Sacks's case histories have no idea that the "reality" they perceive bears no relation (in some particular, at least) to that perceived by the rest of us. Presumably, our neurological make-up is the product of thousands, if not millions, of years of evolutionary fine tuning. That would explain why the woman who had no contact with her hands (59–65) is abnormal. We could not survive if we were all like that. So

their facts. Perhaps an intelligent eleven-year-old might be among Elton's unlimited list of observers who would come up with the "same answers" about specific historical events, but not Oliver Sacks's "Joseph." His mind had not been conditioned by society through language to understand that there could be such a thing as the past, and he certainly did not know that one could ask questions about it since he did not even understand the idea of a question. To condemn Herodotus for misrepresenting his own society is to claim that we can see it more accurately than he could. Is that claim justifiable? Would it not be to commit the same mistake as Herodotus when he went to Egypt, a failure to recognize the difficulties involved in understanding and "translating" pieces of an alien culture out of their setting and into one of his own?

It would be difficult to think of a school of human thought with greater experience in translation, both linguistic and cultural, than Christianity. Possibly the most surprising, and almost certainly the most important, decision made by the early Christians was to translate the teachings of Christ from Aramaic to the Greek koine.[110] From that moment Christian evangelism has developed, and Christianity has distinguished itself as a religion always ready to face new cultures and translate its books into one new language after another. In other words, for the last two thousand years, Christians have dealt with a problem similar to the one in this book: translating profound concepts deemed both truthful and vitally significant by the evangelist from one language—and culture—to another. Perhaps it would be useful to pause and learn a little from their vast experience.

A few centuries ago, the Christians' approach was simple and often brutish. In their eyes, non-Christians were devil worshippers who needed to repent. Whether they did so or not, frequently the result of their contact with European evangelists was the virtual destruction of their cultures. Today the demeanour of the evangelist is considerably more respectful of the non-Christian culture. In a paper delivered in 1988, Louis Luzbetak pointed out the two principal strategies a translator may

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nature has trained us to perceive "reality" in a way that will enable us to survive. What makes us so confident, then, that these superb tools for daily survival are capable of perceiving correctly—let alone understanding—the bizarre information that comes from deep space or even such abstract things as the human condition as it stumbles its way through something we call time, thereby creating something we call history?

110. Sanneh, "Gospel and Culture."

adopt in dealing with non-European peoples.[111] "At one time," he said, "the quality of a Bible translation was judged in no small measure by its faithfulness to the *form* of the message being translated—that is, by its faithfulness to such things as literalness, its closeness to the original grammatical structure, its adherence to the original style and idiom, and the like" (110, author's emphasis). Luzbetak had already argued for an alternative approach. He gave a clear illustration of the limitations of this formalism by citing the example of the Dangombas, who live north of Ghana. They have no word for "thank you," and it is no use looking for a circumlocution in their language. They have such a highly developed sense of duty that kindnesses are a social obligation. Insofar as "thank you" means "I did not expect you to do what you did, but I want you to know that I am glad you did it, and would be pleased to repay you," the remark is potentially both insulting and fatuous in their community—insulting because a dutiful person is not likely to be pleased if you are surprised that he or she has done what is expected; fatuous because it is not needful in a society such as theirs to give assurances that you will repay them dutifully. Luzbetak pointed out how difficult such a concept makes it for the Christian to explain "God's gratuitous love" to a Dangomba (108).

For anyone who wishes to explain how far ancient historical writing corresponds to that of the twentieth century—and how far it differs—the problem is similar to that of the evangelists facing the Dangombas. The Christians wish not only to render certain texts into a new language, but also to make an entire religious philosophy acceptable to people who may lack the "cultural and neurological preconditioning" to understand the most elementary concepts of the new religion. My task is to take a system of thought about the past expressed in a complex language quite different from English and originating in a place nearly halfway around the world from my home and from a culture that flourished more than two thousand years ago and to explain it in modern terms. It would be a mistake to underestimate the potential complexity of this undertaking. It should be clear from the foregoing that I trust in a broadly cultural, as well as a formalist, methodology.

Most of this essay has focused on cultural questions: influences of rationality and empiricism; forgetting and the workings of human memory; non-historical systems of thought, particularly scientific, and the light that they shed on historiography; rhetoric and ideology. But there

111. Luzbetak, "Contextual Translation."

is no substitute for direct contact with the literature itself. Perhaps a comparison will help to illustrate some of the points I have made about ancient and modern historiography and to prepare for the arguments that will follow. I have chosen two moments, one from the ancient world, the other from recent European history, and two descriptions, one from each of those periods of time. They are closely parallel, turning points in two grandiose and catastrophic miscalculations: the Sicilian expedition of the Athenians (415–413 BC) and Operation Barbarossa (1941–43), the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union, which aimed to destroy it and seize the oilfields of the Caucasus (among other prizes). Both campaigns marked the pinnacle of fortune for the aggressor, and both ended in utter defeat. In each case, there was a fierce struggle to capture a city (or cities, for Barbarossa). Syracuse was the main target of the Athenians; Stalingrad was the key to control of the route to the Caucasus for the Nazis. Both aggressors came very close to winning complete control of the targeted cities, but the besieging forces were eventually pinned down by their enemies and placed under counter-siege. In both cases the aggressors' generals begged for permission to withdraw, but were denied and promised supplies and reinforcements. Paulus in Stalingrad received inadequate supplies from the Luftwaffe; Nicias was handsomely reinforced. When opportunities for escape came, both commanders seemed dazed and indecisive. In each case, a single battle can be identified as a critical moment after which it was clear that the aggressor would have to accept defeat, barring an utter miracle. For Paulus and his Sixth Army, the critical battle was Manstein's attempt to drive sixty miles over snow-covered steppe to make contact with him. For Nicias, the last major battle was to be a struggle to defeat the Syracusan navy in the great harbour before the city and break out of the harbour, of which the exit had been barricaded by the Syracusans. The battles have been described by two great historians, John Keegan and Thucydides.

Here is Keegan's description of the advance of Manstein's forces toward Paulus's lines:

> Until 14 December they made good progress; a measure of surprise had been achieved and the Russians, now as ever, found it difficult to resist the initial impetus of a German advance. Time might be on their side but they could not match the Wehrmacht in military skill. Against the Wehrmacht's satellites, however, they were on equal if not better terms. On 16 December the Italian Eighth Army north of Stalingrad, which had thus far escaped the Romanians' fate, was

struck and penetrated and a new threat was hurled against Manstein's Panzer thrust. On 17 December the 6th Panzer Division lurched to within thirty-five miles of Stalingrad, close enough to hear gunfire from the city; but the pace of advance was slowing, the Italian front was bending and the Sixth Army showed no sign of reaching out to join hands. On 19 December Manstein flew his chief intelligence officer into the city in an effort to galvanise its commander. He returned with news that Paulus was oppressed by the difficulties and the fear of incurring the Führer's disfavour. On 21 December Manstein tried but failed to persuade Hitler to give Paulus a direct order for a break-out. By 24 December his own relief effort had ground to a halt in the snows of the steppe between the Don and Volga and he could only accept the necessity to retreat.[112]

In a brief space, this paragraph both describes and explains how the scales of history finally tipped against the Wehrmacht. The unreliability of Manstein's allies on his northern flank, Paulus's indecision, and "general winter" all combined to deprive him of ultimate success.

Now compare the last stages of the struggle for control of the Syracusan harbour as Thucydides describes it. To me, Thucydides writes from two narrative standpoints. One is similar to Keegan's; it is or closely resembles the standpoint of the empirical, objective observer. But most of this paragraph takes the opposite position, what I have called depersonalized subjectivity. Thucydides begins by addressing the pathos of the struggle; then he invents observers who are placed on the shore to experience typical aspects of the struggle and record their emotions.

Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance, were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; the natives thirsting for more glory than they had already won, while the invaders feared to find themselves in even worse plight than before. The all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same point at once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage, and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation, while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds, and they suffered the worst agony

112. Keegan, *The Second World War*, 235.

of all, ever just within reach of safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "We win," "We lose" and all the other manifold exclamations that a great host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight, and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were not taken afloat, now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without the help of some extraordinary accident.[113]

113. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (tr. Crawley), 401–402.

2

Verification, Objectivity, and Interaction: Appreciating the Gulf between Ancient and Contemporary Historical Writing

THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

History according to Jacques Le Goff is a science; and David Hackett Fischer's argument would appear to be that, when it is not, historians simply have their own methodological laxity to blame.[1] Science is usually thought of as a study of things "out there," but I know that many of my colleagues would agree with Anton Kaes in his perceptive article about the Holocaust and the entangling of history with film-makers' images in today's collective memory: "The past cannot be recovered and re-experienced, since it is not 'out there' to be visited and photographed like a foreign country; the past always has to be reconstructed and reconstituted, represented on the basis of representations that already exist."[2] Nevertheless, to judge from the books and articles we write, historians are forced to believe that something happened or existed "out there" and that their task is to use every available form of documentation and logic that will produce an account of it that corresponds as closely as possible to the real thing. This is correspondence theory. It proposes that historians can ideally describe what they observe in much the same way as Newton's *Principia* is believed to have described the solar system. Correspondence has become the general ideal for historians since the late nineteenth century at the very least, and as a theory, it has developed very little since.[3]

1. Le Goff, *History and Memory*, 101–106, 179–99; Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*.

2. Kaes, "History and Film," 117; cf. Vidal, *Screening History*, especially 80–81, and Bann, "The Odd Man Out."

3. Two important books illustrate the condition of current historical enquiry; it appears to be one of widespread fragmentation. Young, *White Mythologies*, covers Europe with a special emphasis on Marxist historiography. On the state of history in America, see Novick, *That Noble Dream*; cf. also *AHR* 96A (Feb.–June 1991): 675–708.

RELATIVITY THEORY AND INTERACTION

This essay will argue for new ways of looking at ancient historical writing, ways that will, on the one hand, emphasize the gulf between ancient and contemporary history and, on the other, point to similarities between ancient and contemporary thought. To do so, I will suggest, it is essential to disengage ourselves from the ancients by relieving them of the burden of anachronistic notions that we have laid on them for a century or more now, notions that may not, in the last analysis, prove to be wrong, but ones whose persistence in our minds inhibits the development of alternative views against which to test them. I accept the argument that is at least as old as E. H. Carr that new ways of looking at the past are not sent to us like visions from above, but come as the result of changing perceptions of the present.[4] Discoveries about ourselves and our own circumstances, whether made by sheer dint of creative imagination or pressed onto our consciousness by such things as changing social or political circumstances, are the principal forces that fling open formerly undiscovered windows on the past.

I begin, then, with the present. If Le Goff is correct, history is susceptible to scientific methods. It is no use lamenting that historians cannot perform experiments on their dead subjects, as if experimenting was the only activity known to science. Much of contemporary science involves observing and explaining, and it is in that sense that it bears comparison with history.[5] Thought experiments were used by Einstein to illustrate the implications of relativity theory. In a famous one, he imagined people in a free-falling elevator (a lift) that is rapidly accelerating

4. In Carr, *What is History*, 29–55, the problem was to find a way of controlling the undeniable influence of the present.

5. This does not mean that history has become a science in a fit of absent-mindedness, so to speak. It means that certain sciences are closer to the humanities than most historians of my acquaintance believe. Kusso's "Observation of the Past" argues that the difference between historical and "scientific" observation is one of degrees (and I agree, insofar as the difference is real at all). Of course, I am prejudiced. Before I ever learned that knowledge is compartmentalized into things such as history and science (and before the distractions of teenage life), I had read the exciting books of Sir James Jeans: *The Universe around Us*, *The Stars in Their Courses*, *Through Space and Time*. Somewhat later (in the middle of my first year as a graduate student in classics), I read George Gamow's *The Creation of the Universe*. Later, in *The Tao of Physics*, Fritjof Capra explored the relationship between quantum mechanics and so-called eastern mysticism, an idea that may have influenced Gary Zukav's *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*. In this book, written in consultation with four unnamed physicists, Zukav explains and perhaps sensationalizes quantum mechanics. Under the influence of books such as this, I had little difficulty with the claim of Maurice Mandlebaum in *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* that historians dealt with a body of knowledge that could meet the

towards a large object. Because of the acceleration, these people experience weightlessness. Objects released from the hands of the passengers do not fall to the floor of the lift, but float in one direction until they collide with a wall, and then change direction. Now assume that these passengers cannot see out and that they live their whole lives in this context. When they formulate their laws of physics, they will have no place for gravity since they do not experience it. Observers from outside the elevator, however, know that the passengers' conclusions about the absence of gravity, while valid for their closed system of observation, are actually created by the way that gravity works on the lift, causing it to accelerate.[6] The passengers may be forgiven if they make the natural mistake of concluding that their experience of an apparently gravity-free world has universal validity.

In this essay I shall speak of ancient historians interacting both with the past and with their societies in the production of their accounts of the past. It will be useful to provide a metaphor with which to capture the idea of interaction and suggest its importance to modern practice, and so use it as a benchmark against which to gauge the distance between ancient and modern historical writing—a kind of historical thought experiment. In addition, it will be seen that my proposed metaphor exposes new avenues of enquiry about early Greek historical writing.

THE METAPHOR

Imagine three groups of people observing a mountain that towers four kilometres above a plain at about 50° latitude in the northern hemisphere (Fig. 1). The three groups are all situated generally to the north, and all are about fifteen kilometres distant from the base of the mountain. Group B is in the middle, group A is ten kilometres eastward and slightly south of B, and group C is ten kilometres to the west and also slightly south of B's position. In addition, each group is at a different

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criteria of *scientia* as satisfactorily as most so-called scientific facts. Moreover, my childish acceptance of the unity of human knowledge was recently given a boost by the man who is arguably the world's leading cosmologist. In *A Brief History of Time*, Stephen Hawking not only combines the roles of physicist and historian with dazzling effect, but also gives us a new understanding of that one commodity with (or against) which every historian must work. That Hawking will have an impact on a much-needed revitalization of historical thinking will, I believe, be only a matter of time.

6. Zukav, *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*, 161–62.



Fig. 1. The Metaphor. This figure illustrates perspectivism in the context of modern correspondence theory. The theory assumes an untruth, namely that the "mountain" exists in some way, waiting to be described. Ancient theorists assumed that the "mountain" existed only in memory.

elevation. B is in a valley about half a kilometre below the level of the plain, A is on a hill about one kilometre above the plain, and C is on a low mountain one kilometre higher than A. The groups cannot change positions or move from their general locations. Now add one further complication. The mountain itself is never fully visible, being shrouded in clouds and fog. Its presence and precise features must be deduced from clues such as shadows on the plain, the breadth and mass of its base on the plain, occasional glimpses of rock formations when the clouds move and momentarily expose a segment, or even such subtle things as air movement and temperature.

So long as the groups remain isolated from each other and members only communicate with fellow group members, disputes over the general shape and features of the mountain will tend to focus on details and the interpretation of individual observations. From the perspective of each group the main features of the mountain will be immutable, and there will be calls for more work to be done here and there, more precise and detailed observation, but not much doubt that the task is to observe as carefully as possible and record only what one sees and as meticulously as possible. This image may be seen as a metaphor for objectivity or historical positivism, which flourished in America and the European nation states in the so-called modern era.[7] Let us say that those states are represented by group C, and for a long time they have been the only ones writing about the mountain. So they believe not only that they alone are observing it, but also that theirs will be the definitive account of all that can be known about the mountain in its totality, once they have agreed on it.

However, when a few members observe that generations go by and the definitive description begins to look ever more elusive because the clouds never go away and there is no way of reconciling perfectly the increasing number of alleged details nor of sorting out definitively correct from incorrect observations, they may reach the conclusion that the mountain is (or may as well be) whatever each observer makes it. When each individual looks at anything and tries to reconstruct it, they will argue, the ability to see evidence and piece it together says more about the person's social preconditioning and neurological make-up than about what is really "out there." This view is, of course, extreme historical relativism, and it brings me to my first observation about the ancients.

The posture assumed by ancient historical writers approximates to that of the modern objectivist.[8] They claimed writing the truth about the past as their project. This undeniable similarity to a present condition could be misleading, for, when we study a distant or alien culture, there are two conceptual traps into which we may fall. One is to focus on differences and so structure the new society as "other." This strategy

7. Particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Cf. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 21–108, and Howard, *The Lessons of History*, 49–62.

8. For an excellent presentation of relativism and its advantages (and controls), see Feyerabend, *Farewell to Reason*, 19–89. Feyerabend discusses the relativism of Herodotus and Protagoras, but this is a relativism of social values. Through Protagoras, it began to encroach on knowledge, but Plato put a stop to that with arguments that Feyerabend exposes as specious or irrelevant. Nevertheless, they won the day.

downplays similarity, even obliterates it from conscious perception. The opposite approach erases or problematizes difference by pursuing a single-minded project of assimilation.[9] If modern scholars have fallen into either of these traps, I expect it will prove to be the second one. For one thing, it is curious that the ancient objectivist stance was never substantially altered, and I am even more interested in the fact that ancient historians never developed a relativist (or subjectivist or perspectivist) reaction to the standard view of historical knowledge. Throughout antiquity, theirs was an unselfconscious objectivism. Since the nineteenth century, a self-conscious objectivism has been fighting the claims of its relativist rival.[10] I believe that this is a fundamental difference between ancient and modern perspectives on history that has largely gone unnoticed.

To return to the metaphor, consider now what happens when the groups at the three locations begin to exchange reports. For the sake of tidiness, assume that each group reaches consensus. As a description of the mountain, each account is likely to be largely unintelligible to any other group because of the different angles and altitudes of placement. If we call the mountain *x*, the unintelligibility is only resolvable if the observations are recognized as interactive functions along the three distinct axes *Ax*, *Bx*, and *Cx*. To put it another way, the historian's present circumstances are essential to both the communicability[11] and the validity of his or her observations; rigid objectivity is impossible (or at least self-defeating), and the strict observance of the practice invalidates any implicit claims of the observer to a "totality" of relevant knowledge.Be that as it may, it is history as an interactive process between past and

9. For an example, see Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, 207–11. For a more comprehensive discussion of narrative history's relationship to fiction, see Porter, "The Gold in Fort Knox."

10. Spencer, in *The Principles of Psychology*, 454–88, seems to have laid the foundation for the debate in English over subjectivity and objectivity with his theory of consciousness, in which he found it necessary to treat the relationship between the observing subject and the observed object. Distance may improve hopes of detached and objective historiography. Cf. McCullagh, "Can our Understanding of Old Texts be Objective?" McCullagh, however, overlooks the problem of recognition that comes with the passage of time. The older something is, the more interpretation it may require before historians can decide how to use it. As the need for interpretation increases, so does the possibility that the interpreter's biases will intrude.

11. History is nothing if not communication. A mute who can read but not write and who has read and remembers every existing historical document and history book is not a historian.

present to which I wish to call attention. When we look for the beginnings of historical awareness, if we look for narratives or descriptions that aim at a reasonable correspondence to conditions that actually prevailed or events that actually happened, we shall see one thing in the ancient world. But if we look for attempts at constructing a past in constant interplay with changing present conditions, we shall see something else.

Now add two more events to my historical metaphor. First, assume that the fog and clouds suddenly clear and the mountain becomes revealed in all its sun-drenched glory. Someone takes a photograph of it in this condition and shows it to a person who has never experienced anything outside the Sahara desert, having lived there since birth. This person has received no formal geographical education; he has heard of the pyramids in Egypt but nothing about snow-capped mountains with evergreen conifers at their base, the sort that characteristically exist around mountains at northern latitudes. Assuming that this person can deal with the potentially disorienting experience of interpreting a two-dimensional photographic representation of a three-dimensional object, we should not be too surprised if the thing in the picture is described as a pyramid covered with white sand, with stick people dressed in long green robes standing at its base. Observation is mostly recognition. When recognition fails, the choice is between rejecting the image as spurious or defining it in terms of known concepts. The known image "pyramid" may be projected onto the unknown image "mountain," and once this is done, our new observer can begin accounting for the photograph. I shall be arguing that projection and the gradual development of a capacity for recognition are crucial concepts for understanding the early development of Greek historical writing.

For my second and last event, imagine that someone now describes the unseen side of the mountain or gives a fictional description of ridges beyond it that cannot be seen from any of the vantage points A, B, or C. I thus introduce the main levels of verification about which I wish to speak. Commenting on European reports of the marvels of the New World, Stephen Greenblatt remarks on the impossibility of a visitor's observing everything.[12] Fictive leaps or assumptions fill gaps and provide a context of intelligibility for the actual observations. The "reality" of the report, therefore, is not of the observed society, but of the contact

12. Greenblatt, *Marvellous Possessions*, 122.

that actually occurred. There can be no similar contact between an "observer" and a fictional range of mountains. Everything takes place in the mind of the observer. The fictional "observation" imitates a real interaction.

In an account of the mountain, the image "pyramid" does not correspond to the object; it represents it. It substitutes for the real concept and facilitates the attribution of meaning to an otherwise unrecognizable thing. It also imports meaning. Pyramids have a historical and religious architectural significance that may imitate mountains, to be sure, but still differentiates them. I shall argue that early Greek historical thinking began in (perhaps) the eighth century as an interaction between a present (which featured colonization) and a non-existent past that had to be assembled from pieces of heroic myths (especially concerning Heracles), which were organized into narratives and projected onto the past. The purpose of this largely fictive activity was to give meaning to the present. Gradually, recognition of detail in conditions of the present or recent past influenced the development of the surrogate narrative (e.g., the Trojan War epic substitutes for a narration of the Lelantine War). It was not until the fifth century that narration by substitution (e.g., Amazonomachies for the Persian War) was displaced by the representative narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides. Despite this promising start, it is not certain that ancient historiography ever took the complete step in the direction of correspondence. Instead, it remained somewhere between substitution and correspondence, providing what I would prefer to call "representative" accounts. A representative description addresses the actual event but lacks, or at least fails to employ, an empirical strategy to achieve a close correspondence to the events as they could have been observed by putative historical "bird-watchers" (see previous essay). The truth of a representative narrative derives from the way it reflects nature and life in general, rather than the specific event or circumstance it purports to describe.

This discussion completes the theoretical framework for my argument. To the possible objection that it has been in part—even entirely—a rehearsal of self-evident fundamentals, my reply is that the walls and floor of the lift would be equally self-evident to the passengers, who would be aware of them every waking hour of their existence. Yet calling attention to their presence makes possible a recognition of the walls not just as obvious features of reality, but as potential barriers to the vast world that lies beyond them.

ORALITY AND LITERACY

With Herodotus, history enters the field of literature. However, the introduction of the alphabet notwithstanding, the age in which I locate the intellectual and social beginnings of Greek historical thinking (the eighth? to sixth centuries BC) belongs to an era that was extensively oral. Moreover, a flood of scholarly literature with which I have no major quarrel now characterizes all of antiquity as one from which orality never disappeared and in which literacy as we know it today never developed (which is not to deny the existence of some highly literate individuals).[13]

Writing was an aide-mémoire, the record of an oral performance aimed at making possible its repetition. An oral society produces oral history, presumably by a process unlike contemporary literary history in ways that are yet to be fully appreciated. Current study focuses on the performance or delivery of the product (which may not necessarily be in its final form). Egbert Bakker calls attention to the inappropriateness of modern notions of literary production and information flow.[14] The contemporary model vests authority in the producer of the text, conferring the legal status of ownership on the writer provided that there has been no plagiarism and, in the case of scholarly work, that the research has been the author's own. Information is thought of as a flow as through a conduit from author to reader. Not one of the components of modern authorship can be securely associated with ancient literary production. I need scarcely point out the absence of copyright laws and the allegations of plagiarism that circulated in later

13. The following is not intended to be a complete bibliography: Havelock, *Preface to Plato, Prologue to Greek Literacy, The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Consequences*, and, of special relevance to my argument, *The Muse Learns to Write*, 44–126; Harris, *Ancient Literacy*; Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*; Lentz, *Orality and Literacy in Hellenic Greece*; Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*; Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*. Also see Gould, *Herodotus*, 19–41. Of special interest is S. Lewis, "Public Information." Heehs, "Myth, History, and Theory," should not be missed. It gives a striking demonstration of how oral history develops a story by aggrandizement and the use of "euphemism" and ends surprisingly (to me, at any rate) with an effective rebuttal of some of Hayden White's more extreme views. To be fair to White, however, he is not always the extremist that he is sometimes made out to be. His thinking develops considerably, and he occasionally contradicts himself from publication to publication. Cf. Kansteiner, "Hayden White's Critique of the Writing of History."

14. Bakker, "Activation and Preservation."

antiquity.[15] It cannot be shown that ancient research, such as it was, had the objective of securing ownership of the content for the historian (see below).

If we are going to be serious about viewing Herodotus as primarily an oral historian (and even his successors as combining literacy with orality in slightly more complex ways),[16] then let us pursue the full implication of the idea. Oral history is tradition, and there would be a serious conflict if Herodotus, the greatest practitioner of the genre, was not only the first, but in some sense the last, of the oral historians. However, only a few recent scholarly studies find evidence for a tradition of antecedents to Herodotus.[17] Obligatory nods of recognition made to Homer and Hecataeus, the geographer, seem as much aimed at emphasizing Herodotus' uniqueness as identifying his intellectual roots. Even if we revive the old theory, the evidence for which still sleeps quietly in the pages of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ad Pomp.* 3; *Thuc.* 5), that some local chroniclers preceded Herodotus by perhaps a generation, we gain very little. This theory simply offers literary origins for someone whom we seek to explain as an oral historian and otherwise just throws the question of the beginnings of Greek historical thinking in the society back one generation.

As literature, Herodotus' history was indeed unique, but if we look for evidence that the Greeks tried to create for themselves a remote past that could interact with their present or recent past, I think that we shall find it in their mythology. When, or after, the Greeks colonized the remote parts of the Mediterranean and Black seas, they "discovered" that their heroes had preceded them. Heracles had gone west beyond the pillars that bear his name, and Jason was assigned to the Black Sea. Very important places received extra attention. Egypt, for example, was covered by both Heracles and Menelaus.

15. Most notably in a work "On Plagiarism" preserved by Eusebius and written by the habitual plagiarist and otherwise important philosopher Porphyry. Cf. Euseb. *PE* 10.3 1ff = Porph. "On the Greeks as Plagiarists" from book 1 of *The Study of Philology.*

16. Most of the works on oral history focus on Herodotus, but if people such as Havelock, Harris, and Thomas are right, all ancient history was oral in some degree if only because ancient society was oral. On Herodotus see Lang, "Herodotus"; Murray, "Herodotus and Oral History"; Packman, "The Incredible and Incredulous"; Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer of the Past,* 89–146; Vignolo Munson, "Herodotus' Use of Prospective Sentences."

17. Cf. Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer of the Past,* and Nagy, "Herodotus the *Logios.*"

In the words of Page Dubois, Heracles' "violent history served as a model of colonisation, mythically recounting his adventures as he moved from the western to the eastern boundaries of the world, exterminating creatures who stood in the way of the civilising presence of the Greeks."[18] It is theoretically possible that the Heracles myth has Mycenaean origins, but the range of his extended exploits conforms generally to the colonized Mediterranean (not the Black Sea, of course), and it must be in that context that much of his mythology took shape as it survives today. For example, the labour of the gardens of the Hesperides and the contact with Atlas must have taken final form after some awareness of the geography of the western Mediterranean became generalized in the Greek world. According to the late surviving versions of the Argonaut story, Heracles left the expedition before it entered the Black Sea.[19] Thus Jason had that region to himself. Once again, however ancient Jason may actually be as a hero, the story of his voyage to Colchis (which was mentioned in Homer's *Odyssey* 12.69–72) must at least have been influenced in its development by the Greek colonizing experience, if it does not altogether represent it.

The literary interests of Hecataeus of Miletus, writing in the late sixth century BC, were in geography and mythology, an unusual combination if it is not unique. His geographical work, the *Periegesis* (FF37–359), may be seen as an attempt to produce a written systematization of the new information about the physical world now in circulation at the (virtual) end of the colonizing period. His other work, the *Genealogiae* (or *Historiae* or *Herologia*), gave prominence to the stories of Jason and Heracles, to judge from the fragments (FF1–32, especially 17, 18, and 23–30). The suggestion that this work also attempted to organize new "knowledge" in the area of myth looks tempting. If the stories of Jason and Heracles were extensively recast by the Greek community to represent and heroize their experience of colonization, we would have a satisfactory explanation of Hecataeus' peculiar literary preoccupations.[20]

18. Dubois, *Centaurs and Amazons*, 58.

19. AR *Argonautica* 1290–1325.

20. The Sagas of Deucalion (FF13–16), the Danaids (FF19–22), and the Theban Cycle (FF31–32) were also represented in the *Genealogiae*. In general, see Dougherty, *The Poetics of Colonization*.

LEST WE REMEMBER

The establishment of a single generalized account of a major historical event has the self-proclaimed purpose of memorializing it. However, since all narrations involve selection, the society's choice is to develop alternative versions, or else the omitted material is consigned to oblivion. The use of myth to narrate a historical experience has many effects, one of which is to orchestrate the society's forgetting of traumatic or uncomfortable details. Myth is the wastebasket of the collective memory.

The myth acts as a substitute for a representative or correspondence version of the events. Substitutions occur at a critical moment in the present when it becomes apparent that something has happened that will be difficult to forget, but has such disturbing aspects that reporting the details would scarcely meet with general approval. Harrisson's observations of Britain after the Blitz (see previous essay, 56–58) illustrate the choice a community faces after such an experience. The memory generalizes or heroizes (his word is "glossifies"), or it fails completely, and massive amnesia takes place. In the classical period the most obvious substitutions are to be found in the Athenian *epitaphios logos*, or funeral oration. To judge from two of the surviving examples, Plato's parody in the *Menexenus* and the speech put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides (2.35–41), neither the deaths nor even the specific acts of heroism of the fallen were suitable subjects. The glorious past of the city for which they have died is substituted with speed and varying degrees of subtlety in both cases. Thucydides, the more explicit of the two, makes Pericles explain. The orator cannot hope to act as a successful broker between the lavish expectations of the immediate relatives of the dead and the jealousies of those who might be forced to hear egregious praise of unknown people (2.35.2). It is implied that distance, both temporal and geographic, is needed to establish what is both true and worthy of record. A third example, preserved among the speeches of Lysias, follows a similar pattern. Most of the speech is a recapitulation of the glorious history of Athens. As in the oration in Thucydides, reference to the exploits of the fallen and the sorrow that their families must feel is brief, generic, and saved for a few paragraphs at the end (67–81).[21]

21. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, 42–50. I cite the three earliest examples of complete *epitaphioi*. The *epitaphios* has also been studied by Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens*. Ziolkowski examines the six known *epitaphioi* (two of which are

The substitution addresses the meaning of the event while avoiding contentious details. The dead have won glory because they have sacrificed themselves for the most glorious city in Greece, and so on. To Thucydides' explanation, modern scholarship now adds the suppression of trauma, cause for excessive lamentation (particularly by women), as an unexpressed reason for this substitution.[22] The celebration of Athena's elegant human sacrifice to purchase power for her city—citizens slaughtered by non-citizens in war—must not be disrupted by womanly outcries of grief at the mention of the names of the dead or any specific description of their heroism. I do not suggest that every mythical scene in art or literature acts as a surrogate representation of a specific event. On the other hand, it would be peculiar to think that the Greeks banished all representation of the Persian War (with the exception of the painting of the battle of Marathon in the Stoa Poikile) from their art and literature (on the *Phoenissae* and *Persae*, see below) until the appearance of Herodotus' histories and the decoration of the parapet of the small Nike temple in Athens, while at the same time (c.470–c.430) producing a flood of Titanomachies, Trojan War scenes, and especially Centauromachies and Amazonomachies. These mythical scenes are pyramids representing the mountain, importing the significance of a struggle of order against bestial greed, the anomie of strange Persian invaders.[23] For the

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incomplete) and the rhetorical treatises. The place for a rehearsal of the deeds of the fallen would be the *threnos*. It logically leads into the *paramythia* (consolation), which is logically placed towards the end of the speech. Thucydides' *epitaphios* lacks a *threnos*, and the question arises whether this is regular or a departure from custom. Ziolkowski argues that the brief *threnos* in Lysias (71–76) is the departure. I follow his (and Loraux's) line in my assumption that the deeds of the fallen had no part in the customary *epitaphios*. See Ziolkowski, 40–52. For a more general discussion of Thucydides' Funeral Oration, see Brunt, "Introduction to Thucydides with a Postscript (1991) on the Funeral Speech." The "Introduction," valuable on its own, was first published in 1963.

22. Holst-Warhaft, *Dangerous Voices*, especially 119–23. As Paul Cartledge reminds us, this is not the only place in Thucydides in which reference to women is suppressed. By comparison with Herodotus, their absence is absolute and remarkable. See Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 63–89, and "The Silent Women of Thucydides."

23. Meiggs, "The Political Implications of the Parthenon"; Dubois, *Centaurs and Amazons*; Tyrrell, *Amazons*. Lefkowitz, *Women in Greek Myth*, 20, points out that Amazons are often depicted wearing Persian costume. See the enjoyable and provocative book by Francis, *Image and Idea in Fifth-Century Greece*; also Tyrrell and Brown, *Athenian Myths and Institutions*. Their demonstration of the capacity of a mythic representation to change significance and accrue new meanings (159–88) is very effective, but I do not understand why they ignore the Persian conflict. Cf. Shapiro, "Theseus in Kimonian Athens"; also, of great importance, Connelley, "Parthenon and *Parthenoi*."

Greeks the representations capture the heroism of the victorious struggle, while suppressing the experience of trauma by avoiding specificity.

The Centauromachy on the temple of Zeus at Olympia says nothing about the loss of Leonidas at Thermopylae and the death in the war of more Spartiates than Sparta could afford,[24] and nothing about the Spartans' loss of prestige as a result of their timid strategy of wanting to hide behind the isthmus wall and abandon Athens, their strongest ally, to Persian occupation. Similarly, the extensive destruction and desecration of Athens in 480 and 479[25] can be tastefully excluded from Amazonomachies and other mythical representations. Mythical substitutions for athletic victories in Pindar's victory odes have the effect of avoiding the indelicacy of hubris and, perhaps, the banality of narrating a sporting event. Finally, as I observed above, from the eighth to the sixth centuries the Greeks might have developed accounts of the Messenian and Lelantine wars, but did not.[26] Instead, stories of the legendary Theban Wars and, more significant, the Trojan cycle took shape in this period.

I have already argued that the stories of Jason's voyage and Heracles' labours are surrogate representations of colonization. In the process of colonization, the *oikistes* determines to leave home, collects what movable possessions he can, and with a group of companions, travels to a distant place with them and establishes a home (an *oikos*), in many cases (presumably) taking or seizing a non-Greek bride. Odysseus re-enacts the career of the *oikistes* in reverse in Homer's *Odyssey*, starting from an alien place, quickly losing all his companions, rejecting alien wives, and acquiring movable wealth just before arriving to (re-)establish his *oikos* in the homeland. As the memory of the events fades, the brutality (Heracles), the rapacity (Jason), and even the vulnerability of longing (Odysseus) stay with the heroes in stories that come to exist out of time. So myth sanitizes the collective memory and makes possible the more proper historicizations of Ephorus in the fourth century, in whose work

24. On Spartan *oliganthropia*, see Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, 37–43; Hodkinson, "Inheritance, Marriage and Demography."

25. Thucydides (1.89) says that the Persians destroyed Athens, leaving only the houses in which their officers had lodged undemolished.

26. The Lelantine War is mentioned by Herodotus (5.99) and Thucydides (1.15), but neither gives any details. Strabo (10.1.12) also alludes to it in connection with an inscription he found on the island of Euboea. His knowledge about the war seems to come exclusively from the inscription, probably meaning that a written account of the conflict was unavailable to him. Similarly, the late descriptions of the conquest of Messenia preserved in Pausanias leave no doubt that an early, definitive narrative was not extant in the third century; cf. Pearson, "The Pseudo-history of Messenia and Its Authors."

colonization was represented as the spread of the Greek *polis*, the reception of delightful locations as divine gifts to the various Greek communities from Pythian Apollo.[27] What changed to make possible the more direct narrations of Herodotus, Thucydides, and their successors?

FABRICATION, REPRESENTATION, AND CORRESPONDENCE: MYTH, *MYTHODES*, AND ...?

Various commentators have noted a correlation between the exercise of power and a desire to memorialize the past.[28] However, the assumed correlation between power and the writing of history should not be oversimplified. Wealth and power were derived from agriculture throughout the ancient world, but it would take until 1896 for anyone to see ancient agriculture as a suitable subject for history. And even in that year, the author, Max Weber, was years ahead of his time.[29] Nor was it simply true that the ancients addressed the past because some putative intellectual revolution made them realize that it was there. Seafaring and exploration had been an important part of the Greeks' experience ever since they entered the Aegean basin, whenever that was, but apart from a few very brief remarks about the emergence of navies at the beginning of Thucydides, they wrote no histories of the subject. True, a few compendious descriptions of maritime voyages have been preserved from antiquity,[30] but these curious accounts seem to have attracted little attention. On the other hand, by the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians were citing their contributions to the Persian resistance, particularly the victories at Salamis and Marathon, to justify their hegemony over their empire (Thuc. 1.73–74). Other states had

27. DS 8.24. 17–24 epitomizing Ephorus.

28. Foucault, speaking of genealogy, by which he means something like positivist history, says that "only a single drama is ever staged in this non-place, the endlessly repeated play of dominations." See discussion and quotations in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault*, 108–10. Cf. Young, *White Mythologies*, 85–87. Le Goff, *History and Memory*, 60–61, demonstrates the close relationship between power and public memorializing in the ancient world. To "write history is to seize power," says Amy Richlin in "Hijacking the Palladion," 74. Once again, cf. Young, *White Mythologies*, 1–12, 120, 157–75.

29. Weber, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*.

30. The smaller geographical texts were edited and published in the last century. For the Greek ones, see Müller, ed., *Geographi Graeci minores*. Warmington, *Greek Geography*, gives a good introduction to the subject of early Greek exploration and collects and translates the ancient Greek references and texts. Perhaps the most interesting is the Periplus of Hanno the Carthaginian. An account of his alleged voyage around parts of Africa beyond Gibraltar

fought in the battles of 480 and 479, so had their own claims to a share in the glory of victory over the Persian invader. In order to advance the cause of empire, the Athenians apparently needed a specific past that was firmly rooted in the very world that they desired to control. Accordingly, the past was no longer mythologized.

Who made the decision to break with mythology, and how was it made? Herodotus is an obvious answer to the first question, and a variety of answers have been offered for the second. According to J. L. Myers, Herodotus may be imagined as a young boy in Halicarnassus witnessing the upheavals connected with Xerxes' massive mobilization in 480 and asking his mother why.[31] The great work of his later life was the ultimate consequence of a lifetime searching for answers to that question. K. von Fritz argues that Herodotus began as an investigative geographer and ethnographer, much like his predecessors Hecataeus and Xanthus—from whom he learned much about investigative method—until the struggle between Persia and Greece drew him away from that calling.[32] These are valuable suggestions, but they seem to me to address only part of the question. Could Herodotus decide to write a historical work in the same way that Beethoven could decide to write his first symphony? The composer could assume the existence of the symphonic form, of orchestras, and of secular audiences sophisticated enough to attend a symphonic performance; but what of the historian? Perhaps the decision that there would be history rested no more with Herodotus than the emergence of symphonies was by fiat of Ludwig van Beethoven.

I should be content to believe that Herodotus was the genius who decided to abandon the remoteness of mythical time and focus on the more proximate age of humans,[33] but there is evidence that the transition away from mythic representation was in progress while he was still very young, perhaps before he was born. The Pisistratids in the sixth century traced their origins back to Nestor's royal family at Pylos

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existed in Greek perhaps as early as the fourth century. Oikonomedes, *Hanno the Carthaginian*, gives the Greek text, an English translation with notes, and reproduction of other scholarly comments and F. Kluge's 1829 edition and commentary. Ramin, *Le Périple d'Hannon*, provides an extensive study of the work and a translation in both English and French. Of course, this brief treatise (three pages) is not really about Greek exploration since Hanno was Carthaginian, but it at least reflects an interest in the history of exploration.

31. Myers, *Herodotus, Father of History*, 1.

32. Fritz, *Die Griechische Greschichtsschreibung*, 419–22.

33. Shimron, "Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν."

(Hdt. 5.65.4). Cimon and his Philaid clan improved on their approach by conscripting the Athenian king, Theseus, grafting him into their family tree, and using, elaborating, or even inventing a heroic career for him that would serve as an exemplar for Cimon's own.[34] If that sort of thing suited aristocratic tastes and political agendas, it appears that the new Athenian democracy was more concerned with who had connived with the tyrants in the much more recent past, the late sixth and early fifth centuries (Hdt. 6.121–31). The need of the Alcmeonid family to clear themselves of the charge that they had conspired with the former Pisistratid tyrants in 490 by displaying a shield to the Persian fleet immediately after the battle of Marathon was dictated by the exigencies of the new politics.

If aristocratic families express long-term dynastic aspirations by creating for themselves a *longue durée* as far back as mythical times, a democratic assembly faces the practical task of planning for the next few months or years in the light of recent experience. A democracy needs a sense of real history as a community possession. It would seem reasonable to expect that the Athenian democracy in control of the most powerful empire in Greek history, defending its hegemony in terms of its own view of the past, would leave its rivals little choice but to engage in the debate over who deserves the glory on these very unmythological terms. Herodotus' task was in part to articulate this new realism, and mediate the important residual conflicts between the rival states. So the democratization of both politics and knowledge may be a satisfactory explanation for the reification of history, but it would be an incomplete one. It is apparent from the mythic representations cited above that there was a need for the Hellenic community to assume an identity in contrast with the barbarian intruder.[35] But unless the events remained in living memory, the art would have no meaning and the identity would be lost.

34. Shapiro, "Thesus in Kimonian Athens." On the relationship of open societies to the development of a sense of history in Greece and the ancient Near East, see D. E. Brown, *Hierarchy, History and Human Nature*, 119–79.

35. Cf. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 36–62. Perhaps the classic statement of this theme of the identity of the western Greek in contrast to the eastern barbarian—along with a magisterial analysis of Herodotus' "thought" as deduced from the structure of his narrative—is Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus*. From the vast literature on the subject of Herodotus and early historical writing, I offer two more recent publications not to be missed: first, an excellent collection of essays with discussions and bibliography by various authors in a special edition of *Arethusa* (20.1 and 2 (1987): 1–282) called *Herodotus and the Invention of History* and, second, the succinct envoi of the master himself, Arnaldo Momigliano, in *The*

In summary, I would argue that every community that has a sense of its future has an image of its past. For the Greeks shortly after their victory over Persia, the future may well have looked secure for the indefinite future. They certainly seem to me to have reached far back, to mythological times, to retrieve images in terms of which to express their recent achievement. But the short-term pragmatics of politics and a contentious Athenian empire required a past that belonged to the "real" world in which the politicians were to survive or the empire dominate. Now it is not necessary to believe that the Greeks had to wait for Herodotus before they could have developed an understanding of their past. On the contrary, Herodotus represents himself in his proem as one who "preserves the great deeds of Greek and barbarian from obliteration by time." In other words, his task is less invention than the preservation of existing traditions. I have shown above that communities can create their own pasts without the aid of historians. The Britons could glossify by shouting down their countrymen—members of Harrisson's M-O team—who recorded some unpalatable facts. The Athenians' opponents were less easy to silence. As Thucydides represents the scene at Sparta before the outbreak of the war (1.72–75), unnamed Athenian spokesmen address an assembly of Peloponnesian allies and sympathizers who have met to voice or hear complaints about recent Athenian aggressions. Some of them, such as the Megarians, Aeginetans, and Corinthians, are extremely angry, in no mood to listen to Athenian self-serving exaggerations. Accordingly, Thucydides presents a very conservative Athenian speech.

Few Peloponnesians could seriously dispute the Athenians' assertions that Marathon was an Athenian (and Plataean) victory and that the success at Salamis depended on the presence of the Athenian fleet. From Herodotus we know that the Athenians could have gone much further. They led the Ionians to victory at Mycale in 479 (9.90–106) and so began the final expulsion of the Persians from the Aegean. Herodotus also shows (7.139) that the Spartan strategy for the defence of Greece, relying on the wall across the Corinthian isthmus, would have been futile without the Athenians defending its seaward flank. To return to Thucydides' representation of the speeches in Sparta, the Peloponnesians do

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Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography, especially 1–53. I give no direct discussion of biography in this book. Momigliano's *The Development of Greek Biography* is a classic. Both these works by Momigliano are collections of lectures that were delivered by him in the 1960s and 1970s.

not dispute the Athenians' "facts." That may not mean too much, since the occasion is not a seminar in recent history; but clearly the Athenians gave them very little about which to argue. The need for a real past in this situation is reflected by the Athenians' opening remarks, in which they spurn all reference to "things of the very remote past, of which the 'witnesses' are more hearsay reports than the visual memory [*opsis*] of members of this audience" (1.73.2).

It would be a mistake to see in Herodotus and Thucydides an abrupt departure from Greek mythic and legendary traditions. Both regarded Homer as an authority. Herodotus accepted the Trojan War as historical, but believed that Helen's actual presence in Troy was a romantic falsehood (2.116–20). Thucydides expressed doubts about Homer's reliability in his archaeology, to be sure, but it eventually appears that his reservations concerned the poet's assumed tendency to exaggerate (1.10), not create whole-cloth fabrication, for he regarded both Herodotus (*Ta Mēdika*) and Homer (*Ta Trōika*) as his competitors and forebears.

Homer, as the ancients called him, bestowed two vitally important gifts on his historiographical successors in the fifth century. One was a style of narrative that was both capable of a close correspondence to real human action and also set in a context of credible human motivation: wrath for Achilles, longing in the case of Odysseus. The second is the very concept of constructing a war story (a *polemos*). The complete Trojan cycle took the war from its beginnings (the *Cypria*) through a fateful crisis (the *Iliad*) and then followed the threads through either the *Aethiopis* or the *Little Iliad* to the *Iliupersis* (Destruction of Troy), ending with the establishment of a clear victor. Similarly, Herodotus devoted four books to sketching out the origins of the conflict, identified the fateful crisis in the Ionian decision to revolt, and then narrated the struggle until a clear victor emerged, apparently rejecting the idea of including Cimon's Eurymedon campaign or the Peace of Callias (if historical).[36] Again, Thucydides devoted book 1 to the origins of his war, identified the crisis in the decision to attack Sicily, and, though his work was unfinished, obviously intended to stop when Athens capitulated and there was no doubt that Sparta had won, rather than include the siege of Samos

36. Cf. Fornara, *Herodotus*, 37–74. Dover, "The Originality of the First Greek Historians," gives a brief but valuable indication of some narrative models less useful to history from Near Eastern literature. It will be evident that my view of the historians' intellectual freedom differs from Dover's. For the definition of Herodotus' subject, see Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus*, 17–45.

or, as Dionysius was to suggest many years later, the restoration of the democracy (DH *Ad Pomp.* 3).

Wars never lost their appeal to ancient historians, but the old war story as a literary form diminished in popularity in the fourth century. Callisthenes wrote a *Hieros Polemos* (F1), but little or nothing is known about it. The new emphasis was on general Hellenic affairs (Ephorus, Xenophon) or the organizing of history around the careers of powerful individuals such as Philip (Theopompus) and Alexander of Macedon (Callisthenes). Myths persisted as part of the historian's interests, however. Herodotus reported the ancient stories with varying degrees of credulity and scepticism,[37] and Thucydides generally maintained a sceptical posture,[38] but in the fourth century, Ephorus and Theopompus reported ancient myths and legends as if they were no different from recent history. Timagetus and Theopompus (in all probability) continued to develop the Jason story.[39] Antipater of Magnesia manipulated the Heracles myth to justify Philip's claims to Amphipolis and other places,[40] and Callisthenes seems to have accepted the task of mythologizing his own patron, Alexander the Great.[41]

I have argued that resorting to a substitute narrative is a means of avoiding the difficulties of a direct narration of the event while, at the

37. Pearson, "Credulity and Scepticism in Herodotus."

38. Marinatos, in *Thucydides and Religion* and "Thucydides and Oracles," argues that Thucydides was indeed a theist. Perhaps he was, but see Dover, "Thucydides on Oracles." Also see Oost, "Thucydides and the Irrational," especially 190, for an interesting comparison with Isaac Newton. Most effective is Hornblower, "The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War." It is no secret that Thucydides is widely regarded as perhaps the best—indeed, the most modern-sounding—of all ancient historians. Any assessment of early Greek historiography must come to grips with him, if only because he seems to illustrate what was possible for all the others. General treatments of him and his work are too many to cite here, but very useful summations, some with further bibliography, may be found in the following places: Finley's introduction to *Thucydides*; Brunt, "Introduction to Thucydides"; Lewis, "Sources, Chronology, and Method"; and Whitehead, "Thucydides: Fact-Grubber or Philosopher." Still very selective, but relevant to themes in this book are Flory, "The Meaning of Τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες (1.22.4) and the Usefulness of Thucydides' *History*," and two articles by Dover: "Thucydides' Historical Judgement" and "Thucydides 'as History' and 'as Literature.'"

39. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 4.259 = Hecataeus F18a ascribes the "discovery" that Jason returned to the Mediterranean by sailing up the Danube to a fictitious arm of that river that issued into the Adriatic to an otherwise unknown Timagetus. I have argued that Theopompus advanced the same thesis in Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 94–101.

40. Antipater's thesis is described in Speusippus' letter to Philip written c.343. Cf. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 200–202.

41. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 22–49.

same time, amplifying its heroic significance. The celebration of the age of colonization by recounting the labours of Heracles is myth telling. Herodotus' somewhat poetic heroization of the Persian War is not myth telling, but it does have the form or the glorifying effect of *mythos*: it has what Thucydides called *to mythōdes* ("myth form" or "story form"). When Thucydides declared that *mythodes* had no place in his history (1.22.4), was he announcing a new purpose of moving beyond heroic representation to a kind of correspondence narrative, was he simply acknowledging that his subject, Athens' catastrophic loss of empire and Sparta's increasing dependence on the old enemy, Persia, had no place for heroes, or was he attempting something else (see below and Appendix 2)?

CORRESPONDENCE IN ANCIENT HISTORIOGRAPHY?

Statements that Thucydides was the first scientific historian or was preoccupied with method are possibly to be understood as claims that he consciously directed his researches so that they would enable him to produce a narrative that would correspond as closely as possible to the real events they purport to describe.[42] Correspondence is established by documentation. The observer who cannot see through the clouds must reconstruct the mountain by meticulously observing every present clue and by sifting through the records of observations from the past when various parts of the object have been exposed by changing weather conditions. Documents verify items in a narrative of a highly particular or momentary nature.

What happened in the student-teacher's house in Romford, Essex, on Sunday morning, 3 September 1939? The young woman's own notes reveal that she was playing the piano (see above, 57), Mother burst into the room, and so on. Further investigation might reveal that this woman only played Chopin on Sunday mornings and that her piano was, say, a Steinway. Perhaps, then, she was the only woman in all of England who was playing Chopin on a Steinway at 11:15 that morning and whose mother burst in shouting, "Stop that noise!" and flung open the win-

42. This seems to be what Gomme means in *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History*, 111–64, when he speaks of Thucydides' "scientific" history; but it is not what de Romilly means in *La construction de la vérité chez Thucydide*. For her, the scientism of Thucydides is found in his search for universal principles. On Thucydides' alleged preoccupation with method, see Murray, "Greek Historians," 187; but see also Hunter, *Thucydides the Artful Reporter*. On Thucydides' concept of truth and clarity, see Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*, 24–8, and Walker, "*Enargeia* in Greek Historiography."

dows. Imagine a photograph taken of the woman seated at the piano and dated Monday, 4 September, in a note on the back. The photograph clearly shows a score by Rachmaninoff on the piano, and everyone insists that the woman always left her music on the piano for days after finishing her Sunday practice. So was she playing Chopin or Rachmaninoff? Most historians are used to increases in conflicts, as well as corroborations, as the volume of evidence proliferates. A meticulous correspondence historiography should produce unique events and deal regularly with contradictions in the evidence.

I take these two points in reverse order and begin with Thucydides' treatment of discrepancies. In his introductory remarks on method (if that is the correct word), he makes no mention of documents, speaking only of his sources as if they were personal eyewitnesses. This could be a convention. In the archaic period there was a popular epigraphic convention that made inanimate objects address the reader as if they were persons.[43] Herodotus speaks of his sources almost exclusively as if they were oral, but some, such as Hecataeus, are known to have been literary. So a written document could have been represented by Thucydides as the writer "speaking" to him. He goes on to say that the "reported facts [*erga*; below] were discovered after much toil [*epiponos*] because the people present at each of the events did not say the same things about them, [but spoke] as one might have some disposition for, or recollection from, one side or the other (1.22.2)." Thucydides does not make clear whether he saw his task as one of resolving specific conflicts in factual detail or of blending conflicting rhetorical tendencies and filling in narrative gaps attributable to the limitations of perspective of one side or the other. Of course, it could have been both. However, if the former is the primary meaning of this passage, then Thucydides may well have grasped the elements of a modern "scientific" search for factual detail, but the alternative may be closer to the truth. It is by no means unsophisticated; it simply resembles more closely the methods used in modern research into oral history.[44]

It is best to ignore what he says and look at what he does, and I shall survey very quickly the most obvious examples. On the subject of the "fifty years" between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he complains

43. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 69. For discussions of the significance of writing in antiquity, see D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ*, and Bowman and Woolf, *Literacy and Power in the Ancient World*.

44. Vansina, *The Children of Woot* and *Oral Tradition*; Reefe, *The Rainbow and the Kings*; Henige, *Oral Historiography*.

that Hellanicus had given an account of this period that was brief and chronologically imprecise. The one he provides in its place could be described in exactly the same terms.[45] It is far from clear, then, that Thucydides engaged Hellanicus on points of detail with a view to producing an improved version of the period. He rejects one (or possibly two; see *regionalism* below) alternative version(s) of the duration of the war by arguing in effect that the interval of the Peace of Nicias was a cessation of hostilities in name only. Reckoning by seasons, he says that the war lasted to within a few days of twenty-seven years (5.26). He may have had documentary evidence for this figure, but refers only to oracles that he remembers people citing to the effect that the war would last "thrice nine years." Elsewhere, he casts aspersions on local traditions, arguing that even the Athenians cannot get their accounts of the expulsion of the Pisistratids straight (1.20; 6.53–59). In this case (6.53–59) he cites three inscriptions and offers a brilliant demonstration from them that Hippias was tyrant of Athens when his younger brother, Hipparchus, was murdered. So properly speaking, Harmodius and Aristogiton should not be called tyrannicides.

If this passage speaks strongly in support of Thucydides the documentary historian, my last example points in the other direction. In book 5 (20) there is a passage in which he rejects chronology based on holders of public office (such as archon lists and the like) in favour of a seasonal chronology (summers and winters). His argument is that the seasonal chronology makes for greater accuracy (*akribeia*). Now it is clear from this comment that *akribeia* for him does not mean pinpoint accuracy but at least a kind of rough-and-ready clarity (more below, where I shall argue that it may mean accuracy of memory). In an extensive comment to this passage, Gomme (*HCT*) points out that real chronological precision would have called for something of a *paperasserie* of documents and calculations, computing months, allowing for intercalations, and the like. His argument is that the relationship of military campaigns to the seasons is vital because a significant part of ancient military activity involved interfering with the sowing and gathering of enemy crops. His remaining observation interests me more than the others: chronologies built up from lists of local officials are of local

45. Some recent studies of this chronology include Schreiner, "The Battle of Oenoe" (against which see Francis, *Image and Idea in Fifth-Century Greece*, 87–90), and Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 73–107. This last item supersedes Badian's earlier version in *EMC/CV* 7 (1988): 289–320.

value. Presumably, Thucydides wishes to produce a chronology that will be immediately intelligible to anyone in the Greek world. If Spartans, for example, are used to eponymous ephors, a chronology based on Athenian archons would be difficult, perhaps useless, for them without a system of equivalencies. The same would go for every other state important enough for consideration. So Thucydides has chosen a system that avoids both documentary research and local identification.

Of course, he does use Homer in his Archaeology (1.3.3, 5.2, 9.1–4) and three inscriptions in his attack on Athenian tradition (6.53–59) to support subtle arguments for a historical reconstruction. These "swallows," however, do not necessarily make it springtime. His overt use of documents in these brief passages could be taken as a strong indication that he did not use them elsewhere. Why would he generally conceal his regular use of documents but reveal his sources in these places alone? I have not forgotten his regular verbatim citation of interstate agreements. They are of a slightly different order since Thucydides manifestly makes only sporadic use of them in constructing his argument. They are reproduced presumably from some sort of written copy, usually to speak for themselves in his text. While it may not be quite what the correspondence theorist expects, it *is* a use of documentary evidence. Discussion of this question is found in the sections on *verification* and *regionalism* below.

I began this section by showing that regular use of documentary evidence for narrative history leads to a recognition of historical events as unique occurrences.[46] Thucydides did not see history this way. Commenting on his famous statement in 1.22.4, J. de Romilly remarks: "un tel souhait et une telle confiance sont, pour un historien, absolument uniques. Ils impliquent qu' à tout moment il cherche à décrire les événements particuliers du passé sous la forme la plus universelle que possible."[47] De Romilly goes on to argue that Thucydides was concerned

46. Berlin, "History and Theory"; Dray, *Philosophy of History*, 8; Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness*, 7; Sevcenko, "Two Varieties of Historical Writing"; against which, Iggers, *New Directions in Modern European Historiography*, 123–74 and 175–205.

47. Romilly, *La construction de la vérité chez Thucydides*, 65. Cf. Swain, "Thucydides 1.22.1 and 3.82.4." Swain argues (among other important things) a parallel thesis to that of de Romilly, namely that "correspondence" for Thucydides relates to general values. Parry, in Logos *and* Ergon *in Thucydides*, 156, maintained that the Funeral Oration made the proud claim that *logos* can not only correspond to reality, but that it has the power to make it. The rest of Thucydides' history demonstrates the failure of this vision (e.g., 184–85). De Ste. Croix, "Aristotle on History and Poetry," shows how Thucydides recognized "the general (the universal or the necessary) in the particular" (52).

with the "science of human nature" (105–37). The principles of this science are articulated in the many general or gnomic utterances put into the mouths of speakers. One important effect of the interplay between speeches of this type and the intervening action is that the action is given meaning, and that meaning is frequently a universal one.

Historians can and do take an interest in general principles of human behaviour. To establish them, they must resort to statistics and probability theory, an approach to history that was unknown in the ancient world. Insofar as Thucydides could be described as scientific, it would not be in any sense of contemporary historical method therefore, but as a result of comparison with scientific observation. In the old belief that matter and energy were separate entities, the first law of thermodynamics is confirmed by repeated observations of phenomena at and above the molecular level and at low velocities. Perhaps Thucydides was attempting to study human nature this way, by repeated observation and testing in and through the events he recorded. With respect to the complex subtlety with which he explored the interaction of specific events with the universalizing observations of his speakers, de Romilly remarks: "[cela] n'avait jamais été fait avant lui et ne devait plus jamais l'être ensuite" (99–100). So Thucydides was too advanced for his age.

Paradoxically, this intellectual plateau of his looks like a very natural result of the combining of historical writing with the truth value system of the Archaic (or Lyric) Age of Greece. Truth (*alētheia*) for the lyric poet is Panhellenic, as Gregory Nagy explains it.[48] There may be many local stories (*mythoi*), but the various myths "stand for an undifferentiated outer core consisting of local myths, where various versions from various locales may potentially contradict each other, while (*alētheia*) 'truth' stands for a differentiated inner core of exclusive Panhellenic myths that tend to avoid the conflicts of the local versions" (66). Truth is found in the points of agreement amidst disagreement. On this view, the truth should somehow be reflected in each one of its local exemplifications, however distorted its superficial appearance. *Lēthe* means forgetfullness (58–60); *a-* is a prefix like the Enlish "un-." "Thus *a-lētheia* 'truth' is 'unforgettable'" (66).[49] If it is really true, I would add, it

48. In fact, the historiography of early Greece, as I explain it, looks like a natural evolution from the Greek Lyric Age as Nagy explains it in *Pindar's Homer*, 58–66 and passim. On the two modern approaches to historical research, see Fogel and Elton, *Which Road to the Past?*

49. For further discussion and bibliography, see Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 49–79 and notes 1–3, 170–71.

should not be specific to either time or location; it is universal. If universal, it will be encountered everywhere and at any time in some form or other. So its universality makes it unforgettable.

VERIFICATION

I have devoted my entire section on correspondence to Thucydides because he is the subject of the strongest, most long-standing claims about modernity in an ancient historian.[50] The question of the extent and nature of the early historians' dependence on documentary evidence, indeed, on evidence of any kind, is still an open one. But it is important, deserving more attention than it generally receives. "As history of historiography is basically a study of individual historians," said Momigliano, "no student of the history of historiography does his work properly unless he is capable of telling me whether the historian or historians he has studied used the evidence in a satisfactory way."[51] What follows is an attempt to show briefly what the ancients took for evidence and how they used it. Whether that use is satisfactory is left to the reader to decide.

Distribution (Usually by Group Size)

Begin with the archaic concept of truth described above. Truth is Panhallenic rather than local, and if so, probably to be thought of as universal; it must be found everywhere. A truth will be Panhellenic in the very least and, if really true, should be found even beyond the cultural frontiers of Hellenism. Its universality makes it an absolute that does not allow for relativism or perspectivism. If Zeus is a true god, he exists and can be named not just in Greece but also in Egypt and anywhere else, and his nature will not change when seen from the perspective of this or that country. However, local myths may depart from the generally reflected core of truth in some detail and thus become less true. The universal absolute permits of degrees or levels of truth that can be assessed by someone who has gained a certain universality of experience, a much-travelled historian, for example. Views held by everyone or

50. Cf. Abbott, *Thucydides*, 25–42; Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History*, 23–26. For a general discussion of more recent work with bibliography, see Connor, "A Post-Modernist Thucydides?"

51. Momigliano, "The Rhetoric of History and the History of Rhetoric," especially 264.

features that are perceptibly common to every statement or manifestation of a thing are true by this thinking. Less-common things become increasingly suspect as they become rarer. The unique example is improbable because it fits no known pattern.

Distribution orders or structures truth into a hierarchy of levels of reliability according to the size of the group that allegedly holds the opinion. The smaller group may then be isolated and marginalized for attack. There is a very clear example of this approach in the opening lines of Andocides' *De Pace*: "That it is better to make a just peace than be at war, Athenians, I think *you all* recognize. That *your politicians* agree nominally with peace but oppose the steps whereby peace could come about, this you do *not all perceive*" (my emphasis). In these two deft sentences, Andocides establishes the "truth," held by all, that will be maintained through the rest of the speech and the error, held by politicians and not detected by all, that will be elaborated, exposed, and attacked.

Herodotus follows this procedure frequently. "The rest of Greece" (but for the Athenians) has the last word on the loyalty of the Corinthians at Salamis (8.94.4); "we Greeks" have the best information about Egyptian history (2.154.4). He does not explain whether he thinks that Greek historical knowledge is superior to Egyptian or that an implicit agreement between both peoples improves the reliability of the knowledge. When he intends to attack a view, it is assigned to a smaller, sometimes unspecified group. Despite the fact that "we Greeks" have good knowledge about Egyptian history, some, namely Ionians (represented by Hecataeus), have got the geography wrong (2.15–17.1). In a famous case (3.80.1), Herodotus assigns doubts that Persian nobles could have had a sophisticated debate about politics after the overthrow of the magus in 521 BC to "certain Greeks." He will eventually "prove" that they are wrong (6.43.3). "Erroneous" explanations of the flooding of the Nile are ascribed to "certain Greeks who want a reputation for wisdom" (2.20.1) before they are attacked.

Thucydides' use of gnomic sayings may at times be a shorthand representation of what everyone is expected to know or think. (However, I accept de Romilly's view that his use of generalizing patterns is unique.) In the fourth century, Ephorus' *Universal History* seems to have tried to represent favourably the historical claims of all parts of Greece. In Theopompus' proem the historian appears to have made an explicit association between his widespread travelling and communications with

all of his important contemporaries and the authority of his work (FF25, 26). It would appear that authority was not vested in the individual but in the community at large. The truth of history had a universality that could be represented by timeless principles (Thucydides) or authenticated by "universal" consultation (Herodotus, Ephorus, Theopompus). This need for widespread consultation and representation explains the development of universal history in the fourth century.

• *Repetition*

This characteristic takes two forms. One is repetition of a single item—a story gains credibility the more times it is repeated, even by the same source—and the other is the multiplication of parallels—something becomes more likely as a principle the more it is exemplified in specific cases or more probable with the frequency of similar events. Thucydides employs repetition to establish certain crucial points.[52] In his Archaeology, he describes Sparta as a city with fewer splendid structures than its power might have permitted and Athens as presenting a display that leaves an exaggerated impression of power (1.10.2). These sketches of the two states establish two of the most relentless narrative threads of book 1, lasting into book 2 until the great Funeral Oration ties them together. The idea of the sluggishness of Sparta contrasted with the aggressiveness of Athens[53] is repeated in a rich variety of ways: it is narrated; it is pointed out by Corinthians (1.68–71); it is exemplified more than once by representative speakers from each side (1.73–77: Athenians; 80–85: Archidamus; 140–44: Pericles); it is illustrated in the public monuments of each state (as noted above); it is historicized in

52. According to Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History*, the repetitions often take the form of planned contrasts. By studying these contrasts, Rawlings argues for an overarching structural plan for Thucydides' history.

53. I admit that my contrast of sluggishness and aggressiveness oversimplifies. I draw my observation from Thucydides' first representation of the comparison (1.10.2), where the aggrandizement of Athens by means of elaborate monuments is compared to the backwardness of Sparta. Badian, *From Plateae to Potidaea*, 125–62, treats this matter at some length, illustrating its complexity and its pro-Athenian bias. I am tempted to suggest that Thucydides' observation about the monuments was prompted by his sensitivity to the local traditions that were being recorded by Hellanicus. Athens was a rich place for a Hellanicus; Sparta was not. There is an assumption that great places have great histories (Thuc. 6.1–6), and insofar as greatness gains expression through the building of cities and the housing of monuments in those cities, Sparta was a curious anomaly.

the Pentecontaetia (1.89–117);[54] and it is given its final ringing celebration in the Funeral Oration (2.35–46). Curiously, as soon as the war is joined, the Athenian *demos* suddenly becomes fickle and unstable in its faithfulness to its own decisions (2.65.4; 4.28.3; 6.32.1; 8.1.4). This motif of an irresolute mob is also developed by repetition, but not to the extent that it undermines the principle of persistent Athenian aggression.

Other historians used repetition in different ways. To Herodotus a unique event or phenomenon was a *thōma* (Ionic spelling), a marvel. When Mardonius of Persia set up democracies in Ionia in 493, Herodotus (6.43.3) expects it to be a great *thōma* to Greeks, who doubt that Persians could have debated the merits of democracy in 521 (3.80.1). His reasoning seems to be that these two occasions are parallel, and therefore confirming, cases of Persians knowing about democracy. Each one without its parallel would be a *thōma* and therefore suspect. A century later Theopompus would devote a substantial part of book 8 (and some of book 9) of his *Philippica* to *thaumata* (Attic spelling), or *thaumasia* (FF64–77). This excursus seems to have focused on Delphi and was strategically placed at or near the beginning of the Phocian (or Sacred) War. If uniqueness makes the *thauma* a marvel, Theopompus turned the idea on its head by amassing parallels for the mantic power of Delphi from all parts of the known world and from all accessible periods of history. The effect must have been to turn the "unique marvel" of Delphic prophecy into something of a commonplace. I doubt that his purpose was to cheapen the importance of Delphi. On the contrary, it was more likely that he wanted to authenticate the mantic claims of the oracle and set on record the enormity of the sacrilege the Phocian mercenaries were about to perpetrate. The same historian circulated a pamphlet, "On the Treasures Plundered from Delphi." To judge from its fragments (FF247–49), its purpose was to demonstrate the extent of the shrine's desecration. What survives looks like fragments of a long list of sacred treasures taken and used for corrupt purposes or examples of the profligate spending of money coined from bullion in Apollo's treasuries. For Herodotus two examples constitute proof that the Persians knew about democracy; for Theopompus multiple examples show the importance and authenticity of Delphi's mantic power, and lists of plundered

54. Stadter, "The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89–117)," brings this out very well.

items prove both the fact and the enormity of the shrine's ultimate despoliation.

Attribution

This element may also take two forms. The first is both problematic and controversial, the second is well documented. The controversial type theorizes that a historian, particularly Herodotus, was capable of attributing a piece of information to the source who should be vouching for it; the other involves the attribution of meaning to an observed phenomenon in convergence with a preconceived story. Detlev Fehling is one of the most recent advocates of the theory of Herodotean source attribution. For him Herodotus fabricated a very great part of the material he preserves and then assigned each item to an appropriate source.[55] Fehling's arguments for widespread fabrication by Herodotus do not convince me (see Appendix 1). On the other hand, that Herodotus attributed much information to his sources (or found the information so attributed) may be a correct assumption. He would have been fortunate indeed, and incredibly busy, to have been able to verify all the legends of national origins assigned to the countries allegedly represented in Xerxes' invading army in 480. That list of national contingents contains a concentration of source attributions, but there are still more than 150 others from all parts of the world scattered through Herodotus' work.[56] He reports people's thoughts, speeches, and dreams on countless occasions, only eleven of which he derives from a source.[57] In most of the remaining cases he is probably imagining thoughts and speeches for people as an inference from *natural probability* (see below). The attribution of stories to appropriate informants involves the same procedure. People are simply made to say, think, or report what he supposes any reasonable person would expect them to do.

Meaning is assigned to objects in convergence with received traditions. Martin Bernal is one of the few scholars who believes that Sesostris

55. Fehling, *Herodotus and His "Sources,"* 87–174.

56. For the ethnic contingents of Xerxes' army and navy, see Hdt. 7.61–95; cf. Appendix 1, p.241.

57. Herodotus usually says something like "X said (thought, dreamed) B." On eleven occasions he uses a different formula: "X is said to have said B": 1.153.1; 3.34.1; 3.160.1; 5.105.1; 7.56.2; 7.130.1; 7.150.1; 8.88.2; 8.118.1–4; 9.82.3; perhaps 1.86.3–87.3 should be counted because of the *oratio obliqua.*

of Egypt conquered the territories given him in Herodotus.[58] Otherwise, the pillars allegedly left by Sesostris would have to be seen as fabrications by someone or real objects given an inappropriate meaning that converges with the Sesostris story. Whether or not Herodotus visited Cape Taenarum, his account of a statuette of a man on a dolphin reportedly standing there converges with the story of Arion and the dolphin that he assigns to, or heard from, various sources (1.23–24). Similarly, inscriptions on tripods that he says he saw in Thebes allegedly had a Phoenician quality to his eyes (5.58–61). Stephanie West finds this claim so incredible that she doubts that Herodotus really did see such inscriptions.[59] I should prefer to take this as a case of attribution. The eye sees what it wants to see. If Cadmus came to Thebes from Phoenicia, as the legends assert, it would be necessary for early Theban inscriptions to have a Phoenician appearance. Elsewhere Herodotus mentions reports of a giant footprint, but seems sceptical of accounts that it was made by Heracles (4.82).

Attribution was alive and well in the fourth century. In the Aristotelian corpus there is a curious collection of strange stories in which we hear about altars dedicated by Jason in the region of the Ister and a temple of Artemis in the Adriatic allegedly built by Medea during her flight from the Colchians. This story reflects a fourth-century reworking of the Jason myth that probably developed as a result of the colonization of Issa by the Sicilian tyrants.[60] In that century the Greeks decided that Jason and Medea did not sail up the Danube to Ocean and so back to the Mediterranean, as Hecataeus had made them do, but came down a fictitious arm of the Danube that supposedly issued into the Adriatic Sea. Now that the region was to become colonized as Greek, old monuments found along the way to Issa could be assigned to the Greek heroic past. A third type of attribution is history by etymology. The meaning of the name of a place prompts the development of a foundation story. There is an amusing example in the fragments of Theopompus. The name Pygella was associated with *pygoi* (buttocks), and the place was

58. Bernal, *Black Athena*, 1: 19, 64; 2: 236–73. Bernal's work has produced an animated response. Very substantial is *The Challenge of "Black Athena"* by various authors in *Arethusa*, special issue, fall 1989, which deals with volume 1. For a review of volume 2, see Vermeule, "The World Turned Upside Down."

59. S. West, "Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests"; cf. D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ*, 132–42.

60. Cf. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 96–97.

accordingly founded by members of Agamemnon's crew left behind there because they had a disease of the buttocks. Given its alternative pronunciation, Phygella, the foundation story now changes. In this case the name is etymologized with the verb *pheugo* (I flee), and the place was "founded by fugitives as the name implies."[61]

Monuments and place names were perhaps not the only subjects of attribution. It is possible that ancient historians expected their narratives themselves to have certain meanings attributed to them that may not have had a lot to do with their superficial content. Herodotus opens his discussion of Egypt in book 2 with the story that Pharaoh Psammetichus, believing that the Egyptians were the oldest race alive, conducted an experiment to prove it. Two children were shut away from all linguistic exposure until they uttered their first word, which turned out to be Phrygian. So it would appear the point of the story is that the Egyptians learned that they were not the most ancient people after all. Herodotus claims to have heard this story from some priests at Memphis. He then asserts that he went to Thebes and Heliopolis to see if the priests there would agree with what he had found at Memphis. From these other places he heard stories to the effect that the Egyptians claimed to have been the first people to have organized the solar calendar and to have identified the twelve gods. I am sure that few contemporary historians would be as satisfied as Herodotus was with this "confirmation" of the Psammetichus story. It is not until somewhat later that he reveals the meaning he took from the story (2.1–4). It appears that he expected his readers to hear in it the information that the Egyptians believed themselves to be the most ancient race alive (2.15.2). It is this meaning, which must be attributed to the Psammetichus story, that is confirmed by the other priestly claims about being the first to identify the gods and the months. The story of Psammetichus' experiment is one of the few places in which Herodotus provides a clue as to how he expected to be read. In the absence of other such clues, one can only wonder about the extent to which we misread him and perhaps his successors as well.

To recall the foregoing remarks about *distribution*, when Herodotus assigns alleged information, such as a story about a national origin, to the race or nation concerned, the purpose may be to give the story a (bogus) credential. On the other hand, it could have the effect of placing the account at or near the margin of credibility. If reliable

61. Ibid., 120.

knowledge is anything told by or credible to all Greeks, and suspect knowledge is anything told by some Greeks, then a story told by some barbarians would probably belong very low indeed on a putative scale of probabilities—unless those barbarians were Egyptians and the subject was religion, of course. A reason for Herodotus' assigning of material to a source was not always to verify the information; it could have been to distance himself from it.[62]

General Knowledge

General knowledge is, of course, Greek knowledge, even when attributed to non-Greeks. It enjoys the highest order of credibility according to the principle of *distribution* mentioned above. It deserves separate treatment for three reasons. First, only a generally known or famous subject was appropriate for a major history.[63] Second, because the audience could be expected to possess the bulk of the information to be recorded by the historian, it illustrates the special relationship the historian had with his audience. And third, in certain cases, specific items generally known informed and verified less well known parts of a historical narrative.

When Herodotus announced that he was declaiming (or publishing) the results of his enquiry to preserve the great deeds of Greek and barbarian (in the Persian War) from obliteration by time (proem), it follows that the events to be declaimed were still alive in the public memory. In the first instance, therefore, he was reporting to people who still remembered the story. Thucydides also wrote for an audience who could scarcely have forgotten the Peloponnesian War. There is

62. As suggested by Tyrrell, *Amazons*, 57, following Rosellini and Said, "Usage de femme et autres nomoi chez les 'sauvages' d'Hérodote." But see Flory, *The Archaic Smile of Herodotus*, 49–79.

63. Xenophon's whimsical attitude to historical writing prompted him to leave on record some explicit statements about the criteria by which the historian was expected to select his material. The bon mot of Theramenes when he quaffed the hemlock was not suitable for history, but Xenophon records it anyway (2.3.56). He dwells on Teleutias' departure from command of the fleet (5.1.3–4), admitting that all the handshaking, ribands, and prayers were not "an expenditure, risk, or contrivance worthy of historical reporting." Later, the stalwart loyalty of tiny Phlious to the crumbling Peloponnesian League draws even more emphatic statements from him. "All historians write of the important cities when they do something great, but I think that a small city that manages a lot of fine achievements is even more deserving of narrative attention" (7.2.1).

no reason to believe that he outlived the conclusion of the war by as much as a decade, and most scholars believe it was less than that.[64] Xenophon assumed that his readers would know his story almost as well he did, as George Cawkwell remarks in his notes to the Penguin translation.[65] Not only was it characteristic for the early historians to write for knowledgeable audiences, but they also chose monumental subjects. Thucydides spends a great deal of time trying to prove that his war was the biggest ever (1.1–21). By contrast, Xenophon openly spurns the criterion of enormity from time to time and announces that he will deal with something trivial instead (see note 63). In general, therefore, the relationship of the early historian to his audience is unlike that of modern researchers. While the modern emphasis is on discovering in a new publication and informing an audience, who are not necessarily expected to know the crucial items of information, but may be aware of the circumstances on which the author's thesis is based, the ancient audience knew the main story but had perhaps forgotten some of the circumstantial details. Thus it was open to the ancient historian to write what might be called today a subtext to, or a commentary on, the important knowledge possessed by the hearers, who were at the same time, in some sense, the writer's sources of information as well. Since we can rarely do more than guess wildly at the knowledge that the historian expected his audience to bring to his work, the chances that we sometimes misread ancient historical writing strike me as fairly high.

One very important influence of general knowledge on fourth-century historical writing came through the encapsulation of certain truths in terms of which a narrative was to be constructed or verified. The most important examples are characterizations. Later commentators such as Dionysius and Cicero were well aware of the use the historian should make of character (*ethos*) to verify his narrative. Dionysius, for example, lauds Thucydides' love of truth (*alētheia*) because Thucydides remains faithful to the "shouted about virtue" (*periboētos aretē*) of Pericles.[66] Truth is attributed to the historian by the reader because he reflects widely believed characterizations of historical figures (see *collateral contingency*

64. Hornblower, *Thucydides*, 150–54.

65. Cawkwell, Introduction and notes to Xenophon, *A History of My Times* (tr. Rex Warner), 34, 337, 392.

66. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*, 78–87, particularly the Ciceronian passages translated on 80 and 86; DH *On Thucydides* 8.

below). There is no hint that any of the later commentators looked for documentary proof.[67]

Natural Probability

I use the term "natural probability" to avoid confusion with modern statistical probability. Fifth-century philosophers assumed that nature was uniform, transparent, and a reliable source of truth. Their opposition of the ultimate validity of nature (*physis*) to the artifice of human convention (*nomos*) is well documented.[68] Nature was assumed to exhibit patterns (*eike*) that, once recognized, permitted the inference of similar ones. Herodotus (2.120.5; 6.85–83) notices apparent examples of punishments visited on mortals from the gods (*tiseis* or *timōriai ek theōn*). When Croesus commits the act of hubris by assuming that he is the most blessed man alive, his subsequent ruin is seen (1.34.1 with 13.2) as a punishment from god, "to judge from the pattern" (*hōs eikasai*) of excessive acts followed by divine retribution. Both Herodotus and Thucydides use *eikos* and its cognates regularly. Not surprisingly, Thucydides is more systematic. He uses the noun *eikos* most frequently in the speeches.[69] Since *eikos* is an obvious way of inferring or capturing the general principles of nature, it should come as no surprise that de Romilly finds the vast majority of Thucydides' gnomic expressions in the speeches also. She further remarks that Thucydides sees truth in layers or levels: more true, less true, and so on. Accordingly, a comment put in the mouth of Alcibiades shows that direct observation is seen as the most reliable source of knowledge, and in its absence one resorts to *eikos* as second best (5.92.5). The vocabulary of natural probability persists into the fourth century. Xenophon uses the noun *eikos* in much the same way as Thucydides. In a few passages (e.g., 2.3.33; 6.3.5), however, he employs it with a moral connotation like *prepon* (fitting) or even *dikaion* (just). We do not have enough of Ephorus and Theopompus to know how much they used *eikos* and its cognates, but their reported stylistic master, Isocrates, frequently draws inferences from *eikos*, and Demosthenes

67. According to Polybius, what the historian needs is something called *polypragmosynē* (12.26–27). This seems to mean that he must read all the authorities on his chosen subject (as Timaeus had done) and then travel a great deal, make enquiries, and visit battlefields (as Timaeus neglected to do). Polybius makes no specific mention of any need for documents (see above, pp.22–24, 66–67).

68. Guthrie, *The Sophists*, 55–134.

69. Westlake, *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, 153–60.

makes regular use of it. So there is no reason to believe that it would have fallen from the language of later, fourth-century historiography.

Collateral Contingency

In the philosophical sense of the term, most of the ancient claims given in the preceding section are contingent, not necessary, "truths." A necessary truth is self-evident, tautological even, while a claim that something is reasonable because it allegedly suits a hypothetical pattern (*eikos*) has no truth of its own, but one that is contingent on some further demonstration of the absolute validity of the pattern. Since such a demonstration would generally require some sort of statistical survey, the ancients never took that final step.

"Collateral contingency" is my expression chosen to indicate a special type of logical interaction. From the time of Thucydides, historians and biographers used character (*ēthos*) in their narratives (*logoi*) to verify them (see above on *general knowledge*). The success of the *logos* constructed in conformity with the *ēthos* reflects back favourably on the *ēthos*. So *ēthos* and *logos* exist side by side in a mutually confirming relationship. In some cases, the *ēthos* receives independent verification, and a chain of validation is established from the alleged proof through *ēthos* to *logos*. From the fourth century, *ēthos* (character) frequently refers to individuals, but Thucydides began with national characterizations (see *repetition* above). In this case, his repetition verifies the aggressive Athenian character and the contrasting sluggish Spartan one. After the Funeral Oration and the shock of the great plague, the relentlessly grasping Athenian character is modified and complicated somewhat by the secondary theme of the instability of the Athenian mob, and the rest of the war narrative receives its inner logic from these characterizations. As the two states continue to exhibit behaviours that conform to these generalizations in situation after situation, the story of the war gains a compelling verisimilitude.

Ideally, *ēthos* is a stable, immutable principle that anchors and directs the *logos*, but such is not always the case. There is a fine example in Xenophon in which the narration undermines the characterization. In the winter of 370/69 Sparta was invaded by a Boeotian-led coalition of forces. In response, it appealed to Athens for support (according to Xenophon), and a number of Peloponnesian ambassadors came to Athens begging for an alliance. Xenophon describes the Athenians as unpersuaded by the Spartans until first Cliteles of Corinth and then


Well Known
Less Well Known
Reflects and Amplifies
ἦθος
λόγος
Confirms
ethos
logos
This is the inner logic of Greek historical writing, starting in the fifth century—particularly with Thucydides—and continuing into the fourth. When the logos becomes an argument for the confirming ethos, the discourse becomes a closed rhetorical system.
C. Mundigler

Fig. 2. Collateral (or Rhetorical) Contingency.

Procles, a Phliasian, succeed in convincing them to enter the war on the Peloponnesian side. Towards the end of his speech, Procles reminds the Athenians of their legendary resistance to Thebes, securing burial for the fallen Argives in the story of the Seven against Thebes. He also mentions their support of the sons of Heracles against Eurystheus. Procles goes on to argue that these stories give the Athenians a reputation for being champions of the oppressed, a reputation they can now reconfirm by aiding Sparta.

Xenophon records an enthusiastic Athenian response. But the campaign that starts with such promise produces nothing. Not only do the Athenians fail to live up to their reputation, it seems, but Iphicrates, their commander, who elsewhere has shown himself to be an effective general, bungles the operation and permits the enemy to return to Boeotia unscathed (6.5.33–52). So Xenophon's *logos* is in effect an argument against the established Athenian *ēthos*. This was, of course, the most crucial campaign in the history of Sparta. Once the Thebans had safely escaped from the Peloponnese, the refounding of Messene was secure and the old Peloponnesian League in ruins (forever, as things would turn out). Xenophon's *logos* probably reflects the extreme Spartan disappointment with this outcome.

It would be of great help to have Ephorus' account of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. As Jacoby reconstructs it from Diodorus (F196, with comment), it probably took the following form: the Epidamnian affair, one of Thucydides' causes of the Peloponnesian War, was narrated as a separate conflict. If that is so, Ephorus did not reflect Thucydides' analysis of the origins of the war at all. Instead, he apparently attributed

its outbreak to Pericles' leadership. Despite certain problems in Diodorus' narrative, Ephorus probably characterized the decision to go to war as an act of effective statesmanship. In order for this idea to succeed, he would have been obliged to ignore Thucydides' view that the war lasted twenty-seven years, culminating in Athens' utter defeat, and make Pericles responsible for the Archidamian War only, from which Athens emerged quite well. If this conjecture is all correct (and there is much to be said for it), the account would be a very clear example of the manipulation of both *ēthos* and *logos* to make each lend the other support.

Unfortunately, we do not have any substantial parts of Theopompus' *Philippica*, but the surviving fragments suggest that he probably used *ēthos* in the same way as I have suggested for Ephorus and shown for Xenophon. A considerable number of his fragments are characterizations, sometimes of nations and sometimes of individuals. In one fragment he moves from a sketch of the nature of Chares the Athenian to the Athenians in general (F213). Most of his character vignettes include brief references to the historical behaviours of his subjects.[70]

Documents in Evidence

By documents I mean any item openly written out and used in evidence by the historian. This definition is to distinguish written documents from written sources. I define a source as a previously existing testimony that is used and passed on, in whole or in part, in the historian's report. By contrast, documents must be clearly identifiable in the historian's text in the form of a quotation or detailed summary. Their purpose may be to show the proximity to the event attained by the historian or his informant—that is, to reflect favourably on the reporting—or to form an evidentiary basis for the report itself. I assume that a document, fully cited or described, existed in a written form and came into the hands of the historian in that form. Of course, this assumption is open to question, but since I am concerned only with the use of items that the historian is prepared to put forward as documents, the question of the actual form they took or even of their ultimate genuineness is of no significance for my argument. Even in the case of a completely fabricated document, could one be so exposed unequivocally, there is much to be

70. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 127–56. Moles, "Xenophon and Callicratidas," treats the subject of Callicratidas' *ēthos* in Xenophon most effectively. It seems clear that skilful characterization was one of Xenophon's primary interests.

learned about what sort of things the writer expected would impress his audience and how such a document could be used to authenticate a narrative.

The groundwork for this discussion was laid in the previous essay. Specifically, it was pointed out that the ancients wrote two types of history, local and universal; and the two main kinds of information on which descriptions of the past are based were shown to come from memory or from documents. It was demonstrated that memory had its own way of preserving events, but that documents were better for precise details. They also provided the most usual means of correcting errors and the only real hope of renewing a fading picture of a past event. People today, even non-historians, think nothing of ransacking old photo albums and family records to re-establish contact with a forgotten parent or with traumatic periods in their lives. Memory decays, but it also (re-)constructs an event along lines of social conformity; it mythologizes. By resorting to documents, the historian works towards a scientific process of collecting, testing, and using evidence following rules developed in professional schools and always subject to expert scrutiny. As in the case of Man the Hunter, where the emergence of the first hominids is well beyond any human memory, evidence (though in this case obviously not documentary as usually understood) provides the only means of investigation. Today, documents and various types of archaeological evidence are usually regarded as materials for doing a history that is completely independent of memory.

From the examples cited in this section and in *regionalism* below, it should become apparent that ancient historians had little or no thought of making themselves independent of memory—whether their own or their communities' oral traditions—except insofar as they drew on the literary productions of their predecessors, themselves ultimately dependent on memory or tradition. After Herodotus has completed his heroic description of the Spartan-led resistance and defeat at the pass near Thermopylae (7.206–34), he gives the texts of three inscriptions erected on the spot after the Persians had withdrawn from Greece (7.228). The first mentions the numbers on each side: "four thousand" against "three hundred myriads." Otherwise all three inscriptions are simply celebrations of the heroism of the fallen, and it does not appear that Herodotus sees them as a way of making himself independent of tradition. He may have been aware that the first inscription gives numbers for the Persian force that were themselves traditional rather than based on independent evidence. The texts simply support the atmo-

sphere of celebration and give evidence only of the quality of Herodotus' "witnessing" of the event. They convey the impression that he had visited the place.

In one case, the text of an inscription is demonstrably part of the tradition and could not have been given for purposes of authentication. The example is found in Thucydides this time (1.132), where the topic is the downfall of Regent Pausanias some years after the Greek victory at Plataea (479). The story is that an arrogant Pausanias had commemorated himself on the serpent column erected at Delphi from the spoils of the victory (see below). Thucydides gives the text of a couplet that Pausanias is alleged to have had inscribed, and it is clearly incriminating. However, as Thucydides explains, the inscription was immediately erased and replaced with the names of the cities that had joined in defeating the Persians. The text that disappeared immediately is given in full, but no part of the one that survived is quoted. That would have been impractical, since the inscription was merely a list of places, but the point is clear nonetheless: inscribed texts may be part of the tradition and not independent evidence for it. There are a few examples of documents used to circumvent or correct public memory. In those cases, the documents address the information being advanced and *not* the quality of witnessing. They are discussed below. It will suffice for the present to point out that all the examples, with the exception of citations from the poets, are from or are associated with local history, usually Athenian.

A local history (obviously) focuses on a single place, such as a *polis*, a nation, or a kingdom, more or less exclusively. The "evidence" used, taking the form of inscriptions, monuments, and the like, must be generally, if not exclusively, from that place (see below). General histories, by contrast, take the interactions of two or more such places as their subjects. Documents used in evidence for general histories must have a general, not a local, identity. The rule is that general documents can be used for general histories and, occasionally, for local histories, but local documents should not be cited in the mainstream of any general or universal narrative.

Quoted documents take three main forms in the early historians. The first are literary citations, the second are oracles, and the third may be inscriptions, monuments, or archival records. The heading of this section is "Documents in Evidence," but there are cases of whole inscriptions or interstate agreements reproduced apparently for no evidentiary purpose. Herodotus quotes certain inscribed texts more for celebration

than proof (see above), and Thucydides reproduces treaties and alliances in full, despite the fact that they had no impact on the course of events or his account of them (in some cases, because they never really came into effect; see below). Where there is an evidentiary use of the document, the historian's procedure takes one or the other of two forms: he may give the citation and argue from it in favour of a reconstruction as if in a modern graduate seminar (there are only four or possibly six examples of this approach);[71] or, most commonly, the item is simply integrated completely with the narrative. In the latter case, the effect will be to add authority to the narrative. To add perspective, it will be informative to note the most obvious cases in which Thucydides' narrative depends on, or would have richly benefited from, the citation of documents that are not in point of fact reproduced by him. Finally, with respect to the two principal types of history, local and general, I shall be arguing that Herodotus writes both kinds, and this interpretation will assist in establishing the pattern of relationship of the type of evidence to the genre of historical writing.

Literary Evidence There are two examples in which I am uncertain whether the earlier work is used as a source or is cited to "give evidence." In Herodotus book 2 (15) the Ionians' views of Egyptian geography (and history, by implication) are cited in order to be attacked. The "Ionians" here are generally acknowledged to be Hecataeus. His view is dismissed, of course, but it is arguable that the procedure of improving on his older version of Egyptian geography—the standard one in Greek circles in Herodotus' lifetime presumably—is one way whereby Herodotus increases the authority of his new one. Therefore Hecataeus, who was used somewhat by Herodotus as a source for his account of Egypt, was also used by him "in evidence" to support a revised view of the country.[72] It is possible that Thucydides made a simi-

71. Herodotus cites a Delphic oracle to explain and partially reconstruct Leonidas' behaviour at Thermopylae (7.220.4); he uses inscribed tripods to "prove" his claim that the Gephyraeans were Phoenician expatriates who came to Athens from Thebes (5.59–61). Thucydides reconstructs the early Delian games from a Homeric hymn to Apollo (3.204); he also re-creates the conditions of early Greece using Homer and other observations (1.1–21). Arguably, 6.53–59 is also a reconstruction from evidence, but Thucydides says that the Athenians really know what he proves from the documents. His primary purpose, therefore, is the destruction of an erroneous counter-claim. Similarly, Theopompus' argument in FF153–55 looks wholly destructive in purpose.

72. S. West, "Herodotus' Portrait of Hecataeus." West regards Hecataeus' recounting his genealogy to the priests at Thebes as a Herodotean fiction.

lar use of Hellanicus' account of the Pentecontaetia (1.97.2), but in the absence of evidence, the question cannot be pursued.[73]

It would be difficult to think of a more Panhellenic author than Homer.[74] Ephorus took his *Universal History* back to the return of the Heraclids.[75] This is so close to the time of the Trojan War that Homer can be assumed as a source for Ephorus, at least for background material. Theopompus used Homer for background once (F354) and for comparison twice (FF114, 225) in the development of moral characterizations. Callisthenes drew upon the *Iliad* in order to develop the heroic qualities of Alexander by comparing him with Achilles.[76] This procedure may have had the effect of adding authority to his depiction of Alexander.

Herodotus used Homer in a variety of ways. Allusions to the Trojan conflict are found at the beginning of his history (1.4) and near the end (9.120). (The Protesilaus of this story was an Achaean hero killed by Trojans at the first landing of the Greek forces.) I have already argued that the idea and general structure of the formulaic war story comes from the Trojan cycle. By bracketing his own war story with references to his great predecessor, Herodotus accomplishes two things: he identifies a major source of his literary inspiration, and he uses Homer's authority to locate the front line of Greco-barbarian conflict not in the Balkan peninsula but in Asia, part of his regional agenda (to be discussed below). Homer is used in book 2 (116) to provide background evidence against which to elaborate the alternative view that Helen was not in Troy when the Achaeans took the place and is briefly cited again in book 4 (29) to support the thesis that horns do not grow well on cattle in cold climates. Similarly, Thucydides uses very select passages from Homer to support his thesis in the Archaeology that Athens and Sparta were at an unprecedented pinnacle of power (in all of Greek history) when the Peloponnesian War broke out. Again, he attributes a hymn to Apollo to

73. For a general treatment of Hellanicus and Thucydides' use of him, see Pearson, *The Local Historians of Attica*, 1–48, which is lucid and insightful. Also, there is nothing quite like the genius of Jacoby in *Atthis*. Today, perhaps, Jacoby's quarrel with Wilamowitz over the role of the Exegetai in the development of the early Atthidographic tradition will seem less gripping than it used to. But even if the first seventy pages of this book are skipped over in haste to get at the meat of the argument, it is as well to remember that everything Jacoby says about documents in the later parts of the book is coloured by that dispute.

74. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*, 199–214, discusses the relationship of authority (and truth) to the Panhellenic status of Homer and Pindar.

75. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus*, 26–27.

76. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 40–42.

Homer and cites it twice in support of his reconstruction of the Delian games in a brief digression found in book 3 (see note 71).

Thucydides makes no specific mention of other poets, though we are entitled to suspect that the authorities who "received in memory from their forebears the most reliable Peloponnesian traditions" included local poets (1.9.2). Herodotus is more forthcoming. An otherwise unknown Aristeas of Marmora (4.13.1) is quoted as an authority on the Issedones and Arimaspians in book 4. This poet is the subject of a wonderful story that seems calculated to lend him an aura of magical authority, and his work is used to discredit stories that the Scythians allegedly repeat about their own origins. A digression in book 5 on the Pisistratid seizure of Sigeum is supported by a connection (probably anachronistic) with a poem of Alcaeus in which the poet threw away his armour (5.95.1).

Most of the other references to the poets are simply passing allusions, and even the above-mentioned examples would have to be called digressions. The Archaeology was clearly important to Thucydides. However, it is obviously not a part of his *polemos* but only a preliminary demonstration of its importance. Poets, such as Hesiod (2.53.3), Pindar (3.38.4), Alcaeus (5.95.1), and Simonides (5.102.3), who are mentioned by Herodotus probably did have Panhellenic respectability. The Athenian tragedian Aeschylus, on the other hand, may not have. He is the one poet given a patronymic (son of Euphorion), as if to allow for the possibility that he might not be immediately recognized, and Herodotus' very brief mention of him seems to contain a dismissive snarl (2.156.6). Poets of Panhellenic stature add authority to a story in various ways, usually incidental. Herodotus' account of the sacking of Sardis during the Ionian revolt includes a brief mention of Eualcidas, an Eretrian general killed at Ephesus. Apparently Eualcidas was commemorated in a poem by Simonides (5.102.3). By contrast, the local Spartan version of the return of the Heraclids is dismissed because it is known to "no poet," presumably outside the Peloponnese (6.52.1). So information from poets with Panhellenic status can be used as a control over local traditions.

Oracles When Athens and Sparta successfully negotiated the Peace of Nicias in 421, they opened their formal treaty with a clause guaranteeing access to "the communal sacred places." Apollo's seat at Delphi was clearly the most important, to judge from the wars that were fought over it and from the fact that it is the only communal sacred place specifically

mentioned—and at some length—in the treaty (5.18.1–2; see also 4.118.1–3). Delphic Apollo's prestige was obviously very high throughout most of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries. I have shown how Theopompus devoted time and effort to the importance of the shrine and the extent of its desecration, but it is impossible to know how much use he made of the god's utterances to give his history authority.[77] Thucydides summarizes a Pythian oracle when he describes the reinstatement of the Spartan king Plistoanax (5.16.), who favoured peace. A little later, in book 5 (26.4), he resumes his account of the war after the Peace of Nicias, arguing that the interval of peace was in name only and that the war really continued without significant interruption. His proof includes a list of breaches of the treaty (repetition) and certain oracles that he remembers predicted that the war would last thrice nine years. This is a passage of no trivial importance to his subject; it actually defines it, and it is remarkable that oracles are the only proofs external to the war itself that he cites (albeit with a touch of cynicism). Herodotus is the great user of oracles, however. He gives three prophetic utterances attributed to Bacis, one allegedly from Amphilytus of Acharnae, one from Lysistratus, an Athenian seer, and seventeen from Pythian Apollo.[78]

Delphic oracles are interwoven into some of the most crucial sections of Herodotus' history. Croesus' preparations to attack Cyrus (1.47.3, 53.3, 55.2, 85.2) and the Athenian deliberations before committing to the sea fight at Salamis (7.140–41.4) are among the most noteworthy. While it is true that both of these passages raise questions about the authority and meaning of Pythian utterances, their full inclusion in the narrative makes it difficult to imagine how Herodotus could have told a

77. But see F336 = Plut. *Mor.* 403 E–F.

78. I do not count oracles cited by speakers like Socles of Corinth; cf. 5.92. Amphilytus 1.62.4; Lysistratus 8.96; Bacis 8.77; 8.80.2; 9.43; Pythia 1.47.3; 1.53.3; 1.55.2; 1.65.2–3; 1.66.2; 1.67.4; 1.85.2; 1.174.5; 3.57.3–4; 4.155.3; 4.157.2; 6.19.2; 6.77.2; 7.140; 7.141.2–3; 7.148; 7.220.4 (6.98.3 is an interpolation). These oracles have been the object of some severely critical scrutiny, and it is perhaps as well to note the arguments at this point. Crahay, *La littérature oraculaire chez Hérodote*, and Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle*, both argue against the authenticity of most of the surviving oracles; Fontenrose hardly permits any to survive. There is a rebuttal of this somewhat extreme position in Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History*, 183–86. Even if Fontenrose is correct (and I think Hart scores well against him), it appears that Herodotus received the oracles embedded in the tradition and was in no haste to remove them. My point is that, by leaving them there, he adds the authority of the Pythian deity to his narrative. He must have believed this was a good credential and have expected his audience to agree.

substantially different story. Apollo is also cited in connection with local histories. The account of Sparta's rise to pre-eminence in Greece is peppered with Delphic oracles (1.65.2–3, 66.2, 67.4), which he may have obtained directly from Delphi. Alternatively, he may have found the utterances embedded in the traditions he received from the Spartans, who had officials whose task it was to consult the oracle (6.57.4). By contrast, the corresponding account of Athens' rise to early greatness in Croesus' time includes no direct Pythian utterances but a prophecy of an Athenian seer, Amphilytus of Acharnae (1.62.4). In book 7 Herodotus actually uses a Delphic oracle to explain and reconstruct Leonidas' behaviour at Thermopylae (7.220.4). After book 7, however, quotations from Delphi cease. There are two references to Bacic prophecies in book 8 and one in book 9 (see note 78), and an Athenian prophecy is cited in book 8 (96). In these cases the oracle is not cited in such a way as to lend authority to the narrative. On the contrary, the well-known story is used to validate the prophecies.

Monuments, Archives, and Inscriptions The historians rarely tell us precisely how they got their documents. Very little is known about the nature of archives in the city-states of fifth-century Greece, and information about fourth-century Athenian state records is only marginally better.[79] Inscriptions were on display in Athens as in many other parts of Greece, of course, but the extent to which they were regularly consulted by historians is a vexed problem. The section on *regionalism* (below) will include the argument that inscriptions and archives were local possessions used, sometimes aggressively, by local historians to celebrate the greatness of the city that owned them. For this reason, the citation of a local document by a general historian was problematical since the generalist's credibility relied on conveying an attitude of impartiality. To use a local document in evidence was to engage in the formulaic celebration of that locality's greatness or perhaps to embroil oneself in its local disputes, and so to risk the wrath and envy of every other part of Greece.

To begin, the passages in Herodotus commonly called ethnography[80] could be seen as adaptations to a non-Greek subject of the emerging Greek "sub-discipline" of local history. The account of Egypt in book 2, being the longest and most elaborate ethnographic digression, is a

79. Cf. Thomas, *Oral Tradition Written Record in Classical Athens*, 68–83.

80. For an excellent representation of the standard view of ethnography from which I am diverging somewhat, see Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*, 12–26.

useful example. Herodotus cites the very great number of marvels (*thōmasia*) and "monuments worthy of description" as his reasons for his extended account of the country (2.35.1). It is also clear that he was impressed with the extreme age of Egyptian civilization. So the unique greatness of the country justifies an extended *logos*. The account proceeds by describing the country; the contents of its temple archives are ransacked (through "priestly" intermediaries), and its monuments and a few inscriptions are "described" in a remarkable pastiche of accuracy, approximation, and make-believe that continues to provoke debate among contemporary scholars.[81] The accounts of Lydia (1.93–94), Babylon (1.177–200), and Persia (1.95–140)[82] are significantly smaller, but exhibit similar features. The description of Scythia in book 4 seems to break the rules, but the Scythians were the first nation not to succumb to a Persian invasion—this fact alone makes them important—and Hartog has shown how Scythia reinforces Herodotus' historiographical patterns by providing a series of negative images.[83]

Greek places that become subjects of sustained *logoi* include Samos, ostensibly like Egypt because of the monuments the Samians have left on display (3.39–47, 54–60), and Sparta and Athens, in the first instance because, allegedly, Croesus discovered them to be the leading states of Greece when he needed a Hellenic ally (see note 82). Later, of course, their greatness needed no apology because of their leadership in the resistance to Persia. The following survey of Herodotus' epigraphical references reveals the extent to which he adhered to the principle of local documents for local history and documents external to any sponsoring state for general history. The three inscriptions cited within Egypt simply provide information about the monuments to which they are attached (2.125.6, 136.4, 141.6). When it is time to illustrate the foreign conquests of Sesostris, only stelae located in the conquered countries are mentioned (2.102). In addition, a victory relief in Asia is

81. The following is a skeletal bibliography: Heidel, "Hecataeus and the Egyptian Priests in Herodotus, Book II"; T. S. Brown, "Herodotus Speculates about Egypt"; Armayor, *Herodotus' Autopsy of the Fayoum*. Bernal, *Black Athena*, 1: 100, regards Herodotus as a reliable representative of the beliefs of his age and generally places a good deal of faith in his claims; S. West, "Herodotus' Portait of Hecataeus," is less optimistic. But see Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* 4: 234–85; A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II*, especially vol. 1; Hunter, *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides*, 50–92.

82. The local history of Persia is really a theme that begins around 1.95–140 and is picked up again and again (at the end of book 1 and in book 3). Of course, like the local histories of Athens and Sparta (1.53–68), it is destined to grow to "universal" significance.

83. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus*.

attributed to Sesostris (2.106).[84] Herodotus mentions a commemorative statue of Sesostris in Egypt (1.110.1), but does not use it directly as evidence for the conquests.

Similarly, he finds no inscriptional evidence for Persian conquests *in Persia.* The solitary Persian inscription he describes from that country is one in which Darius allegedly admits to winning his throne by trickery (3.88.3). Two inscribed Persian stelae commemorating the invasion of Scythia are indeed mentioned in book 4. One is located in Thrace (4.91) and the other on the Bosphorus (4.87.1). Otherwise, an inscription on Lydian Alyattes' tomb is briefly described in the Lydian *logos* (1.93.3), and the account of Babylon includes an alleged inscribed trick of Queen Nitocris of that country (1.187). In general, the paramount consideration seems to be the location of the inscription or stela. West has shown that the inscribed foreign text is generally hopelessly misrepresented,[85] and it is difficult to believe that Herodotus saw non-Greek inscriptions as opportunities to gather precise knowledge from the text about his various barbarian subjects and so deserving of extreme, critical effort to ensure that the text was precisely copied and translated by a reliable expert.

If we set aside a mysterious inscription at Delphi that Herodotus mentions only in order to dismiss it as a pro-Spartan forgery (1.51.3–4), there are nine inscriptions quoted or alluded to in his history that come from Greek localities. Five are clearly not of local ownership. These are the serpent column erected at Delphi (8.82.1) on which were inscribed the states contributing to the victory at Plataea; a message from Themistocles to Ionians in Xerxes' fleet, allegedly inscribed in various places including Euboea, urging the Ionians to create difficulties for their masters (8.22); and the three inscriptions at Thermopylae commemorating the Peloponnesian sacrifice in the famous battles fought against the Persians for control of the pass (7.228). By contrast, a sixth is an excellent example of a local inscription used in celebration of the greatness of the place's inhabitants. The text is an Athenian one in which the Athenians commemorate their two victories, one over Chalcis and the other over Boeotia, in a single day (5.77). It leads into a passage that accounts for Athenian military prestige. This was attributable to their constitution,

84. For a recent discussion of the Sesostris monuments, see Pritchett, *The Liar School of Herodotus,* 106–12.

85. S. West, "Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests." The misrepresentations seem to have the effect of trivializing barbarian power.

which was reformed by Clisthenes. Of the three that remain, two are from Samos (4.88.2; 6.14.3) and the other is actually a group of inscribed tripods at Thebes.

The Theban group is part of one of the most peculiar digressions in Herodotus (5.59–61). For some reason, he has become convinced that the Gephyraeans, the family of Harmodius and Aristogiton, are of Phoenician origin, having come to Athens via Thebes and Tanagra in Boeotia. Theban-Phoenician connections are traced through Cadmus, who was allegedly of Phoenician extraction. In support of these assertions, Herodotus describes certain Theban tripods with supposedly old heroic names on them written in an early script that, he claims, resembles Phoenician. Apparently, in the years after the Persian invasion, Thebans were pointing to these tripods with their "Cadmean letters" as proof of their own Phoenician parentage. It is natural to suspect that this custom was part of the Thebans' defence of their actions in siding with the Persian invader (480–479). Of course, they could not betray their ancestry and fight against their forefathers, seeing that the Persian forces included Phoenicians.

The puzzling thing is that it is by no means clear why Herodotus needs to show that the tyrannicides were of Cadmean descent. In fact, he actually suppresses his main reasons for coming to this conclusion. One wonders if the series of digressions by which he introduces these Cadmean letters is nothing more than a subtle way of importing into his history the Theban defence of their betrayal of Greece. However that may be, the question arises whether or not Herodotus is in breach of my proposed rule that documents from one locality (Thebes) must not be used in evidence for the history of another place (in this case, Athens). In defence of my rule, I must point out that Herodotus regards these Gephyraeans as, not true Athenians, but a Boeotian family living in Athens as domesticated refugees from Tanagra. So if the rule is assumed to hold, then Herodotus would appear to be making this point quite emphatically, locating the tyrannicides as Boeotians by attaching them to venerable Boeotian documents and traditions.

I am not convinced, therefore, that the Theban example breaks the rule, but the two Samian inscriptions are another matter. In one case (4.88.2), Mandrocles of Samos, who designed the bridge over the Bosphorus for Darius, having been heavily rewarded by the king, dedicated a painting of the bridge in the temple of Hera in Samos. Herodotus must have seen the painting, and he quotes the accompanying inscription in full. The second example is similar. Eleven trierarchs from

Samos who stayed to fight at Lade when others abandoned the Ionian cause had their names inscribed on a column, which, Herodotus says, still stood in the marketplace (6.14.3). These are unequivocal examples of local (Samian) documents being cited in the context of a general history, in one case, Darius' invasion of Scythia and, in the other, the Ionian revolt against Persia. These inscriptions are discussed in *regionalism* below.

Thucydides gives brief reports of the contents of four treaties (*spondai*) and clause-by-clause reproductions of the contents of nine others variously described as treaties (*spondai*), alliances (*xummachiai*), or offers of a treaty or alliance. The last three comprise a series in book 8 in which the Spartans seem to progress by stages towards a formal treaty with Persia. Thucydides appears a little uncertain over whether to call this last agreement a treaty or an alliance. This uncertainty is of some significance because in the rest of his history he only reports on the contents of treaties and neglects to describe the details of alliances unless they are accompanied by a treaty.[86] The difference is subtle, and there is some overlap between the two types of agreements. In general, however, the word *spondai* is used to mean agreements to cease or suspend hostilities and *xummachia* to establish the conditions under which two states will join together to make war on a third party.

Use of these treaties and alliances in any discussion of Thucydides is problematic. With the exception of the Peace of Nicias (see below), the agreements are found in parts of his work that many scholars consider to be unfinished.[87] If the finished passages lack cited documents and the unfinished include them, are we entitled to believe that Thucydides would have removed the documents from a future revision? Further, if we believe that Thucydides removed documents from late revisions of his work, does this conclusion mean that he consulted inscriptions and other similar types of evidence much more regularly than is apparent

86. Briefly reported: 3.114; 4.46; 4.65; 4.105–16; terms given extensively (perhaps in full): 4.117–19; 5.18–19; 5.23–4 (alliance); 5.47 (treaty and alliance); 5.77 (offered terms); 5.79 (formal agreement replacing 77); 8.18; 8.37; 8.58 (the formal treaty towards which 18 and 37 appear to be building). Another agreement is mentioned (3.75), but is neither reported nor summarized, presumably because it is a matter of local Corcyrean history.

87. Andrewes gives a full and judicious discussion of indications of incompleteness throughout Thucydides in *HCT* 5: 361–83. He considers the possibility that Thucydides was moving in a new direction when he included verbatim documents in books 5 and 8, but concludes that it is "very much more likely" that they would have been summarized in, or disappear from, a final version (383).

from the present condition of his work? If we believe so, how are we to explain this putative obliteration of all traces of the alleged documents in the finished history? Why would he record them meticulously in his notes and early drafts, only to remove them completely in his final revision?

The theory that part of book 5 and all of 8 are unfinished is no frivolous suggestion, and in fact, I agree with it at least insofar as it shows that the sections in which documents are cited are not as carefully written as the rest of the history. Indeed, book 8 is manifestly unfinished. But does the fact that it is mean that the agreements quoted in these books would have been removed from a finished version? Is it not equally possible that the inclusion of documents in unfinished parts of his work points to a development in Thucydides' thinking? Could it not be argued that he was beginning to discover the importance of including quoted documents towards the end of his life? Most of the treaties recorded had no impact on subsequent events, and one (5.77) was merely a proposal that was never ratified. Their retention in an early draft is puzzling—even more so if he had no intention of keeping them in his final version. I see no choice but to discuss the history as it stands, representing the intentions of Thucydides on the day he stopped writing. Of course, his work would look different had it been completed and revised, but it is impossible to know precisely what changes would have been made.

The most famous treaty is the Peace of Nicias. In fact, it was accompanied by an alliance as well, and the terms of these agreements and circumstances of their signing and ratification are given in impressive detail (5.18–19). Furthermore, the failure of the parties to comply with many of the specific clauses of these agreements is recounted in the subsequent narrative. This attention to detail, the extensive reproduction of two documents, and their thorough integration with the account of subsequent events cannot fail to impress a modern reader as an early example of meticulous documentary history. To generalize from this observation to the conclusion that Thucydides was a documentary historian would involve one in serious difficulties, however. First, as we have Thucydides' text (see above and note 87), other agreements and offers of agreements are given in extensive detail even when they have no appreciable impact on the narrative (3.114; 4.65; 5.77; 8.18; 8.37; and, of negligible influence, 4.117–19; 5.47; 5.79; 8.58). Second, three major treaties or alliances (one with Egesta, one with Plataea, and, of course, the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta), all of which have critical relevance to three of the most crucial parts of Thucydides' narrative (the fateful decision to launch a massive invasion of Sicily, the

destruction of Plataea, and the outbreak of the war itself), are not even summarized.[88] Third, only interstate treaties are described. The agreement reached between the feuding parties at Corcyra, where civil war crippled this promising ally of Athens, is not used in any way, not even in summary, to inform Thucydides' classic account of the terrible strife that followed its apparent immediate breakdown (3.77–85). Fourth, for a documentary historian, the selection of peace treaties, relevant or not to the narrative, side by side with a somewhat careless neglect of the details of interstate alliances can only be called capricious.

Thucydides' account of Athens' alliance with Corcyra in book 1 makes a promising beginning. He is careful to point out that this agreement was not a full *xummachia* (to have the same friends and enemies as the other) but an *epimachia*, strictly a defensive alliance (1.44.1). However, in book 5, when Sparta's Peloponnesian League partially disintegrates and places such as Corinth and Mantinea form separate alliances with Argos, the details of the complex matrix of alliances that eventually develops are not given (5.27–32). This is such an important period for Thucydides that one might wonder why some of the ineffective treaties were not removed to make room for a fuller account of these alliances.

88. The Thirty Years' Peace is of vital significance to the conditions of the outbreak of the war and so to the whole of book 1. It is first mentioned in 1.23. Some sort of understanding that involved Athens, Sparta, Plataea, and the allies who fought the Persians at Plataea was reached in 479 after the battle. Its conditions are central to the debate over the ultimate fate of Plataea (3.51–68), but Thucydides makes no mention of them. Terms of Athenian alliances with Leontini and Egesta in Sicily are known from inscriptions, but he does not include them. A modern documentary historian would be obliged to address Athens' treaty obligations in Sicily as part of any narrative of the armada against that island. On the treaties, see Fornara, *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*, nos. 81 and 125 (= *IG* 1^3 11 and 1^3 54).

The debate over Thucydides' use (or neglect) of documents is very old. Meyer, *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*, 1–12, gives a history of it. More recently, Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, discusses both the Plataean question (109–23) and the outbreak of the war (125–62), and argues that Thucydides' selective representation of archival material (as I call any item that could have been recorded and placed in an archive), such as the agreement at Plataea (479), the Thirty Years' Peace (445), and the resolution of the Spartans (early summer 432; allegedly misrepresented), is tendentious, favouring Athens and discrediting Sparta. The case is forcefully presented but untestable in the absence of the documents in question. For further discussion and bibliography, see Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, and Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. On Thucydides' vocabulary of inference (important and not treated in this essay), see Hornblower, *Thucydides*, 73–109.

More serious, the first major agreement in the series, that between Corinth and Argos, is first described as a *xummachia*, but as Athens gets involved and Corinth's position beside Argos becomes more uncomfortable, Corinth's preparedness to stay in the alliance is explained by revealing that it was really a defensive pact, an *epimachia* (5.48.2). Would Thucydides have changed all this in a putative final revision? It seems better to conclude that the given treaties were of special interest to him, included to commemorate crucial stages in the war's progress. Their documentary value was exploited opportunistically and sporadically.

I regard the treaties used by Thucydides as archival, whether or not they actually found their way into the hands of a state recorder; I mean that they are documents suitable for an archive. I turn now to his use of inscriptions, and it will be convenient to discuss with it a famous passage from the fragments of Theopompus. In book 25 (FF153–55), Theopompus launched an attack on "all the ... things that the city of the Athenians crows about and uses to dupe the Hellenes." The battle of Marathon and other items were singled out as either exaggerations or falsifications. In particular, Theopompus discredited an inscribed treaty with Darius that he apparently saw in Athens. His reason for suspecting it as a forgery was that the script was anachronistic. He apparently examined a text inscribed in "Ionian letters," which, he says, were not introduced until "the archonship of Euclides." The year of Euclides (403/2) post-dates any possible treaty that Athens could have had with Darius of Persia.

Thucydides turns to two Athenian inscriptions in book 6 (53–59). His purpose is to correct an Athenian misapprehension about the liberation of the city from the Pisistratid tyrants. His case seems to be that Harmodius and Aristogiton are not correctly celebrated as tyrannicides because Hipparchus was not tyrant of Athens at the time; his older brother Hippias was. The senior position of Hippias is deduced from an inscribed text on an altar to Apollo erected by Hippias' son. This text is quoted, and an inscribed stela on the Acropolis is described in some detail. It apparently enumerated the family of Pisistratus in sufficient detail to support Thucydides' deduction. After Hipparchus' murder, Hippias apparently prepared a means of escape for himself and his family by forging a marriage alliance with Aeantides, tyrant of Lampsacus. Thucydides then quotes a Lampsacene inscription to confirm this and reinforce his initial deduction about the status of Hippias. These examples from Theopompus and Thucydides reveal an unexpected degree of sophistication in the use and criticism of inscriptions. A full discussion of them is reserved for *regionalism* below.

This may be a convenient place to pause and deal with the handful of letters found in the early historians. From Xenophon (*HG* 1.1.23) comes the briefest: "Ships gone; Mindarus dead; men starving; we do not know what to do." This laconic letter is represented as having come from Hippocrates, who came into the command of the shattered Spartan navy after its utter defeat, including the death of its admiral Mindarus, at the hands of Alcibiades and the Athenians at Cyzicus in 410. It may be accurate—no problem committing that much to memory—but no guide as a document to aid in a detailed reconstruction of the disaster. Thucydides gives a more substantial letter "from the front," allegedly from Nicias, when things were turning out badly for him during the attack on Syracuse in 414. Its text is vastly more substantial than the communication from Hippocrates. Arguably, it contains very little more information, however.

It begins (7.11) with a sketch of recent events and how they have led to the current position. Its use of numerical indicators is impressionistic rather than precise. Gylippus, a Spartan, has slipped into Syracuse "with an army" and after some battles now has the initiative. In the decisive battle the numbers (Gr., *polloi*, "many") of enemy cavalry and javelin throwers gave them the advantage. Now the "multitude" (Gr., *plēthos*) of the enemy hinders the advance of the Athenian circumvallation. The full force of Athenian and allied heavy infantry cannot take the field since "a portion" (Gr., *meros*) must be detailed for guard duty. The result is that the erstwhile besiegers are falling under siege themselves. It would be nice if the Greek word *meros* could be translated "division" (a unit of an army of specific size). If that were possible, then at least the letter would be giving a fairly precise indication of the extent to which guard duty had reduced the fighting capacity of the hoplite (heavy infantry) forces. But the purpose of the first section is not so much to describe the situation for the Athenians as to lead them inexorably to the appreciation of a single point: the would-be besiegers are under siege themselves.

I omit the second section (12–13.1) because it speaks of Syracusan activities, particularly their attempts to seize the initiative by sea now that they already have the advantage on dry land. Probably Nicias' information from within the enemy camp is not as reliable as that from his own. In the third section (13.2) he addresses his own position, where he has secure access to detailed and reliable information. I translate the passage, underlining those expressions in which I believe one would have expected a contemporary reporter to have tried to give precise data 7.13.2):

Our naval crews have deteriorated and continue to do so right to the present. *The sailors suffer casualties* [in what numbers? how frequently?] at the hands of the enemy cavalry because they must forage for firewood, *plunder* [why must they risk their lives for plunder?], and a good deal of their water. Our personal slave attendants *are deserting* [in what numbers?] since the fighting is now *on an equal footing* [how does this statement tally with the implied superiority of the enemy in the first section?]. Our conscripted mercenaries *desert* [in what numbers? how many remain? which are the loyal units, if any?] to their cities at the first opportunity. And when the volunteers who were buoyed up at first by the expectation of being paid large wages rather than having to fight saw that, in addition to our other problems, our fleet was getting resistance from the enemy contrary to their expectations, *some* [how many?] have deserted to the enemy, *others* [how many?] have made off as best they could (Sicily is a large island), and there are *even some* [how many?] who have bought *Hyccaric slaves* [it was not unknown to use slaves in rowing crews; was there something about Hyccaric slaves that made them unsuitable?] and have persuaded the captains to take them on board in place of *themselves* [who were these people? if they were from the conscripts and volunteers just mentioned, would it not be better to have had slaves at the oars who could be trained and controlled rather than half-hearted "volunteers" looking for the first opportunity to desert?], depriving the fleet of its proficiency.

The letter continues in much the same vein, and it would be difficult to argue that its numerical and other imprecisions are the result of momentary carelessness on the part of the historian. This passage is too central to Thucydides' purpose to have been written with neglect. In his introduction (1.22.4) he declared that he wanted his work to be useful to people who wished for a clear understanding of the events (sc., of the war) since similar situations would arise again, human nature being what it was. Given this purpose, it would be difficult to argue that the historian's attentions were anything but riveted on this fateful scene, in which the Athenians failed for the second time (see 6.9–24) to follow Nicias' advice and deliver themselves from impending catastrophe in Sicily.

In sum, this "letter" from Nicias presents the following dilemma: if it is not genuine, it should not be studied as a document; but if it is, it cannot have been very helpful for a detailed recreation of the situation. Two other letters in Thucydides are of doubtful value. After the Greeks had expelled the Persians in 479, the Spartans remained in charge of the anti-Persian alliance until the Athenians and unspecified Ionians

baulked at their leadership (Thuc. 1.95–96). One of the Spartans in particular, Pausanias, was accused and convicted of abusive behaviour, but was acquitted on the more serious charge of collusion with Persia. Later this same Pausanias returned on his own initiative "to support the Greek cause," but Thucydides reproduces a letter allegedly from him to Xerxes, the Persian King, and a reply from the King (1.128–29) in which Pausanias appears to be negotiating the betrayal of Greece.

Thucydides regarded these "letters" as conclusive. Herodotus, who can scarcely have been unaware of them if they were genuine, does not seem to have been convinced. In book 5 (32) he mentions a proposed marriage, but to a daughter of Megabates, not Xerxes as in the Thucydidean version, and remarks in an aside, "if the story is true." Thucydides does not explain why he regarded the letters as genuine; the possibility of forgery seems obvious. Athenians in particular had much to gain—the sole hegemony of the Aegean—from sending the Spartans packing.[89] The value of these "letters" is so minimal that we may be content to see such documents used so rarely in Greek historical writing.

I hesitate to regard the data presented above as quantifiable, but if one takes groups (such as the three inscriptions at Thermopylae) as a single example of a historian's resorting to the use of documents and sets aside the trivial and doubtful cases (the letters; is Simonides really a Panhellenic authority?), I think any reasonable estimate would bring the total of legitimate examples of documentary uses considered above to about fifty. In general, my proposed rule that general sources (i.e., Panhellenic ones or documents or inscriptions located in some neutral place) are used primarily for general historical narratives and occasionally for local ones, while local documents can only be admitted in evidence for treatments of the place that owns them, holds up in all but two cases. These are the Samian inscriptions from Herodotus. The above observations invite certain conclusions, but it will be convenient to develop them in *regionalism* below. There I shall argue, among other things, that the historian's place of origin tended to restrict his ability to achieve the ideal of a truly general perspective.

89. Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, 1–18, is still a useful historiographical study. Fornara, in *Herodotus*, 62–66, thinks that Herodotus agreed with the general condemnation of Pausanias. He does not cite 5.32, however; so it is not clear how he would deal with that passage. For a convincing demonstration that the letters were indeed forgeries and probably very late ones, see Schieber, "Thucydides and Pausanias." An alleged letter from Themistocles to Antaxerxes (Thuc. 1.137) is about as valuable as Nicias' letter to the Athenians.

The Respectability of the Informant

This is an important method of verification because individual informants necessarily mediated between the limited authority of the historian and the greater authority of the society. I have argued (see also below in *regionalism*) that the authority to assign truth and, to a considerable extent, to determine what will be remembered rested with the ancient society. On the other hand, the historian, like the lyric poets of the Archaic Age,[90] gains authority from his unique knowledge of the traditions, his direct link through tradition with the society's heroes, and his narrative power to reify their deeds. Therefore his good judgment in choosing informants who could speak for the society through the historian to the anticipated audience (the society again) was vital. Perhaps the Athenian exile Dicaeus was such an informant for Herodotus. To him is attributed a report that there had been a great portent predicting the Persian defeat just before Salamis (8.65). At the beginning of the story, Herodotus mentions that Dicaeus had become important (*logimos*) among the Persians in his exile.

Similarly, Thersander of Orchomenus, *logimos es ta prōta* among his fellow Orchomenians (9.16.1; *es ta prōta* means something like "in the first or highest rank") allegedly told Herodotus how he had attended a party in company with members of the Persian high command. There, one of the Persian officers voiced grave doubts about his army's chances in the forthcoming battle (which would be fought at Plataea). In both of these cases, the respectability of the informant, particularly with the Persians, seems to add credibility to his story of foreboding told against them. Otherwise, individual informants are rare. Archias, a Spartan, is quoted (3.55.2) for some special information about Samos, with which he has a unique connection through his family. Epizelus of Athens, who proved himself a fine man (*agathos*) at Marathon, is cited but only for a remarkable vision he claimed to have seen during the battle (6.117.3). Finally, a certain Tymnes of Scythia is mentioned as a source for information about the family of Anacharsis (4.76.6). Tymnes was a steward (*epitropos* = aide-de-camp?) of Ariapithes, says Herodotus, and Ariapithes was king of Scythia (see 4.78).

Thucydides believed that certain people, usually identified as great statesmen as opposed to demagogues, had access to reliable information and were likely to be among the few who really understood complex

90. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*, 250–73.

situations. Both Pericles (2.65) and Themistocles (1.138.3) could accurately predict an outcome, he believed, from present circumstances. Nicias, whom Thucydides respected (7.86.5), wisely advised against the Sicilian expedition (6.9–14) and correctly suspected the Egestaeans of exaggerating their capacity to provide the Athenians with financial support (6.22). He seems to have been alone in holding this view, and his good judgment is vindicated with tragic portent after the Athenian fleet has arrived off Sicily (6.45–46). In Syracuse, Hermocrates first advises his city to prepare for the Athenian attack, but fails to convince all the citizens that the reports of it are true (6.33–34). In part, he is unsuccessful because Athenagoras, the democratic leader, responds by denouncing the news as part of an oligarchic conspiracy to cause upheaval in the state with a view to overthrowing the democracy (6.36–40). So the wise Hermocrates is associated with the elites (his opposition to the democratic party is confirmed by Xenophon: *HG* 1.1.27), as were Themistocles (rich enough to build his own temple to Artemis after the victory over the Persians: Plut., *Them.* 22.1–2), Pericles (whose father married into the noble Alcmeonid family: Hdt. 6.131.2), and Nicias (one of the richest men in Athens: Plut., *Nic.* 2.2; 3–4.2).

On the other hand, popular leaders are described as extremely violent (Cleon: 3.36.6), plausible (Athenagoras: 6.35.2; *pithanōtatos* is derisive, as for Cleon: 4.21.3), and a third is dismissed as a shameful scoundrel (Hyperbolus: 8.73.3).[91] Two other known oligarchs, Antiphon (8.68.1) and Phrynichus (8.27.5, 68.3), are warmly commended for their intelligence and reliability, and even Theramenes, whose motives in the oligarchic revolution are roundly condemmed (8.89.2–3), is recognized for intelligence (8.68.4). Whether or not these comments make Thucydides a devout oligarch,[92] they certainly suggest what type of person he would have preferred as a source. When the Athenian fleet left for Syracuse with Alcibiades, one of the commanders, under a cloud of suspicion as a result of the mutilation of the herms, Thucydides says that the Athenians conducted an investigation into the affair. His disparaging

91. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides*, 5–15.

92. Hornblower, *Thucydides*, 160–67, avoids the conclusion that Thucydides had a strong oligarchic bias, but see pp.162–65 below. Relevant to Thucydides' attitude to his informants is the vexed question of Alcibiades' involvement in the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms. Fornara, "Andocides and Thucydides," provides a perceptive discussion of the question.

remarks about the way they conducted their investigation may reveal something of his own values (6.53.2):

> When the fleet had sailed away, the Athenians did not let up in their search for the perpetrators of the profanation of the mysteries and mutilation of the herms. However, they did not subject their informants to scrutiny, but accepted everything as suspicious. They arrested and imprisoned very respectable citizens because of their trust in villains. They preferred putting the matter to the test and finding things out to letting an accused with a reputation for being a good citizen get off uninterrogated because his accuser was a scoundrel.

Vivienne Gray describes much of Xenophon's narrative as conversational.[93] I should add that it is gentlemanly, upper-class conversation. It has time for the loyalty of tiny little Phlious to Sparta but none for the organization of the Second Athenian Confederacy.[94] The devotion of the men to Teleutias and, indeed, how happy his (and Agesilaus') mother would be upon hearing of their exploits (4.4.19), as well as the bon mot of Theramenes, are narrated in Xenophon's comfortable, elegantly adaptable style, but there is no space for the origin and background of the most important Theban of the time, Epaminondas.[95] Xenophon looks out for his aristocratic colleagues, noting how they are sometimes prone to get out of condition (6.14.11). He may not be overtly anti-democratic, but life gets more comfortable in Mantinea when the democracy is overthrown and replaced by an oligarchy (5.2.7). His brief comment that many members of the aristocratic (cavalry) class served on shipboard for Athens at the battle of Arginusae (1.6.24) indicates the seriousness of Athens' plight, as Peter Krentz rightly observes.[96] It is also consistent with Xenophon's general interest in how historical events affect groups and individuals from the upper classes. I believe that this viewpoint effectively defines both his anticipated audience and the type of informant he would have preferred. The preference for respectable (meaning upper-class) informants is not likely to be much in evidence because of the requirement of an assumed impartiality, the next

93. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 11–80.

94. Known from an extensively preserved inscription. Cf. Harding, *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, no. 35 (= *IG* 2^2 43).

95. Cf. Shrimpton, "The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature," and refer to note 63.

96. Krentz, *Xenophon*, 152.

criterion. I have pointed out the visible. The invisible is probably more substantial, in iceberg proportions.

Impartiality

Impartiality means even-handedness in dealing with the reputations of individuals and cities. It is clear from remarks made by Polybius, Dionysius (*Thuc.* 8), and Cicero (who was concerned with Roman history, of course, but conversant with the Greek theoretical manuals) that fairness in handling the reputations of great generals and politicians was an important criterion of historical truth.[97] For Polybius, history, unlike biography, avoids excessive praise of individuals (10.21 [24]). On the other hand, his discussion of Theopompus shows that criticism of one's hero could add respectability to a history, provided these criticisms did not go to excess, as Theopompus seems to have done (T19 = Polyb. 8.10.7–13.8). From Plutarch's *On the Malice of Herodotus*, it becomes clear that at least one later critic was concerned about fairness in the treatment of cities as well as individuals.[98]

As for the historians themselves, the fifth-century writers show concern for impartiality primarily in dealing with cities and nations. Attention to individuals, though by no means absent from the fifth century, becomes more pronounced in the fourth. Herodotus begins his history with Croesus' dealings with the Asiatic Greek communities and includes an apology for putting forward "small cities" when he starts with his origins of the war (1.5.3–4). Later he will also apologize for reproducing the *gnōmē* (no doubt an Athenian one) that Spartan resistance to Persia would have been futile heroism without Athenian naval support (7.139). Clearly there is concern to see that a place's reputation is not

97. Discussion and references in previous essay, pp.24–26 and note 67 of this essay.

98. Plutarch's concern is to show how Herodotus has misrepresented the *ēthos* of many peoples, cities, and individuals. There is a brief list of his criteria for detecting malice at the beginning of the work. In brief they are (1) use of unnecessarily harsh language in describing character; (2) inclusion of digressions that have the effect of maligning a character; (3) the omission of creditable details; (4) preferring a less creditable version (that is, not giving the subject the benefit of any doubt); (5) preferring or inventing slanderous explanations; (6) detracting from success (e.g., by describing a victory as a stroke of luck); (7) prevaricating by introducing malicious charges to make a show of denying them, or starting with a little praise to strike a posture of impartiality in order to make the scurrility look more credible (Plut. *Mor.* 855B–856D). For further discussion with important bibliography, see Seavey, "Forensic Epistolography and Plutarch's *de Herodoti Malignitate*."

made to exceed its size without good reason and to modulate, or at least justify, singling out any one place for recognition.

Similarly, Thucydides is careful to point out that he had been able to consult Peloponnesian sources thanks to being in exile from Athens since 424 (5.26). As an Athenian, of course, he need not remind us of his ability to gain access to informants from his native city. So he creates the impression of a balanced use of sources from both sides in the war. Similar pains to show fairness in the treatment of individuals are not so forthcoming. Witness, for example, his treatment of Cleon and other demagogues, cited above, as compared to richer elites. From the next century, however, Xenophon reveals an appreciation of the difference between laudatory biography and more neutral history, as a reading of his *Agesilaus* side by side with the comparable passages in his *Hellenica* makes clear. With the fragmentary works of Ephorus and Theopompus we are reduced to guesswork. Ephorus had a reputation for bland supineness, which probably indicates scrupulous adherence to received opinion. Theopompus was notoriously malicious. His fragments reveal a penchant for exposing and excoriating the immorality of both individuals and nations, including Philip of Macedon, his most famous subject. Callisthenes had a different task in his *Deeds of Alexander.* Given the greatest hero in Greek history to represent in suitable prose, he apparently threw himself into the task with a zeal that belies the reputation for personal integrity that he sought for himself through his demeanour at Alexander's court.

REGIONALISM

It is important to consider regional interests in any account of the historiography of a nation or period. It may be true that, to the military historian, there was only one Second World War and only one assault on the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, but because these events occurred in specific locations, they had to be reported differently to people in various parts of the world. The historian may dream of an ideal description of those singular events, but at the time, depending on where one was placed, the "best" description was always one that took into account the special knowledge and interests of the prospective audience, people located in various parts of the world. To illustrate this point, I offer descriptions by three newspapers—*The Times* of London, the *New York Times*, and the *Oregonian* (Portland, Oregon)—all reporting events of the same stage of Barbarossa to their readerships. The choice

of journalism rather than historical literature for this comparison is deliberate. Ancient historians did not emerge from universities with advanced degrees in historical research. They could not rely on a community of trained experts to test them and their research for soundness. Relatively untrained in historical method, they had to report to people rather like themselves, and many were not likely to be historians at all. Although some modern journalists may have degrees in history, they are not required to display their advanced critical abilities when they write their stories. In other words, possible similarities between ancient historiography and modern journalism deserve consideration.

The lead story on the front page of the *New York Times* for Sunday, 12 October 1941 (Columbus Day and less than two months before the attack on Pearl Harbor), reported the planned evacuation of two thousand Japanese nationals from the west coast of the United States and Hawaii. The reason given by the Japanese embassy was that trade restrictions between the two countries had so reduced the business opportunities of Japanese people resident in the United States that it was pointless for them to stay. The major headline, which actually introduced reports placed below or to the right of the Japanese story, announced, "U.S. Seizes Nazi Radio in Greenland," and just below it, "Germans are Forcing Russians back in Furious drives toward Moscow." These reports filled the four right-hand columns. Columns on the left-hand side of the page covered labour and political issues of local interest. Inside the paper, the Columbus Day sales were in full swing. There were no western movies playing in New York that day, and predictions were for more romance, comedy, war, and adventure in the motion-picture industry.

Across the Atlantic, *The Times* of London observed the Lord's Day, but on Monday, the thirteenth, page 4 (the headline page—*The Times* actually began with its classified personal and legal announcements) was dominated by the war. "The Battle for Moscow" headed and spanned the two left columns. A column was devoted to the Nazi drive towards the Crimea, and the central one was headed, "Supplies for Russia," and quoted at length Lord Beaverbrook's insipid account of how well he was getting along with everyone in Moscow, especially Joseph Stalin, by promising him, "All that we can give." The subject of the right-hand side of the page was British retaliation thanks to the Royal Air Force. Occupied France had been bombed and an Italian convoy in the Mediterranean had been broken up. As if to add a touch of real optimism, a story headed, "Stirling's Big Bomb Load," gave details of the capacity for both ordnance and defence and the manoeuvrability of the new Stirling

bomber (the glowing report neglected to mention the Stirling's relatively low altitude; the Lancaster bomber was already in the planning stage).

Meanwhile, the west coast of the United States faced the ominous prospect of having to deal with a disgruntled and perhaps war-minded Japan. In Portland the *Oregonian* produced a lavish Sunday issue on the twelfth, complete with a magazine and comics. At the top of the front page, slightly to the right of centre, was a large photograph four columns wide. A group of prosperous-looking women were smiling and waving in the picture. A sizeable dark area in the photograph above the women had bold white letters set into it that said, "Oregon State 10, Stanford 0." As the lead story made quite clear, the smiles were from "gridiron fans" exulting over the victory. By contrast, Oregon State's stunning upset of Rose Bowl champion Stanford did not make the front page of the sports section of the *New York Times* (it was relegated to page 6 of that section). Moreover, the German "wireless" station that made the top of page 1 in New York was given three paragraphs by the London *Times*, directly beneath the six describing the Stirling. The repatriation of Japanese nationals was placed among a collection of brief reports on page 3 by the British paper, where it led into a series of quoted warnings by U.S. senators to their fellow Americans about the possible menace from Japan. It emphasized the defection of Congressman George Bender from the isolationist faction, the movement that was urging the United States to stay out of the war. This news item would raise British hopes that the United States might yet respond to the menacing acts of Japan, Italy, and Germany by entering the war. In Portland the two big stories flanking the photograph were "U.S. Seizes Greenland Radio Plant," which received a detailed account on the left-hand side of the page ending with a British acknowledgment that the elimination of the station would save the lives of "hundreds of Britons," and in the right-hand column, the invasion of Russia.

The newspaper articles described above illustrate how regionalism still remains, even with rapid, global networks of communication. When a world war is raging, everyone wants news of it, and the international wire services provided the same stories to outlets all over the world in the 1940s as they, and now television networks continue to do. Clearly, however, the newspapers did not print these stories just as they received them off the wire. *The Times* put the account of the evacuation of Japanese nationals from the United States with reports of the weakening of the American isolationist faction to make one story, something

that the American papers did not do. On the other hand, *The Times* left a sense of gratitude for the American seizure of the Greenland radio base up to its readers, while the *Oregonian* was careful to find and include a grateful British reaction in its version of the story. British gratitude to Uncle Sam suited the editorial line of anti-isolation adopted by the *Oregonian*. Again, that paper had a feature about training manoeuvres of American troops in Oregon, but did not mention *The Times*'s vaunted Stirling bomber. Moving from the historic to the ephemeral, one notes that Oregon State's gridiron victory, a story that momentarily pushed the war to the margins of the *Oregonian*'s front page, did not even make the front page of the *New York Times*'s sports section. *The Times* of London took no notice of American college football at all. Indeed, to the British reader, "football" meant a game that many American collegians would not have recognized.

It would be unfair to the *Oregonian* to leave the impression that it regularly subordinated momentous world events to ephemeral victories on college football fields. Its reporting (if manipulative at times) and editorializing on world events was both extensive in the one case and reasonably argued in the other. On weekdays it featured the syndicated column "Berlin Diary" by William L. Shirer (along with the regular stories taken from the international wire services). Shirer had been a reporter on the *Paris Herald*. His "Berlin Diary" was his own personal daily record of his experiences and observations in Berlin during Hitler's rise to power and has been issued in book form. Later, in 1960, he would publish his *Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany*. Portland Oregon was nearly half the circumference of the globe from the Nazi panzer tentacles reaching out for Moscow, and London is located at about two-thirds of the distance separating the peaceful homes where people read the Sunday *Oregonian* from the grim carnage a bare sixty miles from the Russian capital. Despite these distances, unimaginable to the ancient mind, within hours of the actual events the same information was simultaneously available for the editors to give to the typesetters both in the heart of Britain and on the west coast of North America. By contrast, ancient news never spanned distances of more than a few thousand miles; it only approached the speed of light when pre-arranged fire signals were used; otherwise, in the Mediterranean its pace was about three to five knots from harbour to harbour, and when it arrived at its destination, it was rarely in sufficient bulk to fill a newspaper. Most of it would have been carried in the memories of the travellers, but written dispatches are known. A pair of "letters from the front" was considered above (see pp.132–34).

One further observation on the subject of regionalism and the Second World War: imagine that thousands of years from now someone tries to reconstruct some putative lost histories of this conflict. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this investigator found that there had been several accounts of it. One group tended to begin with the year 1939 and end towards the beginning of 1945, and another to start very late in 1941 and end late in 1945. Upon further investigation, this historian might discover that the United States came into the war with the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941 and ceased hostilities with the surrender of Japan in September 1945. For Britain, on the other hand, war was declared on 3 September 1939 and effectively ended with V-E day in May 1945. Our putative researcher would probably be justified in concluding from this evidence that there were two regional schools of thought on what actually constituted *the* war, one based in the United States and one in Britain. To my knowledge there are no histories like the putative ones described above, but at the same time, no one dates the beginning of the war to 1935. In that year Italy, later aligned as one of the Axis powers, invaded Ethiopia. Does that mean that Africa was irrelevant to the war? You cannot tell *me* that; my uncle was killed in North Africa. Does it mean that an Ethiopian perspective has had no authority in the definition of the war and in its narration? Probably.

This hypothetical example helps to bring out the Atheno-centrism of Thucydides. He makes the Peloponnesian War begin in the spring of 431, when Athens was first attacked, and end in the spring of 404, when the city surrendered. Thus the war lasted exactly thirty-one years and is defined by Thucydides as something that happened to Athens. Below I shall point out that the Peloponnesians believed that the war began when it was declared by them in early 432, ended in late summer of 404, and lasted for thirty-two years and six months. This view changes everything, particularly the search for causes. If the war began in early 432, then some of Thucydides' preliminaries become parts of the war. In particular, if the war began when Athens was attacked, then a search for causes must answer the implicit question, Why did the Peloponnesians attack Athens? But if it began in early 432, long before Athens was attacked and in the midst of a series of Athenian provocations (the anti-Corinthian alliance with Corcyra, the Megarian decree, provocations to the Corinthian colony of Potidaea), then the search for causes controlled from the Peloponnesian side becomes, Why were the Athenians being so belligerent?

It would be difficult to argue that the ancient world was free from regional perspectives on important historical events. On the contrary, the interaction between regional and universal historiography was vital in both the fifth and fourth centuries (see below). The example of the Athenians' use of the battles of Salamis and Marathon (pp.97–98 above) to promote their empire clearly shows how at least one ancient state was prepared to claim recognition for its recent contribution to a Panhellenic cause in an atmosphere of intense interstate rivalry. In that case, the Athenians prudently limited their claims about the past to ones with which the Peloponnesians could scarcely have disagreed. Had they expatiated further, as they could have done, it is easy to imagine how an argument might have ensued, if not over the facts, at least over their interpretation. Rivalry is the key. It provides an opportunity for giving a narration of the events while limiting scope for exaggeration. In Kentish Town (see the first essay), where apparently everyone wanted a recent past blest with green pastures, there was nothing to stop the invention of pure fiction by the community. With regard to Sparta, the Athenians were not at liberty to invent whatever past they liked in order to glorify themselves and justify a continued, unrestricted exercise of power.

The great Felix Jacoby traced the origins of local histories to the Greek communities in Ionia acting out of civic pride, as it might be called. He placed the beginnings of local historiography in the middle of the fifth century as a reaction to the general history of Herodotus. His evidence comes from Plutarch's essay "On the Malice of Herodotus," which actually quotes Lysianas' *History of Eretria* and Charon of Lampsacus, a fairly well known local Ionian historian, to correct Herodotus. Jacoby concludes: "The motive which inspired these local histories obviously is to a great extent the desire of the writers to acquire each for his native city a place in the history and the exploits of the Greek people; to supplement, and even more to correct the accounts of Herodotus."[99] A difficulty with Jacoby's thesis lies in the relative dates of these local histories—middle of the fifth century or even earlier—and the probable date for Herodotus' publication, which is thought to be about 425 or even later.[100] Somehow these local historians knew what was going to be in Herodotus' history years before it was published.

99. Jacoby, *Atthis*, 185; see also 184–85 and 200–201. Plut., *Mor.* 861 B–D.

100. Jacoby summarizes his reasons for the dates: *Atthis*, 200–201. For Herodotus' date of publication, see Raaflaub, "Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History."

Perhaps Herodotus gave readings (or recitations) from his work long before it was finished. According to one ancient tradition, he was handsomely rewarded by the Athenians for doing just that, but the date is not given even if the story is true.[101] The other possibility would have to be that the story that Herodotus eventually recorded already somehow existed years before he wrote it down. If this idea seems incredible, that there could have been a Panhellenic description of a historical event before there was a Panhellenic historian, and if the examples of Kentish Town and the British public's "glossification" of the Blitz are not enough to show that it was possible, consider the case of the serpent column erected at Delphi shortly after the battle of Plataea in 479.[102] This column survives in Istanbul, where it was taken by Constantine to adorn his capital. The names of the states that contributed to the victory over the Persians were inscribed on it. Two names, Tenians and Siphnians, were added, afterthoughts to judge from the lettering and the placement of the names. All this happened while Herodotus was a child or perhaps in his teens. The monument in a Panhellenic sanctuary told a story of a collective achievement, and two small states (one supposes) saw to it that they were not going to be forgotten.

It is worth a moment to dwell on the probability that stories found in Herodotus were being answered by local historians years before he wrote them down and published them. If such is indeed the case, it means that historical information could exist in circulation in Greece independently of historians. It makes possible a few observations in anticipation of fuller remarks in *authority* below. The first is in part an aside. Classicists use the apparent citations of one ancient historian by another to establish a relative chronology for the publication of the two works. Clearly, however, those conclusions do not follow. Unless the other historian is named, all we know is that the one historian is citing another tradition; we do not know with certainty the precise origin of his information.

Second, Lysianas' and Charon's complaints are an early and precious example of an ancient historical dispute, from which much can be learned about ancient historians' expectations of each other and their assumptions about the process of historical recording. A detailed discussion is reserved for the appropriate place below. For the time being, it

101. For a discussion of this and other reported readings given by Herodotus with evidence, see Evans, *Herodotus*, 7–8.

102. How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* 2: 321–24, give the basic information. Pritchett, *The Liar School of Herodotus*, 147–48, provides a more recent discussion with bibliography.

may simply be observed that the two local historians took pains to put forward anecdotes, presumably missing in rival accounts, that would reflect favourably on their local communities. Reputations were a major concern of early historical writing.

The Greeks told stories about objects, cult places, and festivals, as important recent studies of their epichoric traditions and practices reveal.[103] Stories became attached to objects such as the Abderites' golden axe and those on display in the Delphic treasuries.[104] In a way, these objects become evidence when a historian refers to them, but evidence did not work for them in the same way as for modern historical research. Earlier in this essay (pp.118–19), I suggested that the ancient historian presented himself as a witness. When a witness gives testimony, the quality, the immediacy, of his or her experience of the reported facts is of primary concern. The question is, "How close were you to the thing itself?" In an article of fundamental importance, G. Schepens demonstrates much the same approach.[105] He shows how in both theory and practice the citation of supporting material by generalist historians goes to what he calls the "subjective" side, the quality of the historian's experience of the data (or at least of his informant's), rather than "objectively" proving or supporting the information itself directly.

In fact, when ancient historians explain why they are reporting on the contents of archives and texts of inscriptions, they declare that it is because of the splendour of the place in question; it is not, apparently, that they need evidence. When Theopompus attacked the "crowing" of the Athenians, he singled out a famous inscription (among other things) and discredited it by fixing the introduction of its Ionian script to Athens by citing an archon year. In other words, he was attacking Athenian splendour by assailing the monuments. It is pointed out below, furthermore, that archon years were unsuitable for general histories, but there is no reason why they should not have been used by the chroniclers of Athens, the Atthidographers. In fact, the archon dates did provide a structure for the Atthidographic chronology. So the possibility

103. Schachter, in *Cults of Boeotia*, has published three of the planned five volumes to date; see also Robertson, *Festivals and Legends* and "Melanthus, Codrus, Neleus, Caucon."

104. For Herodotus' detailed knowledge of the dedications at Delphi: 1.14, 50–1; for his respect of the Delphians as authorities: 1.20. At Mycale there was a place where the Ionians met called the Panionion (1.141–43, 148, 170). Perhaps general stories about the Ionians circulated here before Herodotus' time.

105. Schepens, "Some Aspects of Source Theory in Greek Historiography."

arises that Theopompus used the chronological method of the Atthidographers to discredit their own claims.

Thucydides' excursus on one of the most memorable events of Attic history, the expulsion of the tyrants, involves the use of Athenian inscriptions as well. The tradition of the tyrannicides was kept alive by a famous statue group of Harmodius and Aristogiton that stood in the Athenian civic centre. Thucydides begins his digression on the tyrannicides by admitting that the Athenians of his day knew that their city was liberated by the Alcmeonids with help from Sparta. However, his point seems to be that, despite this knowledge, they celebrated a contradictory story that made Harmodius and Aristogiton the liberators. In order to expose their inconsistency, he cites some of their own inscriptions and then adds a Pisistratid family epitaph from Lampsacus to clinch his case. It is almost certain that Hellanicus of Lesbos is being attacked here.[106] His *Attic History* seems to have been a source of some irritation to Thucydides.

Jacoby observed that ethnography and local history were very similar to each other.[107] In fact, I can see no reason for regarding ethnography as anything but a local history of a non-Greek people. In other words, despite the loss of all local Greek chronicles, one can infer their general nature from Herodotean ethnography. The description of Egypt would appear to be the fullest, most self-contained specimen. It will be used below as a likely example of local historiography. Since one purpose of these chronicles was to put forward the glorious achievements of the community, to "crow," as Theopompus put it, it would follow that the general historian should avoid citing local documents except on judiciously chosen occasions for fear of losing his reputation for impartiality. This hypothesis would become more plausible if two conditions could be met. The first requires a demonstration that ideas of propriety, the suitability of style and evidence, changed when one moved from one historical genre to another. The second condition would be filled by the production of direct evidence for the use of documents in local histories.

To turn to propriety: ancient critics do speak of the need for writers to adjust to their subjects. Polybius openly acknowledges that, as a biographer, his task was to praise but that, as a historian, truth was required of him (10.21 [24]). Here "truth" (*alētheia*) seems to mean little more

106. Evidence summarized by Dover in *HCT* 4: 321–22.

107. Jacoby, *Atthis*, 202.

than impartiality. History and biography were not the only literary genres in which ancients had to represent the past. In the law courts they had to persuade a jury that a crime or misdemeanour had (or had not) been perpetrated by the defendant. Doing so involved the use of evidence and the presentations of proposed narrations of the events in question. Lucian gives strict advice to historians to avoid the style of the law courts. He says that Theopompus did use it, with the effect of putting his subjects on trial (T25[a] = Luc., *How to Write History* 59).

As early as the fifth century, Thucydides exhibits an awareness of the distinction that inscriptions are for local celebration, or at least commemoration, while the report that reaches beyond a city's boundaries is something greater. At the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War the historian gives the following words as part of the great Funeral Oration of Pericles. Speaking of the fallen he says (2.43.2–3):

> By giving their bodies in the common cause they gained a personal glory which is ageless and that most illustrious of sepulchres, not so much the place where their remains lie, but the way in which their never to be forgotten reputation abides to influence the chance opportunity for word or deed in the future. The whole world is the sepulchre of the glorious fallen, for it is not just the inscription [*epigraphē*] on grave markers in the homeland that commemorates, but also the unwritten memory [*agraphos mneme*] of these men's spirit, more than their deed, that abides in the heart of each person beyond our frontier.

The "unwritten memory" that goes beyond the frontier must be captured by the general historian or lost forever.

Certain knowledge of the nature of early Greek local (sometimes called epichoric) historiography is elusive because all the works have been lost. The case is not hopeless, however, because a considerable quantity of circumstantial evidence remains. What evidence is there for these histories' use of inscriptions and other types of documents? This question is important, especially if epichoric histories influenced general historiography in the way that I have suggested. When I ask about documents and evidence, I do not mean to reject the value of literary analysis of ancient historiography. It is just that, as critics increasingly approach the ancient historians as literature, they make the question of the evidentiary basis of early historiography more urgent. P. J. Rhodes surveyed some of the recent literary studies of ancient historiography and put the question this way: "What we need to do with the ancient historians, and with all ancient texts, is what sensitive scholars have been trying to do

even before the days of modern literary theory. We must use all the means at our disposal to establish what the writers were trying to do, how they set about it, what material was available to them, what limitations they were subject to, what limitations we are subject to in studying them."[108] When we turn to the basic works on Atthidography, the local chronicles for which we have the most evidence, with Rhodes's general and my more specific question in mind, we do not get a clear picture at first. Pearson's book does not discuss the Atthidographers' use of documentary evidence, and Jacoby's was written with the aim of refuting an earlier thesis advanced by Wilamowitz. According to this theory, the chronicles of Athens were preserved in the documents of a board of religious officers called the Exegetai, which went back to a period long before the first written compilations known to us. Jacoby seems to have destroyed this theory, but one has to be wary when one reads him, for he often uses "documents" to mean these putative records of the Exegetai. Such an approach can be misleading if one wants to know how he thought the Atthis used documents in general. Recently, Harding has taken a more balanced position.[109]

It will be useful, first, to look widely in order to gain a sense of the nature of Greek epichoric tradition in general and then to turn to the examples from Athens. This review will at least make possible the consideration of a larger body of evidence. It was pointed out above (pp.69–70) that the successes of athletic victors at the Panhellenic festivals were the subjects of local celebration from archaic times, a century and more before Herodotus wrote his history. These celebrations were lavish, involving dedicatory offerings, usually inscribed with the name of the victor, set up at Olympia or Delphi and in the home town of the successful athlete,[110] a commissioned victory ode, victory urns, and similar items. So the Greeks were used to celebrating their successes by means of literary productions and inscriptions before we see any evidence of historical writing. Objects from the past, inscribed or not, were preserved as tokens of events that were of more general community interest than an athletic victory. The Abderites kept their golden axe given them by Xerxes, which they used to convince Herodotus that the King had passed through their city on his way home (pp.64–65 above). The

108. Rhodes, "In Defence of the Greek Historians," 157. I wonder myself if it is really necessary to "defend" the ancient historians from literary criticism.

109. Cf. Pearson, *The Local Historians of Attica*, and Jacoby, *Atthis*. Also cf. Harding, *Androtion and the Atthis*, 43–47.

110. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 61, 91–92, 176.

Thebans had inscribed tripods on display that persuaded Herodotus of their Phoenician origins (p.127). In another place, an inscription in Athens celebrating the city's victory over the Boeotians introduced an extended passage attributing their successes to their expulsion of the Pisistratid tyrants (5.77–78).

Herodotus apologizes for two extended local descriptions because the grandeur of the monuments found there (Samos: 3.60; Egypt: 2.35.1) and the presence of other marvels (*thōmasia*; Egypt: 2.35.1) justified lengthy accounts. The information was ostensibly gathered by interviewing the native inhabitants. In some cases, it derived from a monument (or monuments) or is presented as a tradition that explained it (or them). His exaggerated impression of the antiquity of Egypt was based partly on a row of 345 statues allegedly representing a succession of priests of "Zeus" at Thebes (2.143). To be fair to Herodotus, he seems to have sought, and felt that he received, corroboration from other written records kept by the temple priests (2.145; also 142). He behaved similarly at Delphi, observing and recording remarkable dedications in the treasuries and interviewing the keepers of the shrine (1.20, 46–55). From them he must have received information about many of the subjects of his history. Both Gyges and Croesus had made splendid offerings to the shrine. Herodotus placed absolute faith in his Delphic informants (1.20). That he did so is not surprising, for Delphi offered tangible survivals from the past in the form of dedications, probably some sort of record of these dedications that went back well before his time and certainly an unbroken memorative tradition concerning the objects on display.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus declares that local historians preserved epichoric traditions and reproduced the contents of temple archives (*Thuc.* 5). Their procedures probably resembled those used by Herodotus at Delphi and attempted by him less successfully in Egypt. In Athens, Herodotus' methods were taken and raised to a level of considerable sophistication. I have already pointed out Thucydides' clever use of inscriptions to correct an error in Athenian tradition and Theopompus' use of information dated to an archon year to discredit an inscription that was seen to reflect favourably on the city. My suggestion was that these historians were using the methods of Atthidography to undermine its results. Further clues to the nature of Atthidography must be taken from a fourth-century history and description of the Athenian constitution that has been attributed to Aristotle or one of his pupils. It came into the possession of the British Museum late in the nineteenth

century in the form of four papyrus scrolls and has subsequently been identified beyond any reasonable doubt as a treatise known in antiquity as Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens.*[111]

The work is divided into two parts. The first (1–41) gives a brief history of the Athenian constitution to the end of the fifth century, and the second (42–69) a description of the constitution itself as it prevailed through most of the fourth century. It is generally agreed by scholars that the first part particularly can scarcely have avoided influence from the works of the Athenian chroniclers, and some have argued for heavy influence from such famous Atthidographers as Clidemus and Androtion.[112] In the early chapters the work gives quotations from literature as evidence for its claims. Solon's poetry about his constitutional reforms is quoted seven times, occasionally at length, as part of the reconstruction of his program of legislation (5, 7, 12). Confirmation of a couple of details is taken from two drinking songs that supposedly survived from the times in question (19.3, 20.4). Quotations from these songs are provided in the text. An inscription from a statue of a man with a horse at his side is quoted (7.4) to confirm the author's correct use of terminology. In addition, the descriptions of the oligarchic constitutions (30–31, 39) supplement surviving literary descriptions (e.g., from Thucydides) with material evidently derived from documents.[113] All dates are given in archon years, in other words, conforming to a chronological system deduced from documents and inscriptions.

This use of sources does not necessarily mean that local chronicles were produced by a reliable "scientific" method of research. "Documents" could always be produced by forgery, and if they won general acceptance in the community, only a hostile outsider would have the will to expose them.[114] Theopompus was just such a person, it seems, with regard to Athens, but even his attempt to expose a fraudulent decree should not inspire our complete confidence in his method. He based his argument on the letter forms on a stela, which, he says, were

111. Basic information can be found in Fritz and Kapp, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts.* The authors provide an excellent introduction, translation, and commentary. The bibliography is vast. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian* Athenaion Politeia, is the standard commentary to date.

112. Rhodes, *A Commentary*, 15–30.

113. Ibid., 23–30.

114. Some documents quoted by orators and historians from the fourth century have been suspected as forgeries for a long time. For a general discussion, see Robertson, "False Documents at Athens."

not introduced to Athens from Ionia until years after the treaty commemorated in the inscription. However, it is possible that the Athenians had found it necessary to restore some of their inscriptions at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Their city had been taken and occupied for a brief period in 404, and it is known that the victors tore down parts of the defensive fortification. If they also smashed or effaced some of the city's monuments at that time—a reasonable possibility, it seems to me—then inscriptions cut in 403/2, the archonship of Euclides, when the Ionic letter forms were supposedly introduced, need not have been forgeries but restorations in the new letter forms. It is not known if Theopompus gave any consideration to that possibility.

Finally, Polybius' attempt to convict Timaeus of forging an inscription (p.67 above) is noteworthy. His case is based on Timaeus' failure to identify the exact location of the cited inscription. As a modern researcher might put it, he had not paid sufficient attention to his footnotes. Because the document could not be traced, Polybius felt justified in doubting its authenticity. He was not one to pass up an opportunity to discuss historical method. Early in his universal history (1.14.4–5), he remarked on the need for the universalist to overcome regional influences. "A man of quality must love his friends and country and join them in despising common foes and cultivating common friends. However, when one assumes the character [*ēthos*] of history [in this context, "history" means "universal history"], one is obliged to forget all that. One is often required to speak well of, even eulogize with highest praise, one's enemies, whenever their deeds require. In addition, it is often necessary to expose and severely censure one's closest friends, whenever the errors of their ways indicate."

Consider now one of the most sensational exposés of the fourth century. Apollo's treasuries at Delphi were plundered during the so-called Sacred War (357/6–347/6). The Phocians seized the shrine at an early stage in the war and began to "borrow" from its treasuries to hire mercenaries. Thebes opposed the Phocians, but Athens and Sparta were their allies. When the war came to an end and the extent of the desecration of the shrine became evident, historians and orators alike greeted it with silence, as if in a conspiracy. Not one of Greece's traditional powers had stopped the sacrilege. Thebes had resisted Phocis ineffectively, and Athens and Sparta had profited militarily and (Theopompus said) financially from their alliance with the Phocian "temple robbers."[115]

115. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War.*

In the surviving works from the Athenian orators, anxious as they were to trumpet the glories of their city, there is understandably scant mention of this war. The historians of the age also avoided the subject, at least at first. Xenophon's *Hellenica* spanned the years 411–362. Old age may have been responsible for his lack of interest in continuing beyond 362, but the fact remains that his history ends five years before the war's commencement with the abrupt remark, "Let that be as far as I write; what happens next will perhaps be another's undertaking." Anaximenes (*Early Histories*) went back to mythological times and stopped, like Xenophon, with Mantinea in 362 (T14). There was a history of Greece written by Callisthenes of Olynthus (FF8–13). A later description of this lost history informs us that it began with the year 387 and ended with the Phocian seizure of the Delphic shrine in 357 (T27). Sometime later Callisthenes turned to the preparation of his *Deeds of Alexander* (FF14–38). Before this last work he wrote a *Sacred War* (F1; T25), but one of the very few things we know about it is that it was published separately from the *Hellenica.* Ephorus circumvented the Sacred War. He certainly covered the age of Theban greatness to 362. Next he seems to have turned to Philip and to have written an account of his rise to power down to the year 341, but his *Universal History* stopped in that year. We are told by later sources who knew Ephorus' work that an account of the Sacred War had to be supplied posthumously in a separate book by his son, Demophilus.[116]

It is not known who broke the silence first. Callisthenes' exclusion of the war from his history suggests an initial reluctance to broach the subject. However, his treatise on it must have been written before 334, when he left with Alexander for Asia. From that moment until his death in 327 (or a little later), his time and interest must have been consumed by the exploits of Alexander, the intrigues of the court, and his role as court historian. Theopompus, on the other hand, showed no reticence about exposing everyone's shame. The fragments of his lost magnum opus, the *Philippica,* testify to his preoccupation with the shrine (FF80, 156, 193, 280, 336, 344). I have already described his pamphlet "On the Treasures Plundered from Delphi." From the considerable detail contained in the fragments of this work, it appears that the historian researched the events very early while abundant information was fresh in people's minds. One of the things we are told about the plundering of the shrine is that it was not possible for the mercenary generals' secretary

116. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus,* 177–78.

to provide an accounting of the missing treasures (DS 16.56.3–4). If that is correct, then Theopompus would not have been able to consult any written records even had he wanted to. He would have been totally reliant on people's memories. "Researched" very soon after the events, his report was probably published quickly. From what is known of him, Theopompus had neither reason nor desire to suppress his results. Perhaps Callisthenes' *Sacred War* was written in reaction to Theopompus' scathing account with a view to restoring a little dignity to the Macedonian throne in connection with its handling of the war. Such a treatise would have done nothing to hurt Callisthenes' application for the post of Alexander's court historian.

If someone is to be named as the historian who called attention to this scandal, Theopompus would appear to be the natural choice. Some time ago, I advanced the thesis that Theopompus, being from the island of Chios on the eastern side of the Aegean, wrote from a Chian, Ionian, or east Greek perspective, never adopting a mainland point of view.[117] This theory was new and has subsequently been criticized,[118] but it explains so much of what is known about Theopompus that a brief restatement of its reasons would not be out of place here.

Apart from "On the Treasures," perhaps little more than a detailed "pamphlet," Theopompus is credited with three historical works: an *Epitome of Herodotus*, a *Hellenica*, and his monumental *Philippica*. The *Epitome* is completely lost. If it was a true epitome, it covered all the historical material in Herodotus, which would mean that it began with Croesus' subjugation of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century and ended with the liberation of Ionia from Persia at the battle of Mycale in 479. It was compendious, a mere two books in size. The *Hellenica* picked up where Thucydides left off, with the events of 411, and continued through twelve books to the battle of Cnidus in 394.[119] In other words, it covered a period in which Ionia was at or near the centre of Hellenic history. From 411 on, the Peloponnesian War has sometimes been called the Ionian War, but after the battle of Cnidus, Ionia was no longer at or near the centre of Hellenic history. Theopompus' next project was the *Philippica*. In fifty-eight books it began with Philip's accession to the Macedonian throne in 359 (or 360?) and concluded with his assassination in

117. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 35–37; the expression used there was "Aegean."

118. Flower, *Theopompus of Chios*, 30, nn21, 23.

119. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 41–46.

336.[120] At the end of his career, Philip had subjugated all of Greece, Thrace, and parts of Scythia as far as the western borders of the Persian empire.

How did the mainland powers, Athens, Sparta, and ultimately Thebes, fare at his hands? In the *Epitome* there would have been opportunities to commemorate the heroism of Athens and Sparta in expelling the Persians from Greece, but what of the great struggle for power that followed? From 470 until the open hostilities of the late 430s, the so-called Peloponnesian War, there had been growing tension and sporadic fighting between these two states. Again, between the end of the *Hellenica* and the beginning of the *Philippica*, there was another struggle for supremacy involving Athens and Sparta (with various allies) until eventually Thebes emerged to make it a three-way contest. Theopompus only adopted a mainland perspective when it was possible to write about a new power unlike any of the others: Macedon under Philip II. In other words, he omits the two periods in which the main topic for Greek history was competition for supremacy by the traditional mainland city-states. That he did so does not look very friendly to the old mainland powers.

But of course it should be pointed out that the omitted periods were covered in digressions to be found in the *Philippica*. And what digressions! The period between about 483 and about 416 and part of the period between 394 and 360 (actually c.380–c.350) were "covered" in a famous digression, "On the Demagogues," found in book 10. There are many fragments from it, and they have been the object of an extensive study by W. R. Connor.[121] In general, the digression's themes seem to have been the greed, profligacy, and mismanagement of the Athenian political leaders. Greed and corruption of other great leaders was the theme of another digression on a major event of the period, the Boeotian-led invasion of Sparta that took place over the winter of 370/69.[122] According to Theopompus, Agesilaus of Sparta got the Boeotians to leave, not by force of arms, but by offering them a bribe. Theopompus believed that Epaminondas accepted the bribe (F323), but it is noteworthy that this is the only bit of scandal reported of the Theban general from all our ancient sources.

120. The date of 360 for the accession was suggested by Hatzopoulos in "The Oleveni Inscription and the Dates of Philip's Reign."

121. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens*. Also cf. Ferreto, *La citta dissipatrice*.

122. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 41–42 (Theopompus FF322–23).

There is evidence that Theopompus was at Philip's court in 343.[123] Evidently completely disgusted at what he witnessed there (FF224–25), he nonetheless decided upon writing, or renewed an existing resolve to write, history with Philip at centre stage. Since Philip was by this time unquestionably the most formidable foe that Athens, Thebes, and Sparta had faced since Xerxes in 480 (though Thebes was his ally just at this time), Theopompus' general lack of sympathy for them is evident. In fact, his dislike for these cities was so well known in antiquity that it became the subject of a vicious parody written by another historian, Anaximenes.[124] In my example from the Second World War, I showed how one can sometimes infer a regional perspective from the way that a historian divides his work into periods. Theopompus' periods are compatible with a point of view generally unfriendly to the old city-states of Greece. His orientaton seems to have been Ionian.

Generally speaking, the ancient historian was exposed to community influences that came from two directions. His native city had its own traditions and pretensions, but when he became a universal historian, he had to train himself to represent fairly the *agraphos mnēmē* that gained acceptance beyond his city's boundaries. In particular, he would be obliged to put the clamour of his native community in its proper place as seen from his adopted perspective. This task would not have been easy, and as I have suggested, success was rare.

Herodotus was born in Halicarnassus in the southwest corner of Asia Minor. He knew the island of Samos well, and tradition gives him a sojourn there as an exile from his native city.[125] Therefore, from his early life, he was probably identified with two communities, but both were on the eastern, Ionian side of the Aegean. Even the most powerful of the coastal Asiatic cities and Aegean islands were subordinate allies or tribute-paying members of the Athenian empire in his lifetime. After a brief introduction, his history begins with an apology for talking about small places and launches into Croesus' subjugation of certain Ionian states and his establishment of alliances with others, including some of the offshore islands. After Croesus' fall, there is a section on early Persian history, and Herodotus then returns to Ionia to narrate the Persians' campaign to possess it as part of their empire (1.141–76). Some of these conquered Ionians and eastern Greeks accompany Cambyses

123. Ibid., 5–6.

124. Ibid., 12–13.

125. How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 1: 1–4; Evans, *Herodotus*, 4.

into Egypt, and their geographical theories come under fire as book 2 begins. Book 3 features Darius' rise to power and his organization of the empire, but it also includes a parade of tyrants in which Polycrates of Samos figures prominently (3.39–59). When Darius invades Scythia in book 4, Ionians usher him into the country and secure his retreat. In book 5 we find Herodotus' second beginning of the war, the support given by Athenians and Eretrians to the Ionian revolt (5.97.3). When the allied fleet withdraws from Artemisium, Themistocles takes thought for the Ionians in the enemy fleet and leaves behind subversive messages for them (8.22).

At Salamis there is time for an extended anecdote about the exploits of Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus. Fighting on the Persian side, she managed to impress the gullible King Xerxes, who did not notice that she sank one of his own ships (8.87–88). The war ends with the battle of Mycale in Ionia. Homer's *Iliad* is used to justify this notion of the eastern Greeks' occupying a Greek-barbarian frontier of hostilities, as I have shown. Add Herodotus' citation of the two Samian documents discussed earlier, and it is clear that he is pushing his native region into the limelight as often as he can. It is difficult to know if Athenians and Spartans, the leaders of the successful resistance to the Persian invasion, felt slighted by Herodotus' obvious special interest in his fellow easterners. Perhaps his repeated criticisms of the Ionians' lack of cohesion and of their alleged tendencies to laziness (as at the battle of Lade) sat well with the Athenians. A plank in their platform of imperial propaganda was that the Ionians lacked determination to fight for themselves.[126]

Some time ago Ridley demonstrated that Thucydides wrote for an Athenian audience.[127] I gave reasons above (pp.135–37) for thinking

126. Herodotus' criticism of the Ionians has been noted and used to suggest that he was biased against them: How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 1: 120. Someone from the Asian side of the Aegean may feel an obligation to push that region forward for attention but may also reserve the right to be critical. Thucydides declares that Athens' Ionian allies were themselves responsible for their subjugation to Athenian rule because of their lack of enthusiasm for regular military service (1.99.3). Herodotus' sensitivity to the regional versus universal perspectives is perhaps revealed in a curious passage in book 7 (96), where he declares that he is not required by the account of his enquiry to name the native company commanders of the various ethnic units of Xerxes' army. The commanders with real power were the Persian generals, whom he did name. This principle of not naming ethnic "commanders" is then flagrantly violated a few paragraphs later (99) by an extended celebration of Artemisia, queen of his native Halicarnassus, there "leading" her city's contingent. Also cf. Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History* 83–90, 181–82.

127. Ridley, "Exegesis and Audience in Thucydides."

that his friends and probably his informants were from the oligarchic end of the political spectrum. It is difficult to know if staunch Athenian democrats would have sought him out admiringly, but it seems a little doubtful. He did not finish his history, and Flory has recently argued that he gave up his grand undertaking in despair.[128] Could that be true? And what would give him such despondency as to abandon his life's work virtually in mid-sentence with the events of the twenty-first year of the war unfinished?

Despondency has not been the only explanation. Flory shows that the alternative thesis, that a sudden, perhaps violent, death silenced him abruptly, "pen in hand," one might say, has held the field for a long time right down to the present. He dismisses this widely held theory on the grounds that all the sources for it are from late antiquity and that they contradict each other. It is certainly true that they contradict each other. One tradition has him dying in Thrace, another dying and buried in Athens, and yet another dying suddenly on the journey home from Thrace to Athens. There was even a fourth that placed his sepulchre in Italy.[129] As to the lateness of the tradition, that observation deserves a little closer scrutiny.

Flory's article aside, the question gets little attention today. In the nineteenth century, things were different. Indeed, the urgency of the debate and the care with which the ancient evidence was examined cannot fail to impress anyone who turns to glance at the scholarship of a century ago. Charles Morris's introduction to a college edition of book 1 is a good example,[130] chosen because its widespread use has probably made it far more influential than the articles in the learned journals that he cites. Morris concluded that Thucydides retired from Athens to escape from the Thirty Tyrants, and he continued to work on his history in the relative quiet of his Thracian estate until he was murdered by a local brigand.

Morris claims (19) that this account derives from early authorities, and it is both their earliness and their authority that deserve scrutiny. The only information we have about the early sources comes from

128. Flory, "The Death of Thucydides."

129. Thrace: Zopyrus quoting Cratippus, Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 33, Plut. *Cim.* 4.3, Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 10; murdered in Athens: Didymus quoting Zopyrus, Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 32 (?); died of an illnes in Athens: Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 10; buried in Athens: Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 32, Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 10, Paus. 1.23.9, who adds that he was murdered on the homeward voyage; buried in Italy: Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 32 quoting Timaeus.

130. Charles D. Morris, *Thucydides Book 1*, 16–19.

Marcellinus' *Life of Thucydides* (31–33). Marcellinus quotes Didymus (32), an Alexandrian scholar of the first century BC, for the information that Thucydides returned to Athens and died a violent death. Didymus claims to have got this story from Zopyrus, whose dates are unknown. Confusion sets in when Zopyrus is quoted again, directly this time (33), for the information that Thucydides died in Thrace. So it is not clear what Zopyrus said, but perhaps it does not matter because his source for this new information was allegedly Cratippus. With this name we at last have an early authority,[131] and it will be useful to glance at what he may have said in a moment. Before doing so, I should mention the other relatively early source cited by Marcellinus (33), Timaeus of Tauromenium in Sicily (c.356–260 BC). His claim that Thucydides was buried in Italy gets no support from any other source and is probably to be dismissed as an example of regional chauvinism.

Cratippus, on the other hand, was an Athenian, a contemporary of Thucydides and one of his continuators. Whatever he may have said on the subject would be worth knowing. Cratippus was not quoted very often in antiquity, and Marcellinus seems unable to cite his work directly. When he comes to mention the continuations of Thucydides, he seems to be aware of Xenophon and Theopompus only (45). Authors who know Cratippus are few, but they include Plutarch and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Plutarch gives an extensive summary of the contents of Cratippus' history in one place (*Mor.* 345 C–E), and in another (*Cim.* 4.3) he repeats the story found in Zopyrus and attributed to Cratippus by him that Thucydides died in Thrace. Of course, Plutarch does not cite Cratippus in *Cimon* 4.3, but since he knew his history, the possibility looks fairly strong that Cratippus could have been his source for the information given there.

We are therefore left with Dionysius. His testimony, fuller than any other by far, is dismissed by Morris in a brief note (16 n34), and it is easy to see why. It does not help Morris' theory at all. Dionysius quotes Cratippus directly (*Thuc.* 16): "It was probably while attending to these [i.e., the speeches, the rhetorical passages, and the discrepancies of quality that existed between some parts that Thucydides had already written] that he [Thucydides] left his work unfinished, so says Cratippus

131. In Morris's day it was fashionable to discredit Dionysius, particularly in the matter of his testimony concerning Cratippus. So this historian was presumed to be a figment of Hellenistic historiography. This theory was laid to rest by Gomme, "Who was Kratippos?" For further discussion and bibliography, see Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia,'* 25–27, and Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 184–86.

his contemporary and the editor of the remains of his history." Thus if Cratippus did mention Thucydides' death in Thrace, he does not seem to have connected it to the unfinished state of the history. In other words, nothing in the best ancient sources contradicts Flory's thesis.

But why should Thucydides have become discouraged when, as Morris suggests, he always had his Thracian property, to which he could withdraw and finish his history if conditions in Athens were not to his liking? Flory makes a beginning by arguing that certain tactical assumptions that underly Thucydides' battle descriptions were invalid in the fourth century, and this fact would have forced the historian to rethink his approach to describing them. The example is but one instance of a very general problem. It can be stated in various ways. Think of the general defining principles in the upper layer of the cake (pp.16–21 above). These principles must be recognizable by the reader for the history to be intelligible. If they are part of the present and subject to rapid change, a narrative that depends on them may become confused, even impossible. To take the metaphor of the mountain, it must be observed from a stable position. If the vantage point is constantly moving, a raft, say, on a winding river, one may only get a series of glimpses of the mountain that cannot be connected together. I have cited Anton Kaes (see note 2 above), E. H. Carr (note 4), and Michael Fotiadis (previous essay, note 37) on this subject of the unavoidable interconnectedness of present and past in any historical account, but the difficulty a historian faces when his present circumstances are extremely unstable gets no attention in the interpretation of Greek writers. That it does not is unfortunate because Thucydides in particular was attempting to finish his life's work during one of the most volatile periods of Athenian political and military history (see below).

A community can respond positively to changing times. Perhaps the best example from antiquity comes from the early church, which produced four different accounts of the ministry of their founder in fairly rapid succession. As Archibald Hunter explains the process, the gospels were produced in response to the changing conditions that faced the church through the first century.[132] Mark was written first to keep the memory of Christ alive when it became clear that many of the early Christians were dying or being put to death. Luke responded to the need to describe the origins and spread of Christianity to well-educated and influential people. These first gospels, it is argued, had an outward

132. A. M. Hunter, *Introducing the New Testament*, 37–70.

look of proselytization or apologetics, but Matthew was next compiled more for the guidance of the growing church itself. John came last, in this view, to supply the one thing that the three synoptics lacked, an exploration of the spiritual meaning of the ministry.

Whether or not Hunter's explanation is correct,[133] it certainly provides a plausible theory for the production of four different gospels by the early church. Its underlying assumptions interest me, for they may have relevance to Thucydides. These assumptions are that an account of a past event is written in response to a present circumstance. As present circumstances change, the account may lose relevance; it may even become obsolete, and a new one will be required. Further, if circumstances change abruptly and repeatedly before the work is finished, they could have the effect of making it impossible for the historian to complete his original plan. To what extent could these considerations explain the incomplete history of Thucydides?

He gave his war a narrowly Athenian definition. His argument (5.26) that it lasted for precisely twenty-seven years (within a few days) means that it started in early spring 431 with Thebes' assault on Athens' frontier ally, Plataea (2.2–6), and ended with Athens' surrender in early spring 404. If I were a Peloponnesian living at this time, I seriously doubt that I would have accepted either of his dates. My side won the war, after all, and that fact surely entitles it to an opinion on the subject. Xenophon gives a Peloponnesian chronology of the war in a passage the authenticity of which has been questioned by recent scholars. The main argument against it, however, is that Thucydides would not have agreed with it, an obvious point, but hardly decisive.[134] Xenophon sums up the war after the surrender of Samos at the end of the summer of 404 (X. *HG* 2.3.9). He says that the war lasted twenty-eight years and six months and gives the names of twenty-nine Spartan eponymous ephors during whose tenure of office the war was fought. This is a perfectly legitimate Peloponnesian chronology, implicitly dating the outbreak from the congress at Sparta (nearly a year before the invasion of Attica), when the Peloponnesians decided that Athens had broken the Thirty Years' Peace (Thuc. 1.87), and fixing its termination when they ceased fighting on Samos at the end of summer in 404. It shows that they had

133. According to a news report, there may be reason to assign an early date to the gospel of Matthew, one that would not fit in with Hunter's scheme. Cf. Slayman, "Jesus' Divinity."

134. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika I–II.3.10*, 192.

indeed worked out their own ideas about the war, and these did not agree with Thucydides.

The Peloponnesians decided by formal vote taken early in 432 (see Thuc. 1.125) that Athens had broken the Thirty Years' Peace. It is not known if any of them ever speculated on the causes of the war, but it is not difficult to imagine how they would have tackled the problem. The question would have been to explain Athenian aggression in undermining the peace. That is not the question as Thucydides saw it. For him the problem was to explain Spartan aggression in invading Attica. He concludes that they were driven by fear of the growing power of Athens (see below). I imagine that a Peloponnesian would probably retort, "In other words, I became the aggressor because I struck back!" Thucydides' analysis of the causes of the war achieves an illusory precision by carefully obliterating the enemy's claims and successfully elevating a regional (Athenian) definition of the war to the unjustified status of universality. His analysis is not likely to have endeared him to his Peloponnesian informants, on whom he relied increasingly as the war progressed. His success with the younger literati of his age was a little better but still mixed. Three or four historians continued his unfinished work, but not one agreed with the conclusion for which he was aiming. Later critics implicitly deplored his decision to embrace the collapse of Athenian power. As for his fellow Athenians, in 399 they sent a clear message to troublesome intellectuals by trying and executing the philosopher Socrates; one of the prosecutors had been Anytus, a champion of the restored democracy. Thucydides' argument that the Athenians had thrown away their empire by abandoning the cautious policy of Pericles and that some bad decisions by a gullible and unstable democratic mob were, in part, the cause would not have sat too well with the Anytuses of the restored democracy after the civil war.[135]

This point deserves amplification. The last major political event mentioned in Thucydides was the overthrow of the democracy by the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 (8.48–54, 63–97) and its subsequent restoration. Before the restoration, the basis of government was

135. Continuations of Thucydides were produced by Cratippus, Xenophon, Theopompus, and the papyrus historian from Oxyrhynchus (P) who has been identified with Theopompus or, more plausibly, with Cratippus. Cf. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 183–95. Dionysius (*Thuc.* 53) says that Demosthenes was the only orator to study Thucydides. Plato (*Menexenus* 242C–243D) gives an account of the Peloponnesian War that owes little or nothing to Thucydides. Cf. Hornblower, "The Fourth-Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides."

expanded to include the Five Thousand (8.97). Thucydides speaks glowingly of this expanded, oligarchic government despite the facts that he was not in Athens to experience it and that he cites no decisions or pieces of legislation to show specifically why it governed so well. Under the circumstances, one is entitled to conclude that his approval was based on a theoretical preference for open oligarchies. He praises the revolution's mastermind, Antiphon, for being the most astute backstage politician of the day and attributes intelligence to all of his coconspirators (as noted on pp.135–36 above), including the slippery Theramenes.

Now imagine this Thucydides, "the fat man from the traitors in Thrace," as Aristophanes styled him (*Wasps* 288), returning to Athens in 404, as he almost certainly did.[136] He has several scrolls of writing in his personal effects. These scrolls probably contained rough notes on the entire war (5.26.1) and a polished description that reaches, or will soon reach, the end of our book 7, the conclusion of the fateful Sicilian campaign. He enters an Athens now dominated by Sparta. Depending on when he arrives, there is, or will be, an occupying force of Spartans; the democracy is overthrown again, this time to be replaced by the Thirty (later called the Thirty Tyrants), and soon there will be proposals afoot to broaden the base of government to the Three Thousand (X. *HG* 2.3.20). Antiphon is dead now, but once again Theramenes is involved with the oligarchs. The democratic leaders (including Anytus) who have not been assassinated (X. *HG* 2.3.11–56) have fled, but soon will invade Athens, and the ensuing civil war will result in the restoration

136. In 5.26.5 Thucydides complains of having been exiled "for twenty years" after having failed to relieve Amphipolis (see 4.104.4), an event that occurred in the winter of 424/3. From his own words, one infers that his exile ended in 404/3—with the war, in other words. Xenophon (*HG* 2.2.23) mentions the return of the exiles when Lysander sailed into the Piraeus. Later traditions confirmed his return (Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 32), but no early source says so explicitly. On the Four Hundred, the Five Thousand, and Thucydidean politics there has been much comment. McGregor, "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides," has been very influential. Years later McGregor, who hardly ever changed his mind, returned to the point. The "misrule of the Four Hundred, and a distressing naval defeat off Eretria ... put an end to the narrow oligarchy, which was replaced by a mixed form of government (the 'Five Thousand') that drew praise from Thucydides, who had no love for democracy." McGregor then translates the following statement from what proves to be Thucydides' last editorial remark: "In the first phases [of the rule of the Five Thousand] the Athenians clearly conducted their affairs as well as they had ever done, at least in my time. For the change involved a moderate blending of the interests of the Few and the Many and this first revived the spirits of the city from the depths of despair" (8.97.2). See *The Athenians and Their Empire*, 161.

of the democracy in the winter of 403/2. Before this happens, Theramenes will stand up to the Thirty, be treacherously condemned to death, and die a hero of the moderates (x. *HG* 2.3.50–56).[137]

I should think that any Athenian in 403 who got to know what Thucydides was prepared to say about the events of 411 would also know exactly where he stood on the hot political questions of the day. He would see a historian who attributed intelligence to oligarchic revolutionaries and spoke well of open oligarchies. If this same Athenian found out that Thucydides had included (or, even worse, was about to include) a gratuitous digression on the founding of the democracy, one can imagine the interest! I have discussed the content of this digression at some length above. It is now time to estimate its probable impact. It uses the tools of Atthidographic celebration (inscriptions) to show that the "tyrannicides," Harmodius and Aristogiton, were a pair of love-smitten incompetents who assassinated the wrong man. They did not found the democracy nor rid Athens of tyranny. That was done with help from a Spartan invasionary force! Whatever Thucydides meant by all this—and how can we know?—an Athenian in 403 and after could scarcely have failed to see in parts of his work an anti-democratic and moderately oligarchic line of argument, a line scarcely hostile to the legitimacy of the Thirty. The conflict in the characterization of Theramenes—slippery Bill or moderate hero?—alone remained unresolved. It would be nice to know how Thucydides and his history were received in the Athens of the restored democracy. Perhaps it would be mischievous of me to point out

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Cartledge, *Greeks*, 116, takes a similar view of Thucydides' politics. However, Pope, "Thucydides and Democracy," argues for political neutrality on the basis of Thucydides' language. Again, E. M. Harris, "Pericles' Praise of Athenian Democracy," attacks a long-held view that Thucydides puts a less-than-sincere praise of democracy into the mouth of Pericles. Pope does not consider all of McGregor's evidence, however, nor mine, which seems to be new. As for Harris, I found him convincing, but the question of the relationship between Thucydides' own ideas and those put into the mouths of his speakers still remains. On Aristophanes *Wasps* 288, it should be noted that Thucydides is not mentioned specifically. But *Wasps* was produced in early spring of 422, when Thucydides' trial for having lost Athenian control of the richest part of Thrace must still have been fresh in everyone's memory. Who else could that fat man have been?

137. Exactly what Theramenes did, and what the Atthidographers said about him, has been a matter of dispute. Cf. Walters, "The 'Ancestral Constitution' and Fourth-Century Historiography in Athens," and the reply by Harding, "O Androtion, You Fool!" On the period after the war, see Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens*. Krentz gives a rundown of the sources and the chronological problems of the period on 131–52.

that he is the only ancient historian about whom there were repeated reports he was assassinated (note 129). Having done so, I should admit that the stories are contradictory, uncertain about details, and do not give any motivation for the alleged murder.[138]

Fortunately, it is possible to observe the mood of the Athenians in the years immediately following the Peloponnesian War, albeit through the eyes of a prejudiced reporter. I have already mentioned the Athenian naval expedition to Sicily, which sailed in 415 under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus. When it left, the city was in consternation over an act of sacrilege: the multilation of the herms. Andocides, who stayed behind in Athens, became implicated. It appears that he had knowledge of the crime and its perpetrators and agreed to give his information in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Though not prosecuted, he was attacked by his enemies, and he left Athens for the last years of the war. After the restoration of the democracy, there was a general amnesty, and Andocides felt safe to return to Athens. However, in 399 (the same year as Socrates' trial) he found himself in court, prosecuted for impiety. Today, three of his speeches survive (a fourth is suspect), and his defence on this occasion (*On the Mysteries*) is among them. Because his accusers' case sprang from the scandals of 415, they were obliged to revisit that unwholesome past. Andocides was clever enough to see that they were therefore vulnerable.

He spoke before a jury of one hundred Athenians (or some multiple of that number), who would hear and decide the case on the spot. An important line of counter-attack for him was to remind the jury that his accusers were calling past evils to mind. He repeatedly uses the word that Aristophanes put into the mouth of the magistrate when he stopped Lysistrata (see below) from speaking of the appalling losses in the Sicilian campaign, *mnēsikakein*, which means "to call (past) evils to mind." According to Andocides (*Myst.* 79–80, 90), the Athenians had sworn not

138. On Harmodius and Aristogiton, see V. Hunter, "Athens *Tyrannis*," 120. She points out that Thucydides motivates the tyrannicides "*not* by a concern for freedom but by the indignation felt by Harmodios at Hipparchos' slight to his sister" (Hunter's emphasis). She also observes how Thucydides characterized Pisistratid tyranny as moderate and generally respectful of the laws. I would add that there are times when one can point out that tyranny is not necessarily a bad thing, but in about 403–400 in Athens it would have been a very political thing to do. Regarding Thucydides' death, Plutarch (*Cimon* 4.2) says that he was murdered in Scaptē Hylē (in Thrace). Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc.* 32) says that he died a violent death in Athens, but he also knows the story that Thucydides died in Thrace. Both Marcellinus and Plutarch claim that Thucydides' tomb (or stele?) was visible in Athens.

to *mnēsikakein* against any citizen, barring only the Thirty and their senior executive officers from protection. The oath had even been inscribed on stone and so gained legal or quasi-legal status. Andocides won his case, despite his obvious inability to wash off the stain of sacrilege.

Wisely, the Athenians had recognized that the reconciliation between democrats and oligarchs after the civil war was too tenuous to survive without a general amnesty, a forgetting of past crimes. Their resolve must have been strengthened by a widespread desire to forget the blunders, disappointments, and disasters from which those crimes could not be disassociated. Technically, Thucydides' investigation of the last years of the war was no breach of the amnesty, provided that it involved no accusations of wrongdoing against individuals. But it would be difficult for him to avoid implicit accusations, and in the looser, Aristophanic sense he was engaged in an act of *mnēsikakein*, contrary to the spirit of the amnesty. Would this fact have bothered him?

Of course, this question has no easy answer. Two observations seem worth making, however. One is that the Athens of 402–399 was not a good place to talk to people about the war, to *mnēsikakein*. So, to the extent that Thucydides needed Athenian informants, difficulties in collecting together his narrative would have multiplied for him. The other involves a remark from book 3 (113.6) implying that he was not impervious to the pressure of public opinion. Towards the end of his account of Demosthenes' campaign on the western side of the Balkan peninsula, he mentions a great disaster that befell Amphilochia. However, he refuses to give the numbers of Amphilochian dead "because the figure is said to be incredible considering the size of the city." The comment gives a precious clue to the way that ancient historians put their narratives together: through an interactive process with the prospective audience. Before giving information, the historian knows how it will be received. If general disbelief in the community can inhibit the recording of information, what would be the effect of hostility?

Ephorus was famous for two things: his *Universal History* and the fact that he never missed an opportunity to mention his native Cumae. When he had nothing else to report, he reputedly used to remark (F236), "These days the Cumaeans were enjoying a peaceful time." Theopompus seems to have remained aloof from mainstream Greek historiography. As I have pointed out above, in his early years he chose periods in which the eastern Greeks were at or near the centre of history's stage. Later, he spurned the years between 394 and 360, when the mainland

powers were locked in a mortal struggle, and turned to Philip.[139] Even then, considering his evident loathing for his chosen hero, he seems to have refused to write from the standpoint of any nation or city in the southern Balkan peninsula.

Thus Xenophon is usefully isolated. Shortly after the end of the Peloponnesian War, he left Athens to go on the expedition with Cyrus. News of Socrates' execution must have reached him in Asia shortly after he returned with the Cyrean mercenaries. It is difficult to show that the disappointment he must have felt over the death of his old friend turned him against his native Athens, but his *Memoirs of Socrates*, *Apology*, and *Symposium* show how convinced he was of the folly of Anytus and his fellow prosecutors. Exiled from Athens as a pro-Spartan (probably in 394), Xenophon was given a residence in Elis. Forced from there in 371, he moved to Corinth. A few years later he was restored as an Athenian citizen and must have moved back to Athens in 366/5. His intellectual home was with the "international" aristocracy of his day.[140] Owing to the fortunes of empire, both Athenians and Spartans had opportunities for communication and movement to various parts of Asia and the Aegean during his lifetime. His major historical work, the *Hellenica*, reveals the mind of an optimistic, liberal advocate of the "better class," a man gifted with a gentle sense of humour and undogmatic piety. Towards the end of his life, his optimism seems to have faded. Perhaps his circumstances compelled him to rise above the restrictions of regionalism. He never lost his love for Athens, however, nor his admiration for Sparta. He had little time for Thebes, but his friend Agesilaus, who detested the place, may have had some influence there.

At the beginning of this essay, I warned of a possible error into which modern critics were likely to fall: the assumption that an ancient historian who looked modern in some respects would be modern in all. I believe that this has happened in the case of Thucydides. The warning he gives in his introduction that people might not enjoy his history (1.22.4) makes him sound like a very independent-minded enquirer, one who would press on regardless of public opinion. It was this paradigm, a somewhat Romantic construct of the powerful individual, that made the notion of a Thucydides whose investigation could be stopped

139. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 35–44.
140. Rahn, "The Date of Xenophon's Exile."

only by his violent death so irresistible to nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars—so irresistible that they were unable to see the worthlessness of the evidence on which it was based. Without good evidence, the paradigm should be abandoned. Once that is done, Thucydides begins to resemble his ancient fellow historians a little more, and his historiography becomes more accessible. Of course, an alternative explanation for his disclaimer about writing enjoyable history is needed now. That will be offered in the text below and explored in detail in Appendix 2.

AUTHORITY

John Lukacs has pointed out that modern historiography emerged in the seventeenth century simultaneously with a growing vocabulary of self-awareness. From this beginning, I would argue, the concept of the historian as an individual researcher may be traced. Technology helped with the dissemination of the printed page, while at the same time, there was an increase in emphasis on private property as a way of defining an individual. It was no great leap to the conception of literature as the intellectual property of the author. I use "author" in its old sense as the individual on whose personal *authority* statements are advanced as true. In fact it is possible to identify the critical moment in the history of English-speaking scholarship when full proprietory rights to "intellectual goods" were first articulated. The year was 1688 and the gentleman and scholar Robert Boyle was the prime mover. In that year he published his "Advertisement about the Loss of His Writings," in which he decried the "plagiaries" of scoundrels who stole his experiments, publishing them in their own names without acknowledgment.[141]

Today one thinks of a historian as part of a complex of interrelationships. She or he is an individual in a small community of scholars whose critical reactions to each other's publications help to promote scholarly rigour. This small community speaks to a larger public as well, sometimes indirectly. Scholars must teach students at various levels of training, such as graduate or undergraduate, give public lectures, and exercise some influence over the content of school textbooks. Peter Novick has shown how professional historians in the United States "sullenly acquiesced in the demands of ethnic and patriotic groups for additions, omissions, and alterations [to their school textbooks], a prac-

141. Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness*, 13–14; Shapin, *A Social History of Truth*, 182–84.

tice that went back to the early days of the profession, and did not at all improve during the interwar years."[142] Who pays the piper calls the tune; and, it would appear, since money was involved, historians had some difficulty distinguishing themselves from pipers. In antiquity the relationship of historians with patriotic consumers of their products was direct, not buffered by a watchful community of scholars trained in techniques of documentary analysis and source criticism. Without sophisticated techniques of document gathering and source criticism, they resembled modern investigative journalists or the makers of "historical" motion pictures more than professional historians, in their relationship to the community at least. It cannot be shown that the concept of the individual researcher existed in antiquity.

However, it must be granted that a certain amount of individualism seems implicit in some of Theopompus' work (on which more below) and in one of the fragments of Hecataeus of Miletus. In antiquity there was a master of rhetoric called Demetrius, known only for his work "On Style." Early in that treatise (2, 12), he discusses the old paratactic or "disjointed" style that prevailed before Isocrates. By way of example, he cites the opening lines of Hecataeus' *Herologia* (alias *The Genealogiae*), and this is the way we know how that lost work opened (F1a): "Hecataeus of Miletus relates [*mutheitai*] as follows; I write these things as they seem true to me; for the reports [*logoi*] of the Greeks are diffuse [*polloi* = many] and ridiculous, as they appear to me." So Hecataeus intended to use his own judgment to establish "true" accounts from the conflicting, and so ridiculous, stories told by the Greeks. It is tempting to suggest that later readers found a self-assertiveness in his work that made him vulnerable to criticism, even parody. That is very likely the point of Herodotus' ridiculing of Hecataeus and this work in book 2 (43). There Hecataeus is made to stand in front of an Egyptian priest to recite a personal genealogy in which he allegedly traced his own descent back to a god in the sixteenth generation. As if to deflate him, the Egyptians respond by going back 345 generations without ever coming to a god. It certainly seems better to read this passage as a joke aimed at putting the presumptuous Hecataeus in his place than as a sober description of an alleged event. It is a humorous characterization of Hecataeus' *Herologia* more than a serious quotation from it.

Herodotus seems to repudiate the self-importance of Hecataeus when he declares it his duty to report what *people* say (e.g., 7.152.3), implicitly

142. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 199–200.

suppressing his own opinions, whether or not he believes them. And Thucydides rejects Hecataeus' individualism explicitly in book 1 (22.2), where he says that he has reported things not from any "by-passer" and "certainly not 'as they seemed right to me.'" Nevertheless, there were times when both historians had to broach subjects that they knew would be less than popular. In book 7 (139) Herodotus announces that he feels obliged to repeat an opinion (*gnōmē*) that is "abominable to most people," namely that Greece could not have been saved from Xerxes without Athens. He will not hold back, he says, because it seems true to him (139.1). But he has not quite joined Hecataeus in self-assertion here. The opinion was already in circulation; it was not the product of his own personal enquiry. Because it was already "abominable to the majority," it would not be new to them. The reason for the abhorrence in which the view was held is that it was the basis of the Athenians' claim to their imperial hegemony over the Aegean (pp.94–95 above). Apparently Herodotus found himself in a quandary. His avowed purpose, announced in the opening lines of his history, was to celebrate the great deeds of Greek and barbarian alike, but one of his principles, particularly when his fellow Greeks were involved in a dispute, was to repeat their contentions without openly committing himself to any of their views. In this case, he had to break with his principle in order to carry out his purpose.

As for Thucydides, his subject must have grown increasingly irritating to many of his fellow Athenians. I concluded the previous essay with a long quotation from his description of the battle in the great harbour at Syracuse. The passage ends with a vivid account of the breakdown of Athenian morale as the tide finally turned against them. Just like the Britons during the Blitz, the Athenians displayed some acts of heroism, some of panic, and many of simple self-preservation. It is to be expected that Thucydides would have met with the same indignation as Harrisson and his M-O team did when they pointed out the less than dignified behaviour of many of their fellow Britons during the bombings. If Thucydides gave readings in Athens in 404 and 403, it is difficult to imagine people flocking to them, unless the supporters of the Thirty Tyrants enjoyed hearing rehearsals of the catastrophes attributable to the overthrown democratic government.

Aristophanes, the comic poet, did not shrink from sensitive subjects, but even he knew that some wounds were best left to heal. In *Lysistrata* (586–90) there is a rapid exchange between Lysistrata, who is organizing the women's sex strike with a view to stopping the Peloponnesian

War, and the magistrate who has come to dislodge the women from the Acropolis. The magistrate suggests that the women are being impudent, for they have nothing to do with the war. Lysistrata responds by pointing out the obvious:

LYS. What! You slimebucket! We carry more than a double share of it. First we bear the children, and sending out our sons as soldiers ...

MAG. Hush. Don't call up bad memories [*mnēsikakēsēs*].

Lysistrata was produced in 411, two years after Athens' appalling losses in the Sicilian campaign. In this context, it would scarcely help the play's chances of success if Lysistrata were allowed to elaborate on what has been happening to the young hoplites in recent years when they were sent out to battle. The magistrate is made to hush her up before she can say too much, and the subject is quickly changed.

Dionysius regarded defeats and catastrophes as inappropriate subjects for history (*Ad Pomp.* 3). In fact, sometimes even victories had to be treated gingerly. Aeschylus' *Persae* was produced in 472, eight years after the Athenian success at Salamis that it celebrates. The treatment of a recent historical event in Athenian tragedy is unusual, but the playwright seems to have taken steps to place his subject outside its pure historical context. The Persian admirals have names that may be inventions, for they are not known from Herodotus (lines 302–30). A ghostly Darius is introduced who is not permitted to recall his humiliation by the Athenians at Marathon in 490 (lines 681–842). The play is set in Susa, a place that would be visited by a few Athenian ambassadors from time to time during the next a hundred and fifty years, but was quite beyond the imagination and experience of the Athenians of 472. In the play, Persian women and old men wait for news of the outcome of the battle of Salamis, and when it comes, it is not good. A beaten Xerxes arrives towards the end of the play, and it closes with the women lamenting the Persian defeat. Translator Seth Benardete comments on the humanity of Aeschylus and the Athenians in displaying and enjoying a sympathetic representation of the sorrow of their defeated enemy.[143] However that may be, I should have thought that the effect of the play was to deflect Athenian attention away from the memory of their

143. Benardete, tr., *Aeschylus II*, 44. For a good survey of the scholarship and a detailed argument to the effect that the Persians were being constructed as barbarians in this play, see Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 70–100.

considerable suffering (which included the destruction of their entire city, particularly the Acropolis) during the Salamis campaign and to project it all onto the defeated Persians.

These playwrights had good reason to defer to public sentiment. Early in the fifth century the Athenians had shown the lengths to which the community might go to control what would be included in or banished from the collective memory. At the end of the Ionian revolt in 494, the city of Miletus fell to the Persians. It cannot have been too many years later that Phrynichus produced his tragedy *The Capture of Miletus*. The Athenians, says Herodotus (6.21), devastated over the loss of a place they regarded as their sister city, burst into tears, fined the playwright heavily for reminding them of their sorrow, and forbade anyone to produce the play again. The power of the community to control what will be remembered is absolute; the individual has no right to advance an unwanted portrayal of events even when it is the truth. Faced with this absolute authority, the writer of drama or history must tell the community what it already knows and wants to hear, or at least things that it is predisposed to accept. Under these circumstances, documentary proof would scarcely be necessary: it might even be regarded as impertinent.

The community also controlled the standards of verification. General knowledge, universal principles, or the utterances of Panhellenic divinities or poets prevail in importance over specific documents in the process of establishing truth. When modern historians make heavy use of documents, they become aware of the uniqueness of historical events and sometimes get into altercations in defence of their idiosyncratic interpretations. When a historian is involved in a dispute, to some extent his or her authority is in question. So a brief survey of early historical controversies should provide insights into ancient presuppositions about authority.

In order to engage each other in debate, the ancients must have had conventions for citing each other's works. Fifth-century practice is represented reasonably well. The tendency is to avoid the writer's name, alluding to his work by referring to the group he allegedly represents. So Herodotus calls Hecataeus "the Ionians" when he confronts his erroneous geography of Egypt. Thucydides (1.20.3) cites two alleged errors of detail concerning the Spartan kings and their army that are found in Herodotus. The historian is not named, however; he is called "the rest of Greece," which must mean "all the Greeks but the Spartans," who presumably knew their own constitution. So Herodotus is recognized as

a representative of a broad Greek consensus. When Thucydides refers to "the Athenians," he probably means the articulation of their traditions that was being advanced by Hellanicus. He cites his rival by name only once (1.97.2), in this case with the rare intention of going beyond mere criticism to the presentation of an alternative version of the Pentecontaetia, a period already covered by Hellanicus. Whatever Thucydides thought of Herodotus, except perhaps in the Archaeology, more supplementary than corrective, he never undertook to rewrite any part of his history.

The conclusion that Thucydides regarded Herodotus with greater deference than Hellanicus looks tempting. Unfortunately, it does not always follow that an ancient historian avoided the territory of a predecessor out of respect. Polybius began his universal history at the point at which Timaeus of Tauromenium finished his own work (Polyb. 39.8 [40.12].3–5). In this case, there is no question of Polybius' attitude to his predecessor. A portion of his long excoriation of Timaeus appears above (pp.22–23). On the subject of Herodotus' attitude to Hecataeus' geographical and mythological works, there is a similar uncertainty. The famous passage in book 2 (143) in which Herodotus describes Hecataeus at Egyptian Thebes tracing his genealogy back to a god in the sixteenth generation has been discussed above. Stephanie West doubts that Hecataeus would have told such a story to his own discredit. She therefore regards the report as a Herodotean fabrication, no doubt intended as a slur. On the other hand, Evans suggests that Hecataeus might have told the story as a joke on himself, and Herodotus simply repeated it without bias.[144] As I suggested, the passage in Herodotus looks like a parody to me.

Whatever the truth, there seems no denying first, that Herodotus was at pains to discredit certain of Hecataeus' geographical theories; second, that the anecdote in 2.143 does not reflect favourably on his genealogical work; and third, that, according to Herodotus, he transmitted at least one anti-Athenian tradition. This last fact is important because the tradition reflects an Athenian charter myth, as Paul Cartledge has recently reminded us.[145] The myth provides a basis for an Athenian interest in Lemnos and, by extension, in the Aegean as a whole. In

144. S. West, "Herodotus' Portrait of Hecataeus"; Evans, *Herodotus*, 142–43. For more on Thucydides and Hellanicus, see Lenardon, "Thucydides and Hellanikos," and Smart, "Thucydides and Hellanicus."

145. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 24–26.

Hecataeus' version, the Athenians were guilty of an injustice in driving the Pelasgians from Attica. Herodotus refuses to decide, but gives an exonerating version as told by the Athenians themselves. According to the principle of *distribution*, the isolation of Hecataeus against the Athenians, a much larger group, suggests that the mythographer is being marginalized. In the absence from this passage of any indication of special qualifications to make Hecataeus a respectable, individual informant, one may feel justified in that conclusion (see above, pp.135–38).

Early in book 2 Herodotus alludes to existing Greek geographical theories on several occasions. In one case in particular (2.20–23), it appears that he had as many as three different descriptions of the Nile with which to contend, but he avoids identifying them by the name of the reporter. The subject is the annual flooding of the river, and Herodotus sets himself the task of refuting Greek attempts to explain it. The theories, attributed generally to "certain Greeks who want a reputation for wisdom [*sophiē* = "cleverness"?]," can be assigned to three Greek sources with reasonable certainty. The first, that the Nile's flow was heavily affected by Etesian winds, was advanced by Thales of Miletus (early sixth century). The second, that fluctuations in the stream of Ocean, from which the Nile allegedly rose, were the cause, is attributable to Hecataeus of Miletus. The third one, that the flooding was caused by melting snows, was advanced by Herodotus' slightly older contemporary Anaxagoras of (Ionian) Clazomenae. Literary evidence shows that this theory became the prevailing view in Athens until Herodotus' prolonged and vehement attack (2.22, 25–26) disposed of it.[146]

Aegean Greeks and Ionians had been in contact with Egypt for about two centuries or more before Herodotus' lifetime.[147] So it should not be surprising to find treatments of Egypt in early Ionian literature. In about 460, Athenian and Aegean involvement with Egypt escalated. Inarus raised the country in revolt from Persia, and an allied fleet of two hundred Greek ships under Cimon of Athens came from Cyprus in support. Thucydides' report is sketchy, but it is clear that the allies lost heavily after some initial successes.[148] A second allied fleet of fifty ships was destroyed in 454 in a sea fight with the Phoenicians. So ended the revolt,

146. For discussion and identification of Herodotus' sources, see A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II*, 1: 98–102; for Herodotus' use of Hecataeus, see Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians*, 81–88.

147. Cf. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, 108–58; Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II*, 1: 1–60.

148. Thuc. 1.104 and 109–10; Westlake, *Essays on the Greek Historians*, 61–73; A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II*, 1: 38–47, 61–62.

particularly the Greek involvement in it. It would be natural to expect that Herodotus' extended researches into the physical nature and antiquities of Egypt, recounted in book 2, were spurred on by Greek memories of the events of 460–454. People would probably want to know where their sons, husbands, and fathers had gone and died. As obvious as this conclusion may seem, it is curious to note that Herodotus makes no mention of any of the events of this period except for a brief aside about Persian and Egyptian skulls, and this in book 3 (13.2, a cryptic allusion to Inarus' victory at Papremis in c.459)!

Herodotus' avoidance of the revolt and its circumstances will receive further attention in the next section. Interest in Egypt in the middle of the fifth century may account for yet another treatise known only by name. Hellanicus of Lesbos, Herodotus' contemporary who died towards the end of the fifth century, wrote an *Aegyptiaca.* Apparently a self-contained work similar to Herodotus' book on Egypt, it could have been in circulation before Herodotus finished his history. Although Hellanicus came from Lesbos, he appears to have ended his life in Athens, where he was writing his Athenian chronicles (*Atthis*) towards the end of the century.[149] A tactful account of Egypt to be read to curious Athenian audiences would be an ideal means for the islander from Lesbos to insinuate himself into Athenian company.

In summary, the first treatments of Egypt in Greek literature were found in works by Thales, Hecataeus, and Anaxagoras. Thales mentioned the Nile as part of his treatise on rivers. Hecataeus included Egypt in his account of world geography in two books. Anaxagoras, for his part, was a philosopher interested in natural phenomena. There is no reason to believe that his interest in Egypt went beyond accounting for certain of its physical peculiarities. Full-length excursions on Egypt were not to appear until towards the middle of the fifth century (or a little later) with Hellanicus' special publication of unknown extent and Herodotus' lengthy second book. Herodotus was in competition with these writers, whom he dismisses as "Greeks wanting a reputation for wisdom." He clearly wished to establish his authority over them by various forms of ridicule and logical attack coupled with the advancement of his own personal opinion (2.2.5, 5.1, 10.1, 11.3, 12.1, 15.1, 16.1, 17.1–2, 20.1, 23, 24.1).

How far did Herodotus dare go in defiance of other Greek opinions? He puts on a few striking displays of independence from his entire

149. Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians,* 199–203, 209–25; Jacoby, *Atthis,* 215.

Greek community. In his first book (1.75) he scoffs at "the general story of the Greeks" (*pollos logos*) that Thales helped Croesus of Lydia cross the Halys river during his attack on Cyrus of Persia. The story was that Thales split the river into two streams making it fordable. Herodotus says that there were bridges in existence, which the invaders used. Again in book 2 (see above) he ridicules Greek stories and observations about Egypt. Thales, like Hecataeus, was from Miletus. Perhaps few Greeks of Herodotus' day (except for the Milesians?) were anxious to protect his reputation. Croesus' crossing of the Halys, about a century before Herodotus' time, took place some distance from mainland Greece in the heart of the peninsula of Asia Minor. So perhaps Herodotus' apparent show of independence was not so daring. Egypt too was a distant, exotic place. In other words, the historian permits himself moments of flagrant independence only when he approaches the geographical boundaries of Greek knowledge. Even at these boundaries, however, the inhibiting power of the Greek community may be felt. In book 1 (193.2–4) Herodotus begins a lavish description of the fertility of the Babylonian soil and then, in a way reminiscent of Thucydides' reticence about the numbers of Amphilochian dead (p.166 above), stops with the following remarks: "Concerning sesame and millet, I know how high these plants get but do not record it. I am well aware that the descriptions of crops that I have given meets with great disbelief among people who have never been to the country of Babylon." We are left to wonder on how many other occasions the doubts of his Greek audience inhibited his narrative.

In general, Herodotus tends to suppress his personal views when the subject is recent Greek history, especially involving Athens, Argos, and Corinth. To be sure, he identifies himself with the opinion (*gnōmē*) that the Athenians' contribution to the resistance to Persia was absolutely crucial for its success (7.139.1–4), but that was the argument advanced by the Athenians and their supporters (see above). He was simply daring to take sides, not establishing his independent authority. It is more usual for him not to express an opinion at all or to describe a criticized version as one "in circulation" (8.119) without identifying it as Greek. Two famous cases are the alleged Corinthian cowardice at the battle of Salamis (8.94.4) and the accusations that Argos betrayed the Greek cause (7.150–52). In his treatment of Argos, Herodotus includes the famous remark that his task is to report what he is told, but not necessarily to believe it (7.152.3), a sentiment echoed in other parts of his history (2.3.2–4.1; 2.123.1; 4.195.2).

In one other passage he associates himself with a controversial opinion. This concerns the alleged attempt by the Alcmeonid family to betray Athens after the battle of Marathon (6.121–31). The Athenian statesman Pericles was of Alcmeonid descent on his mother's side, as Herodotus well knew (6.131.2). The reputation of the Alcmeonids, Pericles especially, had become the subject of some fierce propaganda at about the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (432–431), which must have been near the time of Herodotus' publication. Pericles was implacably opposed to appeasing Sparta, according to Thucydides (1.140–41). As a result, some Athenians held him personally responsible for the outbreak of the war (Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, lines 509–56). The Spartans, too, had made a concerted attempt to discredit Pericles (Thuc. 1.126–27). So Herodotus' defence of the Alcmeonids looks risky indeed. In this case, however, he seems to have disarmed his critics by resorting to humour. His extended account of the rise to greatness of the Alcmeonid clan includes the scene of Hippoclides standing on his head and kicking his legs (obscenely?) in the air (6.129) and old Alcmeon himself emerging from the treasuries of Croesus with his boots and every fold of his garments bulging with gold and gold dust in his hair and in every crack and orifice of his body (6.125).

Before I turn to the fourth century, I should deal with what looks like the earliest known historical controversy from the fifth. The evidence comes from Plutarch's "On the Malice of Herodotus" (*Mor.* 861 A–D [24]). According to Plutarch, Herodotus (5.97–102) neglected to record the heroic exploits of the Athenian and Eretrian ships that were sent to support the Milesians and others in their revolt from Persia in 499. According to Lysianas' *History of Eretria*, this fleet sailed to the Pamphylian sea, where it defeated the approaching Persian navy, thus buying time for the rebels. Plutarch blames Herodotus for ignoring this victory. After it the rebels marched inland and seized Sardis, the satrapal capital and Croesus' former home, but, says Herodotus, they were then driven back by the Persians. Charon of Lampsacus, a local historian like Lysianas, says that the rebels "withdrew" and so, by implication, were not beaten back. Who was disagreeing with whom? It all depends on the relative dates of the three historians. Jacoby believed that the local historians were correcting Herodotus and therefore that they post-dated him. In my first chapter I demonstrated that communities can develop a picture of their past without the intervention of a historian. So the local historians could have been correcting the tradition as it was in circulation before Herodotus set it down. Two other alternatives deserve

consideration, therefore. One is that the local historians pre-dated Herodotus and were criticizing an oral report that he later adopted. The other is again that they pre-dated Herodotus and were simply putting local traditions on record that he later ignored.

We have little evidence to help with this question. But it is as well to follow the very knowledgeable Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Thuc.* 5; *Ad Pomp.* 3), who says that Charon and other local Ionian historians belonged to the generation before Herodotus. Presumably, this means that their works appeared near the middle of the fifth century. In fact, the years between 479 and about 450 would be right for Ionian historians to search local memories for recent acts of heroism. Their rebellion had been crushed by the Persians in 496, and at first it is hard to imagine why they would have wanted to remember their failures. In 479 things changed, however. That year many of them were liberated to become voluntary members of the Hellenic alliance against Persia, an alliance first headed by Sparta; but, with Ionian connivance, the Athenians quickly expelled the Spartans to take over the leadership themselves. By about the middle of the century most of the Aegean states had become subordinates in the Athenian empire. But for the first few years after their liberation from Persia, the Ionian communities probably believed that they would have a political role to play alongside Athens in what was supposed to be a voluntary alliance.

Hope for a real future creates the need for a real past. Just as the Athenians found a use for their victory at Marathon and their contribution to the allied victory at Salamis when it came time to justify their seizure of the empire before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, so the Ionian states would have found memories of heroic contributions to their first rebellion against Persia useful in their jockeyings for position in the new uprising. The countervailing story that emerged towards the middle of the century was the Athenian line of propaganda that Ionians were lazy and generally unfit for prolonged campaigning. It would have justified their relentless subjugation by the Athenians. In order for Herodotus to save the great deeds of the Athenians in the Persian War from obliteration by time, he was obliged to align himself with Athenian imperial propaganda. So perhaps Plutarch was right. There may be a measure of culpability in Herodotus' neglect of early Ionian exploits. In his defence, Plutarch finds him guilty of maligning every other part of Greece as well. Such were the perils of writing general histories. Herodotus chose not to praise everyone at the level that they themselves thought they deserved.

Historical debates properly conducted should produce improvements in the critical use of evidence and the general quality of historical research. It is for this reason that ancient historical controversies are so interesting. That said, it must be admitted that this controversy can scarcely have produced any developments in historical method. I think that it is fair to call it a historical controversy because it is a dispute over what facts belonged in the definitive version of the Ionian revolt. It fails methodologically, however, because it was fought strictly on grounds of regional propaganda.

In the fourth century, Xenophon makes no easily identifiable reference to another historian, and the other general histories from the fourth century are lost. Therefore one has to infer their procedures from circumstantial evidence. The first task for the generalist was the completion of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' work breaks off suddenly with the events of 411 not quite finished. Cratippus, the Athenian, must have been one of the first to continue Thucydides' history. Plutarch indicates that he went past 404 to the restoration of Athenian sea power under Thrasybulus, an appropriate choice for an Athenian (Plut. *Mor.* 345 C–E). The Oxyrhynchus historian (if he or she is not Cratippus) may have reached 387/6, the Peace of Antalcidas. Xenophon paused just past Thucydides' intended termination and then continued down to 362, as I noted above. Theopompus, who Porphyry says plagiarized Xenophon, ended with the battle of Cnidus in 394. His use of Xenophon may suggest admiration more than rivalry. Otherwise, the production by different historians of varying accounts of the same period sounds competitive. When they did rewrite previous histories, it was probably to make improvements in style and give the story in greater amplitude. There is no evidence that they attacked each other's facts or methods (but see below). Curiously, their battle narratives invariably diverge wildly, but even then they do not seem to have engaged each other directly in debate. For the rest of the century, historians either mined each other as sources or avoided one another's topics. Anaximenes is a notable exception. He attacked Theopompus by means of a vicious parody (T6; FF20–21) and produced a brief *Philippica* (FF6–14, 27–28) obviously named after Theopompus' magnum opus. His intent was probably to redress much of Theopompus' imbalance.

A few conclusions may be suggested or inferred about the conduct of fourth-century disputes. If Cratippus did conclude on a note that tended to glorify his native Athens, then perhaps his history was seen to be tainted by an inappropriate regionalism. I have argued above that

Theopompus' choice of termination suggests that he was interested in the period because his native Chios was at or near the centre of Greek historical activity from about 412 to 394. Of the three historians, Cratippus, Theopompus, and Xenophon, only Xenophon had a high reputation for fidelity to truth (*alētheia*) in the later authors (DS 1.37.4). His standing may come as a surprise to modern critics, but it probably has more to do with his ability to maintain a universal perspective than his thoroughness of reporting or faithfulness to detail. Not much is known about Anaximenes' parody of Theopompus. It was called *The Three-Headed [Beast?]*. He apparently succeeded in passing it off as a true work of Theopompus by closely mimicking that author's style. Otherwise the piece seems to have savaged the three city-states, Athens, Thebes, and Sparta. It probably exploited Theopompus' reluctance to adopt a point of view sympathetic to the mainland powers.

There was a feud between two non-historians, Isocrates and Speusippus. I mention it because, in the one precious document that we have from it, Speusippus attacks Isocrates for an alleged careless historical allusion. The disputants resemble modern occupants of professorial chairs. Speusippus succeeded Plato at the head of the Academy, and Isocrates was the great Athenian master of rhetoric. The surviving document is a letter from Speusippus to Philip of Macedon attacking Isocrates and his school. In it, among other things, Speusippus charges Isocrates with historical incompetence because "he makes Cyreneans, people who are *known by all* to be Therans, colonists of the Lacedaemonians" (my emphasis).[150]

The scant evidence concerning fourth-century disputes is not inconsistent with my thesis that the ancient historian's report was authenticated by the way he represented a suitable constituency or showed a familiarity with general knowledge, or that it could be attacked or supplanted because of alleged failures in these matters. In the fifth century, Herodotus and Thucydides occasionally undertook to mediate between the claims of interested groups, as I have noted in previous sections of this study. Disputes over whether an Alcmeonid displayed a shield as a signal to the Persians at Marathon or whether Harmodius and Aristogiton (who were related, it seems) liberated Athens involved the prestige of important Athenian families. Otherwise, Herodotus usually attacks historical or geographical error by first assigning it to a minority. Later disagreements focused on individual characterizations. Was Alcibiades a

150. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 203.

patriot or a turncoat? Was Demosthenes unstable or a model of constancy? Was Alexander a new Achilles, a Heracles, the greatest general in history; or he was a megalomaniacal sot?[151]

"It is testified about this man [sc., Thucydides]," says Dionysius (*Thuc.* 8), "by just about all learned men and masters of rhetoric—or at least the majority of them—that he took the utmost concern over truth [*alētheia*], of which we desire history to be the high priestess. He added nothing unsuitable to the events and took nothing away; and he did not assert his own authority in his writing, but kept his work blameless and free from any sign of malice." Priestesses preserve long-established traditions that lie at the heart of a society's value system. To keep history pure in this respect, the good historian respects her traditional authority. On the most elementary level, it means that the historian does not add gratuitous editorial remarks out of malice or adulation, or suppress known parts of the story from similar motives. Dionysius does not even consider the possibility that an ancient historian might disregard his society's traditions and collect and evaluate documentary evidence with a view to arriving at a set of independent conclusions.

Writing in the century before Dionysius, Polybius (12.26–27) had recommended extensive reading, visits to battlefields, and discussions with "locals" as a suitable preparation for writing history. Presumably, the locals could be relied on to push forward their monuments, but (as I have shown) Polybius is silent on the two central questions from a modern perspective: What does the historian make of local monuments or documents, should any come his way? And what is the purpose of his preparation; is it to establish a personal view or simply to find out what people know and say and what is possible in a given location (such as a battlefield)? The establishment of a personal view sets the historian apart from the community and its traditions, and I have indicated how dangerous that position could be for any writer.

When West (see note 59 above) studied the epigraphical citations of Herodotus, she observed that when he describes an inscribed monument that is known today, his "descriptions" suit his narrative better than the monument. Either the description was received in the tradition or Herodotus' ability to take guidance from the monument was con-

151. Conflicts in biographical traditions are usually traceable to the earliest sources. I made this point years ago in my "Epaminondas Tradition," 97–111, where I discuss the roots of the traditions concerning Epaminondas, Pelopidas, Agesilaus, Lysander, Alcibiades, and Themistocles. Theopompus questioned the constancy of Demosthenes (F326). On the early conflicts in the Alexander tradition, see Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Attica.*

trolled by the existing story. In either case, the tradition receives greater weight as evidence. It authenticates and explains the monument rather than vice versa. Similarly, he claims to have looked at the tripods in Thebes and agrees that their letters look "Cadmean" (i.e., Phoenician). On the assumption that he had seen Phoenician writing and early Ionic, he should have been able to observe that the old Boeotian script (if it was used) was further from Phoenician than east Greek, and that observation might have destroyed his theory of alphabetic dissemination from Phoenicia via Thebes. Perhaps he did not really look at the tripods as he claims to have done; perhaps he was deceived by a forgery or he looked, not as a private investigator, but as a spectator who already knows from tradition what the outcome of the examination must be.[152]

On the face of things, if any of the early historians was an individualist, one would expect it to be Thucydides. He acknowledges that his history lacks a quality of myth (see *fabrication, representation, and correspondence* above) and goes on to declare that he has made it his goal to provide his readers with clarity (*saphes*), a word that interchanges with truth (*alētheia*) in other parts of his work (7.8, 14.4). On the other hand, his lines of thought owe much to the philosophical disputes of his day, with their arguments based on observations and presuppositions about what his contemporaries took to be nature (*physis*). Since the writings of the great thinkers of the time, the sophists, are extensively lost, it is not easy to determine the precise extent to which he may have been an unconventional thinker (but see pp.35–36 above). I have argued that his topic was defined by two crucial considerations. One was the plot structure of the *polemos* as put together first by "Homer" and then by Herodotus; the other was the local Athenian view that the war began with the violation of Athenian territory and ended when the city surrendered. To accomplish his plan, Thucydides would have been obliged to narrate for his fellow Athenians the story of their utter loss of empire to a Spartan-Persian coalition, a story they would not have wanted to hear (see pp.158–66 above). If the Athenians would not listen, his Peloponnesian informants would scarcely have accepted a version of their victory retold as an Athenian tragedy. Even his literary admirers, Cratippus, the Oxyrhynchus historian, Xenophon, and Theopompus (if "admirers" is the right word), could not accept his anticipated conclusion. Their

152. Cf. Pritchett, *The Liar School of Herodotus*, 116–20, 132.

reaction to his historical vision effectively removed the *polemos* as a major literary form from the historiography of the fourth century.

Xenophon presents a paradoxical picture of the self-effacing, "objectivist" historian who occasionally announces a whimsical intention to depart from history's grandiose themes in order to treat a more trivial subject of his own preference. The removal of his persona from his writing looks decidedly self-conscious. Unlike Herodotus and Thucydides, he does not even name himself. In his *Hellenica*, he finds occasion to refer to his own account of the expedition of the Cyrean mercenaries, the *Anabasis*, attributing the work to a probably fictitious Themistogenes of Syracuse (3.1.2). A little later (3.2.7) he mentions an unnamed leader of the Cyreans; it was himself. When the Paralus brought the news to Athens that all had been lost at the battle of Aegospotami, he describes how word of the disaster travelled from the Piraeus along the long walls, under twenty-four-hour guard, to the upper city. His description is moving, but detached (2.2.3–4). It simply takes the manifest fact of the arrival of catastrophic information and describes its movement through Athens and people's reaction to it in just the way anyone might have inferred the story from natural probability (see p.114–15 above), a very good example of what I have called "depersonalized subjectivity."

Xenophon was almost certainly there, but his description contains no hint of any personal involvement. He permits himself to be the voice of disgruntled Corinthian patriots during the period of Corinthian-Argive sympolity (4.4.6) and of dissatisfied Spartans over Iphicrates' alleged ineptitude (6.5.51–52), and he makes Procles of Phlius, a Peloponnesian, articulate the reputation of his native Athens for philanthropy (6.5.46–48). When Thebes invaded the Peloponnese in 362, his son Gryllus rode with the Athenian cavalry that came in support of Athens' ally, Sparta. Gryllus was killed in a cavalry skirmish a few days before the main battle. Xenophon gives a glowing account of the action, but makes no specific mention of his son's heroism despite the fact that it was a celebrated story.[153] He allows himself time for a few rhetorical flourishes (e.g., 5.7.2.17) and space to editorialize on occasion (e.g., 5.3.7). Examples of outstanding leadership draw approving comments (e.g., 3.4.18), but the despoliation of Delphi must have disturbed him very deeply. It probably explains a number of remarks about divine retribution and

153. X. *HG* 7.5.14–17; Plut. *Mor.* 346B–E; against DL 2.53 (= Ephorus F85) and Paus. 8.11.6, who got the story wrong. Aristotle is supposed to have said that "thousands" wrote encomia and epitaphs of Gryllus (DL 2.55 = Aristotle F1 [Ross]).

the sanctity of temple treasures (4.3.20; 5.4.1; 6.4.3, 7; 4.30; 7.3.8; 7.4.33–36).

Everything known about Ephorus suggests dull conventionality; by contrast, Theopompus was the stormy petrel of the fourth century. It will be useful to devote a few moments to a consideration of modern historical relativism, however, before I consider his unusual reputation. My reason is that there seems to be a relationship between individuality in historiography and relativism. The question I intend to ask about Theopompus is, Was he and not Thucydides the real individualist of early Greek historiography?

What objectivism is to agreement, relativism is to disagreement. Peter Novick's history of the "objectivity question" in American historical scholarship shows how the notion that the past was an object the truth of which could actually be known appeared and reappeared at times of maximum consensus among American historians, particularly before the First World War and for about a decade and a half after the second.[154] At other times, when disputes raged, often driven by conflicting ideologies, the choice was to attempt the daunting task of showing one ideology to be superior to another or to fall back on the relativist view that, after due allowance is made for any egregious factual errors, choosing one interpretation over another may be a pursuit of historical fashion more than truth. Isaiah Berlin distinguishes extreme relativism "of facts" from the more defensible one "of values." Elsewhere he offers a definition of it that implies a fear that objectivists may be attempting to rationalize the occult, that which by definition resists rationalization: "The relativism which has so deeply troubled historians, sociologists, anthropologists and philosophers of history during the last hundred years is, in the main, if not entirely a legacy of the schools of thought which look upon human activity as being largely caused by occult and inescapable forces of which explicit social beliefs and theories are rationalisations—disguises to be penetrated and exposed."[155]

Ancient historians accepted "occult and inescapable forces" in history, such as Tychē (Fortune) and Nemesis (retribution, see below), but, given the violent unpredictability of their gods, they tended to ignore these forces deferentially or to mention them briefly in awe. Otherwise, human motivation was read into the action, assumed with a facility that would probably be dismissed as glib by a modern reviewer. As far as

154. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 1–108, 281–411.

155. Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, 74. The quotation is from 89–90.

Novick's scholarly consensus is concerned, I suspect that early historians' general refusal to rewrite each other's histories had more to do with respect for the constituencies represented in a previous history than for the historian himself. Historical memories could be consensual in communities, but not necessarily so among historians. For one to strike out as an individual, therefore, he had to set himself against a community.

Theopompus' reputation for malice probably means that he did oppose the Greek community at large on questions of more central importance. However, he did so as a Chian, for the most part, an east Greek, not as a private scholar. I have shown how he chose historical topics that would permit him to write from an eastern perspective. His *Philippica* ostensibly anchored him to the Greek mainland in later life, but its longest digression still permitted him to devote one-fifth of that huge work directly to his own part of Greece. It is impossible to know how the world looked to someone born on Chios. Theopompus attacked Aristotle's friend Hermias of Atarneus, who had (perhaps) cheated the Chians out of some land (F291). Now it is known that Theopompus had a political enemy whose name was Theocritus (T9). He also attacked Hermias along lines similar to those of Theopompus (DL 5.11). So the political enemies shared a Chian perspective on that subject, at least. Further, both Chians disliked Aristotle and Philip of Macedon, and both ended up in trouble with Alexander's successors.[156]

Theopompus boasted of his financial independence. This presumably relieved him of the need to attract students from wealthy families by praising their cities. Perhaps it also explains his most daring moment when he chose to speak up for Apollo, expose the extent of plundering of his shrine, and isolate himself by an act of extensive (and meticulous?) research. If I am right and Callisthenes' *Sacred War* was an answer to Theopompus, this would be the first example of a historical controversy among the generalist historians in which the results of pure, individual research were openly debated. Unfortunately, the extent to which Atthidography may have made similar methodological advances is also difficult to assess. Sadly, the works are lost but for precious fragments. Whatever really happened, any hope that history would develop its fourth-century achievements into something like modern investigative

156. For Theopompus' rivalry with Aristotle and intense dislike of Philip, see Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 5–7, 146–50, 162–71. On Theocritus, see Plut. *Mor.* 603c. For Theopompus' trouble with the successors, see Shrimpton, *Theopompus*, 8. Theocritus was put to death by Antigonus (Plut. *Mor.* 633c).

research ended with Alexander the Great. His dazzling conquests redirected the attention of the Greeks from their ongoing disputes. Henceforth, historians had the heroic exploits of enormously powerful generals to celebrate.

THE GREEK ATTITUDE TO HISTORY

Early history preserved the memory of the past, rarely attempting to reconstruct it from documents. It was communication. Learned ancients classified it with show oratory and laid down stylistic rules for its presentation. The title I have chosen for this section evokes A. W. Gomme's Sather Lectures of 1952. At one point in those lectures, he cited Pliny's nervousness about how his work would be received if he turned to writing history.[157] Gomme apparently expected his audience to be shocked at the gulf between the attitudes of Greek and Roman writers to the way that their literature would be received. His Greeks would say whatever they wanted. Evidence suggests that, if they did, it would not have been with impunity, however. Consider the reception of Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus*, the trial and execution of Socrates, and now add the fate of Theopompus, who ended his life, it is said, driven out from everywhere. He barely escaped execution when he visited the court of Ptolemy (T2). The Greeks reserved the right to control their collective memory.

Societies do not remember; individuals do, according to Amos Funkenstein.[158] A collective consciousness depends on communication between remembering individuals and, perhaps, public monuments and regular acts of commemoration such as funeral orations. For most Greek communities, the centre of social activity was the marketplace (*agora*). With the apparent exception of relatively unadorned Sparta, the Greeks chose such places to erect a great many of their historical monuments. The Greek verb *agoreuein* means to communicate, to harangue. When Athenians went to the marketplace to exchange commodities (*agorazein*) or ideas (*agoreuein*), they did so *in* their past (figuratively speaking), represented all around them by tangible and costly memorials.

Today history is too many things for a simple definition. The past does not enter the collective consciousness unless the big screen or the cathode tube reassembles it in presentist stereotypes, as Gore Vidal so

157. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History*, 118–19.
158. Funkenstein, "Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness."

brilliantly declares.[159] If there is any consensus among professionals, it is that documents fuel the engine of historical research. Given a sufficient number of them, the historian can proceed with a statistical analysis. In any case, some interpretation of them will be necessary. At an uncertain stage, imagination takes over, according to Collingwood and Isaiah Berlin. For Berlin, the best histories are great exercises of imagination, carefully controlled by the evidence.[160]

Evidence comprises various forms of testimony and documentation. When it is entered in a court of law, it must be authenticated by expert testimony subject to cross-questioning. In the case of history, the researcher is obliged to authenticate his or her own evidence.[161] Without the critical scrutiny of colleagues, doing so would be a vicious circle of self-authentication. With it, professional history still depends on a scholarly consensus, at least to vouch for the documents used, even if no two people can agree on how to interpret them. Since the writings of ancient historians comprise a very large part of the evidence used by the contemporary historian of antiquity, the historiography of the ancient world is more than a matter of curiosity. Every historian of ancient Greece must be a historiographer or abandon the authentication of vital evidence to another.

The purpose of Gomme's Sather Lectures was primarily to add his own buttress to Thucydides' high reputation as a "scientific historian." That reputation was not being generally challenged when the lectures were given, however. No one was taking Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* too seriously, but there was one cloud in an otherwise serene sky. The important thinker R. G. Collingwood, in his famous book published in 1946, had implied that Thucydides was no historian at all, but a philosopher. He based his observation on considerations similar to those in my section on *correspondence*. Of course, Collingwood did not have the benefit of de Romilly's excellent study. He drew the conclusion from which I shrank: Thucydides' preoccupation with universals must mean that he has no interest in the particular facts of history.[162] *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* (the full title of Gomme's lecture series) was constructed to be a careful denial of Collingwood's claim. On Gomme's own authority, and on that of a French writer who had

159. Vidal, *Screening History*, 6–7 and passim.
160. Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, 61–65.
161. Barzun and Graff, *The Modern Researcher*, 122–44.
162. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 3–31.

experienced the First World War and so understood Thucydides very well, *The Peloponnesian War* was found to have effected the perfect union between the general and the particular (139). The drama in it was not implanted by the writer—was he to rearrange the sequence of events to avoid dramatic effect?—it was the inherent drama of the events that spoke their universal message for themselves in the pages of Thucydides (124–25).

In 1985, when Moses Finley summed up his own views on ancient historical writing, he cited Collingwood on Thucydides, not Gomme.[163] Gomme's influence was still felt, however. In his argument that early history was written by people who had few qualms about inventing fictions for gullible readers, Finley singled out Thucydides for his most sustained assault. That historian's alleged invention of speeches was at the heart of his indictment.

A clear picture of Thucydides' procedures in reconstructing (or fabricating) the speeches he attributes to his various agents continues to elude scholarship. The problem is that we have no original with which to compare one of his facsimiles. So we are left with his own remarkable statement (1.22.1): "With regard to the speeches that each person gave when they were about to go to war, or were already involved in it, it was difficult both for me to remember with precision the words that were actually spoken in the speeches that I myself heard, as it was for people who reported [speeches] to me from various places. They are recorded as it seems to me that each speaker would have said what was required in the various situations while keeping as close as I could to the whole purpose [entire intent?] of the things that were manifestly said."[164] Do not the two apparent claims—to make people say what the situation required and to keep as closely as possible to the whole intent of what was manifestly (or truly, *alēthōs*) said—involve some level of contradiction? The extent of the contradiction depends on the answer we give to the question, Was Thucydides trying to be a correspondence historian? If he

163. Finley, *Ancient History*, 13–15.

164. I translate *diamnēmoneusai* as "remember." This is the only example of Thucydides' use of it, and so variants, such as "record," are possible. However, Herodotus (3.3.3), from whom Thucydides probably acquired much of his historical vocabulary, uses it to mean "remember." For a recent discussion of the crucial expression *xumpasa gnome*, see Badian, "Thucydides on Rendering Speeches." I follow Badian with some minor variation, but see below. For a collection, translations, and comments on all the speeches in Thucydides, see H. F. Harding, *The Speeches of Thucydides*. The debate over the reliability of Thucydides' speeches is very old and apparently interminable. Some recent, provocative contributions: Rokeah, "Τὰ δέοντα περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων," argues that the Greek quoted in the title

was, then he had no business making people say what he thought was required in a situation. Should he not have a single purpose: to capture for posterity the actual speeches, in their very words, as far as he could?

Even worse, if he will fabricate even parts of speeches according to undisclosed personal criteria, what does that say about his reporting of the events? Is it possible for us to believe in him as a sober Dr Jekyll when dealing with events and a somewhat self-indulgent Mr Hyde when he turns to the speeches? Whatever we think of that possibility, his attitude to the speeches remains problematical, especially for anyone who wishes to see him as a correspondence historian. Insofar as the speeches respond to the requirements of a situation, their general reliability is contingent on the accuracy with which the historian understands all the relevant circumstances. However, if the speeches are so important as to merit the extensive representations that he gives them, why are they not important enough to be reconstructed verbatim, as far as possible, so as to document the circumstances on which they comment? Would not a true correspondence historian have seen the speeches as potentially priceless documents, as far as they were accessible, that could be used to verify or reconstruct the surrounding narrative? Thucydides' failure to recognize and exploit their potential distances him methodologically from contemporary practice.

So what was the Greek attitude to history? We may search for an answer with Gomme and, more recently, Connor[165] in the written texts of our ancient writers. Nagy concludes that there is something very public in Herodotus' opening declaration that his work is the "public presentation" of his enquiry (into the responsibility for the war).[166] Thucydides' language suggests something a little more private. His work is to be a possession for all time (or an acquisition for periodic consultation?). He does not speak of its publication; he simply says that he has "written the war" (1.1). The verb he uses for "write" (*xungraphō*) has a cognate noun,

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implies that irrelevancies would have been omitted, but otherwise the speeches are sincere attempts at representing what was actually said; P. E. Arnold, "The Persuasive style of Debates in Direct Speech in Thucydides," contends that the compressed style of the speeches imitates the *effect* of the actual speech on an audience; while Hansen, "The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography," gives practical reasons for believing that generals' harangues in ancient historiography (of which there are several in Thucydides) could not have taken place in the way that is claimed for them.

165. Connor, "A Post-Modernist Thucydides?" 298.

166. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*, 217–20.

xungraphe, which means a contract, that is, a written record of an agreement between two or more parties. Perhaps that is how Thucydides thought of his work.

In the previous essay it was argued that history was a memorative, more than an empirical, exercise for the ancients—the remembered past. Earlier in this one, I pointed out that the impact of orality, or at least of ancient presuppositions about the nature and purpose of literary production, deserves more attention in any attempt to explain early historical writing. It is important to shed anachronistic preconceptions about literary production and ownership that have developed since printing. Even the medieval age, steeped as it was in classical theory as far back as Cicero in Latin and even earlier to Aristotle in Greek, should provide a better model for explaining antiquity than the last few centuries. *Xungraphē*, "writing together," translates comfortably into the Latin *compositio*, "putting together," and thus raises the important question, Should we regard Thucydides as one of the first practitioners of a type of literary production called "memorative literature" by Mary Carruthers?[167]

A memorative literature may give the superficial impression of a preoccupation with documents. In general, however, it is composed from memory for memory. The purpose of reading a document is to acquire it for the mind and so for the reader to become able to function as quickly as possible without documents. In the scholarly and monastic traditions of the Middle Ages, this independence became formidable. William of Ockham was one of many scholars who, like Thomas Aquinas, carried his entire library in his head (Carruthers, 89). As Carruthers shows, the medieval scholar trained the memory to function like a computer. Manuscripts were "tagged" and "filed" visually, and their texts were broken down and learned in "bits" to make possible a random-access recall (a process called *divisio*, 72–79). The elements of this process were at least as old as Plato and Aristotle (16–17). Finally, because memory was at the heart of literary production, there was no clear concept of the past apart from what was remembered. "[T]o say that memory is the matrix within which humans perceive present and future is also to say that both present and future, in human time, are mediated by the past. But the 'past,' in this analysis, is not itself something, but rather a memory, a representing of what no longer exists as itself but only in its memorial traces" (193). In this system, literary production uses memory to enrich the present and illuminate the future as far as possible.

167. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*.

The practices that Carruthers describes from the Middle Ages are identifiable as early as the Greek classical age. A line in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (produced in the second quarter of the fifth century) uses writing as a metaphor for memorization. In lines 788–89, Prometheus tells Io that she must inscribe (*engraphesthai*) what he will tell her in "the remembering tablets of her wits." Written texts were used as "prompt copies" by the "book-buying public" of the fifth century, as Stewart Flory points out.[168] Even more, they had no use as instruction manuals, if we are to believe Plato. "So the person who thinks he can leave a skill [*technē*] on written record [*en grammasi*]," says Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (275 c–d), "and again the person who accepts that something clear and certain will come from a written record [*ek grammatōn*] would be very full of silliness ... because he supposes that written words are more than just a means of recalling to mind [*hypomnēsai*] for the person who already knows the subject of the writing." On this view, the written text is not for learning something new, but simply a link in the chain of memory. The usual Greek word for "I read" is *anagignōskō*. It means "I re-cognize." Writing was done by and for people who already knew not just the alphabet but the subject as well.

Like the medieval scholar, Thucydides made no distinction between the past and the (written) memory of it. In his opening remarks and throughout his history he uses the word *polemos* interchangeably to refer both to the events and to his account of them.[169] He wrote with an eye to the future (1.22.4) because similar situations will recur and his work is to be an acquisition (*ktēma*) *es aiei*, a phrase that is usually translated "for all time," *vel sim.* In fact, *aiei* also means "from time to time." So *ktēma es aiei* can also mean "an acquisition for periodic future reference," an expression that sounds very like the attitude of the medieval scholar. Whatever Thucydides meant by *ktēma*, it is bound to refer to

168. Flory, "Who Read Herodotus' *Histories*?" especially 20–22. Writing as a metaphor for memory is copiously illustrated by D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ*, 100–105.

169. Cf. 1.1.1, where the "war" is *both* the event *and* Thucydides' composition. The formula for terminating a year exhibits the same blending of the two ideas. Cf. 2.70.4, "the second year ended for this war which Thucydides composed." This formula is repeated: 2.103.2; 3.25.2; 3.88.4; 3.116.3; 4.51; 4.135.2; 6.7.4; 6.93.4; 7.18.4; 8.6.5; 8.60.3; and in abbreviated form: 2.47.1; 4.116.3; 5.39.3; 5.51.2; 5.56.5; 5.81.2; cf. Loraux, "Thucydide a écrit La Guerre du Peloponnese." Thucydides was suspicious of memory, to be sure, but his scepticism seems to be directed at traditional logographic performances of poetic(?) or more probably prose narratives, which he must have seen as mnemonically imprecise. At any rate that is the conclusion I would draw from Edmunds, "Thucydides in the Act of Writing," especially 849–52.

mental acquisition in some way, given the relatively low level of ancient dependence on written documents.[170]

If such is the case, how did Thucydides address himself to the question of making his war suitable for mental acquisition? This process calls for breaking the subject down into manageable units. Ideally, the units should be numbered and the total recorded. Now this is exactly what Thucydides does. The problem is that his units are years. So his *divisio* becomes a means of alleged chronological precision and supposed evidence for his "scientific" approach to history. Despite this chronological scheme, Hunter has recently argued quite forcefully that Thucydides is not as interested in chronological precision as is generally supposed.[171] Her arguments have not attracted the attention I think they deserve.[172]

However that may be, I should like to turn to Thucydides' own words, for he has left a defence of his scheme of *divisio* in 5.20.2: "A person should reckon rather by times [*kata tous chronous*], not trusting in the numbering off of names of archons in any place or holders of honorific positions to provide a system of *sēmata* to bygone events. For [that way] there is no precision in how a name follows on after ones at the beginning, middle, or any other point [in the war]. But if you count by summers and winters as I have written it, since each year has this potential [*dynamis*] from its halves, you will find that there are ten summers and an equal number of winters to this [ten-year Archidamian] war." (This translates the received text, ignoring all emendations.) Now the subject is chronological accuracy, to be sure, but the passage obviously requires explanation. Gomme wrestled with it, but made little progress in getting at its full meaning.

Begin from the last sentence and work backwards. Observe that Thucydides prefers his own method because it doubles the number of easily manageable natural divisions. It establishes an *exact number* of years with their summers and winters, a well-known mnemonic procedure. To memorize a long list, you have to know how many items it contains before you start. More than that, the summer-winter division of the year permits the attachment of events to visual and emotional conditions (Carruthers, 54): the brightness and harvests of summer, the cooler wetness and storms of winter. Thucydides' Greek could be translated "by

170. Lendle, "KTHMA ΕΣ AIEI: Thukydides und Herodot."

171. V. Hunter, *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides*, 237–43.

172. Hunter's arguments are ignored in two more recent summary statements: Murray in "Greek Historians"; Lewis in "Sources, Chronology, and Method."

harvests and storms." This is the *dynamis* of the year—as a mnemonic aid (Carruthers, 131). It will be shown below that each season is intended to correspond to a "place," or mental address, in the memory of the reader. Ideally, the historian should have sufficient places to equal the number of events to be recorded: one item per place. But if this rule is to be broken, the maximum number of items for each mental address is nine. According to this alternative rule, memory works best on a list of seven plus or minus two items (Carruthers, 84, 131). A glance at tables 5, 6, and 7 (Appendix 2) reveals how successful Thucydides was in observing this rule. For the years analysed in those tables, no season contains more than nine narrative subdivisions, except, of course, for the years and seasons recounted in book 8. This book, however, exhibits so many signs of confusion that it appears that the historian's narrative project was in complete disarray by the time he reached it.

To return to 5.20, consider now the penultimate sentence. It seems doubtful that attaching events to official time periods such as archon years (for Athens) would lose precision.[173] Documentary historians would love it. If you want divisions, archon years had ten months in Athens. That would make for a real chronology. Ten, however, is just outside the magic range for mnemonics mentioned above. The imprecision of which Thucydides speaks must come from the added complexity of memorizing an archon list for the purposes of mentally organizing a sequence of yearly events. If you get into trouble remembering who is at the beginning or middle of the war, then you lose your sequence. This reasoning only works on the assumption that the historian will write without an archon list at his elbow.

Now turn to the opening sentence of the passage. Here is the clearest indication that Thucydides is describing a memorative system for organizing his narrative. The key expression is "with the names [*sēmainontōn*]

173. To be sure, it has been conventional to translate this sentence to make it refer to the beginning or middle of a given year, not the war. But the subject of the paragraph is ordering the sequence of years. Both the first and last sentences leave no doubt of this. Do we believe then that sentence one begins with a proposal for organizing the chronology of the war by years and seasons, sentence two justifies the proposal by talking about arranging events within a single year, and the third sentence concludes by showing how this procedure will help to establish the exact number of years and seasons in the war? No, the subject is keeping track of the sequence of years, not events in a single year. The scholia are contradictory on this passage (see following note for the reference). They include a general summation that is followed by most translators and a set of individual notes that tends to contradict the summation. According to the notes, the "beginning" and "middle" mean "of the war." The notes must be right, and that is the text that requires explanation.

providing a system of *sēmata*." Unless one simply numbers the years, which is what Thucydides advocates and does, each year must be filed away in the memory by some other system. To do so one needs a tag (Latin, *signum*; Greek, *sēma*) for each year. The tag (*sēma*) would have to be the name of each officer. This is the meaning of "the names providing a system of *sēmata*." In other words, the passage means "with names [of the officers] attached as tags [to the years]" for keeping track of the sequence. Such a system is too cumbersome for Thucydides. His conclusion is expressed in his opening words: "One should reckon by the times." He means years that can simply be numbered and further subdivided into seasons. If one remembers the years of the war, all twenty-seven, by numerical order, confusion as to sequence will be avoided. This is precisely how the medieval scholars committed the Psalms to memory, in numerical sequence (Carruthers, 94–100).[174]

So Thucydides' scheme of *divisio* would have created twenty-seven major units, each with the natural capacity to be divided into a further two, for a total of fifty-four available subunits, all of which he apparently intended use. To acquire his war one would simply have to prepare fifty-four mental addresses in which corresponding parts of the war would be stored. This done, the whole war could be remembered in sequence, or any part could be called to mind at random. On this view, his primary objective was mnemonic, not chronological, precision. Such an interpretation makes possible a technical meaning for Thucydidean terminology in the introduction to his war. The *divisio* sacrifices the story

174. Discussions of Thucydides 5.20 are rare. The tendency is to rewrite the Greek. See most recently Lendle, "Zu Thukydides 5.20.2." His proposed emendations make the passage say what most translators want. However, the text does not appear to be corrupt. So emendation is a drastic step. In addition, the reading of the scholiast supports the unemended text. Cf. Hude, ed., *Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata*, 299. My translation follows the manuscript tradition, not that of the Oxford text. Treatments of the technique of memorization and recall are rare in antiquity, and at first this may seem surprising. However, it is likely that mnemonics were taught at a level considered elementary by comparison to the level at which rhetorical treatises were generally written. They usually assume that the principles of mnemonics are known to readers. Nevertheless, Aristotle offers some priceless observations on the technique in one of his smaller works, *On Memory and Recollection* 449b–453b, and there is a very useful passage in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* XVI–XXIV (28–40) attributed to Cicero, perhaps erroneously. On sequencing and orderliness as essential to recollection, see Aristotle 451b–452a. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*, provides an excellent introduction, translation, and commentary; cf. 22–31 for a clear description of the place system as an ancient—and modern—mnemonic technique. See also Post, "Ancient Memory Systems." Now cf. Shrimpton, "Time, Memory, and Narrative in Thucydides."

form (*to mythōdes*) by carving it up in favour of a mnemonic design to make it a *ktema es aiei* (see further Appendix 2).

Now reflect upon his speeches, more specifically, his account of the way he has arrived at his report (translated above, p.188). As a documentary statement, it is seriously flawed, but as a statement of mnemonic method, it is quite another thing. From antiquity the method of committing a speech to memory—one's own for delivery or another's for recollection—was well understood. It began with what the ancients called *memoria ad res* (memory for things; Carruthers, 85–87). The *res*, or *sententia* (Gr., *gnōmē*), must be broken down by *divisio* into its main components for storage in the memory and then subjected to *compositio* (putting [back] together) at the moment of recall. At this point, the words will come, and one need not be concerned to reproduce the original ones. Since oratory does not aim at sparkling originality of substance in this tradition, the *res* is usually a *locus communis* (Gr., *topos*), a commonplace. Therefore one's own words can be an improvement on the original (Carruthers, 89–91) if they say the "thing" with greater force or clarity.

Thucydides never considers the possibility of gaining access to a written original of any speech. This is either carelessness on his part, since even a medieval mnemonist would have preferred to begin with a written copy, or else the orators of his day were in the habit of composing mentally and delivering their speeches from memory. In the latter case, his "method" of recording the speeches he himself heard is not bad. He begins (1.22.1) by observing that the exact words were difficult to remember. If that means that he has abandoned the idea of an exact transcription (*ipsissimis verbis*) for memory *ad res*, then it is encouraging. The sense of the speeches has probably been captured and preserved, at least in cases where he himself was present. Therefore it is even more reassuring that he says something to this effect in the second part of the next sentence. He observes that the speeches are recorded holding as closely as possible "to the all together [*xympasa*] *gnōmē* of what was actually said." In a mnemonic system, *xympasa* should refer to the *compositio* of recollection and may be taken to imply a prior process of *divisio* for memory storage. Thucydides seems to be anxious to assure his readers that he has reconstituted the *gnōmē* in full.

It is the first part of the second sentence in 1.22.1 that causes confusion. In it Thucydides apparently claims that, while keeping as closely as possible to the *xympasa gnōmē* of what was actually said, he has made people say "the things required by the prevailing circumstances." Some

elucidation of these difficult lines may come from following the flow of Thucydides' thought while keeping in mind ancient mnemonic techniques. He declares his difficulty in remembering "the very precision [*akribeia*] of the things said." He did not attend some speeches and so relied on informants who experienced the same difficulty. Thus (in those cases primarily) he thought about what the speakers would have to say in the existing circumstances, and (in all cases) he has kept as close as he could to the *xympasa gnōmē* of what was actually said.

The passage under scrutiny should not be read as a statement of method. It is little more than an attempted assurance on the historian's part that he has used a proven technique to capture the substance of actual speeches, albeit in his own words. It founders partly on the embarrassing complication that he can scarcely have attended any of the reported occasions after his exile in 424. It also founders as a methodological statement because he does not go on to show which orations he actually heard. His attempt to smooth over this difficulty does not seem to have been thought out very clearly. His inability to see the contingency of his perception of the requirements (*ta deonta*) on the precision of his recreation of the circumstances that make those requirements authentic distances him markedly from any modern, so-called scientific practice. It places him squarely in a culture that lasted in some form from his own day until the Middle Ages. It means that Carruthers's comment about the medieval failure to distinguish between memory and the thing remembered applies to Thucydides as well (and the ancient world in general). Some time ago G. E. R. Lloyd came to a similar conclusion from an entirely different direction.[175] After an extensive study of ancient literature, he observed that analogy was a strong force in ancient argumentation. What was true of particular things would tend to be true of similar ones. By the same logical conflation, Thucydides identifies the past with his mnemonic representation of it.

The implications of this observation are relatively far-reaching, for they suggest a new meaning for Thucydides' brief treatise on "historical method" in 1.22. The understanding of this passage has changed little since Jebb translated it in 1880: "As to the deeds done in the war [*erga tōn prachthentōn en tōi polemōi*], I have not thought myself at liberty to record them on hearsay from the first informant, or on arbitrary conjecture. *My account* rests either on personal knowledge or on the closest possible scrutiny of each *statement* made by others. The *process* of research

175. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy.*

was laborious, because conflicting accounts were given by those who had witnessed the several events, as partiality swayed or memory served them" (I emphasize words that have been added). The Greek does not translate easily. The words underlined reveal how much interpretation must take place to turn the statement into fluid English. The success of the standard translation (Jebb's) depends on the assumption that *erga tōn prachthentōn* means the "deeds done" (in the war). Jebb points out in a footnote that the expression "has the effect of bringing out the antithesis between *facts of speech* and *facts of action*" (his emphasis).[176]

His reference to "facts of speech" is presumably to 1.22.1, where Thucydides alludes to his difficulty in remembering the *akribeia* (precision) "of the things said" (*tōn lechthentōn*; i.e., the speeches). But if the expressions *akribeia tōn lechthentōn* and *erga tōn prachthentōn are* truly parallel, then *erga* should not mean "events" or "facts" so much as "the reports of the facts"[177] (pp.44–46 above), just as *akribeia* means "the precision [of the report or recollection] of the speeches." The ancient perception of the relationship between an event and its recollection, the prerequisite of historical recording, is described by Aristotle in his *On Memory and Recollection* (450a–51a). The occurrence (*pragma*; cf. Thucydides' *prachthentōn*) generates experience (*pathos*) in the human percipient. The *pathos* enters the soul by sensation as a kind of picture. The stimulus that enables recollection "insignifies" (*ensēmainetai*; cf. Thucydides' *sēmainontōn* in 5.20.2) a sort of likeness of the sensation in the soul, just as people make impressions with signet rings. After the event has happened, it is gone (it is *ou paron*, "not present"). It survives only in the picture in the memory. "Just as in the picture, the drawing is both an image [*zōon*] and a representation [*eikōn*] ... so recollection ... is nothing other than the frequent contemplation of a thing as a representation and not as itself." The event ceases to exist except as a representation in the memory.

176. Reprinted in H. F. Harding, *The Speeches of Thucydides*, 236. Cf. Bicknell, "Thucydides 1.22: A Provocation." On Thucydidean "historical method," see V. Hunter, "Thucydides and the Uses of the Past."

177. At times there is no doubt that *erga* in Thucydides means "reports of events." Cleon, for example, rebukes the Athenians for listening to *erga* (3.38.4). This means that *erga* (deeds) are, in a sense, *logoi* (words) and will no doubt seem problematic because Thucydides is famous for contrasting *logos* with *ergon*, not identifying the two ideas. But Parry, the great master on this subject, shows how *ergon* depends on *logos* for its very existence. Discussing Thuc. 1.17, he demonstrates that an event (*prachthen*) does not become a historical event, *ergon*, unless it is deemed *axiologon*, "worthy of *logos*" (report). Cf. Parry, Logos *and* Ergon *in Thucydides*, 92.

This passage in Aristotle brings out the theoretical underpinnings of Thucydides' statement. The events themselves are *pragmata* (Aristotle) or *prachthenta* (Thucydides), and the *erga* are the verbal representations of those events, for the *pragmata*, once done, cease to exist and can only survive as representations—verbal, of course. Now in the previous essay, I showed that *erga* must mean "historical facts" or "factual reports" in this passage. So *erga tōn prachthentōn* means "the factual reports arising from the things done." A little later, these "factual reports" or verbal representations are the subject of the verb *heuriskomai* (discover) *epiponōs* (with toil). So Jebb translated, "the process of research was laborious." But *heuriskomai* used of a verbal representation evokes the ancient, rhetorical concept of *heuresis*, which means the discovery (Lat., *inventio*) of the appropriate narrative procedure.[178] The reason for Thucydides' difficulty, he says, was "that people who were present at each of the reported events [*ta erga hekasta*] did not say the same things about them," but were partisan or forgetful. In other words, their stories had gaps or were too slanted for a generalist to report without modification. Therefore Thucydides' concern is with narrative procedure and coherence more than some undisclosed and, in his time, undiscovered "historical method." He was more concerned with having his war remembered than with lecturing people about investigative method.

To return to Gomme, I see a problem with his use of Herodotus and Thucydides to reconstruct the Greek attitude to history, for they were not "the Greeks"; they were just two of them. Is it possible to identify a Greek social attitude to history to which the historians were obliged to respond? If so, it will not be a single one because of the stratification of Greek society. From archaic times, Greek culture was predominantly aristocratic. It was loosely divided into the *kaloi kai agathoi*, the nobles, and the *kakoi*, the "scruffies."[179] The elites had money and time to travel to the interstate athletic contests, for ostentation, and for the enjoyment

178. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*, 87–94, discusses *inventio* in the context of Roman historiography. The word translates into Greek *heuresis*, which is the term that Dionysius says "the ancients" used for "preparation" (*paraskeuē*) of one's prose (*Dem.* 51). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* it was called *theoria*, "conceptualization." For an example of someone who actually memorized all of Thucydides (but, alas, with no improvement to his style), see Zintzen, *Damascii Vitae Isidori Reliquae*, F138. Narrative in antiquity receives little attention from scholars. Two recent studies by Lee T. Pearcy are valuable exceptions, though they deal with an author and context remote from early Greek historiography: "Theme, Dream, and Narrative" and "Diagnosis as Narrative in Ancient Literature." Also cf. Morgan, "Plague or Poetry?"

179. Ian Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society*, especially 171–210.

of great poetry. The word "Panhellenic" was as old as Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus, poets from the eighth to the seventh centuries BC.[180] It is from this interconnected and intermarrying aristocracy (see Hdt. 6.125–30) that we should trace the Panhellenic values of Greek historiography. By the beginning of the sixth century in Athens, Solon, the lawgiver, was reforming his state to limit the expropriation of wealth from the *kakoi* by the *agathoi* without giving too much power to the scruffies (sometimes called the *demos*).[181] The next few generations in Athens would see this *demos* gain ever more power (*kratos*), eventually to require formal recognition in a constitutional democracy (508 BC and after). These newly empowered citizens were largely peasant freeholders, according to Ellen Meiksins Wood.[182] They can scarcely have experienced the Panhellenic interconnectedness of the more wealthy. The self-containment of an agricultural community has to be experienced to be understood. Richard Goodman lived it both in America and in France,[183] but I can believe that it is the same anywhere. Goodman quotes Balzac's famous observation, "A peasant sees nothing beyond his own village." It is probably from the economic and political empowerment of this localized *demos* that we should trace the origins of Greek regionalism. As this new peasant citizenry gained in political strength, it aped and expropriated the old aristocratic methods of commemorating the past by restricting private funerals and promoting public ones and by erecting state-financed public monuments and inscribed stelae.[184]

This newly empowered public had a taste for history that is reflected in Herodotus. He takes the glory of Athens very seriously, especially since the democracy (5.66.1, 77–78—while avoiding excesses, of course), but

180. Homer *Iliad* 2.530; Hesiod *Works and Days* 528; Archilochus 53.

181. Solon's poetry was extensively quoted by authors from Aristotle to Plutarch, and it appears in many later anthologies. If we assume that the passages are all genuine, it is possible to get some idea of the thinking behind his legislative program. The role of the *demos* and the relationships between richer and poorer citizens in public life are recurrent themes. It is possible that a recognized need for larger citizen armies underlies his reforms and their acceptance by his community. There is a convenient edition and translation of his poetic fragments and the ancient *testimonia* in Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*, 1: 104–55. The standard, comprehensive edition of his poems is in M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci*. Also cf. Anhalt, *Solon the Singer*.

182. Wood, *Peasant-Citizen and Slave*.

183. Goodman, *French Dirt*, 17–18. Cf. Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre*. If this story is true, it illustrates graphically how limited the knowledge of the world outside a peasant community can be for the occupants of that community.

184. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*, 103–108.

has no difficulty gathering and reporting stories that poke fun at the elites. His digression on the greatness of the Alcmeonids includes the hilarious account of old father Alcmeon in Croesus' treasuries described above. With respect to the barbarians (as they called them), these Greeks looked on the monumentality of Persia and Egypt with understandable awe, but on the peculiarities and antiquities of these countries with amused curiosity. Persian and Egyptian inscriptions become jokes—records of money spent on radishes, leeks, and onions fed to labourers on the pyramids—or are made to include pictures of women's genitals.[185] When Heidel studied Herodotus' representation of the antiquities of Egypt, he found in it a persistent tone of mockery that he attributed to a single author, Hecataeus.[186] But Herodotus identifies Greek mercenaries, resident in Egypt since Psammetichus, as among his sources (2.154.4). Emily Vermeule has recently pointed out that the expressions developed to describe Egypt by these very Greeks reveals this same mocking tone that Heidel took to be Hecataeus' trademark.[187] The gentle ridicule is the signature of neither Hecataeus nor Herodotus, but of the Greek community that comprised their informants.

On a more serious note, it is informative to compare certain features of Thucydides' work with the account of the Second World War by one of the world's leading military historians, John Keegan.[188] Keegan

185. In 1.187 Herodotus reports a Babylonian inscription that turns out to be a trick played from the grave on greedy Darius by the dead Nitocris. In 3.88.3 the inscription on an alleged equestrian statue of Darius is made to commemorate a trick played by Darius' groom to get the throne for his master. These two examples suggest that mocking barbarian grandeur was not an exclusive activity of any author or treatise on Egypt. From Egypt we have 2.125.6, where the inscription on the pyramid of Cheops is made to be a record of the cost of onions, leeks, and radishes supplied to the labourers. The female genitals were supposed to be visible on stelae taken to be victory monuments erected by Sesostris in conquered territories (2.102).

186. Heidel, "Hecataeus and the Egyptian Priests," 83, 102 n15, 117, 128.

187. Vermeule, "The World Turned Upside Down," 43. Reviewing Bernal's *Black Athena*, vol. 2, she remarks: "Classical Greek mercenary soldiers working in Egypt literally belittled what they saw in order to feel more at home with the monumental scale of the land and its buildings; so those huge stone pointed pillars became 'obelisks'—'little spits for roasting'—and large angry crocodiles became 'scared yellow lizards,' and the ostrich became a sparrow, *strouthos*." I agree with this comment except that I see no reason to confine it to the classical period. Greek mercenaries were resident in Egypt since Psammetichus (c.650 BC) or a little before. Also cf. Burn, *The Penguin History of Greece*, 95–96. Burn adds that the word "pyramids" means "buns" and mentions an Ionian vase depiction of Heracles in Egypt that clearly mocks the Egyptians.

188. Keegan, *The Second World War*.

begins with a sketch of growing militarism in the European nation states, which leads into the early Nazi successes up to the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. So ends his prologue and part I. In five more parts, the war is analysed into periods of time and further into arenas of fighting. From II to VI each part is introduced with an analysis of the "strategic dilemma" of the national leader most crucially involved in the major decisions. After each analysis, Keegan then narrates the flow of the military struggle as it devolved from these strategic decisions, providing masterful battle narratives in his justly famous style. In his own way, Thucydides attempted something that looks quite similar—on the surface.

Differences begin to appear when one examines the details, Thucydides' battle narratives in particular. George Paul points out that Thucydides is quite sparing in extended battle accounts.[189] He goes on to show how the ancient historian broke his major battles into typical components. He usually begins with a *parakeleusis*, a speech from the general (or generals), which roughly corresponds to one of Keegan's "strategic dilemmas." Next comes an account of troop dispositions, sometimes accompanied by a disclaimer about the numbers provided (e.g., 5.68.2). Thucydides complains that people tend to exaggerate the size of their armies, showing how he depended on oral sources, not documents. There follow generalizations about human behaviour, again a compensation for the absence, or his non-use, of documents. He then may offer depictions of the aims and emotions of the combatants. After this there will usually come references to "aspects of the battle in generalised terms" (309). Finally there will be mention of natural circumstances (weather, earthquakes, and the like). Sometimes the sequence is different, says Paul, but these seem to be the regular components of his battles.

In 7.44.1 Thucydides openly declares that no participant knows what is going on in a battle except what is happening near himself. Generals are included since they regularly fought in the ranks. In a brilliant paper published nearly three decades ago now and originally delivered in 1920, N. Whatley questioned whether anyone has any useful memory at all—even about what he himself did—after an engagement.[190] Nonetheless, even giving Thucydides the benefit of the doubt, I confess to feelings of alarm that he makes the above-quoted statement as part of a

189. Paul, "Two Battles in Thucydides."

190. Whatley, "On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon."

battle narrative without explaining precisely how he managed to get the information he records out of the ignorance he imputes to his sources. Paul quotes a thought-provoking comment from an anonymous referee that it would have been possible to tell something about the final stages of a battle from the litter of discarded equipment and corpses on the field when the slaughter was finished (311 n11).

Paul Fussell, speaking of the First World War, shows how, after a number of stupid rituals that people of the time dignified with the name of "battle," it was possible for an observer to "read" the history of the grim struggle for no man's land between the trench lines, right back to the beginning of the war, from the disposition of the equipment that remained on the field, rotting more slowly than the corpses that wore it, and left because the merciless fire of the enemy never let friends collect and dispose of the casualties.[191] Paul is correct to observe that the ancients did not see the clutter of a battlefield as historical evidence. From the early Greek historians, it appears that the only description of the aftermath of a battle occurs in Xenophon's *Agesilaus* (2.14–17), where it is used as a springboard for some romanticizing over soldierly deaths that will be familiar to readers of Fussell. Xenophon's description is most instructive, for it encapsulates the ancients' behaviour after a battle. The following day the two sides treat for an agreement to collect and take away their dead. The battle and its outcome are memorialized by a trophy erected by the victor. So social conventions, the need to attend to lost friends and relatives, prevail over any possible interest in the dead as historical evidence. The society sees only the need to memorialize with a trophy the significance of the event: who won; and the historian relies on memory, after the fact, for his account, not taking advantage of direct evidence to produce his own version, even when an opportunity comes his way.

Nevertheless, I do not share Finley's extensive lack of faith in the reliability of ancient historical writing. It is easy enough to show that early historical procedures were different from today's. I believe that I have given good reason for believing that the old historians rarely approached modern standards of verification for their claims about the past. And I am not unaware that history written to conform to the expectations of a vague social consensus is not, of itself, likely to inspire confidence in the mind of any serious scholar. However, the fact that generalist historians did not control their narratives directly by constant

191. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, 50.

reference to archival records, diaries, and public monuments does not entitle us to conclude that all such control was effectively absent from their writing. Thucydides did not openly use Hellanicus' documents, but he knew his work. Theopompus may not have paid too much attention to Athenian inscriptions until he came to write book 25, but his understanding of Athenian history was influenced by those inscriptions somehow, and I suspect that it must have been through Atthidography. Some of the greater ancient historians such as Polybius and Theopompus claimed to have travelled extensively. If they did, Dionysius says that there were local histories for them to discover that contained some of the contents of temple archives. The general historians did not copy the methods of the local writers and did not cite their evidence directly, but it would be difficult to believe that the generalists travelled and then systematically ignored the historical claims of the places they visited. Perhaps they followed the example of Herodotus, who claims, however erroneously, to have gained access to Egyptian temple archives (through oral representatives, of course). Just because ancient history was not verified in our way, I do not think that we are justified in concluding that it was not documented in any way.

Gomme's implied question, What was the Greeks' attitude to history? is too vague to yield a useful answer. It could refer to their attitude to the past, to tradition whether familial, local, or universally Greek, to the way that tradition should be commemorated whether in monuments, by oral recitation, or by written narrative, and even to self- or state-appointed commemorators of the tradition. If it is taken to mean history as written narrative, are we to think of style or substantive content when we attempt an answer? And what do we mean by "the Greeks"—Herodotus, Thucydides, and a few other writers or the society as a whole? Or is this the wrong approach altogether? History as an abstract or generic concept either does not exist in any sense useful for the question at hand or else exists in too diffuse a form to yield a simple answer.

I should like to put the question in a different way. Throughout this work I have tried to emphasize the role of the community in generating and controlling its historical memory. On this view, a Greek attitude to history was located in the various communities of Greece and was not necessarily the same as that enunciated by the generalist historians whose works we have. When one looks at local histories, one may be closer to this attitude in some ways, but detailed evidence for their true nature is in short supply. I would propose the following method to identify in general outline the view of the non-historian. If one looks at the

persistent topics and themes of early historiography, one may be able to see in them a response by the individual historian to a perceived requirement of the anticipated audience. To the dictum introduced in the first essay (p.21 above), "history must be of something," now add "and *for* the consumption of an anticipated audience." Most, if not all, ancient historians began their historical projects with a level of compliance with the sort of public expectation that I shall sketch out below, however insincere it may have been. Some, most notably Theopompus and Thucydides, found themselves pursuing unpopular lines of enquiry, however. To the extent that they did, their nonconformity is instructive. Their rebellion, if that is the correct term, did not take them as far as rejection of the great subjects of history, war, conquest, and empire, but rather to an adaptation, if not an undermining, of the subject from within. Thucydides may have expected the Athenians to win the Peloponnesian War, but when they began to lose it, he seems to have seized the opportunity to turn his history into a kind of therapeutic rehearsing of their mistakes. Theopompus' magnum opus presented itself as a celebration of Philip's career, but he destroyed the effect by excoriating the moral bankruptcy of his "hero."[192]

Briefly stated, ancient historians were concerned to narrate achievement—or, more specifically, achievements—in a social, political, or military context.[193] On a deeper level these social, political, and military organizations themselves were achievements. So the question comes down to the Greek attitude to social, political, and military order. To judge from their narrative procedures, order was a heroic accomplishment that deserved extended attention. Disorder was tragic, the product of punitive or capricious natural (or divine) forces such as Fortune or Nemesis, or sometimes of some form of human corruption, especially what they called *hybris*. Therefore there are often moral implications to their historiography. Disintegration of an ordered system into disorder was often noted but not regularly narrated. It follows that their narrative posture assumed order to be unnatural, an accomplishment involving at times the suppression of the "baser" human instincts and at others a struggle against powerful cosmic forces. Their attitude to order cannot

192. Perhaps the most direct and compendious statement is Connor, "History without Heroes."

193. On this subject in general, see Romilly, *The Rise and Fall of Greek States according to Greek Authors*.

be decoded from their views about reason (see previous essay, p.34). While reason must be orderly to be reasonable, the Greeks did not associate order and reason as closely as Europeans have since the Enlightenment. For the ancients, order was supported not so much by reason as by raw brutality. Brutality was heroism's tragic price.[194]

The most nearly perfect model is Herodotus. He narrates the struggle of the Spartans to throw off *kakonomia* (a state of lawlessness or the absence of good customs) for *eunomia* (obedience to law or the presence of good customs) in close connection with their rise to ascendancy in the Peloponnese (1.65–68). Later he stages a debate between Xerxes and an exiled Spartan king, Demaratus, not long before the battles of Thermopylae. Demaratus predicts that the Spartans will stand their ground and die, if necessary, in obedience to their "despotic" laws (*nomoi*). This they do with sensational effect (7.101–95, 208–28). So influential were the relevant passages in Herodotus that Thucydides could not resist invoking them (not without sarcasm) when he described the Spartan surrender to Athenian forces at Sphacteria in 425 (4.36–40). Similarly, Herodotus narrates the Athenians' rise to greatness and attributes their success to the *isagoriē* (equality of speech) that they achieved thanks to their Clisthenic constitution (5.78). Again, the Persian empire's emergence under Cyrus and organization under Darius (3.89–97, also 118–60, with extended treatment of Samian involvement) is fully described (see pp.156–57 above).

By contrast, Greek reversals are either heroized by Herodotus (as at Thermopylae) or ignored (as for the Athenian and allied disasters in support of Inarus in Egypt). In 480 the Spartans had been sent to hold the pass at Thermopylae. They were unable to do so, however, and the position was overrun by the Persians after fierce fighting. Herodotus seems determined to clear Sparta of any blame. The Spartans (with significant support from other Greek states) first gave the Medes and then Xerxes' palace guard, the Immortals, a bad mauling on the first day of fighting. On the second, the Greeks again inflicted damage disproportiate to their numbers, and the Persian officers had to flog their soldiers forward with whips on the third. Betrayed and surrounded, Leonidas, the remnant of Spartans, and a few others were all killed after fighting

194. In some sense, all ancient ordered systems were supported by the brutality of slavery. Cf. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 118–50. See in general V. Hunter, *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides*, 264–85.

even with their teeth. Their "victory" is then memorialized with epitaphs and poems, and Herodotus even announces that he has enquired after all the names of the three hundred fallen Spartans (7.210–28).

On the other hand, the allied defeat in Egypt (c.455/4), admittedly not central to Herodotus' subject (but since when did he avoid digressions?), is studiously ignored. Thucydides, briefly describing the engagements (1.109.4), says that the Persians drove the Greeks from Memphis and trapped them on the island of Prosopitis, which they eventually took. Herodotus cannot avoid mentioning Memphis. It was one of Egypt's major cities. The way that he introduces and describes the less important Prosopitis is fascinating (2.41.1–5; Rawlinson's translation):

> The male kine, therefore, if clean, and the male calves, are used for sacrifice by the Egyptians universally; but the female they are not allowed to sacrifice, since they are sacred to Isis. The statue of this goddess has the form of a woman but with horns like a cow, resembling thus the Greek representations of Io; and the Egyptians, one and all, venerate cows much more highly than any other animal. This is the reason why no native of Egypt, whether man or woman, will give a Greek a kiss, or use the knife of a Greek, or his spit, or his cauldron, or taste the flesh of an ox, known to be pure, if it has been cut with a Greek knife. When kine die, the following is the manner of their sepulture: The females are thrown into the river; the males are buried in the suburbs of the towns, with one or both of their horns appearing above the surface of the ground to mark the place. When the bodies are decayed, a boat comes, at an appointed time, from the island called Prosopitis, which is a portion of the Delta, sixty miles in the circumference,—and calls at the several cities in turn to collect the bones of the oxen. Prosopitis is a district containing several cities: the name of that from which the boars come is Atarbechis. Aphrodite has a temple there of much sanctity.

Written rather like any other description of Egyptian sacred customs on the surface, the passage seems to include clues on which an eager imagination might feed. The size of the island and some of its features are briefly described, and a remark or two about Egyptian taboos regarding their relationships with Greeks (not kissing, nor using their knives, nor sharing cooking utensils and food) are provided. The proximity of a temple to Aphrodite might be enough for a Greek son or daughter to imagine how a lost father could have lived out the last few months of his life in a strange land and in the company of alien comrades.

From book 1 through 4 Herodotus records the inexorable march of Persia into the West. The nomadic Scythians evade capture in book 4, but the Persians suppress the Ionian revolt in book 5, and then the mainland Greeks begin to win some victories. Marathon in 490 is followed by Xerxes' grand invasion a decade later. Despite Persian success at Thermopylae, the naval stalemates at Artemisium foreshadow the first great Greek victory in the narrow waters between Salamis and Attica. In 479 Mardonius is defeated at Plataea with the cream of the invasionary force, and we are now about two-thirds through book 9. How is Herodotus going to finish his monumental work? His great model, the *Iliad* of Homer, ended with the death and burial of the hero of the defeated side, Hector of Troy. Three women sing threnodies over his corpse: Hecuba, his mother, Andromarchē, his wife, and Helen, the "cause of the trouble," to whom Hector had always been polite. Each woman finds her own way of praising him. Like Homer, Herodotus concludes with a series of "statements" about Persian "heroism," but they are not so complimentary.

In the first, after the victory at Plataea, the Spartan commander Pausanias arranges for a Persian dinner to be prepared and spread out by the captured Persian camp attendants. Then he orders a Spartan meal and places it nearby. The Greeks are impressed by the vast difference and laugh at the folly of the wealthy Persians who came to deprive them of their poverty (9.82). A little later, Herodotus reports on King Xerxes' activities while Mardonius remains in Greece. No longer preoccupied with battle, the King turns to womanizing, lusting for the wife of his brother, Masistes. Repulsed, he conceives a passion for Artaynta, his brother's newly married daughter, who proves receptive. When his own wife, Amestris, discovers the liaison, she blames Masistes' wife and has her mutilated. Enraged, Masistes leaves for Bactria, where he plans to raise a rebellion. He is hunted down and killed, however, at Xerxes' orders before he can get there (9.107–113). The third statement follows almost immediately. Near Sestos on the Hellespont is a shrine to Protesilaus, the hero who was first of the Achaeans to die when they came to Troy. Over the years it has apparently attracted rich offerings, and Artayctes, the local Persian governor, tricks Xerxes into giving it to him. He plunders the treasury and defiles the shrine in every way he can. When the Greeks come to liberate Sestos, they capture and punish Artayctes with death (9.116–20).

These three anecdotes seem to be arranged climactically, each predictably more shocking to a Greek audience than the previous one.

Herodotus includes them for a variety of reasons, some a bit devious and self-serving, but their primary effect is to demonstrate the decline of Persia without narrating it directly. The anecdotes are held together by a narrative aimed at rounding off the war, particularly with a view to bringing the focus of attention back to the Asiatic side of the Aegean (where it all began) and even more particularly, it seems, to reintroduce Samos, the historian's home for a time in his early life, and his native Halicarnassus. The Greek army on the mainland punishes Thebes for cooperating with Persia, but even before the battle of Plataea is fought, Samian ambassadors come to the Greek fleet at Delos to beg it to cross over to Asia and raise Ionia in revolt. The naval commanders are persuaded, and the result is a further Greek victory at Mycale, near Miletus (9.90–106). A meeting is held on Samos in which the Ionian and island-dwelling rebels "joined the alliance [of the Hellenes] and gave pledges and oaths to abide therein and not leave" (9.106.4). This is a brief allusion to the founding of what became the Delian Confederacy and, ultimately, the Athenian empire. The Greeks then leave for the Hellespont, and Herodotus switches his attention to the defeated Persians fleeing from Mycale.

The beaten general is Artayntes, who is berated for incompetence by another important Persian. After repeated insults, Artayntes attacks the man with his scimitar, but Xenagoras of Halicarnassus intervenes to stop the murder. The man whose life was saved was none other than Xerxes' brother, Masistes. So, while Masistes was involved with the army in Ionia, Xerxes was back in Sardis trying to seduce his wife. Xerxes rewards Xenagoras for saving Masistes' life, but the sordid story leading to his murder by Xerxes himself now follows. After the victory at Plataea, therefore, Herodotus clearly pursues two complementary themes so tightly joined as to make a single message. The Greeks proceed from success to success, consequently constructing their own independent regime amidst the ruins of a glittering Persian decadence (not to say vicious corruption).

The Xerxes who cannot control himself and is the pawn of both his wife and his mistress (9.109.2–3, 110–11.1) and the easy dupe of a deceiving governor (9.116.2–4) is a far cry from the Persians introduced in book 1. They taught their sons to ride, shoot the bow, and speak the truth (1.136). Such was their faith in the nuclear family that a child who apparently killed a mother or father would in fact prove to be a foundling or the product of adultery, or so they believed (1.138). Ominously, however, they are also reported to be ready to adopt luxurious attire and

self-indulgent customs from the peoples with whom they come into contact (1.135). So Herodotus describes at least two Persias: a simple one that conquered vast territories under Cyrus and a corrupt one that failed to defeat the Greeks scarcely three generations later. The dichotomy is emphasized in his concluding story.

From the death of Artayctes, the deceiver of Xerxes and plunderer of Protesilaus' treasury, the man who had brought women into the hero's shrine to have sex with them and had cultivated his sacred land (9.116.3), Herodotus moves back to the time of Cyrus. It appears that Artayctes' grandfather once advised the Persians to leave their relatively rugged country and expropriate better land from their neighbours, "now that we are rulers of many men and all Asia." When Cyrus heard the suggestion, he replied that they might do so, but should prepare to become ruled and cease from being rulers. "For from soft countries soft men are born. For marvellous crops and men stalwart in battle cannot grow from the same soil. So the Persians went home conceding that Cyrus' opinion was better. And they chose to inhabit a harsh land rather than sow the plains and be slaves to other people" (9.122). Thus ends Herodotus' history. Presumably, the reader is expected to understand that moral conditions in Persia had declined between Cyrus' and Xerxes' times. Perhaps the change took place at the time of Darius' reforms, but Herodotus does not say.

More than one scholar has seen in Herodotus' concluding paragraph a warning for the Athenians as rulers of their relatively new empire.[195] Seeing that the foundation of that empire has just been mentioned (9.106.4), the suggestion makes good sense. After the account of the battle at Plataea, he seems to select stories to tell about Persia that illustrate the corrupting influence of imperial power. So three functions of ancient historical writing emerge from the discussion above. The first is entertainment. It must have been easy for Herodotus. Stories of Greek victories over an alien invader, properly told, should "sell" to a Greek audience. The second is the provision of information. Herodotus claims to have travelled a great deal. The stories he could tell about distant places were probably well received, but there were limitations. He could not go on at length about Babylonian harvests, and the description of Egypt was restricted by sensitivities about recent Greek disasters in that

195. Brief discussion and bibliography in V. Hunter, *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides*, 216 and n69. On the execution of Artayntes as an omen of Athenian imperialism, see D. T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ*, 154–57.

country. The last function, vaguely shamanlike, is the historian's personal contribution: to return as a quasi-outsider, having visited distant places with a superior understanding of how things are, and offer instruction, warnings, and advice. In this last role the historian is at odds with his own discipline, which aims primarily at recording success. One can learn more from mistakes, but huge errors are not fit subjects for history. Herodotus' solution to that problem at the end of book 9 was to provide examples that would invite the reader to understand the fact of Persian decline and so decode the lesson of excessive self-indulgence from the examples. The advantage to this approach is that it avoids the stuffiness of preaching, but the risk is oracular: the message is lost on any who cannot solve the riddle by grasping the implication of Persian decline.

Thucydides' task was daunting, perhaps impossible. It was to set on record a near-contemporary account of a major war from the point of view of the losing side. His probable reception in Athens after 402 has been discused above (pp.158–66). Ephorus seems to have adopted a strategy of describing Greek conflicts from the perspective of the winning side. This approach made it possible for him to narrate nothing but successes interspersed with comments about the better Greek moral and cultural values.[196] His books were all furnished with prefaces in which he probably expatiated on narrative method or the moral significance of his subject.[197] In this way he celebrated and educated. The extent, or manner, of information he collected and supplied, if any, is not known for certain. Titles of other works by him, however—*On Discoveries*,[198] for example—may suggest that he did collect arcane items, perhaps to include for purposes of diversion in his *Universal History*.

Theopompus claimed to have travelled extensively (F25). By way of information, he apparently developed an elaborate description of the geography north of Macedonia, but it proved to be so wildly inaccurate that it is impossible to believe he could have visited the northern Adriatic.[199] To judge from the remains of his *Philippica*, his approach to the

196. Shrimpton, "The Epaminondas Tradition," 91–95.

197. See DS 16.76.5 = *F. Gr. Hist.* no. 70, T10, for an example of a preface that may be modelled on Ephorus. See DS 4.1 and compare T8; F9 = Harp. "*archaiōs*" gives a quotation from Ephorus' general introduction.

198. Polyb. 12.28.10 = T23 commends Ephorus' *History* for its digressions and personal judgments. FF2–5 give the pitiful remains of *On Discoveries*.

199. Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian*, 94–101.

celebration of Greek achievement was perverse. The *Philippica* was ostensibly an account of Philip's success in forging a powerful Macedonian state and then (presumably) using his brilliantly trained army to conquer Greece. But the fragments suggest that this was a splenetic historian who never missed an opportunity to attack Philip savagely for his extreme self-indulgence. He seems to have attributed Philip's success to luck and the failure of the Greek states to laziness and corruption.[200]

Xenophon faced a task similar to that of Thucydides. He covered the period (411–362) in which Sparta reached a pinnacle of power (404–394) and then declined to the status of an isolated city-state, bereft of the old Peloponnesian League. His strategy in dealing with the deterioration of Spartan power seems modelled on Herodotus' avoidance of the Greek defeat in Egypt and the decline of Persia. As things get worse for Sparta, Xenophon begins to turn his back on "history" in ways already noticed above (pp.137–38), digressing on the leadership skills of Teleutias or the loyalty of tiny Phlious, or commenting on divine retribution. When a significant event such as the battle of Mantinea (362) is described, the historian actually conceals the straits to which Sparta was reduced. Speaking of the stalemate that resulted from the battle, he remarks: "The outcome of these events was the opposite of what everyone expected. Nearly all of Greece had gathered together and drawn up in opposing camps. There was not a person who did not suppose that, if there was a battle, the victors would be rulers and the defeated would be subjected to them" (*HG* 7.5.26). But it is difficult to imagine whom Sparta would actually rule after a victory at Mantinea in 362. The reconquest of the central Peloponnese, recapture of Messenia, and restoration of the old Peloponnesian League, Sparta's former power base, would scarcely have been natural consequences of such a victory. So Xenophon moves from the achievement of Sparta to historical anecdotes as a commentary on a narrative of decline that must be known and supplied by the reader. In his role as collector and provider of information, he seems to have confined himself to other works such as his *Memoirs of Socrates* and *Anabasis*.

So the decline of ordered systems had to be avoided by ancient historians or narrated with studious care. Xenophon's description of the failure of the Thirty Tyrants turns out to be a showpiece for the courage

200. Ibid., 127–56.

of Theramenes and the moderation of both Theramenes and the successful restorers of the democracy. Further, I have given reason to doubt that Thucydides' unfinished account of the utter defeat of Athens under democratic government was intended for circulation in the restored democracy of 402. People were not really free to say what they pleased in ancient Athens. In 399 Anytus, a hero of the restoration, sponsored an indictment of Socrates for "corrupting the youth of Athens" and "not believing in the gods of the state." Socrates was convicted and drank the hemlock. In the next few years, war was in the air once more. In 396 Athens, now allied with Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, declared war on Sparta once again. It must have been about this time that Xenophon was exiled for alleged pro-Spartan sympathies. If Thucydides was still alive, how many people in Athens would have wanted to hear him telling them that democracy was rule by an unstable mob, demonstrably ill-suited to developing a successful war policy?

So what was the Greek attitude to history? There is a comprehensive statement on the subject from antiquity. It has the advantage of being written by an ancient Greek who was familiar with the historical writing of the fifth and fourth centuries far beyond what is possible today, for he knew histories lost to us now as well as those that survive. It is not widely quoted today, however, because it comes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who was critical of Thucydides. I suppose that many modern scholars believe that anyone who would criticize Thucydides must be a fool. And yet I have shown that Dionysius was far from being alone in having reservations about Thucydidean historiography. Here, then, in the (translated) words of one informed individual is a statement of the ancient Greek attitude to history (*Ad Pomp.* 3). It will be seen that Dionysius articulates most faithfully what I would call the expectations of audiences of his time, to which historians conformed in various ways, as I have argued above.

> The first and just about the most essential task of all for all writers of history is to choose a fine and pleasurable subject for their readers. I think that Herodotus made a better selection than Thucydides. He has produced a general history of both Greek and barbarian affairs, "in order that," as he himself put it, "the accomplishments of humans should not be obliterated by time, nor the deeds ...," and so on [see Herodotus' proem] ... But Thucydides has written a single war and this neither a noble nor fortunate one. It should not have happened, but failing that, it deserves to be consigned to silence and oblivion and ignored by subsequent generations.

Dionysius goes on to argue that Thucydides himself revealed the inferiority of his subject by announcing in his introduction that his war was full of unprecedented disasters. Dionysius continues:

A second task for the historical enterprise is to know where to start and how far one should go. In this too, Herodotus was far more sensible than Thucydides, for he begins with the first aggression that the barbarians perpetrated against the Greeks, goes as far as their punishment and retribution, and stops. On the other hand, Thucydides made as his beginning the moment from which the Greek nation's troubles began. He, a Greek—indeed, an Athenian—should not have done so ... His concluding narrative is freighted with a greater error. Although he declares that he was present for the entire war [5.26.6] and promises to describe the whole thing, he ends with the battle of Cynossema [411 BC] that occurred between the Athenians and Peloponnesians ... It would have been better to finish off the whole war and make a very remarkable conclusion of his history and one most pleasing to his audience, namely, the return of the exiles from Phyle [the restoration of the democracy in 403/2], as a result of which the city regained its freedom.

Dionysius' third task involves the selection and inclusion of appropriate digressions to give the reader variety. Here too Herodotus outshines Thucydides, as he does in yet another area, that of narrative flow. Thucydides' year-by-year account of the war takes a single subject and breaks it into segments, confusing the reader. Herodotus, on the other hand, "has taken many diverse subjects and put them together into a single, harmonious construction." Dionysius concludes:

I shall mention one other aspect of content that we seek in all histories no less than the aforementioned points. This is the attitude of the writer that he displays towards his material. The attitude of Herodotus is moderate in everything. He rejoices in the good and feels distress over the bad. Thucydides is a bit too blunt and harsh, mindful of his grudge against his country for exiling him. He describes [his city's?] mistakes at length—in great detail—but when things go according to plan, he does not mention them at all, or he does so as if under constraint.[201]

201. And still the story is unfinished. Greek history, like much early literature, sought to define "Greekness" as opposed to its alien other. But that subject is treated by Cartledge, *The Greeks.*

Ancient history was produced through a sustained interaction between the writer and his (we know of no women historians from the time) chosen community. In general, the community was the dominant partner. These two partners had ideas about the present that, put together, provided a platform of observation for the historian viewing the past. Because the main structural components of this platform were supplied by the community, there was little room for individualism, true independence of enquiry, on the part of the historian.[202] Therefore the authority to verify the historian's report came primarily from the community. Communities disputed over the correct version of things, often through their historical spokesmen, but never seem to have doubted that there had to be one. As a result, it was not open to ancient historians to agree to disagree and fall back to a relativist or perspectivist position. Since communities had certain expectations of their writers, the content of the literary product was generally tailored by the historian to those expectations. A failure to respond by showing too much independence was usually met by some form of ostracism from the community.[203]

202. Evidence for restrictions to intellectual freedom has sometimes been found in a number of alleged trials for impiety reported in ancient sources. Dover, "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society," discredits most of these prosecutions, but I would consider it hasty to conclude with Dover that intellectual freedom was as unthreatened as he suggests. From a different direction, French, "Herodotus: Revisionist Historian," argues that Herodotus rejected a popularly held view when he wrote 7.139 (about Athens being the saviour of Greece in 480). French's mistake comes on 33, where she does not consider the possibility that the Greek world was divided on this question, as it must have been. Herodotus simply decided that the "evidence" as he knew it from both sides favoured the line of Athenian propaganda and dared to say so. This position makes him courageous, but not a revisionist. For a more general discussion of the relationship of historiography to a perceived audience, see Thompson, "Reception Theory and the Interpretation of Historical Meaning."

203. Dionysius has not been used very much to throw light on ancient historiography, largely because of a theory that assumed such a significant gulf between classical and Hellenistic historiography that Dionysius, living in the early Roman period, would have to have been completely out of sympathy with the classical period—or, at least, would scarcely have been able to understand it on its own terms. Brunt, "Cicero and Historiography," has disposed of this theory to my satisfaction. In addition, Pritchett has left on record a fine demonstration of Dionysius' usefulness for understanding Thucydides: Pritchett, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus.*

CONCLUSIONS

The past is gone, less visible than my metaphoric mountain. The sensation that there is a vast unknown that somehow influences our world is, nonetheless, ever present. Enquiry into this unknown, geological, cosmological, historical, or whatever it might be, has been under way now for millennia, ever since Herodotus and the pre-Socratics, some would say. The physical nature of the universe and the Athenian empire are alike in that they are our own mental constructs deduced from clues, traces, secondary information. To Einstein the universe was like a watch that could be studied but never opened. What the scientist seeks is the most complete explanation of everything that the watch is seen, heard, and felt to do. But since it cannot be opened, the absolute truth of any explanation is not ascertainable. So the scientist requires the simplest and most elegant hypothesis that accounts for the maximum number of observed phenomena.[204]

"Did not the great classical scholar, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, tell us (alluding to Homer's account of Achilles, whose ghost was summoned from the nether regions by Odysseus) that the dead cannot speak until they have drunk blood?" asks Isaiah Berlin. He goes on, "But since it is our blood that we offer them it is with our own voices that they talk to us, and in our words, not theirs."[205] Odysseus does not choose to go to the underworld, and his purpose is not to enquire about the past but the present and, especially, the future. However, once he is there, discovery of the past becomes an added, time-consuming pleasure. Nor does he open his own veins to supply the blood for the otherwise voiceless dead. Odysseus brings animals to slaughter for this purpose, gifts from his lover, Circe the witch. They are a black ram and a black ewe. So it takes a blend of male and female fluid to restore to the empty shades, men or women, the capacity to communicate. And what do we offer to our ghosts to make them speak to us?

I fear that we bring a rather cold blend of Cartesian dualism and Baconian empiricism, the intellectual bases of Newton's physics. If that is true, the ghosts will have little choice but to speak to us as Newtonian mechanists. Do we hear Herodotus speaking of historical forces like billiard balls? What does it mean to say that Croesus began the conflict by

204. Zukav, *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*, 11.
205. Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, 63–64.

enslaving Greeks? And is there not a contradiction when he says that the ships sent by Athens to support the Ionian revolt, long after Croesus was dead, were the beginning of evils for Greek and barbarian alike?[206] A Newtonian chain of causes, if it is allowed a beginning at all, can have but one. And is Thucydides not a little vague when he makes Athens' involvement in the Corcyrean alliance a kind of superficial cause of the war but Spartan fear of growing Athenian power the "truest" cause? And if the power causes the fear, is not the power the cause of the war and not the fear?[207] In a Newtonian system, causes are not true or false. They are either present or absent. Gravity is not the "truest cause" for (or even the truest explanation of) the earth's rotation around the sun. For Newton the earth is engaged in a tug-of-war with the sun in which gravity exactly counteracts the centrifugal force of the earth's velocity. Perhaps we should have given them blood.

The sacrifice of animals is rarer today in North America than in the ancient world. We kill them in slaughterhouses and wash their blood down drain holes into the sea. We need something that will revive the consciousness of our old historians and, if possible, bring their temperature to that of living human bodies. After all, we do not know just where they have been for the last two and a half millennia. According to Danah Zohar, such a substance exists.[208] It seems to imitate, if it does not offer a physical explanation of, human consciousness, and it only exists at body temperatures. There is no use telling Herodotus or Thucydides what it is called (Fröhlich-style Bose-Einstein condensate), and there is a price to pay for giving it to them. We shall lose our old friends, the Newtonian Herodotus and Thucydides the mechanist, (whom, it seems, we could not understand very well anyway), and they will be replaced by historians who have what Zohar calls quantum selves.

Of course, I make no claim to expertise in quantum physics. My point is that, as far as I know, my classical and ancient historical colleagues are not experts in Newtonian physics either, but this fact stops no one from interpreting ancient writers in terms of the constructs of Newton's mechanistic universe. Just as the old ideas of seventeenth-century materialism, enshrined in physics, have permeated our thoughts imperceptibly, so the notions of quantum mechanics are already beginning to

206. 5.97.3. On Herodotus' search for causes, see also Nagy, *Pindar's Homer*, 254–61; Gould, *Herodotus*, 63–85; Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus*.

207. Cf. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 357–74.

208. Zohar, *The Quantum Self*, 82–87.

reshape the way we see the world. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not have to be fully understood to leave its mark on contemporary thought. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, scientific uncertainty as a perpetual state would have sounded like a contradiction in terms. In the future, the discoveries of the new physics, which, as Zohar says, make a mockery of our cherished concepts of time, matter, and space,[209] will slowly change the way we see everything as they come to be more generally reported. I introduce them to suggest how the ancient historians might look to us once we have changed our perceptions of the physical world—to cut a porthole in the wall of our mechanistic elevator.

When the great Arnaldo Momigliano considered Herodotus' causes of his war, he found in them a rich variety: "Croesus' interference with the Ionians, Democedes' advice to Atossa that she should persuade her husband Darius to conquer the Greeks, the Ionian rebellion with all its complications, the part played by the democratic assembly of Athens in provoking Darius, and finally Xerxes' lust for glory and empire." For Momigliano, Herodotus presents his story with its array of "causes" leisurely, like "a historian who has never read a book on historical method." Herodotus "never pretended to have exhausted his subject or to tell a fact only if it was relevant to his subject," and his "causes" are "quite unsystematic." Otherwise, Momigliano found in this lack of system a "sympathetic understanding for the complexities of human life."[210] Humans love systems; macrocosmic nature permits their occurrence randomly and grudgingly. If Herodotus harnessed his humanity in service to the entropy of real events, he may have been less a historian, but more of a scientist—or at least, more in tune with nature.

However that may be, Evans has recently pointed to an overarching principle not included in Momigliano's list that connects perhaps all of its items into what Herbert Spencer might have called a nexus (see note 10 above). Evans speaks of the *nomos* of "imperialism."[211] *Nomos* is often translated "custom" or "convention"; it also means "law." I pointed out above that many Greeks of Thucydides' time saw *nomos* as at odds with nature (*physis*), but Evans shows that Herodotus was not one of them. He belonged to an earlier generation that saw people's conventions as expressions of their nature.

209. Ibid., 8–21.
210. Momigliano, *Studies in Historiography*, 114–15.
211. Evans, *Herodotus*, 9–40.

According to Thucydides, in 415 the Athenians told the people of Melos, which they were about to destroy as an independent state, that it is in the nature of imperial power for the stronger to rule the weaker (5.84–114). Herodotus was putting his history into its final form not long before this moment.[212] So he had no need to explain to his contemporaries what empires were capable of doing. It was the *physis* (or *nomos*—it comes to the same thing) of empires to expand. As Herodotus relates, in the 550s Croesus found himself on the throne of a fabulously wealthy Lydian empire with a series of independent and weaker Greek communities on his western coasts. Naturally, he absorbed most of them. Later they were possessed by an expanding Persia, against which they revolted in 500 BC. Herodotus says in book 5 that the Athenian *demos* was gulled into sending a force in twenty ships to side with these Ionian rebels. At Melos in 415 Athens was still a *demos*, this time possessing a navy of far more than twenty warships, which now menaced the Aegean. Herodotus (5.97.3) describes his twenty ships sent to Ionia as "the beginning of troubles for Greek and barbarian alike," but it was not just a question of attracting the hostile attention of Persia while supporting the rebels. This was the first moment in which the Athenian *demos* caught the intoxicating scent of sea power, the fascination with the *nomos* of imperialism, the power to destroy the weaker.[213]

It may not be safe to follow this line of reasoning too far, for it would seem to suggest that Herodotus believed that there could be laws of history. In the first essay of this book (p.37), I argued that the underlying metaphor of causation for Herodotus was agency, mostly human, often divine. In a recent article, van der Veen has shown that this apparent "law" of imperialism is perhaps better understood as a typical behaviour of powerful men. Taking the examples of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, Croesus of Lydia, and the Great King Xerxes, van der Veen analyses Herodotus' language in describing the mental states in which these rulers make crucial decisions. What emerges is a consistent picture, not of an inexorable law, but of individual potentates seduced by their delight in their existing power into thinking that they will be immune from

212. Raaflaub, "Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History."
213. Fornara, *Herodotus*, 75–77.

disaster.[214] If there is a law, it is not of empires so much as of a persistent weakness in human nature. If van der Veen is right, he is pointing out how Herodotus characterizes the disintegration of the heroism of state- and empire-building into *hybris* and ensuing collapse.

In a mechanistic world, causes must come before effects. To the narrative historian, chronological is logical. For subatomic particles, however, though they sometimes behave as if they have a modicum of consciousness, there is no awareness of time. Capra, the physicist, shows that there is no reason to assume that interactions between particles are taking place in time as we know it. It makes little difference whether they are thought of as moving backward or forward in time.[215] On the other hand, Hawking argues that time marches forward in the macrocosm where historical events take place because the "no boundary condition" permits the universe to expand and causes the increase of entropy.[216] However, Zohar points out that one of the paradoxical effects of quantum mechanics is that it can reverse or suspend the effect of the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy, in specific contexts and create order.[217] That it can do so does not mean that quantum mechanics can reverse time in the macrocosm, but it appears to mean that it can briefly reverse the local effect of time. I point this fact out simply to prepare for my next proposal, which involves a more flexible view of the relationship between time and causality than the one I see my fellow ancient historians using when they interpret Herodotus and Thucydides.

214. Veen, "The Lord of the Ring." .

215. Capra, *The Tao of Physics*, 203–205. Capra shows that if we insist on notions of causality in forward-moving time, then "effects" precede their "causes" as often as not. "Events" need have no specific location in space-time. The only effect that time has on an interaction of particles is that, backwards in time, the particle is regarded as an antiparticle. An electron moving forward in time is a positron moving backwards.

216. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, 152.

217. Zohar, *The Quantum Self*, 67. Zohar's suggestion is exciting for many reasons, not least because it attempts a bold leap across the gap between the theories of the new physics and human experience that was noted by Einstein (note 25, previous essay). In general, I have no choice but to follow the leading lights in physics when they speak of the spread of entropy in an expanding universe. But if one turns to the relatively new science of chaos, some modification of the meaning of disorder may be required. Entropy is not chaos, and the chaos observable in the phenomenal world appears to be permeated by form, the product of strange attractors. For example, the erratic flow of the atmosphere accepts random pressure systems, all different, all unstable, but similar in form one to another, in much the same way as the flow of history accepts empires and other unstable human systems. For a survey of chaos theory, the mysteries of fractals, and Mandelbrot sets see Gleick, *Chaos*.

In specific cases, it may be more logical to say that effects can precede causes than vice versa. The prior existence of the effect allows the cause to specify its existence.

What causes my life? A mechanistic explanation would suggest that I came into being as the result of a moment of sexual union between my parents. I accept this as a true, but incomplete account. Sex is a generic cause. It explains why *a* conception may take place, but, owing to a number of variables, there is no necessary connection between *my* life's beginning and that moment. Another similar, or very different, child could just as easily have been conceived around that time. After I came into the world, if I thought about it as a small child, I might have said that my life was fully explained by my consumption of food and drink and my enjoyment of shelter. At conception, my specific existence was caused by the genetic information in the two cells that united and began to multiply, and it continues to be influenced by specific acts of maintenance. When I was a child and had no notion of my sexual or genetic origins, the existence of my life was what gave the food and drink set before me the chance to fulfil its potential as the cause of my continued existence. If bad food had been provided, my life would have been a sickly one. As it was, my parents sacrificed much to ensure that everything would contribute to my good health. Generic causes explaining why *an* event takes place seem appropriately placed at or before the event's commencement. But specific causes, those that explain the particular qualities of the event, often require the prior existence of the event in order to realize their potential. This is an interactive process because, of course, once the food is consumed, it has a mechanistic effect on my body. In the traditional sense, it causes it to grow healthily or to languish in illness as the case might be.

I have chosen the example of a life precisely because the case could be argued in both ways. To me, the danger lies in assuming that the mechanistic model for *specific* causes is superior to the interactive one or vice versa. Now consider Thucydides' account of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Unlike Herodotus, who cites causes of his war (especially the twenty ships from Athens) that date from times long after the conflict formally commences with Croesus' interference with Asiatic Greeks, Thucydides only analyses prior causes and does not specifically identify events subsequent to the war's outbreak as its causes. And since he gives no information that corresponds to a "genetic code" for his war, then despite his claim to the contrary (1.23.6), his causes are non-

specific. If they are found acceptable, they can only explain why *a* war erupted, but will have little or nothing to say about why it had to be "so great a war as *this* one."

Athens' involvement with Corcyra, which angered Corinth so much, explains the outbreak of the war. But "the truest cause" (one to which the aggressor does not admit,[218] or the one least obvious in theory, or the one least often advanced)[219] is that the Athenians, becoming great, brought fear to the Spartans and compelled them to go to war (1.23.6). Later (1.88) he is more explicit. The Spartans, he claims, voted for war (in 432) because they were afraid that Athens would become more powerful (i.e., if they voted otherwise). "This assertion," says Kagan, "is then supported by a long excursus [the Pentecontaetia] whose purpose is to show just how Athenian power had grown and caused fear for the Spartans. Since the immediate causes [Corcyrean alliance, etc.] are dismissed as incidental, since the growth of Athenian power that goes back to the Persian War is offered as the 'truest cause,' and since no way of preventing the growth of that power or the fear it engendered is presented, we can only conclude that Thucydides meant us to think that the war was inevitable once the Athenian Empire was permitted to come into existence."[220] We can only surmise what Thucydides meant from what he knew, and that must be deduced from what he says. He makes remarks that show that he was familiar with Herodotus. His Pentecontaetia directly continues Herodotus' history.

But Herodotus (5.74–76; 6.108) shows that in 506[221] the Spartans were already interfering in the Athenians' internal affairs and seeking to embroil them with Thebes. That is, they were allegedly acting as if they were already afraid of Athenian power before it existed in any egregious form. The effect preceded the cause, and the only reason why anyone would find this improbable is if that person were tied to a mechanistic view of history. It is just possible that Thucydides meant us to think

218. This is what I think Thucydides means in book 6 (33.2) when he uses the same language to explain the Athenian expedition to Sicily.

219. Of the two last possibilities, the first strikes me as just possible from the Greek and the second is what Kagan identifies as the *communis opinio*: see *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 363. See further, Hornblower, in *A Commentary on Thucydides*, 1: 64–66, who gives an excellent discussion, with bibliography, of this long-debated passage.

220. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 366.

221. The date is mine; see Shrimpton, "When Did Plataea Join Athens?" *pace* Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 222.

that Spartan fear caused Athenian power. States of paranoia are quite capable of constructing and reifying the conditions that cause them, and there is no reason why Thucydides would have been incapable of recognizing this fact. From his remarks in 1.23.6, I should have thought that he was describing coexisting, interactive states in which each feeds off the other. The long debate over the meaning of 1.23.6 has aimed at reducing the passage, and Thucydides' general intent, to a single proposition (he is giving the *Spartan* motive, he is giving *his* cause of the war, which is Athenian power, and so on).[222] Because the debate seems irresolvable on these terms, I conclude that 1.23.6 permits either view, and if that is what he intended, then his cause is to be found in the interaction between the power and the fear. In the new physics, existence can be expressed in terms of a particle—wave function dualism. The Athenians contribute the particular aspect of the duality (the empire) and the Spartans the wave function (the agitation of fear). In order to eradicate the fear, the system must attack and destroy itself, which is what happens in the Peloponnesian War.

Whatever one thinks about "coexisting, interactive states," it is as well to recall the probability that agency is still likely to be Thucydides' principal concern. Therefore the question should come down to, Why did the perpetrators start the war? There may be times when Thucydides speaks of power as a force in history that limits people's choices. Pericles is made to argue this way (2.63) when in effect he tells the Athenians early in the war that by taking their empire they have grasped a tiger by its tail and cannot now choose to let it go. On the other hand, he has been speaking previously (2.62) of power as something that the Athenians exercise and have been exercising to date. Even more explicitly, Alcibiades (6.18) is made to tell the Athenians that their power exists when they are active and that quiescence will mean that their power will cease to exist. Power, therefore, is reified through the activity of powerful people. So, if Thucydides was consistent in his thinking, the growing power of Athens that compelled the Spartans to begin the war out of fear was not some dormant, abstract force, but a sequence of menacing actions by the Athenians. It might as well be admitted that, in

222. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 363–64. On the relationship between power and fear, see the words that Thucydides reports from (or attributes to) the Mytilenaeans in 3.11.2–12. The Mytilenaeans' attempt to increase their power is motivated by their fear of the Athenians, who in turn are in fear of them.

effect, this interpretation means that Thucydides' analysis of the causes of the war comes down to: "The Spartans started the war because the Athenians did."

My use of scientific parallels to illuminate historical thinking may be open to the objection that the cosmologist observes real things "out there" in ways that the historian cannot. Indeed, given the vast reaches of observable space, the light and radiation from objects in deep space are appreciably older than that from ones nearby. Arguably, therefore, (subject to certain reservations expressed in the previous essay) the cosmologist can move about in time by studying objects of varying distances with greater freedom and confidence than the historian can dream of. Past events are not "there" for observation in the same way as nearby stars and distant galaxies. So the claim of Hayden White—that there is no ontological difference between the referents of history and of fiction—wins out after all. I have shown that Aristotle would have agreed with White that the *pragmata* of the past are lost forever, and there is no reason to think that any ancient would have argued the point.

As I pointed out in the opening essay, history must be of something. But that which history is of seems to have no existence distinguishable from Tolkien's Tom Bombadil or The Shire. In fact, one can press this argument even further. There may be a truth that is inaccessible to narrative history as it has been practised until recent times. To be frank, empiricist history palpably destroys much that is important about the past. This, at least, is Pierre Vidal-Naquet's message in his recent book about revisionism and the Holocaust, *The Assassins of Memory*.[223] Fifty years is the critical time span. After that period, the monstrous crime of racism propagated by a totalitarian regime has no choice but to move insensibly from living memory, but not into "living history," for we have no such thing. With the passage of time, history resembles a post-mortem, the clinical dissection of a corpse. Eventually, even the corpse decomposes. There are no lessons of history, but there *are* lessons of memory, such as the great anti-fascist, anti-racist consensus widespread at the end of the Second World War. As Peter Heehs suggests, history needs to revive itself through a dialectic with memory.[224] Unlike history, memory can indeed

223. Vidal-Naquet, *Assassins of Memory*. See the excellent discussion by Hutton in his review essay of this book and Le Goff's *History and Memory*, 95–106. On the development of, and conflicts in, Hayden White's thought and on his response to the problem of the Holocaust, see Kansteiner, "Hayden White's Critique."

224. Heehs, "Myth, History, and Theory."

be of things, such as the Holocaust, that are ontologically distinguishable from Tom Bombadil. The ancients, for their part, gave up on the *pragma* (the event) but tried to preserve its *pathos* by preserving memory.

I began this essay with a mountain, from which I fear I may have descended much too far. The problem with history seems to be that it calls for attempts to observe something that either is not there or is shrouded in perpetual mist by people (ourselves) whose conscious identity we can not describe to our mutual satisfaction.[225] We may not be sure what *x* is, and we may be in doubt as to what creatures we are at location A, but the interaction along the axis *Ax* is valuable enough for some to attempt to record it in the hope that our colleagues and even those at B and C will derive something informative or useful from the event. We can return again and again with Wilamowitz and Isaiah Berlin to watch Odysseus communicate with his mother, Tiresias, and Achilles at the edge of the underworld. Those people are gone, if they ever existed in any form at all, but their conversations that we can still read in Homer are brilliant evocations of reality.

I have argued that history began in Greece from an impulse in the small, independent communities of archaic times. Their wish was to capture a sense of the past in an uncomplicated, heroic representation. First they chose Panhellenic stories and heroes: Heracles and Jason stood for colonization; the Trojan War for other, more recent conflicts. However, local histories could celebrate regional accomplishments as commemorated in domestic monuments and temples without regard for Panhellenic respectability. Panhellenic shrines such as Delphi and Olympia could serve in some sense as repositories for a more "universal" collective memory. The Persian War provided an opportunity for Panhellenic traditions to receive written representations similar to the local displays, but the problem was to mediate local bombast into a uniform story that could be accepted by all. At first, this task was generally avoided, but Athenian imperial propaganda eventually left the Greeks with no choice but to accept the account of a master arbiter, Herodotus. The historiography invented by him generally avoided documents because most of them were local. However, I believe that Greek

225. Jaynes, *The Origin of Consciousness*, attempted a synthesis of alleged historical manifestations of consciousness with evidence from clinical neuropsychology. A somewhat more empirical attempt has recently been published by Dennett in *Consciousness Explained*. I do not think that Dennett's conclusions preclude those of Zohar in *The Quantum Self*, but I leave that question to the experts.

general history, influenced by boasting from epichoric records but mollifying their extravagance, had a fair chance of producing a reliable account of the past that maintained indirect contact with local archives and inscriptions (such as they were). Thucydides continued in this tradition and passed it on to the fourth century. For him, the problem was that his war was a monstrous tragedy that played itself out after his two great heroes, Themistocles and Pericles, had left the stage of history. Not long after the death of Pericles in 429, the most influential "character" in the history becomes the war itself, which laughs at all human attempts to stop it. Peace treaties and agreements are painstakingly negotiated and displayed by Thucydides in elaborate detail, only to have the war sweep by them as if they were not there. Eventually, "peace" negotiations (between Sparta and Persia) become a means of prosecuting the war.

For the Greeks, the meaning of history from its very beginnings generally involved some interplay between the heroic and the tragic. Perhaps it still does today. Hawking asked why the arrow of time points forward. There is no physical reason why it should not point in the other direction.[226] His answer was that the law of entropy makes intelligent life possible. We eat food, which is energy in a highly ordered form, and dissipate this energy as heat in a disordered form into the universe. This process is irreversible in our expanding universe. We can do history because time rolls forward and with it goes the inexorable increase of disorder. History, therefore, must work both with time as a tool to organize a narrative or description and against it as the measurement of the progress of disorder. All the historian can do is suspend time for a brief moment for a synchronic analysis of some sort of social, economic, or political system. But still he or she is studying the human resistance to entropy. We wish to organize the events of history into a narrative or explore the way that humans organize their world into armies, constitutions, or societies—through time (diachronically) or in stalled time (synchronically), it comes to much the same thing—the organized opposition to the spread of entropy, to the forward march of time.

Many of us find it necessary to explain the disappearance of order in human affairs (e.g., Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, Novick's *That Noble*

226. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, 143–53. Kellner, "Narrativity in History," discusses the problem of historical time and explores some of the bibliography on this and many other questions raised in this essay.

Dream), but if history is subject to the law of entropy, then it is the rise of ordered systems that requires explanation and not their disappearance. Francis Fukuyama has revived the neo-Hegelian thesis that there is a "Universal History" tending towards the development of liberal democracy.[227] Natural science is cumulative, he argues, and the need to provide for national defence propels technology forward. Meanwhile, totalitarian states (such as Hitler's or Mussolini's) or authoritarian ones (organized along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideology) have shown a remarkable inability to outlast Western democracies. For Fukuyama, this fact means that History is propelled towards a millennial age of stability and peace. To summarize his argument is to belittle it, and I do not mean to do so. As an active participant in my country's liberal democracy, I hope that he is right.

However, it is just possible that Fukuyama's book is an unintended demonstration that the law of entropy really does govern the course of Universal History. Liberal democracies are anarchies by comparison to their more centralized alternatives. Now that the world's economic structure can support liberal democracies, unlike their more agrarian antecedents, communications technology can provide the glue for anarchic nations. The question is, How long can the gravity of technology neutralize the centrifugal force of anarchy? Fukuyama closes his book by considering and rejecting the possibility that the next step for liberal democracy is to fragment, to atomize, to sink, as it were, into a black hole of escalating demands from all quarters that the state expend its resources on eliminating even the minutest manifestation of inequality. For his optimistic vision to prevail, someone must show that the law of entropy does not apply to History. But how can that be done if it is entropy that makes history possible in the first place? What then is the future of the mountain?

Somewhere west of the Greek world, mythology reports, stands Atlas the Titan,

227. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man.* Apparently Fukuyama does not read Noam Chomsky. His name does not occur in the bibliography despite a number of opportunities to cite him in the text. Moreover, I am less certain than Fukuyama that natural science is a stable prop for liberal democracy, but perhaps my mind has been corrupted by Feyerabend's *Against Method.* Predictably, Feyerabend is also absent from Fukuyama's bibliograpny. I have read Fukuyama's response to his critics, "Reflections on *The End of History,* Five Years Later." My somewhat idiosyncratic reactions to his book remain unchanged.

... whose granite shoulders prop the sky—
Atlas: his pine-clad head forever crowned
with clouds, is buffeted by wind and rain.
A glacier clothes his back, and cascades course
down over his face; his beard bristles with ice.[228]

Atlas' majestic effort keeps order in our world. It stops the sky from crashing down and mingling chaotically with earth. But for every ounce of resistance that he exerts, his body must release millions of times more entropic energy into the universe.[229] Atlas is doomed to be crushed by the weight of his own exertion. In the meantime, while he remains in his place, he leaves us the choice between the fatalistic acceptance of chaos or the heroism of a struggle to resist it.

228. Vergil *The Aeneid* (tr. Frank O. Copley), 77 (lines 247–51).
229. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, 152–53.

APPENDIX 1

Herodotus' Source Citations

WITH K. M. GILLIS

INTRODUCTION

This book has questioned some of the assumptions that scholars bring to the reading of ancient historians. Inevitably, however, it has some of its own. One is that the ancient historians did not wilfully invent fictions for gullible readers. Indeed, an implication of this study is that the very idea of inventing fabulous novelties for the delectation of a naive readership is anachronistic for this early period; rather, it is a phenomenon of nineteenth-century European literature that has no relevance to Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. But if this book itself relies on a questionable assumption, then it too is vulnerable. There has always been a contrary view: that some or all of the ancient historians paid lip-service to truth, claiming honesty in prefaces to works that would then proceed to be in some degree exercises in sham and persiflage. Herodotus has been the most frequent target of such allegations.

Most recently, works by O. K. Armayor and Detlev Fehling have assaulted Herodotus' honesty (see below), and the result has been that some, such as Stephanie West, have joined in with strong-looking arguments in support, and others, such as Lateiner in his review of Fehling,[1] have expressed concern that there seems to be no ready answer to his book. The usual response is a review of the archaeological remains of the places that Herodotus claims to have visited coupled with a re-examination of his Greek text to show that he could indeed be giving an eye-witness account of such-and-such a monument or landscape. The most

1. Lateiner, reviewing Fehling, *Herodotus and His "Sources."* Also cf. Dewald and Marincola, "A Selective Introduction to Herodotean Studies," 26–32.

recent and copious attempt to settle the question by using this method was published by W. K. Pritchett (see below). However, the Fehling-Armayor-West school of criticism has its own method of decoding monuments and geography so as to claim that Herodotus' text cannot be an eyewitness description, and it appears that the "debate" may be no such thing at all but a series of publications of conflicting manifestos. The argument that follows attempts to move the debate into new territory. It gives reason to the underlying assumption of this book and suggests a new way of attacking the problem that avoids manifesto. It takes the data advanced by one of the school's major proponents, Detlev Fehling, and analyses them to suggest that other, and perhaps better, conclusions can be drawn from them.

Herodotus' accuracy is not really at stake. Even his supporters know that he gets things wrong. To err is human; the question is, When does an error become a lie? The problem is complex because, as is argued below and was pointed out in the first essay, when an observer is plunged into a completely alien world, errors of observation and reporting multiply. It seems nearly impossible for the observer to get anything right at all. Only careful preparation and training can minimize misapprehensions, but their elimination may be impossible. It would seem to follow that the test of correspondence will be of only limited value in cases such as this. If Herodotus' account corresponds to the thing described moderately well, it would be fair to give him the benefit of doubt over minor errors and regard him as an honest reporter. But when he is in a totally strange environment, the proliferation of errors is to be expected and need not reflect on the honesty of his intentions or prove that he is engaging in pure fiction. An alternative and more promising test involves his use of sources. But it can never be known what any single informant might have told him; so here again the correspondence test is a weak one. It involves the conjectural recreation of what a source is likely to have said and a comparison of it to our understanding of the information that Herodotus attributes to that source. This approach clearly involves a double jeopardy that all but completely discredits the method. Therefore the argument below turns from a correspondence methodology to one that works with probability and with correlations internal to Herodotus' own work.

The source citations occur in sufficient number for crude statistical analysis and are distributed throughout Herodotus' work in ratios that differ from each other dramatically enough to deserve analysis. Despite a high degree of noise in the data, there appears to be a correlation between the citation of a source with expressed doubt, or a desire of

Herodotus to distance himself from the information, and, on the other hand, in the case of certain very specific items of information (list 3), between the absence of a source and Herodotus' willingness to identify with the information. The behaviours illustrated by the statistics occur too frequently and consistently to reflect a planned obfuscation by Herodotus. When they are taken by themselves and in conjunction with other significant correlations, there is no compelling reason to regard items of information attributed to sources as Herodotean fictions.

In *Herodotus and His "Sources"* (1989), Detlev Fehling examines the ancient historian's use of named epichoric sources and traditions. It will be clear from our subsequent remarks that his examination of Herodotus' source citations is extensive, but in our view, it lacks statistical rigour and is hampered by a serious limitation of vision. This appendix reassesses Fehling's data in order to broaden the field of vision surrounding Herodotus' use of source references and submit his data to a series of statistical tests designed to indicate the probability of his conclusion. If, as we argue, a source citation is often intended to call attention to the doubtfulness of the report, that fact tends to contradict the notion that Herodotus is inventing the information. We propose that it is improbable that he would create a story and then immediately draw attention to its dubious nature by means of a putative convention of attributing it to a source.

Fehling believes that source citations indicate falsehood and serve to detach Herodotus from responsibility for the information presented. Herodotus was not informed by oral or written sources, he believes; instead the source citations are "generally attached to things of his own creation."[2] Fehling proposes three primary rules that govern Herodotus' use of source citations. The first is the principle of citing the obvious regional source,[3] the second is a regard for party bias,[4] and the third is Herodotus' tendency to ascribe his own views to his sources. Fehling describes Herodotus' approach to the *Histories* as one consistent with literary creation, not with a historical work as we understand it: "As a story-teller, he is clearly sticking to a perfectly understandable rule: the more unlikely the story, the stronger the confirmation has to be ... His main concern was to ensure that his own disclaimer of responsibility for such an incredible story was all the stronger."[5] Now it is one thing

2. Fehling, *Herodotus and His "Sources,"* 9.
3. Ibid., 10.
4. Ibid., 10.
5. Ibid., 115, also 257.

to disclaim "responsibility for such an incredible story" that one has just invented and quite another to turn on it and attack it as doubtful or contradicted by other information. The more frequently that Herodotus does the latter, the more Fehling's single-minded argument is undermined. Our contention becomes a statistical one, therefore: to establish the extent to which alternative explanations of Herodotus' behaviour should be sought.

In order to create a test for the tenability of Fehling's conclusions based on the evidence presented, we initially compiled two lists of source references in Herodotus' *Histories*. The first was based on the order in which the references appear in Fehling's analysis, while the second arranged these same source references according to their actual appearance by book and section in the *Histories*, thereby enabling us to control repetition of references. Next we incorporated into the data some source citations that had been noticed by G. S. Shrimpton but were not cited by Fehling. We then conducted a series of keyword searches using an Ibycus CD-ROM. We searched under words indicative of source citations, such as *legousi*, *phasi*, and *legetai*, and we consulted Jacoby's list of Herodotean source references in Pauly-Wissowa.[6] As a further check of our results, we compiled a separate list of all named source references and a further list of all unnamed source references. Finally, we checked our results against those of von Gutschmid's "Index Fontium."[7]

Our interest in Herodotus' source citations was twofold. On the one hand, being unconvinced that Fehling had made his case, we wanted to devise a test for his hypothesis. On the other hand, we saw in Fehling's collection of source references an opportunity to go searching for the general conditions under which Herodotus refers his material to a source. As we began to compile our lists, we noticed a preponderance of citations among books 1 through 4 and few from book 9. We therefore decided that an attempt to establish a book-by-book ratio of source citations per unit of text might make a good and relatively objective begin-

6. Jacoby, "Herodotus," coll. 397–400.

7. Gutschmid, "Index Fontium Herodoti." Von Gutschmid includes anything that could be construed as a source or as providing a clue to the possible location or identity of a putative source. By contrast, we have counted only those cases in which Herodotus uses a specific expression to show that he expects his audience or reader to understand that a specific claim, series of statements, or piece of narrative is derived from some person or persons. Of course, everything he writes must come from somewhere, even if it is his own imagination, but those passages in which he either names a source or indicates that his material is derived from an unnamed source are of special interest in this study.

ning. We counted the source references three times, and each time our definition of what constituted a source reference changed with experience. This was because we had to establish the definition as we went along. At first we tended to err on the side of inclusion, and our figures were higher than the results published here. It is worth noting that in every case the results pointed to a high frequency of source citation in the early books, especially books 2 and 4, and a markedly low frequency for book 9.

We then proceeded to ask ourselves what were the characteristics of books 2 and 4 or, according to our final results, 2, 3, and 4 that distinguished them from the other books. Their main subjects are (in order) Egypt, Persia, and Scythia. They often deal with very remote parts of the world relative to Greece and, especially in the case of Egypt, treat subjects very remote in time. By contrast, book 9, which always showed the lowest frequency of citations per unit of text, more than any other concentrates on recent events in Greece. Its very subject, therefore, tends to exclude considerations of cultural, temporal, and spatial distance. Next we considered whether these three features—description of a non-Greek culture and remoteness of the subject matter whether expressed in time or distance (for more precise definitions of these features or "criteria," see below)—characterized all of Herodotus' named source references. We found that not all but 76 per cent did, and we regarded this result as significant enough to proceed.

Our task was to count source citations in order to compare the proportion of source references per book. Proceeding on a book-by-book basis is admittedly crude. As analysis continued, we came to suspect that subject matter was a critical factor in Herodotus' decision to quote sources, and the books do not really divide his history by subject. Nevertheless, we stayed with the book divisions to avoid any suggestion that we were building our conclusions into our method. After determining our ratios, we did conduct one test in book 7 to see if more minute analysis of Herodotus' text by subject matter would bear out our ratios. The results were encouraging. On the whole, however, we avoided minute breakdowns of the text by subject matter for fear that our argument would become entangled in a mesh of evaluative decisions. We had to arrive at a precise definition of a source reference, something that proved less straightforward than we had at first expected. What were we to do, for example, in cases where Herodotus refers to a source more than once in the same passage? As noted above, after the battle of Plataea (479), regent Pausanias reportedly instructed the captured Persian

camp attendants to prepare a meal and serve it in the grand style of Persian nobility, even royalty. Then he ordered his helots to prepare a Spartan meal. The contrast was laughable and prompted some choice remarks about the folly of the rich Persians who came to deprive the Greeks of their poverty (9.82). The story is both introduced and closed with a *legetai*, "it is said." In other words, one single passage cites an unspecified source, or sources, twice. Arguably, we have two source citations to count in this case.

On the other hand, the *legetai* at the end of the passage is part of a formulaic Herotodean transitional sentence. The most common way that the historian terminates a discussion of one subject in order to introduce another involves the use of the Greek particles *men* and *de* in the formula: so much (*men*) for subject X; now (*de*) so-and-so started to do Y. A variant on this formula involves a brief recapitulation of subject X: that is (*men*) what A did; B (*de*) was such-and-such a person. Obviously, the second *legetai* could be seen as nothing more than a stylistic variation on the motif of recapitulation in a transition to a new subject. On that view, it would be questionable to count the second occurrence as belonging to the same class of source indicators as the one placed at the beginning of the story. If it is nevertheless objected that the second *legetai* deserves to be counted if only because it serves to emphasize the alleged dependence on a source by repetition, our response would be that we cannot allow for such subjective considerations as emphasis. In 1.20 Herodotus sums up the war between Alyattes of Lydia and Thrasybulus of Miletus by saying, "I know this because I heard it from the Delphians." This remark is the first indication that the foregoing material was derived from a source, but, arguably it could be seen as considerably more emphatic than a couple of *legetais*. One more example should be sufficient to clarify this point. In 1.75 Herodotus weighs the merits of three accounts of how Croesus crossed the Halys river when he attacked Cyrus. He begins with his own opinion, gives a popular Greek view, mentions an opinion held by "some" (*hoi de*), and concludes by criticizing all views except his own. Now it could be argued that the expression "but some say" (1.75.6) at the conclusion of the popular story includes an implicit reminder of the previous source. We decided to avoid complications by discounting repeat citations in the same continuous context.

Therefore our definition of a source citation was refined to any material attributed to a source that intrudes into a given context. Repeat citations of the same source, not being intrusive in most cases, were not

counted. Intrusion is another expression for a change of subject. This definition has implications, particularly for book 2. In 2.99–144 there is an extended report of Egyptian antiquities based allegedly on the reports of "the Egyptians and their priests." Every paragraph includes at least one reminder of this source. However, we counted the priests as a single source citation so long as the subject was Egyptian antiquities. On the other hand, in sections 116–20 Herodotus claims that he asked the same priests what they knew about Helen and the Trojan War. This is counted as a second source citation because of the intrusion of an unrelated subject. Now since the Egyptian antiquities begin in section 99, are suspended from 116–20, and resume with 121, it could be argued that the subject of Egyptian antiquities reintrudes, and this contention might justify counting the priests twice. But in this case we regarded the subject of Egyptian antiquities as a continuation of a previous source, and the duplication was discounted. We called such passages virtually continuous narratives and modified our definition of a source citation to read: any continuous, or virtually continuous, narrative or statement intruding into a given context that is attributed to a source or sources.

Book 2 has the greatest number of repeated references to the same source, and they are not confined to sections 99–144 alone. Sections 158–82 treat Egyptian history since the arrival of Greek mercenaries in the time of Psammetichus. In 2.154.4 Herodotus leaves no doubt that this more recent information is derived from those Greeks and their descendants. References back to this source occur in 169.1, 174.1, and 177.1. Once again, this counts as a single source reference. By contrast, repeated references to a similar named source, such as "the Egyptians" in book 2 or "the Scythians" in book 4, were counted separately only when it was clear that the subject had changed. This was invariably due to a change of location. "Egyptians" speaking of local customs in Memphis were assumed to be different from "Egyptians" describing rituals peculiar to Thebes. It should be clear that our totals for source citations could have been significantly higher if we had adopted a more inclusive definition. One of the most important of the considerations that led us to choose a more conservative definition was our desire to avoid the accusation that we had adopted a method of counting that would tend to confirm our suspicions that there is a significantly high proportion of source citations in the earlier books, particularly book 2.

Fehling primarily discusses named epichoric sources; he does cite unnamed sources from Herodotus' narrative but only to enhance his

discussion of named sources or to support his case for Herotodean narrative invention. We have defined a "source" conservatively as anyone who provides an intrusive statement or continuous or virtually continuous narrative. Totals produced by applying this definition rigidly necessarily involve a degree of random error because some source references that recur in two separate parts of the narrative had to be counted twice as separate source references. For example, the Arabians are cited as authorities on the subject of the so-called snake skeletons in 2.75, and the same people are cited for information on the same subject in 3.108.1. This is clearly a single piece of information derived from a single source, but because it intrudes into two quite separate contexts, we tabulated it twice as a named source citation that met the criterion of *cultural transfer* (but not *time* because the ibis is alleged to kill these creatures—probably locusts—regularly and not *distance* because Herodotus claims to have visited a place where he saw the remains). This error slightly inflates the total number of citations and the criteria, but we do not believe that it distorts the actual distribution figures. We left the error in the totals because the same degree of error should presumably affect the statistics for the unnamed sources, where duplications would be impossible to identify. We assume that the duplication inflates the figures for both named and unnamed source references with the same frequency.

In an effort to understand the disparity between the distribution of source citations by book number, we attempted a more detailed look at the distribution of source references relative to the nature of the material they describe. Herodotus' treatment of his material seemed to be influenced by the factors of temporal and geographical distance and cultural separation: the earlier books deal primarily with events remote in time, including those that ostensibly belong to the legendary past, discussions of non-Greek cultures, and the exploration of unknown lands. We therefore ran a preliminary check of all identifiable source references to see how they conformed to the criteria of *time*, *distance*, and *cultural transfer* (see below) and prepared a full tabulation of their occurrence according to Herotodean book order. These preliminary results were read by Shrimpton at the University of Toronto and were followed by a second, more precise test in which we sought to eliminate repeated references by applying the restrictive definition described above and to identify with greater precision continuous and virtually continuous source references. The results of our second test produced modified and more accurate tabulations, but our general impressions were unchanged (Table 1; Graph 1).

Table 1
Herodotus' Source Citations by Book Number

Book	*Named sources*	*No. of pages*[a]	*Ratio*[b]
1	26	87	0.9045
2	40	72	1.6822
3	19	66	0.8716
4	37	68	1.6469
5	12	46	0.7896
6	17	50	1.0284
7	21	83	0.7656
8	13	50	0.7885
9	3	47	0.1932
Total	188	569	1.0000
Average ratio of citations in books 1, 3, 5–8			0.8580
Average ratio of citations in books 2, 4			1.6646

Note: The comparison of books 2 and 4 to books 1, 3, and 5–8 yields a ratio of 1.95: 1 named source citations per unit of text; that is, the frequency is nearly double.

[a] Pages in the Penguin translation. A comparison of the Oxford text to the Penguin translation indicates that the ratios would have been slightly higher in books 2 and 4 if that text had been used. All the other ratios would be diminished proportionately. In other words, the choice of translation arguably downplays the true effect of our ratios. Our lower ratios for books 2 and 4 are a clear enough indication of the distinct nature of those books to permit us to proceed.

[b] The number of source citations for each book is divided by the total number of source citations found in the text in order to yield the percentage of actual references per book; the number of pages for each book is then divided by the total number of pages of the *Histories* in order to yield the percentage of space that a given book occupies within the text. The ratios compare the proportion of references in a given book with the proportion of space that each book occupies. This method incorporates variation in book size and between the number of references per book; the resulting figures are thus comparable, independent of book size.

We departed from Fehling's analysis of named epichoric sources in order to examine Herodotus' use of unnamed sources, that is, references to pieces of information where a source is indicated but not named, as in "There is a story ...," "It is said ...," and so on. Unnamed sources relate to specific items of information that intrude into the main narrative and frequently (58 per cent) meet the criteria associated with named source references. Thus in addition to the list of named sources, we have identified a further ninety-three unnamed sources and



Graph 1. Named Source Citations

recorded them according to book distribution; when the respective figures for the unnamed sources are combined with the named ones from Table 1, a more complete picture of the distribution of sources is revealed (Table 2; Graphs 2 and 3). Significantly, however, the impression of a higher frequency of source citations in the earlier books is maintained. In fact, the unnamed sources make no radical difference in the pattern of distribution by book number. This outcome could be seen to minimize the importance of named epichoric source citations.

The ratios compare the proportion of references in a given book with the proportion of space that each book occupies. First, the number of source citations for each book is divided by the total number of citations found in the text in order to yield the percentage of actual references per book. Next, the number of pages for each book is divided by the total number of pages in the *Histories* in order to provide the percentage of space that a given book occupies within the text. The percentage of references for each book is then divided by the percentage of the book's size relative to the text in order to produce the ratios. This method incorporates variation in book size and variation between the number of references per book; the resulting figures are thus comparable independent of book size.

The revised figures in Table 2 indicate a tendency for a higher frequency of source citations in the earlier books, particularly in books 2, 3, and 4, whereas there is a lower frequency in book 1 and the later

Table 2
Herodotus' Unnamed Source Citations by Book Number Combined with Named

Book	*Unnamed sources*	*Ratio*	*Combined*	*Ratio*
1	15	1.0549	41	0.9543
2	11	0.9350	51	1.4347
3	16	1.4831	35	1.0738
4	8	0.7198	45	1.3401
5	6	0.7981	18	0.7928
6	5	0.6119	22	0.8907
7	18	1.3266	39	0.9513
8	6	0.7342	19	0.7710
9	8	1.0414	11	0.4739
Total	93	1.0000	281	1.0000
Average ratio of all citations in books 1, 5–8				0.8720
Average ratio of all citations in books 2, 3, 4				1.2829

Notes: The comparison of books 2, 3, and 4 to books 1 and 5–8 yields a ratio of 1.47: 1 named and unnamed source citations per unit of text.
When Herodotus refers to an unnamed source, the chances that at least one of the criteria will be met are 58 per cent; that is, 54 do and 39 do not.



Graph 2. Unnamed Source Citations



Graph 3. Named and Unnamed Source Citations

books. Source references occur at a ratio of 0.8720 in books 1 and 5 through 8, but one and one-half times as frequently in books 2 to 4, with a ratio of 1.2829. This shift in the distribution of source references seems to be part of a response to a change in the nature of the material as perceived and shaped by Herodotus. For example, the earlier books deal primarily with events that are remote in time or are located in a mythical past, and there is extensive discussion of non-Greek cultures and accounts of the exploration of the frontiers of the known world. These observations form the basis for our selection of the criteria used to re-examine Herodotus' use of source citations (Table 3). These criteria focus on an apparent quantifiable distance between the author and his subject.

The criterion of *time* is defined as one hundred years before Herodotus' dates, which, for argument's sake, we take to be c.450-c.440 BC. In *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*, Rosalind Thomas suggests that the reliability of oral traditions begins to falter roughly one hundred years after the events they attempt to preserve have taken place.[8] Assuming that Herodotus was compiling material for his *Histories* between 450 and 440 BC, then those events that take place at or before 550–540 BC qualify according to our criterion. The criterion of *distance* is defined as any place that Herodotus locates at the ends of

8. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*, 123–31.

Table 3
Herodotus' Source Citations Analysed by Time, Distance, and Culture

Total number of citations	281
Citations meeting criterion of time	114
Citations meeting criterion of distance	41
Citations meeting criterion of culture	108
Citations meeting one or more of the criteria	196[a]

Note: Approximately 76 per cent of Herodotus' named sources meet at least one of the three criteria, as do 70 per cent of all sources combined.
[a] Some citations meet two of the criteria; a few meet all three.

the known world and those lands that he says were too distant for him to reach by travel. And finally, *cultural transfer* includes anything that is allegedly transferred from a non-Greek to a Greek culture. Source citations that do not conform to any of the above-mentioned criteria (*zeroes*) yield a higher frequency of citations in later books (Table 4; Graph 4). They thereby offer a sort of "reversed-angle" confirmation of our initial assumption about the relation of the criteria to the earlier books; namely, their subject matter affects the frequency of source citations. In other words, as one would expect, they show that in those books where the topics involve the three criteria to a lesser degree, the source references are less subject to the criteria.

Patterns of the distribution of source citations that emerge from our analysis can be viewed as a function of the material or as a reflection of the historian's perceived need to support the information presented. Sections 61–99 in book 7 provide a useful illustration. This passage describes the land and naval forces that invaded Greece with Xerxes and treats the legendary origins of the ethnic contingents of Xerxes' army. In other words, it is a brief return to the sort of material found particularly in books 2, 3, and 4, and predictably, it contains patterns similar to them. It occupies nine pages and contains six source references, for a ratio of 1.3306, which is actually greater than that of books 2 through 4 (1.2829). When this passage and its source references are removed, the remainder of book 7 exhibits a ratio more similar to the surrounding books, that is, 0.9084 as compared to 0.8720 (see Table 2). We suggest that the increase in the use of source citations in this section is Herodotus' response to the nature of the material at hand.

Remarks in his introduction notwithstanding, Fehling does not explain exactly how he expects his conclusions to flow from his evidence. It appears that he pursues two strategies. One is to show that, in a number

Table 4
Comparison of Distribution of Zeroes to Non-Zeroes

Book	*No. per book*	*Ratio*	*Non-zeroes by book*	*Ratio*
1	1	0.0769	40	1.3347
2	3	0.2790	48	1.9360
3	8	0.8114	27	1.1876
4	2	0.1969	43	1.8359
5	9	1.3104	9	0.5683
6	15	2.0076	7	0.4063
7	20	1.6127	19	0.6644
8	17	2.2805	2	0.1164
9	10	1.4243	1	0.0618
Total	85	1.0000	196	1.0000



Graph 4. Zeroes (Source Citations Not Conforming to the Criteria)

of cases, certain informants cannot have said what Herodotus imputes to them. After this claim has been "shown" in a sufficient number of cases, a correlation between falsehood and the citation of a source becomes implicit, even in those cases in which falsehood seems to be more difficult to demonstrate. But as the book progresses, source citations diminish in importance. In his third chapter, Fehling analyses 113 examples of what he calls "motif-repetition." For some reason, the repetition of a motif is taken to be its own evidence of falsehood. Source citations do not figure significantly in these examples. More than half of them, 68 to be

exact, are unassigned by Herodotus to any source. Again, in chapter 4, "formulaic" numbers are examined. Using Fehling's methods, almost any number can be "shown" to be formulaic or to have formulaic components. Like motifs, formulas too are their own evidence of fiction in Fehling's mind. In this case, source citations are even less significant. Of 132 examples, 96 are not derived by Herodotus from a source. So what is the line of reasoning? Is it that some items assigned to a source can be shown to be false, others are false because they are assigned to a source, and finally, things not assigned to a source are false for some other reason?

This approach would not appear to be very methodical. The second strategy at least looks tidier and seems to be closer to what Fehling actually claims for his work (19). It impugns the information in Herodotus first and draws the secondary conclusion that the alleged sources must then be fictive. In other words, if a story is made up by Herodotus and then attributed to certain sources, the alleged sources must be as fictive as the story. Here the difficulty lies in proving conclusively that a story in Herodotus, however strange in appearence, is a piece of fiction. Pritchett has undermined or rebutted all of Fehling's "proofs" to some extent (see note 11 below). While doubts may still remain in some cases, it is pertinent to observe that all of Fehling's "proofs" commit the fallacy of the excluded middle. Again and again, Herodotus is shown to fail this or that test of accuracy, but the standard of accuracy applied, while suitable for an empiricist birdwatcher like Tom Harrison (see first essay), is of very little use in criticizing the type of oral historiography that Herodotus claims to be practising. Oral history depends on memory, and Bartlett's experiments, reported in the first essay of this book, show how memory both succeeds and fails. Herodotus' alleged shortcomings are generally of the sort to be expected of an oral, memorative historical tradition and are not proof of fabrication. This is not to deny that many of the stories he reports must be inventions, in whole or in part. Nonetheless, it is fallacious to assume, as Fehling does (see p.11), that unless one of Herodotus' stories is true, the only other possibility is that he must have invented it. The capacity of whole communities to fabricate their own histories was demonstrated in the first essay of this book.

To test our thesis that the nature of Herodotus' material prompts his use of source citation, we analysed those source references that do not conform to our criteria of time, distance, and cultural transfer (*zeroes*; see List 1). We arranged them by content into six categories. The first category, *conflicts in sources*, includes citations that contain contradictory

source references for a particular piece of information and thereby give rise to doubt; the second, *doubt/ridicule*, covers material that Herodotus calls into question or openly ridicules; the third is directed to *miracles, portents, and claims about mythology*, which also, it may be argued, give rise to doubt; the fourth includes *firsts, superlatives, and absolutes*; and the fifth, covers *Greek and barbarian stories*. By definition, *zeroes* must be primarily, if not exclusively, Greek in origin. Only in the case of the last category, *Xerxes in Greece*, is there information influenced by the relationship between Greeks and the non-Greek invader, but all are stories that originated in Greece, presumably from Greek sources. It seems unlikely that Herodotus would relate stories describing recent events concerning Greece for the consumption of a Greek audience if they conflicted with the accepted understanding. Of 188 named source citations, more than one half (96) are Greek. This number includes 54 explicit citations of "central" Greek sources, such as the Athenians, Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Argives, Aeginetans, and so on, as well as three Macedonian citations. So we infer that invention is not a likely reason for source citation in the case of these 96 examples and the *zeroes*. Participating in a largely oral community, these Greeks are likely enough to have been aware of their own traditions, and Herodotus, being a Greek, should know them too. We suggest that a compulsive fabricator would want to conceal his inventions by attributing them to alien, rather than domestic, sources.

Herodotus' treatment of history seems to reveal an instinctual, rather than a rigidly prescriptive, response to the material at hand. His approach is governed by native impulse, not formula or method. The list of *zeroes* contains material that describes predominantly recent Greek events based on Greek sources. As Table 3 suggests, 76 per cent of Herodotus' named source references support information about remote, barbarian, or ancient societies. By contrast, the unnamed sources in List 2 deal with comparable material only 57 per cent of the time. This figure suggests a tendency for him to leave sources unnamed when the subject is recent Greek history, a pattern that is confirmed in another way. Of the *zeroes* in List 1, sources that by definition deal with recent Greek history, only 53 per cent are attributed to a named source—again, this figure contrasts with the non-*zeroes*, since 73 per cent (143/196) are attributed to a named source (Graph 5). In other words, as Herodotus gets away from recent Greek history, there is a greater probability both that he will cite a source and that he will name it. Comparison of the lists show that the two tendencies are not



Graph 5. Non-Zeroes (Source Citations Conforming to the Criteria)

differentiated from each other in any abrupt way because unnamed sources appear in List 1 and Table 4. Further, the examples from List 2 exhibit features that resemble characteristics of both the *zeroes* and the named sources. However, there is only one clearly identifiable motive for citing a source that emerges from the examples in Lists 1 and 2, namely, doubt or at least a desire on the part of the historian to distance himself from the material. Is it possible to infer that a degree of doubt is present in many, if not all, of the remaining examples?

We defined a source citation above as "any continuous, or virtually continuous, narrative or statement intruding into a given context that is attributed to a source or sources." We wanted to find some sort of control over our data. Accordingly, we looked for specific items of information that met this definition in all respects but for the source citation. The items found in List 3 fit that requirement. They are all intrusive statements that mostly meet one or more of our three criteria of time, distance, and cultural transfer, in other words, precisely the sort of thing that Herodotus tends to derive from a source. They are expressed as superlatives, absolutes, or first examples of something. A small handful of similar statements is found in Lists 1 and 2D. The items in List 3 are all cited as "knowns" (i.e., "to the extent of our [more rarely, my] knowledge"). When a source is given as in Lists 1 and 2D, then the assertion that the item is known disappears. The inference is clear: when Herodotus feels that the item is reliable knowledge, no source citation is required, but an otherwise identical item that cannot be confidently

advanced as knowledge is attributed to a source. (In all of these cases, the source goes unnamed.) Therefore, there is an implied tendency for him to doubt, or feel a certain lack of confidence in, material he assigns to a source and for him to avoid source citations when specific items are reported as established knowledge. Of course, a modern critic may still choose to believe that select items, even all, from any of the lists are Herodotean fictions, but it would be impossible to show any compelling correlation between the alleged fiction and the presence of a source citation. Moreover, insofar as Herodotus' implicit doubts are genuine, it seems more likely that he is reflecting on received information than on a figment of his own imagination.

Fehling's thesis brings into focus a fundamental methodological question concerning the reliability of an ancient writer such as Herodotus. How does a contemporary researcher establish the credibility (though not necessarily the accuracy) of an ancient witness? When the ancient observer writes about a culture alien to himself, the difficulty becomes threefold. We seek to understand someone who is other to us when he tries to explain something that is other to himself. In this context, the approach of a critic similar to Fehling, O. K. Armayor, is noteworthy.[9] Armayor's procedure is to show that Herodotus cannot have sailed the Black Sea because he drastically misrepresents its dimensions. The response of W. K. Pritchett is, in part, to demonstrate that by those criteria no other ancient geographer could have visited the Black Sea either, and perhaps neither could the Romans.[10] In a later publication, Pritchett focuses on Fehling's work.[11] The result is a somewhat unevenly argued barrage of critical comments and bibliographical references partly aiming to show that Fehling is not adequately informed and partly to demonstrate the error of his arguments. The reader who wishes to explore this question further should turn to Pritchett's study, which we regard as complementary to our own. On the whole, Pritchett shows that many of Fehling's demonstrations of Herodotean fabrication are not as definitive as he supposes.

It has been observed on several occasions throughout this book that the literal description of discovery, or any novel experience, is conditioned by one's assumptions about what one expects to find. Attempts to understand new experiences are circumscribed by one's past experience

9. Armayor, "Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?"

10. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, 4: 234–85.

11. Pritchett, *the Liar School of Herodotus*, 10–143.

and the capacity of one's imagination. Early colonists tried to make sense of alien cultures through a process of analogy, that is, by comparing their observations of the other to what was already known and then extrapolating from these observations to form an understanding of their new environment. Stephen Greenblatt remarks on the linguistic and conceptual difficulties involved in the description of a newly discovered culture and cites the European colonialists' tendencies to make sense of the other by imposing an image of their own society upon unfamiliar peoples while, at the same time, projecting an inverted image of their own society upon the inhabitants of the New World. He illustrates this phenomenon with the following quotation from the chronicler Peter Martyr: "For lyke as rased or vnpaynted tables, are apte ot receaue what formes soo euer are tyrs drawne theron by the hande of the paynter, euen soo these naked and simple people, doo soone receaue the customes of owre Religion, and by conuersation with owre men, shake of[f] theyr fierce and natiue barbarousnes." As Greenblatt remarks, "One moment the Indians have no culture; the next moment they have ours."[12]

Fehling's "suggestive questioning theory," the notion that Herodotus employed leading questions when interviewing his informants in order to extract particular information regarding a given culture or place that corresponds to his own preconceptions,[13] reflects real difficulties in the accurate transfer of information from culture A to culture B because the interviewer is inevitably trapped by his or her "social semantics." A good illustration of the lengths to which a contemporary, professionally trained investigator goes in response to these difficulties is found in Janet C. Hart's article "Redeeming the Voice of a 'Sacrificed Generation': Oral Histories of Women in the Greek Resistance." Hart set out to research women's roles in the resistance movement to the Nazi occupation of 1941–44 and to explore their motivations for joining and the impact that women's participation had upon their lives in terms of their long-term expectations. In addition to sixty oral histories, she made extensive use of other source material including, for example, written histories, personal accounts, and archival material.

She identifies three central issues influencing the success of her interviews. The first is "researching the cultural terrain" (4); this involves a

12. Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions*, 95, quoting Martyr, *The Decades of the Newe World (De orbe novo)*, 117.

13. Fehling, *Herodotus and His "Sources,"* 4–5.

sensitivity to cultural difference in order to accomodate the person being interviewed. The second concern is to earn the trust of the subject in order to gain access to sensitive material, and the third is the interviewer's task of eliciting and then interpreting information received during the interview. Hart points out that the interviewees did not appear to have been conditioned by outside influences such as the media; instead they were able to respond naturally without trying to anticipate what it was she wanted to know. She identifies *flexibility* and *reflexivity* as two important factors in dealing with unexpected developments that arise during the actual interview. Flexibility "can be defined as the capacity, combined with the willingness, to take on a new persona as warranted by the situation" (16), while reflexivity, "in Rousseau's terms, requires the capacity to regard oneself as other and to be aware of oneself as his own instrument of observation" (16).

Hart emphasizes the importance to the success of the interview of an appropriate emotional response while dealing with sensitive material. She outlines several cultural symbols that shaped the way she was perceived by the interviewees. Since she was a woman, it was assumed that she possessed a sympathetic understanding of what women everywhere experience during wartime. Since she was a Black American, Greek women from the resistance identified with her struggle as a member of a historically oppressed group. Finally, her insistence upon conducting interviews in Greek, even with people who were fluent in English, greatly contributed to her legitimacy as a confidante (18–21, esp. 21). An awareness of cultural constraits is essential to the success of the interview, although the unavoidable influence of symbolic characteristics may inevitably impede the interview's outcome. "Because of problems which are an inherent part of the process of collecting oral histories, their utilization is, realistically, not to be undertaken by just anyone on any topic. There may be settings where personal characteristics are so much at the core of issues of access and researcher legitimacy as to negate all of the valiant efforts of well-meaning students of culture" (22).

Without seeking to excuse Herodotus' mistakes, it seems appropriate to ask ourselves, What could realistically be expected of him? How do we react when he claims to have seen things that twentieth-century historians choose to believe cannot have existed? Is it possible for an untrained observer in an alien environment to "see what is there"? The question may seem odd, but consider the inability of European watercolourists—supposedly experienced observers—to depict accurately an unfamiliar species of tree in a new world. "In his history of the Australian colonial experience, Robert Hughes remarks that in much the same

way, early representations of Australian territory were conditioned by English landscape conventions. He explains this tendency as 'habit resorting to familiar European stereotypes to deal with the unfamiliar appearance of things Australian; thus it took at least two decades for colonial watercolorists to get the gum trees right, so that they did not look like English oaks or elms.'"[14]

Janet Hart is a trained observer who went to considerable lengths to prepare herself for interviews, partly by eliminating as much as she could of the gap between herself and her informants and partly by exploiting a sympathetic aspect of her otherness. Strategies of this type were unknown to Herodotus. The lengths to which Hart went are also unthinkable for someone from his time. Consequently, the possibility that a Greek visitor in ancient Egypt could actually recognize and accurately describe the nature of its vast and complex history and culture seems remote indeed. By comparison with the reports of European colonialists, the garbled nature of Herodotus' reports are not to be seen as proof that he never went there (*pace* Fehling) Otherwise, the Fehling-Armayor method should be used to "prove" that Columbus never discovered America.

LIST ONE CLASSIFICATION OF ZEROES

* = named sources

A Conflicts in Sources

3.45.1	Three different versions of the fortunes of the Samians exiled by Polycrates (3).[15]
3.47	Samian explanation of expedition rejected by Spartans.*
3.120–21	Conflicting stories about the fate of Polycrates (2).
4.45	Some say that the Macetian river Tanais and the Cimmerian ferries are boundaries (between the continents).
5.41.3	Some say that Cleombrotus and Leonidas were twins.
5.44	Herodotus gives conflicting accounts of the capture of Sybaris, mentions the "evidence," and withholds judgment (2).*

14. Dougherty, *The Poetics of Colonization*, 7.

15. Numbers in parentheses indicate multiple source citations supporting a particular piece of information.

5.85–87	Conflicting Athenian/Argive stories over the dispute of the statues from Epidaurus involving portentous thunderclaps and statues falling to their knees; Herodotus doubts this (3).*
6.14.1	The Ionians blame each other for the failure at Lade; Herodotus is non-committal (490s).
6.75.3	Most Greeks explain Cleomenes' insane self-mutilations and death as punishment for corrupting Delphi; Athenians have their own local explanations (3).*
6.84	Return to Argive explanation of Cleomenes' madness; adds Spartan explanation that he drank wine Scythian style; Herodotus believes that it was because of his treatment of Demaratus (i.e., what "most Greeks say").*
6.134.1	Herodotus follows the story of Miltiades' attack on Paros as told by "all the Greeks," and then adds a Parian story that a junior priestess, Timo, tried to betray the city (2).*
7.150.1, 151	A Greek story that Xerxes approached the Argives (c.481); Argives excuse themselves alleging Spartan arrogance; Herodotus is non-committal (2).*
7.201	The Greeks call the place Thermopylae; the locals call it Pylae.*
7.214	Variant story about who betrayed Leonidas.
8.8.2	Herodotus cannot say how Scyllias got to Artemisium, unless it was in a boat (480); he cites a story that he swam underwater.
8.84.2	Athenians and Aeginetans both claim to have started the battle of Salamis (480) (2).*
8.94.4	Corinthians and Athenians disagree over the behaviour of Adimantus at Salamis; the rest of Greece agrees with the Corinthians (3).*
9.51.2	The locals (Thebans or Plataeans) call the river created by the splitting of the Asopus "the daughter of Asopus"; Herodotus calls it Oeroe.*
9.74	Two stories about Sophanes (2).

B Doubt/Ridicule

1.216.1	Custom wrongly ascribed to the Scythians by the Greeks.*
2.15–17.1	Ionians cited; this is almost certainly Hecataeus.*
2.16.1, 17.2	Herodotus takes exception to general Greek views of geography.*

2.20.1 Certain Greeks wanting a reputation for wisdom advance a view about the Nile's flooding.*

3.56 There is a very foolish story that Polycrates bought off the invading Lacedaemonians with lead coins.

5.32 The story of Pausanias and his desire to rule Greece doubted by Herodotus.

5.85–87 (see *conflicts in sources*)

6.74.2 The Arcadians say that the Styx is located in their city of Nonacris.*

6.76 River Erasinus flows from Stymphalian lake.

8.8.2 (see *conflicts in sources*)

8.120 The people of Abdera say that their town was the first place that Xerxes felt safe enough to undo his girdle (in his flight from Greece).*

9.84 Uncertainty about the location of Mardonius' body.

9.95 Evenius not the son of Deiphonus.
(Claims about Greek mythology).

C Miracles, Portents, and Claims about Mythology

4.30.2 The people of Elis explain the inability of mules to breed in their country as the result of a curse.*

5.85–87 (see *conflicts in sources*)

6.61.4 Ariston's friend's wife, Demaratus' mother, is made beautiful by a mysterious woman who appears at Helen's tomb.

6.98.1 The people of Delos say that their island was struck by an earthquake at about the time of Datis' operations in the Aegean (first and last time since).*

6.105.1 Pheidippides' story of meeting Pan (490).*

6.117.3 Epizelus' is reported to have experienced a phantom at the battle of Marathon (490).

7.137.1 The Lacedaemonians say that the wrath of Talthybius, Agamemnon's herald, was visited upon them for having mistreated the Persian ambassadors; Herodotus agrees.*

7.189.3 Boreas helped the Athenians at Artemisium.*

8.38 Heroes save Persians from Delphi miraculously.*

8.41.2 Athenians say that the Acropolis is guarded by a snake that eats honey cakes; the snake abandoned it, however, before Salamis (480).*

8.65.6 Dicaeus' story about the portent at the time of Salamis (480).*

8.84.2 Woman's voice chides the Greeks (2).

8.129.2 Some of Artabazus' men were trapped and drowned by the highest tide that the people of Pallene could remember; they and Herodotus agree that the Persians were being punished by Poseidon.*

8.135 Mys of Caria sent to some oracles by Mardonius (480/79); Thebans report a very great marvel; the Theban oracle spoke in Carian.*

9.16.1 Thersander of Orchomenus' story of Persian despair before Plataea (479).*

9.120.1–4 A story told in the Thracian Chersonese about a portent: some fish being roasted started leaping about in the pan (479).*

D Firsts, Superlatives, and Absolutes

6.98.1 (see *miracles, portents, and claims about mythology*)

7.226 The bravest at Thermadon was Dioneces.

8.120 (see *doubt/ridicule*)

8.129.2 (see *miracles, portents, and claims about mythology*)

9.71 Mardonius was the bravest Persian at Plataea.

E Greek and Barbarian Stories

3.55.2 Herodotus reports a story allegedly told in Pitana by Archias, a descendant of a hero of the Samian campaign.*

5.49.1 The Spartans say that Aristagoras came to Sparta with bronze plaques depicting a map of the world.*

5.63.1 The Athenians say that the Alcmeonidae bribed Delphi to dupe the Spartans into liberating Athens (514–510).*

6.44.3 Three hundred ships sank off Athos.

7.3 Demaratus goes to the court of Darius.

7.145.2 The power of Gelon is said to be great.

7.165 The people in Sicily say that Gelon would have aided Greece had it not been for a Carthaginian invasion (c.480).*

7.176.3, 201 The locals call the hot springs at Thermopylae "Chytroe" (the pots).*

7.220	Leonidas is said to have dismissed certain Greeks at Thermopylae to spare their lives.
7.229–32	Stories about three absentees from Thermopylae (480) (3).
8.98	Description of Persian messenger route.
9.85	Tomb of Aeginetans.

F Xerxes in Greece

7.35	Xerxes brands the Hellespont.
7.55	Xerxes crosses the Hellespont last of all.
7.56.2	A man is said to have given a speech when watching Xerxes cross Hellespont.
7.130	Xerxes is said to have commented on the Thessalians.
7.212	Xerxes is said to have leapt from his throne three times at the battle of Thermopylae in fear for his army.
8.88.2	Xerxes is said to have enquired about a ship in the battle of Salamis and to have been told that Artemisia had sunk a ship.
8.118.3–4	Xerxes is supposed to have suggested that the Persian nobles throw themselves overboard.
8.120	(see *doubt/ridicule*)
9.82	Xerxes is said to have left his tent behind; after Plataea, Pausanias has Mardonius' cooks et alii make a meal suitable for Persian grandees.

LIST TWO CLASSIFICATION OF UNNAMED SOURCE CITATIONS

A Conflicts in Sources

1.27.2	Some say Bias of Priene—others, Pittacus of Mitylene—gave Croesus advice (2).[16]
1.65	Alternative version of Lycurgus story.
1.201	Conflicting descriptions of Massagetae (2).
1.202	Two conflicting descriptions of the Araxes (2).
2.106	Asiatic statues of Sesostris may be of Memnon.

16. Numbers in parentheses indicate multiple source citations supporting a particular piece of information.

2.131	Alternative story about the cow and Mycerinus' statues.
2.175	Variant explanation for leaving the huge slab outside Amasis' temple.
2.181	Three variant stories about the parentage of Ladice.
3.9	Variant stories about transporting water for Cambyses (2).
3.45	Disagreement over the fate of Polycrates' exiles (3).
3.120–21	Two stories about Oroites' murder of Polycrates (2).
4.11	Variant story about the wanderings of the Scythians.
4.45	Some say the Macetian river Tanais and the Cimmerian ferries are boundaries (between the continents).
4.103	Variant story about the Tauri.
7.214	Variant story about who betrayed Leonidas.
9.74	Two stories about Sophanes at Plataea (2).

B Doubt/Ridicule

2.106	(see *conflicts in sources*)
3.3.1	Unbelievable story about why Persia attacked Egypt.
3.56	Story that Polycrates bribed the Spartans with lead coins.
5.32	Pausanias is said to have aimed at rule of Greece.
8.8.2	Story about Scyllias the diver.
9.84	Uncertainty about the location of the body of Mardonius.

C Miracles, Portents, and Claims about Mythology

1.159.3	Voice comes from the temple of Apollo at Branchidae.
1.171	Carians (Leleges) ruled by Minos.
3.5.3	Story that Typho is buried by Lake Serbonis.
4.179	Jason goes to Tritonian lake.
6.61.4	Ariston's friend's wife is made beautiful by a mysterious woman who appears at Helen's tomb.
6.74.2	Location of Styx in Arcadia.
6.76	River Erasinus flows from Stymphalian lake.
7.170	Story of Minos in Sicily.
7.193	Place in Magnesia where Jason left Heracles.
7.198	River Dryas rises to help Heracles against the fires that destroyed him.
8.84.2	Woman's voice chides Greeks at Salamis (2).

D Firsts, Superlatives, and Absolutes

3.98.1	Indians live furthest to the east.
7.226	The bravest at Thermopylae was Dioneces.
7.229–323	All three hundred Spartans sent to Thermopylae died there, but three stories tell of individuals who escaped death (3).
9.71	Mardonius was the bravest Persian at Plataea.

E Barbarian Stories

1.92	Croesus makes offerings to Branchidae.
1.153	Cyrus asks who the Lacedaemonians were.
1.187	Nitocris' trick deceives Darius.
2.8	The length of the Arabian mountain range at its longest.
2.29–34	The size of Egypt up to Elephantine.
2.81	A sacred tradition about burials with woollen clothes.
2.110	Darius intimidated by Egyptian priests.
2.148	Underground chambers in a labyrinth near Lake Moeris.
3.160	Darius held Zopyrus in high regard.
4.110–17	Story of Sauromatae.
4.192	Beasts of the country of the Libyan nomads.
5.105	Darius orders his servant to remind him of the Athenians after the burning of Sardis.
7.114	Xerxes' wife buries fourteen youths as a thank-offering to the god of the netherworld.
8.98	Persian messenger route.

F Greek Stories

1.59.3–4	Hippocrates rejects Chilon's advice.
1.82.8	Othryades kills himself after surviving a battle.
5.41.3	Some say that Cleombrotus and Leonidas were twins.
6.14	Samians are said to have fled from the battle of Lade.
6.44.3	Three hundred ships sank off Athos.
7.3	Demaratus goes to the court of Darius.
7.145.2	The power of Gelon is said to be great.
7.220	Leonidas is said to have dismissed certain Greeks at Thermopylae to spare their lives.

9.85	Tomb of Aeginetans.
9.95	Evenius was not the son of Deiphonus.
9.120.4	Site of the execution of Artayces.

G Xerxes in Greece

7.35	Xerxes brands the Hellespont.
7.55	Xerxes crosses the Hellespont last of all.
7.56.2	A man is said to have given a speech while watching Xerxes cross the Hellespont.
7.130	Xerxes is said to have commented on the Thessalians.
7.212	Xerxes is said to have leapt from the throne three times at the battle of Thermopylae in fear for his army.
8.88.2	Xerxes is said to have enquired about a ship in the battle of Salamis and to have been told that Artemisia had sunk a ship.
8.118.3–4	Xerxes is supposed to have suggested that the Persian nobles to themselves overboard.
9.82	Xerxes is said to have left his tent behind; he is captured by Pausanias at Plataea.

H Stories about Very Remote Regions

2.29	Meroe said to be the capital of Ethiopia.
3.98.1	(see *firsts, superlatives, and absolutes*)
3.99	Indians eat their friends.
3.115	Story about the Eridanus.
3.116	Arimaspians steal gold from griffins.
3.117	Persian king's control over Aces river.
4.26	Issedonians eat their dead.
5.9.1	Sigynnae live north of Thrace.

I Stories about the (Remote) Past

1.91	The Pythian replies to the messengers from Croesus.
4.178	Spartans told to found a colony on the island of Triton.
5.82	Olives once grew in Attica alone.
5.113.1	Courians said to be colonists from Argos.
7.129	Thessaly was once a lake.

LIST THREE CONFIDENT ASSERTIONS OF FIRST AND SUPERLATIVES (NO SOURCE CITATION)

A Includes the formula "of whom we know" (vel sim)

	Question	*Answer*
1.6	Who was the first non-Greek to subdue the Greeks?	Croesus of Lydia
1.14.2	Who was the first barbarian to make offerings at Delphi?	Midas of Lydia; Gyges was second
1.23.1	Who was the first to write, name, and choreograph the dithyramb?	Arion of Methymna
1.94	Who were the first to strike gold and silver coins?	The Lydians
1.142.1	Who lives in the places most blessed with an ideal climate?	The Ionians
1.178.2	What is the most lavishly adorned city?	Babylon
1.193.2	What place produces the finest crops of grain?	Babylon
2.68.2	Which animal grows most from first emergence to adulthood?	The crocodile
3.60.3	Where is the largest temple?	On Samos
3.94.2	Which country has the largest population?	India
3.98.2	Which nation lives furthest to the east?	The Indians
3.122.2	Who was the first Greek to hold a sea empire?	Polycrates of Samos (unless, perhaps, Minos of Crete)
4.42.2	Who first showed that Africa was circumnavigable?	Pharaoh Neco of Egypt
4.46.2	Which people are responsible for the wisest contrivance?	The Scythians
4.48.1	What is the largest river?	The Danube
4.58	Where would you find grass most likely to produce colic in animals?	In Scythia

	Question	*Answer*
4.152	Which Greek generated the most profitable cargo from trade with barbarians?	Laodamas of Aegina (Colaeus, in a Samian vessel, was second)
4.183.4	Which people have the swiftest runners?	The Ethiopians
4.184.1	Who are the only people who do not assign individual names?	The Atarentes
5.199.2	Who are the only people to sacrifice to Zeus of Armies?	The Carians
6.21.1	Which two cities were the closest in ties of friendship?	Miletus and Sybaris
6.112.3	Who were the first Greeks to charge the enemy at the double?	The Athenians at Marathon
7.20.2	What was the greatest invasionary force ever?	Xerxes' when he invaded Greece in 480
7.170.3	What was the greatest Greek military disaster in terms of numbers killed?	The defeat of the Tarentines and Rhegians by the colonies from Hyria
8.105	Who exacted the most severe revenge on an enemy?	Hermotimus of Pedasus
8.124.3	Who was the only man to be given an official escort of honour by the Spartans?	Themistocles of Athens
9.37.2	Who performed the most courageous deed?	Hegesistratus of Elis
9.64.1	Who won the finest victory of all? Where?	Pausanias of Sparta At Plataea

B Introduced by the formula "to the extent of our knowledge" (vel sim)

	Question	*Answer*
4.17.2	Does anyone live north of the Neuri?	No
4.18.2	Or north of the cannibals who live north of the Scythians?	No

	Question	*Answer*
4.20.2	Or beyond the black-cloaked Scythians?	No
4.197.2	Do the occupants of Libya number more than four races?	No
7.111.1	Have the Thracian Satrae ever been subjugated?	No

LIST FOUR NAMED SOURCE CITATIONS

1.1–5	Legendary beginnings of the Persian War (Greeks, Persians, Phoenicians) (3).[17]
1.20	Construction of temple of Athena near Miletus (Delphians, Milesians) (2).
1.23–24	Story of Arion (Corinthians, Lesbians) (2).
1.51.3	Claim the bowl to be the work of Theodorus of Samos (Delphians).
1.65	Lycurgus introduced the Spartan constitution from Crete (Lacedaemonians).
1.70	Mixing bowl's disappearance; for a conjecture of what some would have said, see end of 1.70 (Lacedaemonians, Samians) (2).
1.75.3, 6	Diversion of the Halys river (Greeks).
1.87.1	Story of Croesus' rescue from the pyre (Lydians).
1.94	Invention of games; colonization of Tyrrhenia (Lydians).
1.105.3	Temple of Aphrodite on Cyprus founded from Syria (Cyprians).
1.105.4	Scythian impotence (Scythians).
1.122.3, 95.1	Birth of Cyrus (Persians).
1.137.2	Say a man cannot murder his own father (Persians).
1.171	Claim to be autochthonous (Carians, Cretans) (2).
1.172.1	Claim to have come from Crete (Caunians).
1.174.5	Received oracle at time of Persian conquest (Cnideans).
1.182	Zeus has intercourse with a woman in a temple (Egyptians).

17. Numbers in parentheses indicate multiple source citations supporting a particular piece of information.

1.182–83	Zeus himself visits their temple; description of temple statue (Chaldaeans).
1.191.6	Story of the capture of Babylon (Babylonians).
1.216.1	Custom wrongly ascribed to the Scythians by the Greeks; Herodotus denies this (Greeks).
2.2.2	Psammetichus' experiment (Egyptian priests and priests of Hephaestus at Memphis).
2.2.5	Psammetichus' experiment—violent version (Greeks).
2.3.1	Confirm impressions of 2.2.2 above (Theban and Heliopolitan priests) (2).
2.10.1	Geological origins of Egypt (Egyptian priests).
2.16.1–17.2	Geographical theory about the earth (Ionians).
2.18	Oracle confirms Herodotus' opinion about Egypt (Ammonians).
2.20.1	Flooding of the Nile (some [three] Greeks) (3).
2.28.1	Sources of the Nile (Egyptians).
2.32.1–3	Sources of the Nile (Cyreneans).
2.43	Egyptians deny knowledge of Heracles (Egyptians).
2.44	Temple of Heracles founded at the time of the foundation of Tyre (Phoenicians priests).
2.45	Greek story of Heracles in Egypt (Greeks).
2.52.1	Pelasgians get the names of their gods from the oracle at Dodona (Dodona).
2.54–57	Account of the origin of Dodona (Theban priests).
2.55	Priestesses on the origins of their oracles (Dodona).
2.60.3	Festival at Bubastis is described (Bubastis, in Egypt).
2.63.3	Description of a mock battle at an Egyptian feast (Egyptians).
2.73.1	Phoenix comes to Egypt when its father dies; once every five hundred years (Heliopolitans, Egyptians).
2.75	Snake skeletons (Arabians, Egyptians) (2).
2.86–89	Egyptian rules and practices regarding embalming; not named, but epichoric and implicitly Egyptian (Egyptians).
2.91	Claim that Perseus came from their city (Chemmites) (2).
2.99–142	History of Egypt (Egyptian priests).
2.104	Origins of Colchians in Sesostris' army (Colchians, Egyptians) (2).
2.111–20	Story of Helen in Egypt (Egyptians: priests).

2.125.6	Description of an inscription on the pyramid of Cheops (interpreter: Egyptians).
2.130.2	Statues of Mycerinus' concubines (Egyptian [saitic] priests).
2.134.1	Rhodopis built the pyramid of Mycerinus (some Greeks).
2.143	Hecataeus is used as a source for the genealogies. (use not clear) (Hecataeus).
2.143	Hecataeus and 345 generations of Egyptian history (Egyptian priests).
2.145	On the origins of the gods (Egyptians).
2.146.2	Birth of Dionysus; includes 2.144 and 2.146.2 (Greeks).
2.148.5	Claim that subterranean chambers under the lake at Moeris are the tombs of kings (Egyptians).
2.150.1–2	Subterranean passage extending from a lake to Libyan Syrtis (Egyptians).
2.154.4–182.2	Source for later Egyptian history (Greeks).
2.156.2	Egyptians clam that Chemmis floats (Egyptians).
3.1–2	Story of Princess Nititus (Egyptians, Persians) (2).
3.8.3	Cut their hair like Dionysus (Arabians).
3.10.3	Uniqueness of rain in Thebes (Thebans) (2).
3.12	Heaps of skulls (Egyptians).
3.14.11	Story of Croesus and Persians regarding Psammetichus' answer (Egyptians).
3.16.3	Views on fire contrasted with the views of the Egyptians (Persians).
3.16.7	Amasis' precautions against abuse by Cambyses (Egyptians).
3.18	Description of the Table of the Sun (Cambyses' scouts: Persians).
3.26.2	Persian expedition destroyed by violent wind (Ammonians).
3.29–30.1	Cambyses violates Apis because of insanity (Egyptians).
3.30.3	Egyptian version of Smerdis' murder (Egyptians).
3.47.1	Different reasons for sending an army to Samos (Lacedaemonians, Samians) (2).
3.55.2	Describes grandfather's involvement in fighting on Samos (Archias).
3.86–87	Two versions of the groom's trick (Persians).
3.105.1	Ants collect gold (Persians).
3.108.1	Snake skeletons (Arabians).

3.110–11	Cinnamon obtained from the land where Dionysus was born; Arabians seem to give a secondary report (Arabians).
4.2.1	Slave blinding and milking mares (Scythians).
4.5–13	Three versions of their origins (Scythians, Greeks in Pontus, Greeks and barbarians alike) (3).
4.14	Disappearance of Aristeas (Cyzecaenes, Proconnessians).
4.15.1	Tradition concerning Aristeas (Metapontines).
4.25.1	Accounts of fabulous people beyond their own territory (Bald Men).
4.27	One-eyed men (Arimaspians) live north of the Issedones (Scythians).
4.30.2	No mules, owing to curse (Eleans).
4.33.1	Describe offerings from the Hyperboreans and how they are delivered (Delians).
4.42.4	Claim to have circumnavigated Africa; also refers to material in 7.89.2 (Phoenicians).
4.43.1	Carthaginian statement about the extent of Satapes' voyage (Carthaginians).
4.45.3	Greeks disagree with Lydians over the origin of the name of Asia (Greeks).
4.45.3	Claim that Asia was named after Asises, who gave his name to Asiad clan near Sardis (Lydians).
4.67	Aphrodite gave divination (hermaphroditic Enarees).
4.76.5	Deny any knowledge of Anacharsis (Scythians).
4.76.6	Information about the family of Anacharsis (Tymnes, a Scythian).
4.77	Anacharsis makes a favourable remark about the Spartans (Peloponnesians).
4.78.3	Claim to have come from Miletus (Borysthenites).
4.81.4	Bronze vessel and arrowheads (Scythians).
4.85.1	Planctae's location (Greeks).
4.90.1	Tearos river possesses healing powers (Thracians).
4.95	Salmoxis' trick (Greeks around Hellespont and Pontus).
4.103	Taurians sacrifice shipwrecked people to the "Virgin" (Scythians).
4.105.2	One of the Neuri turns into a wolf once a year (Greeks, Scythians) (2).
4.145–56	Cyrenean settlement by Therean colonists (Cyreneans, Lacedaemonians, Thereans) (3).

4.173	Account of the disappearance of the Psylli (Libyans).
4.180	Festival of Aphrodite (Ausees).
4.184.3	Say that they have a mountain called the Pillar of Heaven (Atlantes).
4.187	Cauterizing children's heads and treatment with goat urine (Libyans).
4.191.11	Claim descent from Troy (Maxyes).
4.191.4	Fabulous creatures from beyond the River Triton (Libyans).
4.195–96	Panning for gold with feathers; trade beyond Gibraltar (Carthaginians).
5.9	Claim to be colonists from Media (Sigynnae).
5.10	Claim that the north is infested with bees (Thracians).
5.13.2	Claim to be colonists from Troy (Paeonians).
5.22.1	Descendants of Perdiccas are Greek (Macedonians).
5.44	Dispute over how Sybaris was captured (Crotoniats, Sybarites) (2).
5.49.1	Aristagoras comes to Sparta with a map (Lacedaemonians).
5.57.1	Claim to originate from Eretria (Gephyraeans).
5.63.1	Delphic oracle bribed (Athenians).
5.83–90	Feud between Aeginetans and Athenians (Aeginetans, Athenians, and Argives) (3).
6.52–53	Version of the origin of the dual kingship (Lacedaemonians, Greeks) (2).
6.54	Persians claim descent from Perseus; Perseus was an Assyrian (Persians).
6.75.3	Cleomenes' madness (Argives, Lacedaemonians, Greeks, and Athenians) (4).
6.84	Various accounts of Cleomenes' madness (Argives, Lacedaemonians) (2).
6.98.1	Earthquake of Delos (first) (Delians).
6.105.1	Pheidippides meets Pan in the Parthenian hills (Athenians).
6.117.3	Epizelus sees vision during battle of Marathon (Epizelus, an Athenian).
6.127.3	Give hospitality to the Dioscuri (Arcadians).
6.134.1	Story of Miltiades' attack on Paros (Greeks, Parians) (2).
6.137	Drove the Pelasgians away justly (Athenians, Hecataeus) (2).

7.12	Confirm Xerxes, dream (Persians).
7.62.1	Changed name from Arians to Medes after Medea (Medes).
7.73	The Phrygians crossed over from Macedonia to Asia (Macedonians).
7.75.2	Crossed over to Europe from Asia (Bithynians).
7.89.2	Used to dwell near the Red Sea (Phoenicians).
7.90	Tribes came from Salamis, Athens, Arcadia, Cythnus, Phoenicia, and Ethiopia (Cyprians).
7.94–95.1	Ionians and Aeolians were originally Pelasgians (Greeks).
7.129	Poseidon makes a rift between Olympus and Ossa (Thessalians).
7.137.1	Gods delayed vengeance for the murder of ambassadors (Lacedaemonians).
7.150.1, 151	Alleged betrayal of Greece by the Argives (Argives, some Greeks) (2).
7.153.4	Story of Telines (Sicilians).
7.166–67.1	Death of Hamilcar (Carthaginians [Phoenicians], Sicilians) (2).
7.171	Depopulation of Crete and origin of Carians (Cretans).
7.176.3	Hot springs called "the pots" (Thermopylaeans).
7.189	Boreas helped the Athenians at Artemesium (Athenians).
7.189.1	Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, was Boreas' wife (Greeks).
7.197	Story about Athanes and Phrixus (Achaeans).
7.201	Names of Thermopylae (Greeks, Thermopylaeans) (2).
8.38–39.1	Miracle at Delphi (Delphians).
8.41	Story about the snake that guards the Acropolis (Athenians).
8.55	Mythical story of spring and olive tree (Athenians).
8.65.6	Portent connected with the battle of Salamis (Dicaeus).
8.84.2	Athenians and Aeginetans make rival claims to have begun the battle of Salamis (Aeginetans, Athenians) (2).
8.94.4	Adimantus at Salamis (Athenians, Corinthians, Greeks) (3).
8.120	Xerxes removed his girdle here (Abderites).
8.129.2	Claim unique flood tide (Pallenians).

8.135	Oracle of Ptoan Apollo speaks in Carian to Mys (Thebans).
8.138.2–3	Phrygians crossed over from Macedonia (Macedonians).
9.16.1	Persian banquet at Thebes full of foreboding (Thersander of Orchomenus).
9.73	Tyndaridae helped to recover Helen from Theseus by the Deceleans (Athenians).
9.120.1	Miracle proclaims the end of Artayctes (Chersonnesians).

APPENDIX 2

To mē mythōdes: Narrative Subdivisions in Thucydides

Thucydides did not narrate the Peloponnesian War in story form, but broke it down into years, and the years in turn into summers and winters.[1] As a consequence, campaigns of more than one year's duration had to be subdivided into segments, with each part narrated in its appropriate season. It was argued above (pp.190–98) that the seasonal "chronology" was suitable for memorization according to ancient systems of place memory. In point of fact, it does not follow the place-memory system rigidly, but adapts it by making the seasons the "places" that must be established in the mind preparatory to storing the details of each season. To put it another way, imagine the Archidamian War as a grid (Fig. 3) of twenty squares. Each pair of squares is a year numbered sequentially, and each square represents a season. The mnemonist must now fix this grid in the mind and then begin to put the main events of each season into the appropriate square. Properly done, this process will facilitate either total recall of the events that have been selected for memorization or a random-access recall of an individual event. If a single event is needed, the mind simply follows the procedures as outlined by Aristotle (*DM* 451b–52a) or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (XVII–XVIII; 30–1) and scans the years and seasons sequentially until the event is found.

1. For the years, see second essay above, n169. For the seasons, see 2.2.1; 2.32–33.1; 2.47.2; 2.69.1; 2.71.1; 2.93.1; 3.11; 3.18.5; 3.26.1; 3.87.1; 3.89.1; 3.103.1; 4.1.1; 4.50.1; 4.52.1; 4.89.1; 4.117.1; 4.134.1; 5.1.1; 5.20.1; 5.36.1; 5.40.1; 5.52.1; 5.56.1; 5.57.1; 5.76.1; 5.82.1; 5.84.1; 5.116.1; 6.8.1; 6.63.1; 6.94.1; 7.10; 7.19.1; 8.2.1; 8.7.1; 8.29.1; 8.61.1.



Fig. 3. Thucydides' Grid for the Archidamian War. Each square in the grid represents a season and corresponds to a "place" in the memory in which events of the season can be stored for retrieval.

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According to ancient mnemonics, this system will work if each segment to be memorized is clearly marked off with a label (*sēma*). I argued above that the years are "labelled" in the simplest possible way, by number, and the main annual subdivisions in a very natural way, by season. But what of the episodic subdivisions within each season? They too were identified by formulaic tags (see below), and before a detailed discussion of their significance is begun, it will be useful to lay out one or two concepts on which the present study hinges.

First, as Aristotle said (450a–51b), memory is not so much of the events themselves as of experiences. We remember how events affect us and reconstruct each event from the memory of its effects. Now, it is also clear from ancient mnemonic theory that a large number of items can only be recollected if they are organized according to an easily remembered sequence. Therefore, in the case of a number of historical

experiences, what is the appropriate order for purposes of memorization? The answer that suggests itself is "experiential order": the events should be remembered in the order in which they were experienced. However, acceptance of this proposal leads to some interesting questions. It will be shown below that the order in which events are experienced is not necessarily the same as the order of occurrence. The reason is that experiences must happen to someone, or a group of people, in a given place, and the events of the Peloponnesian War were located in many places distant from each other. One does not experience events in distant places until the news of them has arrived, and in the ancient world this could take time. Distance, therefore, can have the effect of dislocating an event from its strict chronological order. What would Thucydides do with distant information? This question leads to some related ones. Where was Thucydides located in relation to the events? Did he receive useful clues as to the exact chronological position of an event in its season as part of the news of it? If not, what did he then do when he narrated it? What would he do if the answer for some events was yes, but for others no? Firm answers to all these questions are difficult to find, but a detailed examination of the arrangement of the segments in a great number of his seasons will give rise to some interesting suggestions.

The segments are in fact fairly easy to identify. Most of the time (but not always) when Thucydides wishes to change the scene from one location to another within a season, he begins a new paragraph with a sentence that includes an expression such as "in the same summer (winter)" or "at about the same time" and then proceeds with a description of the goings-on in the new locality (or, occasionally, localities). In some cases, the order is inevitable, in consequence of natural sequence. The segment may include a specific indication of the chronological relationship of the new segment to the foregoing, such as "in the same summer, a little later" or "in autumn," where, presumably, we are being told that the new events are later in the summer season than all previously narrated ones for that summer. In these cases, I am not going to question whether Thucydides has actually got the chronology right. I take it that he has specific reason for believing that he can so order the events in relationship to each other, and that view will suffice for the purposes of my argument. The question is, In those cases where two or more events are narrated side by side with no specific indication of a chronological relationship to one another, is there any other discernible pattern of arrangement or does Thucydides simply give them in random order?

When the chronological relationship of events is not known or specified, how are the narrative segments arranged?

It is apparent that information about the Archidamian War came to Thucydides from a variety of places, some as near as Athens itself and some as far away as Corcyra and Sicily. I assume for argument's sake that he was based in Athens at least until 424, when he was exiled.[2] The first question to ask is, To what extent does distance distort the narrated sequence? To illustrate the point of my question consider the diagram in Figure 4. I have taken three recorded supernovae (exploding stars). One was observed in China in 1054, and the other two (in 1572 and 1604) by European scientists, all with the unaided eye; the telescope had not yet been invented. Their dates are 1054, 1572, and 1604 therefore, but that is not when they occurred. In my diagram I have assigned them imaginary distances from earth. For purposes of argument, I have placed the 1604 explosion in deep space 200 million light years from earth. So the light, bringing the "news" of the explosion, took that long to get here. The light from the 1572 explosion took 100 million imaginary years to arrive, and the earliest one, from 1054, will have taken place only 75 million years before that date. Once allowance is made for these distances, the actual order of the explosions in absolute time is the exact opposite of the order in which they are recorded in experienced time.

To return to Thucydides: speaking of his method of recording events discernible in book 8, Andrewes says, "it appears that his method was to write out in full literary form the reports he received, soon after receipt of them and without waiting for the fuller information he could be sure of getting later" (*HCT* 5.382). If that is so, then distance could arguably effect a chronological dislocation of events for Thucydides, similar to my imaginary chronology for the supernovae, unless he rearranged the events when further information came in. If we imagine him at home in

2. I am unable to accept Canfora's suggestion that Thucydides was not exiled and that references to exile in his work are self-references by the editor, Xenophon. First, this would not be characteristic of Xenophon, who excludes all self-references from his own work. Second, if Canfora is right, I think we would have to believe that he has added all the other references to Thucydides that occur at the end of each year (see second essay above, n169). Thus the annual chronology would be more Xenophon's creation than Thucydides'. But the chronology is simply not an editorial addition to Thucydides' history. Moreover, it would be odd to see Xenophon force something onto Thucydides' work that he would all but abandon in his own continuation of it. Cf. Canfora, "L'historien Thucydides n'a jamais été éxilé."



Fig. 4. Three Supernovae. The supernovae were real; fictional distances from Earth are assigned to illustrate the argument.

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Athens during the Archidamian War, how did news concerning the progress of the Sicilian campaign come to him? He does not provide this information, but there is an interesting story from the later attack on Syracuse recorded in book 7 (8–10). There he tells us that Nicias decided to send a letter back to the Athenians informing them of how badly things were going. He adds the further remark that Nicias had often (*pollakis*) sent newsletters back to the Athenians in the past (7.8.1), and this comment suggests an important way whereby information came to Athens, particularly during the Archidamian War. Of even greater interest, Thucydides leaves no doubt that the message under consideration was sent before the end of summer and that it arrived and was read to the Athenians at some unspecified time after the beginning of winter (7.10). A glance at the table covering the Archidamian War provides an opportunity to look there for specific instances of possible dislocation caused by delays in the transmission of information (Table 5).

As a general rule, ancient wars were fought in the summer more than in winter. This was especially true in the case of naval warfare. It was advisable to protect the wooden vessels of antiquity from winter storms.

Table 5
Narrative Subdivisions of the Archidamian War

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
YEAR ONE				
Spring	1	2.2.1	Thebes attacks Plataea	(chr)
	2	{ 2.26.1	30 ships to Locris and Euboea	(p2)
	3	2.27.1	Expulsion of Aeginetans	(p2)
	4	2.28	Solar eclipse	(na)
	5	2.29.1	Pises of Thrace	(p4)
	6	2.31.1	Athenians invade Megarid (autumn)	(chr)
	7	2.32	Fortification of Atalantē	(chr)
Winter	1	2.33.1	Corinthian expedition to Astacus	(p3)
	2	2.34.1	Funeral Oration	(p1)
YEAR TWO				
Summer	1	2.47.2	Invasion; plague	(chr)
	2	2.58.1	Hagnon attacks Potidaea	(p2)
	3	2.66.1	Spartan expedition to Zakynthus	(p3)
	4	{ 2.67.1	Aristeas to Persia	(p3)
	5	{ 2.68.1	Ambraciots to Amphilochian Argos	(p4)
Winter	1	2.69.1	Phormio to Naupactus	(p2)
	2	2.70.1	Potidaea capitulates	(p4)
YEAR THREE				
Summer	1	2.71.1	Peloponnesians invade Plataea, not Attica	(p1)

Table 5
Narrative Subdivisions of the Archidamian War *(Continued)*

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
	2	2.79.1	Athenian expedition to Thrace	(p2)
	3	2.80.1	Spartan expedition to Acarnania	(chr)
Winter	1	{ 2.93	Spartan attempt on Piraeus	(pl)
	2	{ 2.95.1	Sitalces attacks Perdiccas	(p4)
YEAR FOUR				
Summer	1	3.1.1	Invasion, Mytilenaean revolt	(chr)
	2	3.7.1	Athenian, Periplous, Mytilenaean ambassadors in Sparta	(chr)
	3	3.18.1	Mytilenaean attack on Methymna	(chr)
Winter	1	3.20.5	Some Plataeans escape	(chr)
	2	3.25.1	Salaethus goes to Mytilene	(chr)
YEAR FIVE				
Summer	1	3.26.1	42 Spartan ships to Mytilene Invasion, surrender of Mytilene	(chr p1)
	2	{ 3.51.1	Nicias takes Minoa	(p2)
	3	{ 3.52.1	Plataea falls (p1 or 3); Corcyrean civil war	(p4)
	4	3.86.1	20 Athenian ships to Sicily	(chr)
Winter	1	3.87.1	Plague renewed in Athens	(p1)
	2	3.88.1	Operation off Lipari islands	(disp., p2)
YEAR SIX				
Summer	1	3.89.1	Earthquakes; no invasion	(p1)

Table 5
Narrative Subdivisions of the Archidamian War *(Continued)*

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
	2	3.90.1	Sundry actions in Sicily	(Sic. disp.)
	3	3.91.1	30 Athenian ships around Peloponnese	(p2)
	4	3.92.1	Spartan colony to Heraclea	(p3)
	5	3.94.1	News from Peloponnese	(Pel. disp.)
	6	3.99.1	News from Sicily	(Sic. disp.)
	7	3.100.1	Operations around Naupactus	(Pel. disp.)
Winter	1	3.103.1	Operations in Sicily	(Sic. disp.)
	2	3.104.1	Athenian purification of Delos	(p2)
	3	3.105.1	Demosthenes in Ambracia	(Pel. disp.)
	4	3.115.1	Operations in Sicily	(Sic. disp.)
	5	3.116.1	Lava flow from Aetna	(Sic. disp.)
YEAR SEVEN				
Summer	1	{ 4.1.1	Syracusans capture Messina	(Sic. disp. chr/p4)
	2	{ 4.2.1	Invasion; 40 Athenian ships to Sicily; seizure of Pylos	(p1,2)
	3	{ 4.42.1	Athenian invasion of Corinth	(p2)
	4	{ 4.46.1	Athenians in Pylos; end of Corcyrean civil war	(Pel. disp.)
	5	4.49.1	Athenian Seizure of Anactorium	(chr)
Winter	1	4.50.1	Athenian capture of Persian ambassadors at Eion	(p2)
	2	4.51	Athenian pressure on Chios	(p2)

Table 5
Narrative Subdivisions of the Archidamian War *(Continued)*

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
YEAR EIGHT				
Summer	1	4.52.1	Mytilenaean exiles take Antandrus	(chr)
	2	4.53.1	Nicias takes Cythera; Athenians seize Thyrea	(chr)
	3	4.58.1	Peace in Sicily	(Sic. disp.)
	4	{ 4.66.1	Athenian attempt on Megara	(chr)
	5	{ 4.70	Brasidas blocks 4 (above)	(chr)
	6	4.75.1	Athenians retake Antandrus	(chr)
	7	{ 4.76.1	Athenian attempts to provoke Boeotian revolutions	(p2)
	8	{ 4.78.1	Brasidas goes to Thrace	(p3)
	9	4.84.1	Brasidas at Acanthus	(chr)
Winter	1	4.89.1	Delium (p1); Demosthenes at Sicyon	(Chr,p2)
			Sitalces dies (p4)	(chr)
	2	4.102.1	Brasidas takes Amphipolis	(p3.4)
	3	4.109.1	Megarians recapture long walls	(p3.3)
			Brasidas in Thrace	(p3.4)
YEAR NINE				
Summer	1	{ 4.117.1	One-year armistice	(p1, p3)
	2	{ 4.120.1	Brasidas takes Scione	(p3.4)
	3	4.123.1	Brasidas and Perdiccas in Lyncus	(chr)
	4	4.129.1	Athens recaptures Mende	(chr)
	5	4.133.1	Thebans take down walls of Thespiae	(pr)
	6	4.133.2	Chrysis burns down temple Argos	(?)

Table 5
Narrative Subdivisions of the Archidamian War *(Continued)*

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
	7	4.133.4	Athenians complete walls around Scione	(chr)
Winter	1	4.134.1	Battle between Tegea and Mantinea	(chr)
	2	4.135.1	Brasidas' attempt on Potidaea	(chr)
YEAR TEN				
Summer	1	5.1.1	Cleon goes to Thrace	(chr)
	2	{ 5.3.6	Boeotians capture Athenian fort	(p1)
	3	{ 5.4.1	Phaeax goes on embassy to Italy	(p2)
	4	5.12	Spartan force to Thrace	(chr)
Winter	1	5.13.1	Spartans return from Thrace	(chr)
	2	5.20	Peace of Nicias	(chr)

{ shows two items indicated as contemporaneous by Thucydides.
shows two items in a segment indicated as contemporaneous.
{ invasion = invasion of Attica.
(chr) = segment is in chronological order, as indicated by Thuc. or *clearly required* by the narrative.
(p1), (p2), etc. = priority one or two, etc., of contemporaneous or indeterminate segments, when more than one event is included in a segment; the priority within the segment is so indicated after each item. The priorities are explained in the text.
(p3.3) = Peloponnesian initiative in a Peloponnesian locality to distinguish it from a similar initiative in a distant locality (= p3.4).
(Pel. disp.) = dispatch from force (or forces) operating around Peloponnese or to the north of it.
(Sic. disp.) = dispatch from force operating in Sicily.

Tables 5 and 6 do show a general tendency for fewer of Thucydides' items to appear in the winter, but counting the number of entries for each season would be a bit misleading. First, one must remember that "summer" included spring and autumn, thus making "winter" a considerably shorter period of time. But, second, one should look more closely at the number of sections of text taken up by each season. The numbers recorded in the tables illustrate something that becomes immediately evident from Thucydides' text: for most winters the historian had far less to report than for the average summer. One striking exception is the winter of year six, which is full of activity, but all of it at some considerable distance from Athens. How much of this fighting actually took place in the summer, but only became known in Athens when it was reported to the Athenians in dispatches that arrived the following winter?

No clear answer can be given, of course, but it is worth noticing that the greater the distance from Athens, the greater the likelihood that the fighting will be recorded in winter rather than summer, the more normal time for campaigning. If we discount the eruption of Aetna (3.116.1), there are seven reports from Sicily, three of which fall in winter. By contrast, there are five reports from around the Peloponnese and the western side of the peninsula, but only one (3.105.1) is placed in winter. To be sure, some of these events may be correctly placed in "absolute time." The operation in the Lipari islands (3.88.1) is explained as having taken place in winter because there was not sufficient water there during the summer. Presumably, this explanation came in with the report and served to locate it correctly in absolute time. As for Demosthenes' campaign in Ambracia (3.105–15), there is no reason why it could not have been fought in winter as Thucydides places it, but two details do look a little peculiar for a winter campaign. There is an Athenian fleet of twenty ships that "happens to be around the Peloponnese" (5.105.3). It is sent for and sails northward past the Gulf of Corinth to the Ambracian Gulf. This is a long winter voyage in open water—not impossible, of course, but a bit surprising. Second, in the course of the critical battle, Demosthenes places four hundred men in ambush "in a hollow way, overgrown with bushes" (3.107.3). To provide effective cover for four hundred men, the bushes must still have retained their leaves. So perhaps the campaign occurred in late summer, but was reported in Athens the following winter, where Thucydides has placed it in his narrative.

In this connection, the last two items in table 5 identified as "Sicilian dispatches" deserve attention (4.1.1, 58.1). I take them in reverse order.

The peace settlement in Sicily is narrated in 4.58–65. It continues uninterrupted through a speech given by Hermocrates to conclude with the exile of two of the unsuccessful generals after their return to Athens. Now the speech of Hermocrates cannot have taken place immediately prior to the exile of the Athenian generals. Time must be allowed for the conclusion of the agreement, the dismissal of the Athenians, their homeward journey, and their subsequent trial. The following suggestion seems unavoidable. The entire episode is anchored to the moment in Athenian time when the generals were tried and convicted. It must have been the generals themselves who brought home the information about the settlement, and Thucydides has narrated Hermocrates' speech at the time when it became news in Athens. A glance at table 5 shows that it had been more than a year since news had been reported from Sicily. This is surprising because before 4.1, reports had been much more frequent. A glance at the previous piece of Sicilian news (4.1) reveals a possible reason for the long delay. This item deals with the Syracusan occupation of Messina, which is said to have occurred "about the time of the swelling of the grain" (4.1.1). Now if this was a piece of chronological information that came in with the story, it could explain a lot of things.

First, the report is in a slightly unusual place because until the eighth year, when invasions stopped, Thucydides normally begins each summer by telling us whether or not the Peloponnesians invaded Attica before he turns to other things. Item 3.26.1 is an instructive exception (see Table 5)—instructive because in this case the sending of the ships to Mytilene and the invasion are related as part of a two-pronged strategy to give the Athenians trouble on two fronts. The very slight departure from the usual narrative order (a single sentence precedes the invasion) connects with the events of the previous summer and winter, with the Mytilenaeans in Sparta pressing for assistance. In other words, the relatively minor change in narrative procedure is smooth and natural looking. By contrast, the opening of book 4 looks awkward. After the capture of Messina "as the grain was swelling," the invasion of Attica is reported "just before the grain was ripe" (4.2.1). In other words, at just about exactly the same time. Thucydides' more normal expression is "at the same time," *vel sim.*

It is tempting to suggest that he began year eight with the summer invasion and was proceeding normally until the news came in from Sicily with its own chronological information included, and he simply attached it to the beginning of the year, out of news order but in its correct

place chronologically. This interpretation could explain the two remaining peculiarities. The capture of Messina follows closely on the heels of two or three other reports from Sicily narrated in the previous winter: sundry activities (3.103), more sundry activities (3.115), and eruption of Aetna (3.116), which brings book 3 to a close. Thus 4.1 is not only puzzlingly close to a flood of information just in from Sicily, but it is uncomfortably distant from the peace settlement, news of which must have arrived with the generals (4.58–65). If the items in 3.103 and 115–6 are in news order, 4.1 is in chronological order, and 4.58–65 is in news order, everything is explained. None of this is conclusive, but it does make a closer look at the remaining narrative segments seem worthwhile. Are there further clues to the principles (if any) underlying their arrangement?

To recapitulate a little, Thucydides declares that he has narrated the war "in order" (*hexēs*), and this is generally assumed to mean in chronological order.[3] Of course, the years are kept in sequence, as are the seasons. So, unmistakably, the major divisions are chronological. When the seasons are subdivided, the order of the subdivisions tends to be chronological also, but in some cases the sequence is not made clear, and in others there is a positive indication that two or more segments occurred at about the same time. In the cases in which the chronology is not known or not made explicit, Thucydides could have (1) left the entries in random order; (2) put them in chronological order as far as possible and left the reader to assume that that had been done; or (3) introduced or reflected a second set of priorities that might not necessarily adhere to strict chronology.

Table 5 suggests that the third of these options was the choice. For the Archidamian War the priorities appear to have been (1) something that happened to (or in) Athens; (2) (an) Athenian initiative(s); (3) (a) Spartan initiative(s) (other than the invasion of Attica); and (4) anything elsewhere (Table 5). Towards the end of the Archidamian War, things become a little chaotic because of sustained operations around the Peloponnese and in northwest Greece, as well as in Sicily. The narra-

3. See 2.1; 5.26.1, where he records the explanatory "as each thing happened." The crux is, Does this mean "in the precise order of their occurrence in time" or "in the order of his learning about them"? One answer puts Thucydides among nineteenth- and twentieth-century correspondence historians; the other places him in an ancient, oral community. For a sketch of the long debate over how Thucydides defined his seasons, see Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 324–26, and add Pritchett, "Thucydides' statement on his chronology."

tive segments read like dispatches from the two fronts, which they probably are. So the arrangement of thirteen out of fourteen of the chronologically uncertain narrative segments of the Archidamian War is explained by one assumption: they are in "news" order. Each segment is preserved in the order in which someone living in Athens would have become aware of it as news. By all appearances, this sequence was violated in only one case, and that is the postponement of Pericles' magnificent Funeral Oration to the end of the first winter. The effect is to place it as closely as possible to its grim contrast, the plague narrative.

After the Peace of Nicias, the war was supposed to be over, but Thucydides eventually came to the belief that it was not. He called the ten years' war before the peace "the Attic war" (5.28.2), and perhaps he at first expected that the renewed hostilities would become the Argive war, or at least the war for control over north-central Peloponnese, since Argos or the Peloponnese now tentatively becomes the focal point of his narrative (Table 6). The new priorities for contemporaneous segments, or ones of indeterminate chronological relationship, are (A) something that happens to (or in) Argos or the Peloponnese; (B) (an) Argive or Spartan initiative(s); (C) (an) Athenian initiative(s); and (D) something elsewhere. These priorities are followed in only the majority of cases (eight out of ten), and where they are abandoned, no reason is immediately evident. The part of book 5 in which they occur has often been regarded as one of the least polished parts of Thucydides' history (*HCT* 5.361–83). So perhaps he would have indicated more precise chronological relationships of the segments in a finished version or rearranged them more uniformly. A tradition recorded by Marcellinus (24) put Thucydides in Aegina during these years, and perhaps it is correct. Thucydides does say that he had occasion to contact Peloponnesian informants while in exile (5.25.6), but it would be hasty to read a sojourn in the Peloponnese or, say, Argos into these new, but somewhat unstable-looking, prioities. Nonetheless, the story about Chrysis burning down her temple suggests communication with Argive informants on an unprecedented scale after 423.

With year twenty, Thucydides turns to the aftermath of the Sicilian catastrophe. Table 7 is confined to the winter of that year and the ensuing, unfinished summer of year twenty-one. Signs of disorder abound. For the first time a season runs to eleven segments, and the summer of the twenty-first year already had ten when Thucydides suddenly stopped. There is no longer the same tidy little sparring match between two powers. A fleet comes from Italy (Ital) and the Persians get involved (Pers).

Table 6
Narrative Subdivisions of the Peace Period down to the Sicilian Campaign

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
YEAR ELEVEN				
Summer	1	5.27.1	Argos' attempt to seize Peloponnesian hegemony	(PA)
	2	5.32.1	Athens takes Scione; restores Delians	(PC)
			War between Plocis and Locris (PD)	(chr?)
	3	5.33.1	Spartans to Arcadia	(chr?/PB)
	4	5.34.1	General return of Spartans	(PA)
	5	5.35.1	Dians take Thyssus	(PD)
Winter	1	5.36.1	Shift in Spartan policy	(PA)
	2	5.39.1	Olynthians take Myceberna (PD)	(chr?)
			Spartan alliance with Boeotia (PB)	
YEAR TWELVE				
Summer	1	5.40.1	Talks between Sparta and Argos fail	(PA)
	2	5.42.1	Spartans snubbed by Thebans	(PB)
			Athenian-Argive alliance	(PA/C)
Winter	1	5.51.1	Occupants defeated at Heraclea	
YEAR THIRTEEN				
Summer	1	5.52.1	Spartans expelled from Heraclea	(chr)
	2	5.52.1	Alcibades in northern Peloponnese	(chr)
	3	5.53.1	War between Epidaurus and Argos	(PA)

Table 6
Narrative Subdivisions of the Peace Period down to the Sicilian Campaign *(Continued)*

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
	4	{ 5.54.1	Spartans to Leuctra	(PB)
			Argives invade Epidaurus	
Winter	1	5.56.1	Spartan garrison to Epidaurus	(PA)
			Athenians install Messenians in Pylos	(PC)
	2	5.56.4	Fighting between Argos and Epidaurus	(PA/B)
YEAR FOURTEEN				
Summer	1	5.57.1	Battle of Mantinea	
Winter	1	5.76.1	Spartan-Argive alliance Athenian evacuation of epidaurus	(chr)
YEAR FIFTEEN				
Summer	1	5.82.1	Revolt of Dium in Athos (PD); Argive democracy restored (PA)	
Winter	1	5.83.1	Spartans destroy Argive long walls	(PA)
	2	5.83.4	Athenians blockade Macedonia	(PC)
YEAR SIXTEEN				
Summer	1	5.84.1	Alcibiades takes 300 pro-Spartans from Argos; Melian debate; siege	(chr)
	2	5.115.1	Skirmishes near Phlious, Pylos, and Melos	(chr)
Winter	1	{ 5.116.1	Abortive Spartan invasion of Argos	(PA/B)
	2	{ 5.116.2	Melos surrenders	(PC)

Table 6
Narrative Subdivisions of the Peace Period down to the Sicilian Campaign *(Continued)*

No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
3	6.1.1	Athenians plan attack on Sicily; investigators to Egesta; Sicilian history	(chr/PC)
4	6.7.1	Spartans ravage small part of Argolid	(PB)
		Athenians respond; also raid Perdiccas' territory	(PC.D)

(chr?/PA) = chronological (?) with relation to the preceding segment; priority A in relation to what follows.
(PA/C) = elements of priorities A and C.
(PC.D) = C priority in a remote area by contrast with preceding item.

Table 7
Narrative Subdivisions of Year Twenty (Winter) and Year Twenty-one (Summer, Incomplete)

	No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
YEAR TWENTY				
Winter	1	8.29.1	Dispute over Tissaphernes' payment to Peloponnesian fleet	(Pers, 3, B)
	2	8.30.1	Athenians at Samos (2b, Cb)	(chr?)
			} Spartan fleet supports Chios	(3, B)
	3	{ 8.34.1	Athenians encounter Chian fleet	(chr)
	4	8.35.1	Hippocrates to Cnidus	(chr?, 3, B)
	5	8.36.1	Astyochus to Miletus	(3, B)
			Revised Persian agreement	(Pers)
	6	8.38.1	Athenians fortify Delphinium	(chr)
	7	8.39.1	Antisthenes from Sparta	(3, B)
	8	{ 8.40.1	Chians try to link up with Astyochus	(Ion)
	9	{ 8.41.1	Astyochus to Cnidus	(3, B)
			Plans for oligarchic coup in Athens	(1a, Ca)
	10	8.57.1	New Persian agreement	(chr)
	11	8.60.1	Boeotians take Oropus	(chr)
YEAR TWENTY-ONE				
Summer	1	8.61.1	Dercylidas to Hellespont	(3, B)
	2	{ 8.63.1	Chians' position improves	(Ion)
	3	{ 8.63.2	Overthrow of democracy	(chr, backtrack)
	4	{ 8.73.1	Events on Samos	(2b, Cb)
	5	8.80.1	Peloponnesian approach to Pharnabazus (3, B);	(chr)

Table 7
Narrative Subdivisions of Year Twenty (Winter) and Year Twenty-one (Summer, Incomplete) *(Continued)*

No.	*Reference*	*Description*	
		recall of Alcibiades;	(2b, Cb)
		oligarchs approach Athenians at Samos	(2a, Ca)
6	8.87.1	Tissaphernes to Aspendus;	(Pers)
		modifications to Athenian defences;	(2a, Ca)
7	8.91.2	Italian fleet to Peloponnese	(Ital)
8	8.99.1	Athenian victory at Cynossema;	(2b, Cb)
9		Athenians recover Cyzicus	
10	8.108.1	Alcibiades to Samos 2b, Cb); Peloponnesian fleet to Hellespont (3, B); Arsacus driven from Antandrus (4, D); Tissaphernes to Hellespont	(Pers)

(Pers, 3, B) = Persian subject or initiative; "priority" would have been 3 in table 5 or B in table 6.
a = Athens as subject.
b = "Athens" on Samos as subject.
Ion = Ionian subject or initiative.
Ital = Italian subject or initiative.

Initiatives now come from Chios in Ionia (Ion). The order is primarily chronological, except that there is a flashback in the account of the oligarchic revolution. When the chronological sequence is in doubt, the old priorities (1–4) of the Archidamian War and the newer, more tentative ones of the peace period (A–D) do not seem to hold. Both are represented in table 7, but no order is evident. Finally, "Athens" is no longer a single place, since the fleet becomes stationed permanently on Samos. Initiatives from Athens itself are represented in table 7 by *a*, and *b* is used for the Athenians on Samos, while 2 and C represent the priorities of tables 5 and 6 respectively, as in 2a, Ca, 2b, Cb, and so on.

It will be noticed that I have not produced tables for books 6 and 7. My analysis of these books convinced me that there was nothing to be gained from doing so. They cover the Sicilian war episode and follow the story pattern (*mythōdes*) far more than the rest of the history. The Sicilian adventure is memorable on its own and is written up by Thucydides with great vividness; witness, for example, the description of the fight in the great harbour quoted at length at the end of the first essay above. The chaos of book 8 is a stark contrast. It could perhaps be explained by imagining Thucydides near his mining interests in Thrace receiving reports from widely scattered places but finding no order in them.

Traditional criticism has paid little attention to these seasonal subdivisions. In his famous commentary, Gomme did remark on their effect. For him, Thucydides breaks the narrative into seasons because he wants to keep careful record of the chronological development of the war. Of course, Gomme believed that this alleged concern over chronological accuracy was laudable, but the inevitable disassociation of parts of a prolonged campaign was found to be annoying by Dionysius. In the Archidamian War, Demosthenes' campaigns around Naupactus and Sicyon, the battle of Delium, and Brasidas' northward march are described in such a disjointed way that possible strategic interconnections between these manoeuvres become matters of conjecture.[4]

But this is to criticize an ancient historian in terms of modern expectations. What was Thucydides trying to accomplish when he laboured on his magnificent opus? Perhaps he has left a clue for us in his own

4. Discussions of the seasonal chronology, mostly by Gomme, can be found in *HCT* 1.2–8; 2.1; 3.540, and note especially 546 in connection with my argument; see also the tables in 3.716–21 (preceded by a lengthy discussion in 699–715) and 5.445–53; finally the comment on 5.20 in 3.682–87.

pages. In 1.23.1–3 Thucydides justifies the greatness of his topic by referring to the length of the war (for which he had to argue in 5.26) and to the many *pathēmata* (experiences, disasters) that occurred in it. Gomme thinks that his reference to natural disasters in 3 is a concession to popular opinion, and perhaps it is. But we should not allow this rationalization to conceal the evident fact that Thucydides saw the war as a *pathos mega* (a great suffering) for all of Greece. Now, if the conclusions that I draw from my tables are correct, he wavered between noting the order of events in "absolute time" and in "experienced time" or "news order." In other words, he records the war partly as a sequence of events to be described as they happened and partly as a series of experiences gathered from a specific vantage point and arranged as *pathēmata* to be remembered in the order of experience rather than of absolute time.

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